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Abstract
This thesis analyses Islamic reform as a social process interwoven with 
apprenticeship, work and learning in shipyards in the port of Mandvi in western 
India. Those owning shipyards and the ships built in them are engaged in active 
campaigns of Islamic reform and proselytisation in the town that are intimately 
related to trade routes and their experiences overseas, especially in the ports of the 
Gulf States. Assuming that religious reform movements are defined by what they 
oppose as well as by what they represent the thesis presents an analysis of rhetorical, 
daily and occasionally violent opposition to Hindus and other Muslims in an 
ethnographic exploration of David Hume’s ‘flux and reflux’ hypothesis. These 
oppositions it is argued are products of the historically contextualised biographies of 
those who patronise the reform process, rather than a random expression of religious 
identity. The thesis contrasts the social organisation and economic engagements of 
ship owners with Hindus and other Muslims in order to demonstrate the socially 
meaningful nature of communal antagonism in the process of religious reform. This 
exercise is conducted through an exploration of varying conceptions of ethnicity, 
race, social segmentation, migration, nationalism and diaspora. The ethnography of 
shipbuilding, skill acquisition and hierarchy, in the workplace demonstrates that 
apprenticeship and the division of labour that surrounds it reproduce a reformed 
social and religious order. This involves a discussion of issues that relate local 
Islamic social and ideological practices to wider geographical and doctrinal 
perspectives. Throughout the thesis runs a concern with the role of charismatic 
leaders and their constituents which, it is concluded, points to the fact that Islamic 
reform movements more generally contain within them the potential to reproduce the 
same social and religious orders they oppose.
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used in Kachchh runs approximately 56/57 years ahead of Gregorian 
calendar.
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Orthography and transliteration
The principal languages in this thesis are Gujarati and Kachchhi. Gujarati is an Indo- 
Aryan language (L.S.I. Vol. IX. Part 11:322-377) spoken by some fifty-five million 
people worldwide. It has four principal dialects: Pani, Surati, Charotari and 
Kathiawadi, with a fifth major variant spoken by the Parsis. A standard written form 
is used in government schools and in literature. In Kachchh the lingua franca for the 
majority is Kachchhi -  a distinct language, but classified by the Linguistic Survey of 
India as a ‘Sindhi dialect’ and part of the ‘North Western’ groups of the Indo-Aryan 
languages (L.S.I. Vol. VIII. Part 1:183-206). Kachchhi has no formal script and 
where Kachchhi words are used they appear in transliterated Gujarati form. Both of 
these languages use many loanwords in their spoken forms from Arabic, Swahili, 
Hindi, Urdu, Sindhi and English. The etymology of such words is ignored in the 
glossary; these words are transliterated as they popularly appear in Gujarati. 
Technical words, especially those associated with religion and social organisation, 
are derived primarily from the classical languages of Arabic and Sanskrit. In such 
instances the simplest form has been provided in the text, which remains closer to the 
colloquial use, but is elaborated in the glossary. For example, the apostrophe 
commonly used in transcribing Arabic as in jama9 at and Isma ’ili has been dropped to 
leave jamat and Ismaili. Words common to Indological literature, works on 
Hinduism and Islam, and the names of persons, places, communities and religious 
movements appear in non-italicised anglicised form. For example, ‘Kachchh’ is 
consistently used -  although this word also appears as Cutch, Kachh, Kutch and 
Kacchh in quotation. Likewise, when English words exist for indigenous categories 
and concepts such as Shia, Sunni and Haj the English version has been used. 
Generally, throughout the text priority has been given to the way words sound rather 
than to the conventions of Sanskrit orthography. In the glossary a diacritical version 
of most terms is given. The glossary is primarily intended as an aid to the reader. It 
includes only those words that appear several times in the text.
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Glossary of selected terms
abru - honour, reputation, character, dignity.
adat - (commonly elsewhere adab) - knowledgeable discrimination, correct order, 
behaviour, taste, refinement, respect. 
amgreji - English.
aql (akal) - reason, reasoning, intelligence; mental faculty of the soul that dictates 
the higher levels of human potential for knowledge and discretion. 
atak - lineage.
avtar - incarnation of a deity (especially Vishnu).
bahen - sister. 
banavatl- counterfeit.
barakat (commonly elsewhere baraka) - blessing, holiness, spiritual power, 
abundance of wealth or power; charisma. 
bava - a colloquial term of respect for Rajputs, Saiyeds, and rulers more generally. 
bhal- literally ‘brother’; as a suffix to a proper name it connotes respect; a general 
term is used to describe men of the same religious or social community. 
bhakti - devotion; attitude of loving devotion to a deity; refers to a trend in 
mainstream Hinduism that emphasises such devotion. 
biradan - lineage.
camdra (vams) - moon (those descended from the Rajput house of the moon).
dada - a popular style of political and social power, which evokes images of a
masculine, assertive local strongman, acting through a multitude of local, self- 
made networks of loyalists, and not through institutionalised action and 
discourse.
darbar- (cf. English ‘durbar’) an audience - chamber; a reception or levee; a court;
the body of officials of a court; a door of admittance. 
dargah - literally ‘court’; the seat of spiritual authority represented by the shrines and 
tombs of Saiyeds. 
dariyachoro - literally ‘son of the sea’; a colloquial name for Kharvas. 
dariyadil - literally ‘one with a heart as wide as the ocean’; a generous patron. 
dariyani bhasa - literally ‘the language of the sea’; a dialect peculiar to those 
merchants and sailors associated with the sea. 
darsan - vision, sight of deity or image. 
desi- literally ‘of the country or region’; local, rustic. 
desl vahan - literally ‘country craft’; a wooden ship; a generic dhow. 
dev - god. 
devl - goddess. 
devlputra - son of a devl. 
dharma - religious and moral duty; righteousness.
divan - revenue official; and sometimes in a derived sense, the head of a shrine.
gadl - throne, dais or seat of authority at the Durbar and at a shrine. 
gamdum - dirty.
gnan (jnan) - knowledge.
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hadls - the body of traditions about Mohammed, supplementary to the Koran. 
havell - mansion, heavenly abode; the central place of worship of the Pushti Marga. 
hijra - the flight of Mohammed from Mecca to Medina in AD 622 from which is 
dated the Muslim era. 
himsa - literally ‘killing’ and hence violence (opposite, ahimsa).
imam - the officer who leads the devotions in a mosque; a title for various Muslim 
potentates, founders, and leaders.
jamat- literally ‘brotherhood’; the dominant form of social organisation found 
among Muslims referring to population and communal institutions. 
jati - kind, type; ‘caste’.
jihad - ‘struggle’, in the sense of personal struggle with temptation and in terms of 
promulgation of Islam to non-believers. 
jism - body.
kacbo - tortoise. 
kam - work. 
khalasi- sailor. 
kharab - bad.
kuldevi, kuldevta - lineage goddess, lineage god.
kulpir - saintly figure presiding over the interests of a particular lineage or caste. This 
term conflates what appears in the present as the language of Hindus and 
Muslims: kul (kul) being a term associated with Hindu lineages and the term 
p irbeing associated with Muslim ‘saints’.
lohl - blood.
mahajan -  illustrious man, assembly of leading men, association. 
majur - labour. 
masjid - mosque.
mata - literally ‘mother’; the Goddess. 
mazar - the tomb of pir. 
mistri - craftsman, carpenter.
mufti - one qualified to give instruction and verdicts in Islamic law. 
murid - aspirant or novice, who undertakes complete obedience to a Saiyed or pir 
after initiation.
murasad - spiritual guide who acts as an instructor for his disciples; pir. 
musalman - Muslim.
nafs - the lower or ‘base’ faculty of the human soul responsible for human
interactions with the physical world and for some of his mental and emotional 
activities.
nagarseth - the apical formal or informal social position associated with Mahajan and 
mercantile social organisation. 
nakli - counterfeit.
namaz/namaj - the five daily ritual prayers of Muslims; salat, 
napak- literally ‘impure’; referring to moral, social, and ritual qualities of 
individuals and groups.
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nariyel - coconut.
nice - literally ‘low’; disreputable character.
nlsan - the flag and pole erected in the compound of a dargah which marks the kutub. 
nukh - cluster of lineages with an putative apical ancestor among whom inter­
marriage is forbidden.
pak- literally ‘pure’; referring to social, moral, and ritual qualities of individuals and 
groups. 
paliyo - hero stone
pir - ‘saint’; respectful name given to Saiyeds alive and dead; Saiyed lineage name; 
‘teacher’.
puja - worship, normally consisting of a series of offerings or services. 
purvaj - apical or common ancestor.
pusti - nourishment, strengthening, divine graces, hence pustimarga - the way of 
grace.
qutb (kutub) - the North Pole, the Pole Star; a centre around which anything 
revolves; the title given to the chief of an invisible hierarchy of mystics 
(commonly Saiyeds) of any age.
rav - king.
ray - a prefix for lineage names connoting royalty.
sahedl- testimony, the religious and civil statement of faith of Muslims. 
sariyat- Islamic law; the totality of the exoteric revelation of Islam. 
sakti - power, energy.
salat - Muslim ritual prayer performed five times daily.
samaj - society, community; collectively, the society’s members and institutions. 
sambamdhl - relationship.
sarum - good; a positive evaluation of the moral qualities of individuals and groups. 
seth - a term associated with a successful commercial character; a patron and
important respected male figure; one who controls the labour and loyalty of 
their clients.
seva - service, charity; a specific term for worship in the Pushti Marga that entails 
devotion to images of Krishna. 
sirk - polytheism.
s iya -  Shia, collective name for the segments of Islamic thought that recognise Ali 
and his descendants as the true imams. 
sufi - various Muslim orders that aspire to a state of union with God through mystical 
contemplation; more generally a Muslim mystic. 
surma - traditional root of Muslim law, based on biographical stories about the 
Prophet.
sunnl - adherents to the sunna, the teachings and beliefs of orthodox Muslims. 
surya (vams) - sun (those descended from the Rajput house of the sun).
tajiya - the mock shrines made during Moharam to mark the martyrdom and death of 
Hussein, Hussan, and Ali. 
trisul/trisul - trident, associated with the iconography of Shiva.
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vahan - ship vahanvata (cf. vahanvatl i.e. sailor) - all those associated with ships - 
sailors, merchants, and others - who together form a specific kind of social 
hierarchy.
vams - line of descent specifically associated with divisions among mythological 
Rajputs that finds a general use in the present for claims to a particular origin. 
varna - the four theoretical classes of Hindu society Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaishya, 
and Shudra. 
vatan - homeland. 
videsl- foreigner, outsider.
yatra - journey, pilgrimage.
zakat (jakat) - charity, alms giving - as one of the sunnl ‘five pillars of faith’. 
zikar (jikar) - recollection of God, often through the repetition of specified formulae.
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Introduction
On any monsoon day in the Rukhmavuti estuary there are as many as sixty wooden 
ships beached at precarious angles in the mud. To the west of the estuary lies the 
walled town of Mandvi. Old and beautiful, the town’s narrow streets are lined with 
once-fine houses built with commercial money during the nineteenth century. Many 
of them are boarded up, their owners now living overseas. The town’s bazaars are 
busy with people from the countryside, but the days are gone when the merchant 
fleet brought foreign wealth to Mandvi docks. To the east of the river, behind the 
shipyards, is the village of Salaya (Plates 1 and 2). Those who live in the village own 
the ships lying in the estuary and have built the new mosques, minarets and grand 
houses visible along water’s edge with profits recently derived from sea-borne trade.
The first time I ventured along the Salaya riverbank, I was commanded in 
Bombay English to join a huddle of men overseeing the work that was going on in 
the mud below them. One man asked me what I was doing. Rather hastily I told him 
that I was interested in shipbuilding and had come to study its techniques and history. 
He said something that I did not understand, but which made the other men laugh. 
Looking up at an even larger man, he asked me if I had a cigarette. I offered him a 
cigarette and light, but he refused the light and gestured for me to walk to the 
opposite side of the ship. There, out of the view of his father, we lit up.
I took the opportunity to ask the man, who turned out to be called Rafiq, a few 
questions about the ship. It had been overhauled and they were trying to get it back 
into the water before the sailing season started. I asked him what the sailing season 
was. He told me that for three months the seas and the wind were too strong for the 
ships so they came back to Kachchh, adding that in a month Salaya would be empty 
when the men returned to sea (Plate 3). Cigarette finished, we rejoined the white clad 
‘big men’ who were shouting at a man who stood closer to the ship, who in turn 
relayed instructions to those who were knee deep in mud fastening oil barrels to the 
underside of the hull to reduce the ship’s draft on the next tide.
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I was introduced to the Rafiq’s father, who offered a disinterested hand with his 
‘salam aliekhum\ I perplexed them by asking in Gujarati which language they were 
speaking, ‘dariyani Kachchhi’ (sea Kachchhi) they replied. Rafiq asked, for the 
benefit of the assembled, a series of questions about what I was doing, where I came 
from and whom I worked for. I had come to study shipbuilding, I was from England 
and I was a student, so, in a technical sense, I did not work for anyone. Throughout 
my interview they continued to wave instructions to those working around the ship. 
Ominously, I was asked: “Who knows that you are here?” and “Who will come 
looking for you if you disappear?” I felt threatened and did not imagine that reciting 
the names of my university professors was going to impress them. Fortuitously, I told 
them that my father would come and this seemed to please them, but they were 
clearly suspicious of me.
A few days later, I retraced my steps over the bridge and along the eastern 
riverbank. This time the ship was skewed at an awkward angle in the mud. It had 
been caught in the monsoon floodwaters. The labourers were attempting to secure it 
to prevent it from being washed out to sea in another deluge. In the absence of his 
father, Rafiq offered me a cigarette. We smoked the same brand. He was twenty- 
nine, had four brothers, his father had built the mosque we could see in Salaya, and 
his grandfather had built a second one that we could not see because it was obscured 
by a ship. That was his house, the big green and white one right on the water’s edge. 
He had been to university in Bombay to study commerce. He was Muslim and 
prayed five times a day. He was Bhadala. He was Pathan. His father and uncle had 
been to Mecca. His father owned two ships. He was responsible for the ship by 
which we stood, but he did not actually go to sea because he managed the business 
with his father. His older brother was the captain of another ship laying some way 
off. It was nearly a year later that I learned he was married and had three children.
The afternoon passed. The labourers left for Mandvi as night set in. We climbed a 
ladder to board the ship. I cautiously pulled myself over the side and onto the
17
decking. He was talking as he walked with utter ease along the gunnel (significantly 
less that a foot wide). This ship was small, but the drop to the riverbed was still 
around five metres. Over the next twenty-three months I became increasingly 
familiar with moving around ships, but I never felt confident enough to walk the 
gunnels. The call to prayer came drifting into the estuary from Salaya.
After he had prayed, we sat on the quarterdeck. He whistled shrilly into the dark. 
Some minutes later a wet and muddy boy came with a pot of black tea and two steel 
bowls. The boy addressed the man as seth and then crouched silently on the floor. He 
waited until we had finished and disappeared with the empty vessels. Alone again, 
Rafiq said that I could ask him whatever I wanted about ships and building ships, but 
there were some questions that I could not ask. He was willing to teach me the 
language and techniques of shipbuilding when he had time, but I was not to ask 
about money or business. At that time I wanted to know what lseths\ ‘Bhadalas’ and 
‘Pathans’ were. I was confused. He seemed to be all three, but the questions turned 
out not to be tautological. A seth is an owner of a ship, an owner of labour, and a 
patron. He said that he, his father, and brothers were seths to the sailors on their ships 
and to anyone else in Salaya who did not own a ship. He explained to me that the 
Muslims who live in Salaya are all called Bhadala. The Bhadala used to be sailors, 
but have ‘moved up’ to own their own ships. He gestured towards Mandvi and said: 
“Those Hindu people who live over there used to do this business, but it belongs to 
us now ...”
He grew distracted and said: “Where is that fucking night-watchman? What do I 
pay him for? To sit at home and chew his cock?” It was dark and he had to go. He 
had still not told me what Pathans were. I was nervous in his company, but I asked 
him again anyway. In the glow of the paraffin lamp illuminating the quarterdeck his 
face crinkled with pained exasperation. He said: “Pathans are a famous and noble 
people. Our homelands were in Afghanistan, but we wandered around seeing 
different places. We ruled India before your people came.” I did not see him again 
for ten months because he spent the year in Bombay managing his family’s offices.
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When I set off to Kachchh I had a clear picture of what I wanted to research and 
how I wanted to do it. I was interested in skill, learning and representation of 
technology in the shipbuilding yards. I was interested in ‘praxis’, ‘embodied 
knowledge’ and how non-linguistic tradition and bodily techniques were conveyed 
between men of different levels of experience. Having laboured on and off for ten 
months in shipyards I have experienced these processes and could describe them, but 
this is not how men who work in shipyards conceive of what they do. It slowly 
became apparent that the things I had thought were important for apprentices 
working in shipyards were, for them, literally immaterial and practically 
inconsequential. They learned and prioritised another set of ‘things’ that we broadly 
call social relations, and they specifically call vahaanvatta (seafaring), which gives 
apprentices a particular ‘way of being in the world’. And, although hierarchy within 
the vahaanvatta (sing, vahaanvatti) reflects skill and knowledge, the kinds of skills 
and knowledge given priority are those of a social and religious kind, rather than 
those of a particularly technical nature. What makes the vahaanvatta hierarchy is 
discussed at length in chapters 5 and 6. For now it is sufficient to say that as a form 
of sociality it is divisive and hierarchical and that its premises often contradict the 
prior social knowledge of apprentices. Thus the thesis I have produced, based on 
fieldwork conducted between August 1997 and May 1999, focuses more on 
apprenticeships in social relations than it does on how to deftly handle an adze or 
decipher the life expectancy of a piece of wood from the density of its grain.
The Bhadala build ships for their fleets in the yards along the Salaya riverbank. In 
business, as in their village, they emphasise the Muslim part of their identity. A 
central part of becoming and being vahaanvatti means adopting the form of Islam 
advocated by the Bhadala ship owners. Apprenticeship engenders a healthy 
knowledge of a ship’s constituent parts, however a greater emphasis is placed upon 
learning social and religious propriety. The young men who go to work in Bhadala 
shipyards do so to become sailors and not to become shipbuilders. This unusual form 
of apprenticeship generates constituencies of clients for Bhadala patrons. In this way,
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apprentices are encouraged into particular kinds of social antagonism and 
conceptions of space, hierarchy and morality, all of which are expressed in religious 
reform.
The argument presented in this thesis is that the content, direction and oppositions 
inherent in Islamic reform are largely informed by the life experiences of those who 
patronise it, and as different groups rise to power there is a ‘flux and reflux’ (Hume 
1998) of religious tradition. The ways in which biography and reform are related are 
examined through the lives of aspiring sailors who are apprenticed into the particular 
antagonisms of their new employers. Chapter I introduces Kachchh and Mandvi and 
some historical background to the population diaspora that has profoundly marked 
the region. It is argued that the diaspora was the dominant process in defining present 
social relations and antagonisms. A brief introduction to the types of relationships 
that Bhadalas have with other Muslims and Hindus is given against the backdrop of 
Indian Ocean trade, religious violence and the precedents of Islamic orthodoxy.
Chapter 2 examines the social tensions generated by a tradition of international 
trade from a Rajput kingdom and provides a history of the present that determines 
the identity of those to whom the Islamic reformers are opposed. Throughout the 
previous century the ethnography of peninsular Gujarat (Kachchh and Saurashtra) 
repeatedly points to a structural social opposition between traditional rulers and 
traders of the region. This division is underpinned by differentiated patterns of 
residence, political and economic propriety, transactional preference, lifestyle and 
history. Through a critical appraisal of this literature, and in light of recent work on 
the role of ritual and political transaction in the formation of caste relations, this 
chapter questions the validity of such a distinction. In contrast to the established 
model the chapter presents the ethnography and ethno-history of a powerful caste of 
Kachchhi traders, who dominated commerce and the prestigious social life in many 
of the port towns of peninsular Gujarat throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The social, religious and philanthropic activities of these traders do not fit 
with the traditional model of dualistic sociality or its various elaborations concerning
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conceptions of individuality, ritual exclusivity and constituency building though 
maximal or minimal transaction. This ethnographic evidence suggests that there is no 
analytically sustainable division between rulers and traders taking conventional 
sociological measurements as a benchmark. The alternative model presented divides 
the population in to categories of endogenic and exogenic tendency. The endogenic 
is exemplified by kingship, the ritual boundary of the kingdom and self-generating 
power. In contrast, traders and their allies draw on conceptions of power and wealth 
exogenously (from outside the kingdom). This material begins to point to the 
significant divisions in Kachchhi society through which religious and communal 
antagonisms, and travel and wealth are understood.
Following on from this, Chapter 3 examines social organisation among Muslims 
in Mandvi, from where the majority of the apprentices in Bhadala shipyards are 
drawn. The argument presented is that Muslims in the town are hierarchically 
ordered by perceptions of blood purity, which is related to distinct values attributed 
to various lands of the littoral Indian Ocean. This is explored through an analysis of 
ideologies of ‘origin’ and kinship. The material presented describes the social origins 
of apprentices and the conceptions of hierarchy and social propriety that they have 
before they cross the river to work in the Bhadala shipyards. Apical figures in this 
hierarchy are Saiyeds, putative descendants of the Prophet, who are seen as having 
extra-human powers that allow them to mediate between human and divine realms. 
The Bhadala, as mixed bloods, are of low rank in the eyes of Mandvi’s Muslims. Part 
of the social apprenticeship described in chapters 5 and 6 is a denial of the hierarchy 
prevailing in Mandvi and a condemnation of the activities and status ascribed to 
Saiyeds.
Having contextualised the relationship between Bhadalas and Mandvi’s Muslims, 
Chapter 4 describes Bhadala relations with Hindus. In the past the Bhadala crewed 
the fleets of Muslim merchants, while Hindu sailors crewed the fleets of Hindu 
merchants. This commonality has been swept away by differing patterns of migration 
between Hindu and Muslim merchants and by the different construction of patron-
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client relationships between Hindus and Muslims. This context is given as a way of 
explaining the Bhadala rise to power and the tensions that have emerged from it. The 
argument presented is that accordingly Hindu sailors and the Bhadala have different 
conceptions of the past, which is evident in both the rhetoric of Hindu nationalism 
and in the Bhadalas attempts at religious and social reform.
Chapters 5 and 6 concentrate on the ethnography of apprenticeship in shipyards. 
Chapter 5 describes and analyses work in the shipyards and the ways in which it is 
understood within the context of social hierarchy. This involves a discussion and 
evaluation of skill and the techniques of labour. Chapter 6 follows on from this by 
looking, through the biography of sailors, at changing notions of religious propriety 
and social correctness among apprentices over a longer period of time. The lives, 
opinions and aspirations of experienced sailors are contrasted to neophytes in the 
shipyards. This chapter again returns to the oppositions inherent in Islamic reform 
this time from the perspective of work, language and rhetoric in the shipyards.
The concluding chapter looks at the role of commodity exchange and conceptions 
of learning among sailors and merchants as a way of explaining the success of the 
local manifestations of Islamic reform. Parallels are drawn between the material 
presented in previous chapters and the social processes evident in shipyards to point 
to the fact that although the religious reform movements of the Bhadala are opposed 
to the dominant social order they are in fact a product of it and have the potential to 
reproduce it.
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Chapter 1. 
Bhadalas and their ‘others’
1.1. Kachchh - Mandvi
Kachchh is a barren, archaic and remote land, the shape of which resembles an 
upturned tortoise. The diverse population includes nomadic herders, retired London 
shopkeepers and mariners. For centuries the only reliable way in and out of the 
region was by sea and the seafaring traditions spawned extensive commercial 
migrations from the region. As a result the population of around one million is at 
least matched again by the numbers of Kachchhis living in other parts of India and 
overseas. Before Kachchh became an area of strategic military importance it was 
isolated by the flat salty expanse of the Rann to the north and east. Today, although 
roads and rails run into Kachchh, there is no through traffic as it nestles against the 
closed international border shared with Pakistan.
Mandvi was the principal port for Kachchh throughout the nineteenth century; 
today it is a dwindling lighterage port, but home to an expanding fleet of deshi 
vahaan (wooden country craft) that plough the seaways of the western Indian Ocean. 
Some distance inland from Mandvi is the village of Riyan where backfill reveals an 
ancient quay. Artefacts from distant ports and dynasties are regularly uncovered in 
the dry soil and revealed here is a tradition in trade that post-dates Indus valley 
settlements, but precedes the current geomorphology and environmental conditions 
of Kachchh. This archaeological trace is mentioned because it points to the fact that 
western India has been cosmopolitan for millennia and that the social, architectural 
and religious fabric of the region has been constructed out of the exchange of 
population, trade goods and ideas.
There are over sixty deshi vahaan (from now on ships) registered with Mandvi’s 
port offices, the majority of which return to Kachchh for three months at the end of
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each season to shelter from the monsoon seas. During these summer months the 
population swells as the fleet’s 900 or so sailors, and many hundreds of labour and 
commercial migrants, return from abroad. Marriages, fights, football matches and 
religious congregations take place most intensely during this season. After Nava 
Naroj (New Year of the sea, falling in August) the population starts to thin out and 
with every high tide there are fewer ships in the estuary.
The archaeological remnants uncovered by the seasonal winds might tell of an 
ancient tradition, but the ships built along the river that separates Mandvi from 
Salaya are new in design and purpose. Built to hold large marine diesel engines, they 
carry cargoes of onions, bentonite (a clay mineral), cattle fodder, bamboo and an 
assortment of other items back and forth between India and the Persian Gulf. But the 
ships do not trade from Mandvi, which is merely home to the ship owners and 
sailors. Gone are the days when Kachchhi ships brought bullion, dates, cardamoms, 
ivory, pepper, silks, opium, slaves and currency from Zanzibar, Muscat, Rangoon 
and Malabar to Mandvi port. Most of the wealth reflected in the temples and havelis 
(mansions and religious buildings) of the past -  and in the mosques and houses of 
today -  has been derived from trade between lands other than Kachchh. Those who 
crew and manage ships are no more ‘traditional’ than the ships themselves because 
over the last century those known for conducting sea-borne commerce migrated and 
were replaced by the Bhadala who, along with a caste of Hindus known as Kharvas, 
had traditionally crewed Mandvi’s mercantile fleet. Over the previous two centuries 
the human geography of the town developed around the social organisation of 
shipping. The language and traditions of shipping are to be seen in all areas of social 
life and the caste iconography of the Hindu merchants and sailors is saturated with 
images of ships, reflecting their seafaring past, although today shipping is a Muslim 
business.
Nearly half a century ago, the historian L.F. Rushbrook Williams (1958:42) noted 
two mosques in Mandvi: the ‘Kajivali’ (built 1608) and the ‘Jami’ (built 1603). 
Despite the fact that there must have been at least six mosques in Mandvi in the
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1950s things have changed and in Salaya today brightly painted columns and domes 
rise from elaborate new mosques. The Bhadala used to live in Mandvi and some of 
the many derelict houses in an area of the town still called ‘Bhadala Pod’ remain 
registered in their names. The Bhadala moved across the river over the course of the 
last century and they are responsible for the new mosques and for the ships currently 
being constructed along the Salaya riverbank.
After his visit in the 1950s Rushbrook Williams lamented that Mandvi:
was a mere ghost of its former self. To see almost deserted shipyards, which in the days 
of Rao Godji (1760-1778) had built and kept in repair a fleet of four hundred vessels, 
including the famous ship which sailed to England and back (1760) was to wonder 
whether its ancient glories would ever return (1958:41).
Today, Mandvi’s shipyards are producing to their maximum capacity with a ship 
slowly rising from every possible piece of riverbank. Although ships are built on 
both sides of the river this thesis focuses on those that are built on the Salaya 
riverbank, a total of eleven shipyards in all. The Salaya shipyards are managed and 
financed by Bhadalas, who build ships for their own fleets and, through the 
production of this technology, also reproduce suitable crews for their ships. Chapters 
5-7 focus on the apprentices in these yards, who are not apprenticed to become 
shipbuilders but sailors. Typically, the first journey made by apprentices in Salaya’s 
shipyards is across the river from their homes in Mandvi, a journey repeated every 
working day for two or more years. The apprentice is slowly drawn into the patterns 
of work, hierarchy and status that prevail in shipyards and that differ importantly 
from his home environment in Mandvi. Only when his seth considers him to be 
suitably moulded is the apprentice allowed to make the longer journeys as a sailor to 
the ports of the Gulf.
The mobility of this population raises a series of technical problems for framing 
the ethnography. Although much of this thesis is devoted to describing work, 
hierarchy and skill in shipyards, a considerable amount of the material is informed by
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experienced sailors and ship owners for whom the boundaries of their social 
interactions are spread much wider. The material presented is rooted in a specific 
place, the river and the riverbanks, but the subjects of the study are constantly 
moving in and out of the field. This may involve a nightly absence as men leave 
work and return to their homes in either Mandvi or Salaya, or much longer absences 
as in the case of the Bhadala seth described in the Introduction. The knowledge, 
language, social propriety and materials that pass into shipyards are from diverse 
origins and conditioned by disparate historical processes. To a man who works on a 
ship, the neighbouring settlement to Mandvi is literally Bombay or Dubai and I think 
it fair to assume that many more men from both Mandvi and Salaya have been to 
Dubai than have been to Gujarat’s principal city, Ahmedabad.
As with much of littoral western India, the history of Mandvi is characterised by 
successive invasions of rulers, visitors, religious proselytisers and colonists, as well 
as by outpourings of population for trade and commercial migration. From the 
sixteenth century Mandvi was a departure point for Haj pilgrims bound for Mecca; 
and throughout the nineteenth and early half of the twentieth centuries it was the port 
of embarkation for migrants destined for Bombay. In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries vast numbers of Kachchhis migrated from Mandvi to East Africa, 
Zanzibar and Oman on the back of the expansion of both British and Omani empires. 
A significant node within the Indian Ocean and hinterland trade networks, Mandvi 
had a quay-side slave market and regular Arab trading partners. Its wealth and fame 
also attracted considerable numbers of migrants from the hinterlands and the 
resulting population is heterogeneous. Ancestral claims among Muslims variously 
trace descent from mercenaries, slaves, traders, warriors (including the armies of 
Alexander the Great), saints and the Prophet Mohammed.
With this in mind it is necessary to give some of the history that lies behind the 
nineteenth century Kachchh diaspora within the Indian Ocean. The century marked a 
new wave of migration from the region distinct from previous phases because of the
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British presence in the Indian Ocean and because the effects these migrations 
continue to have on the social organisation of the town.
1.2. Migration
The regions of Kachchh and Saurashtra were the origin points for the well-known 
pattern of migration to East Africa and later to England, Canada and elsewhere. The 
multiple connections between ports and populations continue to give Mandvi a 
somewhat peculiar cosmopolitan yet conservative atmosphere. Kachchhi merchants 
established satellite communities in many ports in the Indian Ocean, most notably 
along the East African coast between Madagascar and Zanzibar in the south and 
Aden and Muscat in the north. Most families who have been involved in commercial 
migration today have relatives in Tanzania, Kenya (Mangate 1969; and Pocock 
1957b), Oman (Allen 1978), United Arab Emirates (UAE), Britain (Tambs-Lyche 
1975,1980a, 1980b) and North America, and Kachchhis are also found in other 
Indian ports. These migrations did not simply involve leaving the homeland and 
taking up residence elsewhere for there is a constant flow of people between 
Kachchh and the satellite communities. There are important differences in these 
patterns between merchants and sailors and between Hindus and Muslims that are 
discussed in chapters 2-4. The contingency of these migrations is well illustrated by 
a small section of the Bhadala population, called Swali (a corruption of Swahili), 
who returned to Salaya after three generations had been bom in Tanzania. But the 
pattern of migration that has received the greatest attention in the Indian Ocean is the 
movement from India to East Africa. Data from Mandvi shows that these migrations 
were far more complicated than has typically been assumed and were (and continue 
to be) far from a uni-directional movement from the west of India to East Africa and 
then to Britain or Canada.
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1.21. Natural disasters
The migrations of the nineteenth century laid the foundations for the present social 
organisation of Mandvi. But how are we to account for this vast movement of 
people? The most obvious reason is the natural disasters that have affected Kachchh, 
forcing people to leave their lands or face starvation or disease. These factors 
‘pushed’ the population from the land. Locusts and drought visited Kachchh in 1811 
and 1812 (Camac 1819:296-303) and the resulting crop shortage reduced the 
population of Kachchh by half (G.B.P. Vol. V.:40). In 1813 Kachchh was infested 
with bubonic plague. In 1819 there was a serious outbreak of cholera (LeGrand 
1856:448) and the subsequent famine, pestilence and intestinal broils were cited as 
the reason why so many Kachchhis were appearing in Bombay (B.G. July 14th 1819). 
In 1819 a huge earthquake struck Kachchh, killing between 1,500 and 2,000 people 
(see below), while in 1823 it was reported that further crop failures and rumours of 
an immanent military invasion from the Sindh further reduced the population (G.B.P. 
Vol. V.:165). In 1824 there was drought and famine (Masselos 1996:29-32), and 
throughout the 1840s and 1850s there were yet more crop failures and pestilent 
visitations. In 1862 excess rain destroyed the harvest, and cholera once again struck 
in Mandvi in 1866 (G.B.P. Vol. V.:173). There was a widespread famine during 
1888-89 (see Masselos 1996:33-37), and epidemic plague between 1896 and 1905. 
So over the course of the century the series of disasters paved the way for the 
movement of the population.
Migrants were not only ‘pushed’, they were also ‘pulled’ by the rise of colonial 
Bombay and the potential profits of trade. Many of those who became ocean traders 
migrated from agricultural lands in northern Kachchh and started to trade in cotton. 
Kachchhis had long before established trading posts overseas and the existing 
networks of information and credit, along with the commonality of the Kachchhi 
language, allowed a rapid expansion of their activities. Kachchhi traders in the 
satellite communities acted as brokers for the passage, accommodation and 
employment of neophyte migrants from Kachchh (a nineteenth-century form of
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employment broker). From these humble origins the diaspora grew and grew, 
reaching its peak at the beginning of the twentieth century.
1.22. Demography
In the absence of precise migration data the population’s sex ratios and growth rate 
point to the scale and impact that the culture of migration has had. The ratio of men 
to women at an all-India level is 1,000:947 (Trivedi 1955), however, in Kachchh, 
from the mid-nineteenth century and possibly earlier the ratio is significantly 
weighted in favour of women.
Figure 1.1. The population of Mandvi by total and sex for the years 1872 -  1911 
(from G.B.P. Vol. V-13.:9).
Year 1872 1881 1891 1901 1911
Mandvi 35,988 35,980 38,155 21,683 24,235
Men 17,829 17,285 18,407 12,226 11,238
Women 18,159 18,695 19,748 12,457 12,997
Women to 
1,000 men
1,018 1,081 1,072 1,018 1,156
From 1872 to 1911 the mean ratio was 1,000:1,069. In the middle of the twentieth 
century the ratio was given as 1,000:1,079 (Trivedi 1955). In the absence of any 
other statistical data these figures indicate that there is a shortfall of one tenth in the 
expected numbers of men compared to the national average, which I would attribute 
to the high levels of male migration.
The second demographic indicator is the relative stability of the population size 
during a period when the Indian population has grown rapidly. The size of the town 
does not seem to have radically altered since the 1820s, when the population was 
estimated to be around 50,000 (MacMurdo 1820a:217). Between 1872 and 1911 the 
population of Mandvi declined by a third from 35,988 to 24,235. The present 
population of Mandvi barely exceeds the level of 1872 (see Figure 1.1.), while since
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then the population of India has multiplied six-fold. This incongruence is not a 
reflection of a lower birth rate but of the huge outpouring of people throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to the 1981 census the population of 
Mandvi was approximately 40,000, around 30% of which were Muslim. Mandvi is a 
‘kin centre’ (Mines 1983) that retains the loyalty and affection of the diasporic 
populations who return periodically. Thus the rates of migration for temporary and 
longer-term settlement overseas make the census figure somewhat meaningless 
because many families who have lived overseas for generations maintain property in 
the town and the number of people in the world who claim that Mandvi is their 
hometown is clearly many times higher than the census population.
1.23. The 1819 earthquake
The erratic rains, disease and pestilence that blighted Kachchh throughout the 
nineteenth century are all but forgotten in the way the region’s past is narrated today. 
These events, and the population flows that stemmed from them, are collapsed into a 
single event. James MacMurdo, then the political agent of Kachchh, was in Bhuj at
i t .
6.45pm on June 16 1819 when a massive earthquake hit the town. His various 
writings on this disaster have had a profound effect on the perception of the past in 
Kachchh. The earthquake destroyed houses, fortifications and temples, and killed 
upwards of 1,500 people. As MacMurdo wrote at the time: ‘There does not seem to 
exist even a tradition of an earthquake ... the natives therefore were perfect strangers 
to such a phenomenon and were terrified in proportion to their ignorance’
(1820b: 104). Fire was seen to burst forth from the land; dry creeks brimmed with 
water, wells overflowed and in numerous places spots of ground from twelve to 
twenty feet in diameter threw out red-coloured water to a considerable height, before 
subsiding into a slough (1820b: 103). Popularly, this earthquake is seen as the end of 
agricultural fertility in Kachchh and the start of the population movements. The 
seismic disruption is said to have formed the Allah Bundh (Allah’s dam) across an 
eastern arm of the Indus. The various names given to the ‘dam’ reflect the 
associations made between the devastation of the earthquake on the land of Kachchh
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and the similarly destructive presence of Muslims in the region for the Hindu 
population. In some accounts the unfortunate effects of the earthquake are seen as a 
direct result of the Muslim influence in the region. Importantly, the dam is said to 
have prevented the flow of fresh irrigation water into Kachchh, which turned the 
once fertile soil saline. MacMurdo’s insightful text is the basis for this story, but the 
account he actually provides is rather different:
This branch of the river Indus, or, as it may now with more properly be termed, inlet of 
the sea* (* It is many years since the eastern branch of the Indus has been deserted by 
the waters of the river), has since the earthquake deepened at the ford of Luckput to 
more than eighteen feet at low water; and on sounding the channel, it has been found to 
contain from four to twenty feet from the Cutch to the Sind shore, a distance of three or 
four miles. The Alibund has been damaged; a circumstance that has readmitted a 
navigation which has been closed for centuries (1820b: 104).
This account claims that the waters of the Indus had already stopped running 
through this channel, and that even if they did they would have mixed with the saline 
waters of the Rann before reaching Kachchh. Furthermore, the Alibund (not the 
Allah Bundh) was damaged rather than created. MacMurdo seems to have thought of 
this as a positive rather than a negative outcome. In short, the earthquake cannot have 
altered the supply of irrigation water to Kachchh in the way that it is popularly 
claimed. This does not, however, mean that the earthquake did not drastically alter 
the depth and distribution of ground water. The fact that the dam held responsible for 
the desertification of Kachchh is associated with Muslims is indicative of how past 
events are interpreted. The apocalyptic movements that developed after the 
earthquake placed blame variously at the feet of others. Today the story is told as a 
reflection of how damaging Muslims are to the land of Kachchh. This ‘history’ is 
taught in schools and often reprinted in local Hindu-owned newspapers and as with 
many other past events, the history of the earthquake is narrated with an explicitly 
communal moral.
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1.3. Hindu-Muslim relations in the past
It is demonstrated throughout this thesis that Islamic reform in shipyards is 
characterised by what it opposes as well as by what it represents. The remaining 
sections of this chapter introduce the underlying principles on which the Bhadalas’ 
opposition to Hindus and to other Muslims is based. The theme of communal 
relations is explored in the following sections before the discussion turns to examine 
the issues of travel, piety, charisma and behaviour, which variously create social 
schisms among Muslims.
Hindus commonly associate the earthquake with what they consider to be a 
further tragedy of Kachchhi history. The king, Rayadhanji (b.1764), converted to 
Islam in the 1780s under the influence of the Muslim fakir, Mohammed Saiyed. The 
ruling family in Kachchh were Jadeja Rajputs, worshippers of the Goddess (see 
Chapter 2), and part of a martial Hindu tradition that runs throughout western India. 
Rayadhanji’s adoption of Islam was a clear break with tradition. He began to roam 
the streets of Bhuj accompanied by a band of Pathan followers and demanded that 
everyone he met should profess Islam, regardless of their position or creed. Later he 
turned his attention towards Mandvi:
He first began by slaughtering animals in large numbers; he then announced his 
intention of smashing all the images in Rameshvar’s temple ... But he had 
underestimated the temper of the citizens of Mandvi. They collected in large numbers 
and attacked the Maharao and his Pathans so fiercely with stones, sticks and other 
improvised weapons that Rayadhan [here Rushbrook Williams drops the customary 
respectful ‘j i ’ suffix] had to ride for his life, while two of his followers were killed and a 
number were wounded (Rushbrook Williams 1958:170).
Most Hindus consider that Rayadhanji’s adoption of Islam a sign of insanity. How 
accurate accounts of this period are is difficult to ascertain, but both this event and 
MacMurdo’s account of the earthquake raise questions about the nature of 
relationships between Hindus and Muslims at the time. It is common to argue that
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before British colonialism elite Hindus and Muslims shared political interests and 
that the ‘masses’ were united in syncretistic culture. British rule is seen to have 
divided the interests of the population or, as Gayanendra Pandey suggests, the British 
looked on India with a communalist gaze, through which they interpreted social and 
political action (1990).
There are two further arguments to consider on this subject. First, that Muslims 
started to ask the British for preferential treatment in response to their sense of 
minoritisation through electoral politics and that this induced Hindus to mobilise for 
political action (Brass 1979). Secondly, that the development of political identity 
among Muslims in the late nineteenth century was a response to Hindu revivalism 
and an effect of the government policies, which were not aimed at setting Hindus 
against Muslims, but at reconciling them to British rule (Robinson 1997:84-132). 
Both of these arguments emphasise the divergence of politicised religious identities, 
which became communalised. However, if communal differences were forged during 
this period the assumption seems to be that people had different identities before and 
acquired new ones as a consequence of the conjoined influence of the political elite 
and the state (van der Veer 1994:30). This discussion is clearly a sensitive one 
among Indian historians who are keen not to provide material for the Hindu right 
(see C.A. Bayly 1998:44-45), and has implications for the material presented in this 
thesis. Today, the events of the past are narrated with explicitly communal 
attributions, which does not necessarily mean that they were understood as such at 
the time, but have been reinterpreted through changing religious and political 
saliences. For the elite communities of Kachchh, Hindu and Muslim, the nineteenth 
century saw them pass from relatively amorphous social conditions to clearly 
defined, quasi-legalistic groups opposed to religious ‘others’ (see Masselos 1978). 
However, as discussed below, there is some evidence to suggest that religious 
identities were extremely important at the turn of the nineteenth century, but the 
importance of such was not distributed evenly throughout the population.
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It is commonly held in Kachchh that in the past relations between Hindus and 
Muslims were peaceful. However, Rayadhanji’s conversion and the antipathy he 
displayed to Brahmans and merchants (Rushbrook Williams 1958:170) suggests 
there were clear social fault lines through which antipathy could be expressed. But, 
compare the following three statements from British sources relating to the early 
nineteenth century. The Gazetteer of 1880 states that: ‘At the beginning of the 
present [nineteenth] century, so progressive was Islam, that it seemed as if another 
hundred years would see the last of the Hindu faith’ (G.B.P. Vol. V.:39). This 
observation was made of the same period of which MacMurdo wrote: ‘of late the 
religion of Vishnoo has become so prevalent in Cutch, that some of the Jharejas [sic] 
even have adopted it, with all its peculiarities’ (1820a:224). Finally, Mrs Postens, the 
wife of a colonial official, notes: ‘The Rao himself says that out of about two 
thousand Jharrejas [sic], he does not think three of them know what their religion is’ 
(1839a: 133). The first two statements imply that religious identities were strong and 
were actively being proselytised; while the last implies that religion was not an 
important marker of identity. The validity of these statements may be of dubious 
worth as historical evidence, but I am not inclined to think that they are wrong. The 
other writings of MacMurdo are incisive, accurate and demonstrate a profound 
understanding of Kachchhi society, and Mrs Postens, although given to pomposity on 
occasion, benefited from reading MacMurdo. Their statements are, however, clearly 
contradictory. I do not think this is a factual contradiction, but that the statements 
refer to different sections of the population.
Differing conceptions of space and location clearly had much to do with the 
perceived importance of religion as a marker of social identity, for example, those 
who travelled overseas had strong conceptions of religious exclusiveness. In the 
aftermath of the 1819 earthquake, MacMurdo observed:
The Moosulmans were equally alarmed ... and an abundance of threats of punishments 
to the wicked were fulminated from the musjeeds; and a paper asserted to have come 
from Mecca, with the usual seals attached, foretold of the day of judgement 
(1820b: 106).
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This response was matched among Hindus by the rise of millenarian movements. 
The community responses to the event were clearly very different and emerged from 
distinct patterns of sectarian organisation. None of these observations indicate the 
nature of religion in the construction of social segmentation, but they do imply that 
religion was an important and competitive part of social life. The paper arriving from 
Mecca interrupts the scene and intrudes into the image of India as a syncretic social 
synthesis, reminding us of the outside world. In Chapter 2 it is argued that the social 
division of most importance throughout the nineteenth century (and up to the present 
day) is between those who routinely travelled outside the kingdom and those who did 
not. In this chapter this division is highlighted in the present discussion because the 
contradictory statements presented above refer to such a division in the population. 
Those who travelled the most were the same sections of the population that adopted 
Islam and the Vaishnava movements. Those who did not travel, or travelled much 
less, were the rulers and dominant landholders -  who Mrs Postens refers to as 
‘Jharrejas’, who were vague about their religious associations.
Although earthquakes and royal conversions affected the whole of Kachchh, 
similar incidents are to be found in the social history of Mandvi’s travelling 
populations. Throughout the nineteenth century Hindu merchants campaigned to stop 
Muslims fishing in Mandvi because of the violence and pollution resulting from this 
activity (Postens 1839a: 17). Alexander Bumes also visited Kachchh in the early 
nineteenth century and noted that Hindu merchants deliberately understated the size 
of the Muslim population in Mandvi (1879). He also notes that: ‘By their (the 
‘Banians’) influence they deprive a large Mussalman population of animal food, and 
forbid a fish being caught within six miles of the town. To eat an egg is a crime’ 
(1879:13). Up until the late nineteenth century Muslims in Mandvi were forbidden 
from riding and owning horses and when the King decreed that this prohibition 
should be lifted for the benefit of the prosperous Vohra (Shia) merchants the Hindu 
merchants of Mandvi went on strike (G.B.P. Vol. V.:242). Although these disputes 
occurred over a century ago, today there are no fishermen living within six miles of
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the town and it is still not possible to buy a cooked egg within the city walls. 
Mandvi’s Hindu population continues to play down the size and importance of the 
Muslim population, and horses are one of the most hotly contested symbols of social 
legitimacy (see Chapter 2). From the early nineteenth century the strongest sense of 
religious and social distinctiveness was found among the diasporic populations, but 
because the diaspora was not rooted in foreign lands, and because vast sections of 
this population frequently returned home, the pattern is clearly replicated in Mandvi 
to the present day.
1.4. Hindus, Kharvas and Muslims
In a recent study of democracy and nationalism, primarily focusing on western India, 
Thomas Blom Hansen identifies three related processes that together produce and 
perpetuate the construction of ‘communal’ identities: first, the limited social 
interaction across religious boundaries; secondly, the narratives, rumours and 
sometimes experience of riots that establish the other community as the source of 
absolute evil and brutality; and thirdly, the formation, organisation and dissemination 
of political identities around the discourses of others (1999:203-214). In this section 
Hansen’s framework is used to show which aspects of Hindu relations with Muslims 
locally are salient and how. The issues raised in the following section are explored 
further from a Hindu perspective in chapters 2-4; and from a Muslim perspective in 
chapters 4-7.
1.41. Religious geography of Mandvi
Mandvi is a town that developed around the social organisation of shipping. Broadly, 
the town is arranged around the central bazaars and an invisible line drawn from the 
southeast to northwest. At the base of this line are the areas traditionally inhabited by 
sailors; at the far end of the line is the area of mercantile houses, temples and social 
institutions; while the middle areas are predominantly populated by townsfolk who 
do not traverse the ocean. This is something of a simplification as pockets of other
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populations are scattered throughout the town and in a number of places the town 
walls have been demolished and residential areas have spilled outside their confines. 
However, it is broadly true that the traditional areas of merchants and sailors are 
located on opposite sides of the town and this pattern encompasses the less 
significant divisions made between Hindus and Muslims within both areas.
Hansen argues that the limited interaction across religious boundaries has been 
historically substantiated by patterns of settlement, differentiated economic 
engagement and by the limited practices of friendship and the exceptionally rare 
cases of inter-marriage (1999:203). Additionally, in Mandvi, Hindus and Muslims do 
not visit each other’s religious buildings, participate in each other’s festivals, or form 
mixed teams in sporting tournaments. Limited interaction between religious groups 
distances the stories that circulate about them from the social realities of ‘others’. 
Within the dominant model of spatial organisation outlined above there are clearly 
defined Muslim, Hindu, Jain and Dalit areas. There are also mixed neighbourhoods 
where the boundaries are less rigid. In these areas similar lines of a smaller scale are 
drawn between housing clusters or at the threshold or perimeter wall of particular 
houses. At a very general level Muslims are concentrated in the south, east and 
northwest of the town in areas adjoining the old town walls, while Hindus and Jains 
dominate the central areas.
The traditional quarters of sailors are clearly demarcated along religious lines, and 
the invisible lines that separate them continue to have social effects long after the 
Bhadala left Bhadala Pod. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) dominated council 
officially renamed the area ‘Pith Chowk’, a name that Hindus have adopted, while 
Muslims continue to use ‘Bhadala Pod’. This area has witnessed a series of 
competitive property disputes between Hindus and Muslims. Some Hindus have 
occupied houses that they claim historically belong to them, despite the fact that the 
legal owners, most of whom have distinctly Muslim names, are now unknown. 
Navaratri (festival of nine nights) dances have recently been started in the area’s 
central square, which is bordered on one side by a mosque and on the other by a
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Muslim shrine. This area is the site of a non-violent struggle for religious supremacy, 
and although this trend is by no means restricted to Bhadala Pod -  Pith Chowk, the 
Hindu right has paid special attention to it because of the Bhadala association. As 
this chapter makes clear in the case of the Bhadala village of Salaya, and Chapter 4 
for the Kharva, inviolate territory continues to be an important marker of legal, social 
and ritual identities. Friendships are rare between Hindus and Muslims in the town 
and practically unheard of between Bhadalas and Kharvas. The social separation of 
Hindus and Muslims in Mandvi is matched by their mutual ignorance of one another 
and reinforced by geographical separation.
1.42. Violence
Hansen’s second point is that narratives, rumours and sometimes experience of riots 
establish the ‘other’ community as the source of absolute evil and brutality 
(1999:204-206). The geographical separation of the demonised Bhadala from the 
town is matched by a gap between beliefs held about them and the facts of their 
existence. Hindus in Mandvi were incredulous to the point of disbelief when I told 
them I knew men in Salaya who had university degrees. Yet the same Hindus 
simultaneously claim to know a lot about the activities, personal habits and politics 
of the same Bhadala men.
The obloquy ‘the gentle crow always has two feet tied’ is frequently used in 
Mandvi to describe the ‘purpose’ of violence that occurred in 1983 between Kharvas 
and Bhadalas. The incident left a number of Bhadala dead and several others 
maimed. What I know of this violence has been assembled from a variety of 
subjective sources, which sometimes coincide, but more frequently do not. The 
following two statements reveal some of the issues that are now understood to have 
been at stake. The first statement is made by a Bhatiya resident of Oman who 
periodically returns to Mandvi:
“The Bhadala were dangerous, our women could not walk anywhere, now they can
because the Kharva made them quiet. They were roaming in the streets at night without
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a care or any sense of respect. They were covered in gold, wearing new clothes, and 
riding new motorbikes. Someone fired a rocket over the river and it destroyed half a 
mosque in Salaya. There was a lot of competition for space at that time. Wherever we 
were doing a festival they would be nearby also doing one. Lots of people said very bad 
things about each other’s gods at that time, but now it is quiet for us all because of the 
Kharva.”
A Brahman journalist from Mandvi made the following observations:
“In the early 1980s there was a large trade and market place for ‘imported items’ in 
Salaya and people would come here openly to buy them. Today that has subsided and is 
limited to electrical goods, perfumes and cigarettes. But in those years Salaya was 
infamous. In a customs raid a large number of hand-grenades were uncovered in Salaya.
They also found gold and dollars hidden away in secret compartments. In one house 
they could find no men to arrest... The only person there, it seemed, was an old lady.
They threatened her and told her that they would shoot her if she did not tell them where 
the men were hiding. She pointed inside the house, and there the customs men found a 
secret room in which a man was hiding. He was brought over the river into Mandvi and 
beaten. A sign was put round his neck on which was written: ‘I am the dog of the 
smugglers’. He was paraded around the bazaar. Later the man died in the police station.
Many Bhadala came across the river to protest outside the police station. They were not 
welcome in the town -  Salaya was their place. They were blocking the roads, making 
loud noises and shouting to the police and at the people of Mandvi. For us this all 
started when Ghazni sacked the temple in Somnath and cut the lingam of Shiva with his 
sword. Our Kharva men came to attack the Bhadala. Some time later the police placed 
the town under curfew.”
In these accounts, festivals, various kinds of state intervention, accusations of 
‘anti-nationalism’, public protest and revenge all feature as both causes and 
justifications. These are typical characterisations of events, but, as Paul Brass argues, 
it is impossible to construct sequential narratives of violence after the event because 
the accounts are subjective, the truths partial and the aims of those narrating events 
have changed given the violence itself (1997:5-20). In narratives such as those given 
above, the events of a single week in 1983 have become conflated with other 
contentious issues that happened before and after the violence itself.
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So much has been written on ethnic, communal and religious strife, and on 
rioting, antagonism and violence that an adequate review of the literature is quite 
impossible in this chapter. In this section my aim is merely to signal a violent 
incident and highlight the central ways in which this is understood in anticipation of 
material presented in subsequent chapters. Religious violence is an abnormal activity 
in Mandvi. Various antipathies, not just those between Hindus and Muslims, are 
apparent and pervasive in daily social life, but they seldom erupt into violence. Thus, 
this particular violent outbreak looms large in the construction of social antagonism 
because there are no other events to rival its rhetorical supremacy. There are four 
points to be made about this violence. First, the organisational basis of violence 
stemmed from pre-existent patterns of social organisation and social institutions (see 
Brass 1997). The second point (related to the first) is that this violence was not 
divorced from wider social contexts from which conceptions of authority, prestige, 
duty, devotion and legitimacy are derived (see Frietag 1989). Thirdly, a new realm of 
social discourse and transaction seems to have appeared which takes the violence as 
an abstract theme from which the corruption of Hindu or Muslim ‘others’ is further 
elaborated (see Tambiah 1996). And finally, that the role of religion in this violence 
was not merely an ideological smoke screen, behind which the real clash of material 
interests was hidden (see van der Veer 1994), but at the same time ‘religion’ was not 
the primary ‘cause’. The following sections address these themes in turn: in each 
instance the experience of rumours and narratives that surround, legitimise or explain 
violence have contributed to the creation of the image of antagonistic ‘others’.
1.43. Social organisations and violence
The first point to make is that this violence is presently reported to have been an 
exclusive Kharva-Bhadala incident. However, newspaper reports of the time reveal 
that there was also a fatality in Mutchi Pith that involved neither Kharva nor 
Bhadala, which has been erased from contemporary recollections. This observation 
leads me to the two existing forms of social organisation that played a role in the
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ways in which this violence was enacted: the role of specific institutions and a 
pervasive social division between merchants and sailors. Neither of these two social 
forms is explicitly associated with communal divisions between Hindus and 
Muslims.
Paul Brass uses the term ‘institutionalized riot systems’ to refer to the social and 
political organisations, riot specialists and information networks that maintain a 
public level of awareness about potential riotous events (1997:15-18). Brass’s 
analysis of the role of ‘agitators’ and ‘riot specialists’ seems to fit the Mandvi case. 
The violence, although appearing to be spontaneous, was supported by ‘outsiders’ 
who were bussed in from Saurashtra by an extension of the Kharva caste 
organisation (a group described in detail in Chapter 4). Today this organisation 
serves as the local mobile muscle power for the BJP and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh (RSS). When a cyclone hit Kachchh in 1998 the RSS were the first to organise 
relief and rescue personnel to be sent from Mandvi. The organisers and financiers 
were merchants from Mandvi and overseas, while those who did most of the manual 
search and rescue were Kharvas.
Contentious events that imply potential confrontation have a life of their own in 
rumour. The most contentious events are those that breach the gap between Hindu 
and Muslim interests. Inevitably, religious issues are high on the local agendas of the 
RSS and the BJP in Mandvi and these organisations are usually the first to respond to 
rumours of anti-Hindu activity. The awareness of potential conflict is not restricted to 
political activists. Cows dying in suspicious circumstances, Muslim boys flirting 
with Hindu girls, complaints arising from music interfering with mosque prayers, 
non-vegetarian foodstuffs appearing in areas of the town dominated by vegetarians, 
and the forthcoming coincidence of religious festivals are common currency in 
conversation on the streets. However, although the role of political organisations was 
clearly instrumental in the way that this violence was executed, their significance has 
paled in the way in which events of the past are described in the present. As will be 
shown below, the violence has been routinised through its assimilation into the
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dominant social framework of merchants and sailors and, in the process, the 
narratives have erased the roles of non-sailors and political organisations controlled 
by merchants.
1.44. Assimilation of violence and social form
The second form of social organisation from which this violence was carried forth is 
the partially institutionalised division between merchants and sailors. In this sense 
the violence was a logical extension of the widely recognised notions of authority, 
prestige, duty, devotion and legitimacy that comprise conventional merchant-sailor 
relations. Those who silenced the Bhadala were Kharvas. This violence has become 
routinised by its assimilation into the dominant patterns of power, status and 
stereotyped group character. Everyone knows (and not so much as a mere stereotype) 
that sailors are subject to the political demands of high-status merchants and are 
prone to violence because of their uncultivated natures. Today, the complex of 
violent actions of the past is typically discussed as the religious violence of Hindus 
and Muslims even though it occurred between unsuccessful and successful sailors. 
The same pattern is true for the ‘deeper’ past: earthquakes and insane kings are seen 
through the same bifurcated gaze. Hindus and Muslims were fighting, but in 1983 
they were not fighting because they were Hindus and Muslims, they were fighting 
because a series of factors came together at once which erupted into violence, not 
least of which was a general sense of revenge against the Bhadala for having usurped 
the traditions of shipping from the Kharva.
In the shorter of the two accounts of violence given above it is evident that 
wealth, women, territory, religious buildings and religious propriety are given as the 
contexts in which violence took place. But there is more to this account than meets 
the eye. The man narrating these events was Bhatiya by ‘caste’; as the highest- 
ranking merchant group in Mandvi, the Bhatiyas act as patrons to the Kharvas. 
Traditionally, Kharvas crewed Bhatiya ships and fought their battles; today, Kharvas 
work in Bhatiya businesses in Oman and fight Bhatiya battles. The Kharvas tied the
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Bhadalas’ feet in the interests of the Hindu population at large: this was their role as 
sailors under the patronage of Hindu merchants. In this sense Kharvas are the strong 
arm of Hindu society, a position from which they derive pride and a degree of 
prestige. At a general level the violence has been tamed and attributed to the ‘natural’ 
volatility of sailors that emerges as a characteristic of their mixed genealogical 
heritage. As shown in subsequent chapters, the flows of command and performance 
(from merchant to sailor) are replicated in other more mundane circumstances.
Sailors were traditionally the ones called on for violent interventions, regardless of 
who was in dispute.
1.45. The discursive realm of violence
One of the effects of this violence has been the creation of a new arena of discourse 
in which social and religious hostility can be legitimately discussed. So, although I 
am emphasising the fact that this violence was based on patterns of long standing 
social relationships it also provided a new set of conceptual resources, metaphors and 
rhetorical devices through which the social lives of ‘others’ can be articulated. 
Tension between these groups has produced distinctive social identities that 
emphasise religion and homogenise, depersonalise and dehumanise ‘others’. This is 
seen in formal and institutional discourse and in general social attitudes towards 
‘others’. However, this violence occurred between the two communities that 
traditionally had the most in common. As sailors they were bonded to merchants, 
lived by the same rhythms dictated by tides and moon, and in the past both venerated 
the gods of the sea at the same site. However, today religion is seen to make them 
qualitatively different kinds of people.
The commonalities that both Kharvas and Bhadalas claim to have shared in the 
past have paled in relation to religious differentiation. Social and geographic 
separation of the two communities has taken on a greater urgency after the violence 
of the early 1980s. This is reflected in the competitive building of temples and 
mosques on opposite banks of the river. At a time when Kharva and Bhadala both
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use religious signs and actions to separate themselves and declare their social 
aspirations to others it is impossible to peel away religious constructions from the 
array of other factors involved. The final three chapters of this thesis explore how 
material and religious interests among the Bhadala are inseparable, and how one 
appears as a manifestation of the other.
1.46. Smuggling and material interests
The forth point made in this section about the violence is that although religious 
categories have become important in understanding confrontation they were not the 
sole cause. Today, this incident is vaguely described as a reflection of perennial 
struggle between Hindus and Muslims. The violence, which occurred fourteen years 
before I arrived in Mandvi, was partially organised, partially spontaneous, but today 
appears in discourse as an expression of popular feeling, which relates to descriptions 
of ‘others’. The dust had long settled and a few men killing a few other men had 
become a sign of Hindu-Muslim antipathy. In some ways it haunts all that is 
presented in this thesis, or, more accurately, its rhetorical and ritualised elaborations 
pervade the language, action and behaviour of those living in Mandvi and Salaya. In 
this sense the history of the region imploded in the events of a single week and from 
that moment on these events became the defining event in local social organisation. 
However, from the long-term perspective taken in subsequent chapters, it is clear that 
this incident was, in Jonathan Spencer’s words, ‘socially meaningful action’ 
(1992:262). The channels of communication and those involved in the violence, at 
least with a few years hindsight, have been socialised into widely recognised 
differentials of power and performance among merchants and sailors. This violence 
has become routinised both in social and rhetorical statements made about it and 
through the language and behaviour of antipathy that runs through daily life in the 
town. Informants did confide their opinions and sometimes their roles in the 
violence, but on the whole, the events themselves remained obscure and mysterious. 
As a result, no attempt is made to resurrect the events of that period, but only look at 
how they have come to be understood.
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One of the key issues in the accounts given above is ‘smuggling’. The whys-and- 
wherefores of smuggling have a long history in Kachchh. In modem times, shipping 
is controlled by a single community with a particular religious identity that appears 
homologous with their material interests. As a result, smuggling, piracy and other 
activities of sailors have led to social antagonism on religious grounds. However, the 
condemnation of smuggling is selective and self-serving: if a Sony television set 
finds its way off a Bhadala ship and into a Hindu home in Mandvi accusations of 
‘anti-nationalism’ and terrorism are not raised. The kinds of attributes given to the 
goods that are smuggled are the cause of dispute -  not the process itself. The 
predatory activities of sailors have a long history in Kachchh and a brief review will 
highlight how the related activities of smuggling and piracy have led to a series of 
disputes that are not defined by the religious identity of their perpetrators or those 
attempting to right perceived wrongs. The following examples show that it is 
materialistic interests and the morality of exchange that tend to be the defining 
features of such disputes.
The British first expressed an interest in Kachchh because of piracy because 
Dwarka and Haj pilgrims, and British and Indian merchant ships were being 
indiscriminately plundered (MacMurdo 1856:441). Sometime between 1801 and 
1804 a vessel belonging to a Bombay merchant was attacked and a man and a 
woman were allegedly flung overboard. News of this incident reached Bombay and 
armed vessels were sent to Okha to seek redress, but returned without having 
completed their task (LeGrand 1856:447). There is every reason to suspect that 
Kachchhi merchants were the patrons of this activity because smuggling and piracy 
were often part of the same process. In order to land goods discreetly, without going 
through Mandvi port, goods were unloaded onto smaller vessels and the ‘lost’ goods, 
for which paper work could be produced, were written off to piratical activity. The 
strategically placed Chaika islands in the Gulf of Kachchh were a safe haven for 
‘pirates’ and Mandvi’s mercantile fleet. The importance of the islands for piracy and 
‘illicit’ trade led to dispute between the Kachchh Durbar and that of Jamnagar, which
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focused on rights to levy taxes on ships passing through the islands. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, opium, slaves and gold were smuggled into Kachchh, and the 
acts of piracy and the high level of smuggling deprived the Durbar and the British of 
taxation revenue. It was evident, however, that the Durbar did not have the power, or 
the resources, to police the activities of merchants and seaman effectively -  a 
condition that remained throughout the nineteenth century1. It is a situation that 
continues today: in 1997 hashish resin with an international market value of sixty 
crore Rupees was found on a sandbank in the Gulf of Kachchh.
Disputes between the British and Kachchh, Kachchh and Jamnagar, and 
merchants and Durbar focused around the question of ‘illegality’. It is clear that this 
notion ‘illegality’ is an ideological smoke screen generated in an attempt to control 
trade and accrue profit. Present-day accusations of piracy and smuggling are 
informed by local rumours that feed from and into the Hindu nationalist discourse, 
which describes all Muslims as inherently anti-national.
It has been argued that the violence of early 1980s was socialised through the 
channels of authority that have developed around the shipping industry. Broadly, this 
means that sailors fight the battles of their merchants. In this case the Kharva came to 
the rescue of the Mandvi Hindu community at large and by tying the feet of the 
troublesome crow forced the Bhadala to retreat to their village. The Kharvas claim to 
have been defeated by Muslim invaders at the Shiva temple at Somnath.
Rhetorically, their victory over the Bhadala is cast as a revenge for this defeat, which 
is explored in the following section through an exploration of the relationship 
between nationalist discourse and the local Hindu rumour mill in Mandvi.
1 M. G. S. A., P. D. 1876. Kutch. Vol. X. No. 306. Kutch. Post Office. Regarding customs duties 
leviable on Banghy parcels and the detention o f  mails by the officials o f  the Durbar.
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1.47. Hindu nationalist discourse
Hansen’s third critical dimension for the reproduction of communalised images is the 
formation, organisation and dissemination of political identities around the 
discourses of ‘others’ (1999:207). This section addresses the wider theme of Hindu 
nationalism and how it impacts on Mandvi. Here, Hansen’s argument is that although 
there are frequently differences between nationalist discourse and its local 
manifestations there is a clear relationship between the two.
There is a remarkable similarity between the socio-political geography of Mandvi 
and Salaya and the socio-political geography of the sub-continent of India. The town 
is partitioned by a river. On one bank lies a fledgling Muslim settlement inhabited by 
people stressing the fundamentals of the Koran and looking to the Middle East for 
political allegiances. On the other lies a town of diverse and heterogeneous 
population rooted more in the political traditions of India as a nation state and living 
through similar highs and lows to the state itself. On the same riverbank the walled 
compound of a new Hindu temple rises from amid the gravestones of an ancient 
Muslim cemetery. Without pushing the analogy any further the grounds for 
comparison are clear between the geography of the town, the division of the sub­
continent, and the location of its contested religious sites.
India’s most widely publicised current political drama has revolved around a 
battle between Hindus and Muslims for the control of contested religious sites. Many 
of these celebrated places are located in the country’s ancient centres of pilgrimage 
and popular piety. The most important of these battles is the series of agitations that 
have focused on the sacred Hindu temple town of Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh. Over 
the last decade large numbers of people have died throughout India in clashes led by 
self-styled servants of the Hindu god Ram, known as kar sevaks, who pledged 
themselves to reclaim the now-famous site of the Babri Masjid (mosque) in 
Ayodhya. The leaders of these Hindus publicly declared their desire to reclaim the 
site, demolish the mosque and construct a new Hindu temple on the spot, because at
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some disputed point in the past it is held that Muslim conquerors built the mosque on 
the birthplace of the royal warrior-god Ram.
Hinduism is the majority ‘religion’ in India and has often been described as a 
related assortment of many faiths, doctrines and sects, rather than an integrated 
religion. This is disputed by the leaders of the new Hindu nationalism who present 
Hinduism as a unified religion that is naturally fitting to the country (van der Veer 
1994:28). The new Hindu political groups, such as the BJP, are attempting to redraw 
the country’s history within the divine landscape of the continent. India has become 
the Hindu motherland, which was tom asunder by the partition. At the time of 
partition Pakistan was envisioned as a Muslim homeland, yet more Muslims elected 
to stay in India than to leave and set up home in either East or West Pakistan. This is 
ignored in Hindu nationalist rhetoric, which plots onto the land of India sacred 
connections in the landscape between shrines, pilgrimage destinations, centres of 
royal Hindu power and mythological events. Rivers, mountains and whole regions 
are inscribed with the sacred past. Lying behind the gaudy colours of the new 
cartography are the terrains of battle and defeat at the hands of the ‘invading’ 
Muslims. Hindu social grandeur is viewed as having fallen at foreign hands. The 
most elevated of these evils are the Moguls, who are reputed to have built the 
mosque in Ayodhya, but the demonisation of the ‘other’ extends generally to all 
Muslims. The ruins and archaeological traces in the deserts of Rajasthan, and on the 
plains of northern India, are being reinvented as contested sites of wrongdoing and 
injustice. Hindu nationalists are animating the landscape, and in the process they are 
recreating religious contest and dispute in order to reclaim the past and the land as 
their own.
Part of the Hindu nationalist myth is that Islam spread into Asia from Arabia 
through conquest and holy war. It is not widely known, either in India or in the West 
today, that Islam actually penetrated India largely as the religion of trade and through 
the activities of mendicants (S. Bayly 1992). In Hindu nationalist discourse, Muslims 
are seen as a foreign incursion to the natural land of Hinduism. The partition stirred
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up feelings of mistrust and made Hindu-Muslim relations much worse, and during 
the subsequent bad relations between India and Pakistan the Muslims in India are 
seen as agents deliberately weakening the strength of India’s position (van der Veer 
1994:10). Furthermore, Muslims are perceived to form a homogenous community 
that actively seeks political affiliation and financial support from the Middle East. 
They are seen as exclusive and expansionist, a view that contributes to their image as 
violent, intolerant and seeking political dominance (Hansen 1999:150-152). This is 
the picture drawn by the nationalist rhetoric of the Hindu right, and these kinds of 
issues find particular social expressions among Hindus in Mandvi. The process of 
Islamic reform in Salaya engages with the discourse of Hindu nationalism in quite 
specific ways. But, as the following chapters make clear, in Mandvi this political 
stereotype is not as abstract as it might appear (see Hansen 1999:211) because in 
Mandvi, anti-Muslim Hindu rhetoric is graphically represented by the houses rising 
from the opposite riverbank and by those who live in them. The image is not an 
abstraction but a reality that not only inhabits political discourse but also lives in the 
village on the opposite bank of the river.
In the last thirty years the material and religious interests of the Bhadala have 
coincided. In the years before, this was not the case as their economic interests were 
bonded to those of Shia Muslims, the sectarian divide separated the religious 
interests of merchants and sailors. There were traditionally three groups of Shias in 
Mandvi: Daudi Vohras, Isna Ashari Khojas and Aga Khani Khojas. Although most 
of them have left the town their past influence continues to be heavily felt. All three 
groups employed Bhadala sailors on their ships and traditionally, merchants were 
religiously exclusive. Thus patron-client relations between them were not of a 
proselytising nature. Now that the Bhadala control capital, and are producing their 
own constituencies of sailors, their religious (‘Sunni’) and material interests 
coincide. The resulting pattern of religious polarisation presently corresponds to 
polarised economic engagement. In Mandvi the Bhadala lived as sailors bonded to 
the economic and material interests of their patrons, while now, as patrons in Salaya, 
they have their own space and their own clients bonded to their interests. However,
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these interests are not always homologous with the majority of the Mandvi 
population, and, as shown, this can lead to violence.
1.5. Divine tensions within Islam
Having given the general background, this section lays out the main theoretical issue 
addressed in the thesis in terms of social and religious divisions found among 
Muslims, the creation of social ‘others’, and the role of migration and pilgrimage 
within their tradition.
In a wide variety of contemporary studies of Muslims it is possible to identify a 
tension between universalist and particularist religious tendencies. This is manifest in 
contrasts between: ‘Great’ and ‘Little’ traditions or sharia-minded Islam and 
mysticism (Eickelman 1981:202-203), and what Ernest Gellner (1969:7-8) calls 
‘type p’ and ‘type c’ (for similar divisions in ethnography see Barth 1965; Lewis 
1961; Evans-Pritchard 1954; and van der Veer 1992). The former instance relates to 
a stress being placed on scripture, literacy, puritanism, monotheism, egalitarianism, 
sobriety, and the absence of mediators and graven images. The latter is characterised 
by ‘anthropolatry’ (Gellner 1969:8), personalised relationships with the divine, social 
and religious hierarchy, ritual elaboration and proliferation of the sacred in the 
landscape. The apparent universality of this division means that the basis for 
variation cannot simply be located in specific social contexts. H.A.R. Gibb argues 
that this division is inherent in the theological construction of Islam in relation to the 
humanity of its adherents: a tension between a transcendental God and an immanent 
God. Transcendentalism is the otherness, pervasiveness and absoluteness of God, 
while immanence is expressed through love, subtlety and saintly charisma (1972:38). 
In the material that follows, access to the transcendental God does not require the 
patronage of intermediaries, while, more often than not, the immanent God does, and 
broadly, this corresponds to a division between Muslims in Salaya and Mandvi.
52
1.51. ‘The Natural History of Religion’
Such ideas have a long history, which can be traced back to the philosopher David 
Hume (1998). The questions outlined by Hume and subsequently elaborated by 
Gellner (1969,1970,1974,1981) and Gibb (1972) form the theoretical hypothesis 
for the ethnographic material presented in this thesis. This being the case an outline 
of Hume’s argument is given below. In ‘The Natural History of Religion’ (1998), 
Hume presents two principal arguments concerning the nature of religious 
development in human society. The main and oft quoted part of this essay (and the 
‘Discourses’ frequently published along with it) describes the historical transition 
from less rational polytheistic religions to more rational monotheistic religious 
expressions. The argument runs as follows: polytheism, man’s original religion, 
emerged from the unknown causes of human misfortune being ascribed human 
characteristics; from this monotheism emerged because particular gods became 
increasingly important and eventually lost their anthropomorphic qualities. 
Importantly, in this part of the argument Hume describes the process of particular 
men becoming powerful in society and associating themselves with particular gods, 
which in turn become all-powerful:
in an idolatrous nation, that though men admit the existence of several limited deities, 
yet is there some one God, whom, in a particular manner, they make the object of their 
worship and adoration ... his votaries will endeavour by every art, to insinuate 
themselves into his favour; and supposing him to be pleased, like themselves, with 
praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration, which will be spared in their 
addresses to h im ... Thus they proceed; till at last they arrive at infinity itself, beyond 
which there is no further progress (1998:154-155).
The second part of Hume’s argument is more subtle. He argues that as deities 
emerge as unified and infinite they become too abstract for vulgar human nature that 
turns once again to intermediaries and lesser gods. So having elevated a particular 
deity to perfection:
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Such refined ideas, being somewhat disproportioned to vulgar comprehension, remain 
not long in their original purity; but require to be supported by the notion of inferior 
mediators or subordinate agents, which interpose between mankind and their supreme 
deity. These demi-gods or middle beings, partaking more of human nature, and being 
more familiar to us, become the chief objects of devotion, and gradually recal [57'c] that 
idolatry, which had been formerly banished by the ardent prayers and panegyrics of 
timorous and indigent mortals (1998:159).
Yet this process is again reversible, and as polytheism degenerates a shift towards 
monotheism will be evident:
as these idolatrous religions fall every day into grosser and more vulgar conceptions, 
they at last destroy themselves, and by the vile representations, which they form of their 
deities, make the tide turn again towards theism. But so great is the propensity, in this 
alternate revolution of human sentiments, to return back to idolatry, that the utmost 
precaution is not able to effectually prevent it (1998:159-160).
Thus Hume argues that there is a ‘flux and reflux’ in the human mind that leads to 
a tendency to rise from idolatry to theism or from polytheism to monotheism and 
then for this process to lapse into polytheism (1998:158-159). Clearly, in these 
sections of the work Hume confuses idolatry with polytheism because monotheism 
and idolatry are not mutually exclusive categories. However, the more general 
criticism Gellner aims at Hume is that the two main strands of argument are 
contradictory or at least the former is a mere historical observation rather than a point 
of sociological or philosophical note (1970:235). This appears to be the case, but 
Hume’s attack on the rationality of religious thought, and especially Christian 
rationality, was veiled in order to protect him from the orthodox establishment. As 
John Robertson ironically writes in an introduction to a 1889 edition:
The ostensible draft of the treatise ... is to make out that whereas ignorant people cannot 
rightly conceive the power interpenetrating an infinite universe, more cultured people 
may; but that is a thesis which for any thoughtful reader serves to refute itself. He, at 
least, who in these days can suppose that the scanty knowledge possible to the wisest of
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mankind will serve to bridge the gulf between finity and infinitude, is already past all 
misleading (1889:xxiii-xxiv).
These observations, I think, get to the heart of Hume’s thesis in which he points 
towards the ‘irrationality’ of all belief in terms of the structure and limitations of the 
human mind. He does this through a presentation of a common sense view of the 
evolution of religion (from polytheism to monotheism) and then turns this subtly 
upside down by concluding with ‘flux and reflux’, where monotheism has the 
capacity to create polytheistic religious orders.
Gellner regards Hume’s theory as too psychologistic, because it locates what 
Gellner terms the ‘pendulum swing’ (rather than ‘flux and reflux’) in the human 
heart and not in the societies where change is occurring (1981:11). As a result of this 
criticism, Gellner applies the ideas to historical shifts in Moroccan society. He 
concludes that the processes Hume describes are evident, but that the ways in which 
they are structured in Islam differ dramatically from the ways in which they are 
present in Christianity, because:
in Christianity, the religious tradition characterised by syndrome C [Catholic] is central.
It had the greatest continuity over time and the greatest extension territorially and in 
numbers. It is the religious traditions of syndrome P [Protestant] which are fragmented 
territorially and in organisation, and which have perhaps a lesser continuity in time, or 
at any rate those extant at present have a lesser depth in time than has the main tradition 
(1970:237).
The implication is that, unlike Christianity, in the Islamic tradition ‘type p’ is 
central and ‘type c’ is peripheral. However, it is made clear in following chapters that 
‘type p ’ exists as a variable and contextual set of practices, also recognised among 
those resembling ‘type c’, as a powerful and authentic religious form. ‘Type p ’ is 
thus used as an example for reforming those of ‘type c’ because is already holds 
significant moral and historical sway. The major difference between the two 
syndromes is the position of ‘saints’: variously venerated in the ‘type c’ tradition and 
dismissed by those of ‘type p’ as adjunct polytheistic corruptions. The figures that
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occupy these ‘saintly’ positions for Muslims in western India are not directly 
comparable to Christian saints (see Brown 1981). As Turner argues for the Christian 
tradition, we cannot know what counts as a ‘saint’ independent of the procedures, 
institutions, and labels given by the centralised authority of the church (1974:60). 
This contrasts markedly with those considered to be saints in western India because 
‘sainthood’ is a potential given at birth to a select few; the procedures, institutions 
and terminology that surround the saint are decentralised, heterodox and are 
primarily determined by the personality and gifts of the ‘saint’ -  as well as by the 
kind of relationship he maintained with his devotees.
Having identified a pervasive tension among Muslims in a wide variety of 
contexts, a further problem emerges which is beautifully summarised by Gellner:
‘the saints [embodied forms of religious particularism] confer an appearance of Islam 
for local practices and cults, or, to put it the other way around, express and facilitate 
reverence for Islam by giving it a local and personal anchorage’ (1969:301). The 
problem in presenting a coherent analysis is a matter of defining a perspective. This 
thesis addresses Muslim religious reform among the Bhadala of Salaya, who are 
reforming themselves, but through apprenticeship, are also reforming those who 
work for them. From this perspective, ‘universalistic’ Islam is located in Salaya, 
while ‘particularistic’ Islam is to be found in Mandvi. This is something of a 
simplification, but is the way in which the problem can be most clearly expressed. 
The potential logical and ethnographic circularity in this case is best conveyed by the 
following anecdote. Frequently, I would sit with a Muslim shopkeeper in Mandvi 
and listen to him talk about how he profited from Bhadala customers because they 
were so stupid he could overcharge them. However, in shipyards the Bhadala would 
say how stupid Muslims in Mandvi were because they had no idea of the value of the 
goods they traded in, but the Bhadala had no objection to paying higher prices if it 
meant they could help the poor and the deluded. To avoid a similarly inwardly 
spiralling argument the problem is presented from the Bhadalas’ perspective and this 
necessarily involves characterising the ‘particularist’ from their own perspective on 
‘universalism’. In the following chapters, the tensions (as ‘flux and reflux’) between
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immanence and transcendentalism among Muslims in western India are outlined and 
the relationship between them is explored through the experiences of apprentices 
who move from the social milieu of one to the working environment of the other. 
There is an additional tension in this context between Muslims and Hindus 
(discussed above) and this affects the way in which those with a tendency towards 
universality construct their opposition towards those they consider to be particularist.
1.52. Islam and charisma
Implicit in Hume’s writing is the notion that powerful individuals become associated 
with particular forms of deity that become transcendental as a result. This idea later 
finds more concrete expressions in Max Weber’s concept of ‘authority’, especially as 
‘charisma’ and ‘elective affinity’. In Weber’s view, social force and power are 
underpinned by the ways in which they are made to appear legitimate, which is in 
part given by the constituents of the power coming to understand it through ascribing 
its purpose to their most mundane activities (Eisenstadt 1968:46-65).
Weber identified three types of belief system that legitimise relations of 
domination: legal (rational), traditional and charismatic (Eisenstadt 1968:46). The 
material presented in this thesis concentrates primarily on the traditional and the 
charismatic. Traditional forms of authority rest on habitual attitudes and beliefs in the 
legitimacy of standardised and sanctified practices. Charismatic domination is 
characterised by obedience, not to the rules or traditions, but to a person of imputed 
holiness, heroism or some other extraordinary quality (see Shils 1965). The death of 
a charismatic individual leads to the devolution of their charisma into ‘charisma of 
office’ or ‘hereditary charisma’. Charismatic enterprise necessarily involves the 
creation of new obligations, ideas and social relationships. In this sense charisma 
challenges the existing order and creates new institutions and social formations, 
through which charisma (as extraordinary) is made routine and mundane. There are 
three further important points to make about Weber’s characterisation of charisma. 
First, charisma emerges during periods of social strain or rapid social change,
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making it possible for more than one charismatic figure to emerge, prompting 
competition for clients and disciples. The period of rapid social change from which 
charismatic figures emerge in Salaya is given by the shifting economic and social 
relationships structured around the shipping industry. For now it is sufficient to say 
that traditional Muslim sailors became merchants, while other traditionally high- 
ranking Muslims have become sailors on Bhadala ships. Secondly, charismatic 
enterprise crucially depends on disciples adopting the social values of their leader. 
Here Weber’s argument seems to depend on a materialistic explanation for the 
enchantment of charisma, in the sense that, there is an ‘elective affinity’ between the 
‘ideal’ features of charisma and the sociologically generated ‘material’ interests of 
social classes and status groups. This is clearly expressed by Bryan Turner in his 
analysis of Weber and Islam:
This ‘pure’ [ideal] charisma is devotion to the person and not to the benefits of his 
miracle-working or magic. For the charismatic leader, his authority derives from a 
special calling, independent of his magical powers and mass following ... the mass of 
people, according to Weber, will follow charismatic leaders who are capable of 
supplying ‘empirical’ evidence of their authority in terms of magic or booty and, 
without a mass following, it is difficult to speak of a leader being charismatic.
Accordingly, there seems to be an inescapable incompatibility between genuine and 
successful charisma: pure charisma depends on devotion to the person, but successful 
charisma is based on devotion to his works ... The relationship which emerges, between 
leader and followers is not so much a discipleship relation but a patron-clientpattern in 
which a leader supplies booty in return for adherence (1974:24-25; [my italics]).
In shipyards the technical and biographic processes of apprenticeship (clientship) 
lead to the neophyte adopting the social values of their patrons through coercion and 
commodity and other material transactions. In chapters 4—7, Weber’s notion of 
‘charisma’ underlies the discussion of contemporary anthropological theory 
concerned with the exchange relationships of ‘big-men’ (Mines 1988; and Mines and 
Gourishankar 1990) and centre-periphery exchange relations (Raheja 1988) in the 
production and maintenance of status. However, in Chapter 7, it is argued that this
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process is not only the product of charismatic leadership, but also reflects widely 
held assumptions about the nature of learning and social status in Muslim society.
Thirdly, Weber characterises charisma as emerging from traditionally held 
concepts (as if a reinterpretation of them) rather than a revelatory new phase. In this 
sense, the language and concepts used in charismatic leadership are those drawn 
from pre-existing patterns of knowledge and language. Throughout the second half 
of the thesis the argument is developed that the Bhadalas’ pre-eminence emerges 
from a social transformation based on traditional social categories of ‘merchant’ and 
‘sailor’. Furthermore, and less obviously, their position is based on a transformation 
of the power of divine mediators to which their religious reform is seemingly 
opposed, a process in which Hume’s ‘flux and reflux’ is evident.
The following chapters identify two kinds of charisma: one premised on divine 
mediation and descent, the second is on commodified mediation between Kachchh 
and the ports of the Indian Ocean, which correspond to the division between 
immanent and transcendental divinity outlined above. There is competition between 
the two, but elements of all of Weber’s conditions for the emergence and operation 
of charisma are self-evident in both. Here the approach taken differs from that of 
both Hume and Gellner. Hume implicitly located charismatic authority in the 
moment that particular powerful individuals or groups gained power and became 
associated a particular deity, who, because of the association, became infinite. 
Gellner, in keeping with his argument about the opposite relations of power being 
found in Islam and Christianity, locates charisma in the polytheistic traditions of 
Moroccan Islam that may or may not have developed out of monotheism. The 
material presented in the following chapters locates charisma in both transcendental 
and immanent forms of Islam, but distinguishes them through discussions on the role 
of migration, descent and conceptions of space and place.
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1.53. Pilgrimage and travel
The central argument in this thesis is that Islamic reform is a reflection of the life 
experiences of those who patronise it, and this finds expression in the conflict 
between transcendental and immanent forms of deification. Although the focus is on 
a specific group of men in a specific place, the processes described can be seen in 
other Muslim societies (see Eickelman 1976; and Roy 1983). Such parallels arise 
from the centrality of travel and the role of personality in Muslim society. The role of 
exemplary personality is examined in the following section. This section examines 
the role of travel as Haj and hijra, the latter is of particular note given the structure of 
apprenticeship described in chapters 5-7.
Pilgrimage and long-distance trading are often related, the Haj being the pre­
eminent example. Likewise, the historical population movements, referred to in 
Chapter 3, were often connected to religious expansion, the spread of ideas and most 
importantly to the construction of a public sphere outside the homeland in which new 
forms of national and religious identity were (and are) imagined (van der Veer 
1994:108). Although Haj is the most famous form of pilgrimage associated with 
Muslims there are other forms of travel that ‘suggest an integrated vision among 
believers of “local” religious practices with those of the “central” rituals such as the 
pilgrimage’ (Eickelman 1981:222). These include travel to local shrines, which in 
Kachchh means travel to Haji Pir, and at a regional level means travel to Haji Ali in 
Bombay, and various forms of pilgrimage of a lesser order that are not 
conventionally thought of as such, but are considered as pilgrimage among sailors. 
Haj is a marker of religious and social differentiation between ship owners and 
sailors, as the significant expenses involved in the Haj place it out of the reach of 
most sailors. However, the routes sailors voyage during the sailing season (to and 
from the Gulf States) are constructed as a pilgrimage of a lesser order. This crucial 
religious sign is discussed further in Chapter 6, in relation to the way the Gulf region 
is imagined by those who do not travel. From this perspective the sailors are seen as
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communing with the sacred populations and atmospheres of the Gulf, which gives 
them a social prestige out of the reach of most of those who do not sail or travel.
The second form of travel that has a significant tradition among Muslims is hijra. 
The term literally means to ‘abandon’, ‘to break ties with someone’ (Masud 
1990:30), but it also has connotations relating to migration. Primarily, it refers to the 
Prophet’s flight from Mecca to Medina in AD 622. Those who accompanied the 
Prophet left behind their property and broke their ties with all Muslims and non- 
Muslims remaining in Mecca (Masud 1990:31). This migration is seen as an 
obligation to move from dar al-kafir (non-Muslim lands, also dar al-harb) to 
establish dar al-islam (Muslim lands or lands of submission). In the ethnographic 
context elaborated in this thesis the opposition is a reality of life experience and a 
key metaphor in the social transformation of apprentices in shipyards. Eickelman and 
Piscatori argue that hijra is a spiritual migration, a transition from accommodating 
state authority to resisting it because of a growing realisation of its illegitimacy, and 
a transition from poverty through an association with specific Islamic movements 
(1990:11). The transition from non-Muslim lands to establish a Muslim land is both a 
metaphor and reality among those living in Salaya. The Bhadalas’ migration from 
Mandvi to Salaya over the last century is construed as a spiritual move towards 
wealth and legitimacy, and as a rejection of the dominant social forms in Mandvi.
The biographic construction of hijra from Mandvi to Salaya dominates the 
metaphors of social and religious reform, and is especially potent because the 
migration is replicated by apprentices who originate in dar al-kafir but go to work in 
dar al-islam.
This raises the question of what makes dar al-islam. The Bhadala follow the 
Hanafi legal tradition, although they do not often articulate this association, 
preferring to simply call themselves ‘Sunnis,’ and in doing so they deny the doctrinal 
relativity of orthodoxy. However, the fact that they are associated with the Hanafi 
tradition has a number of implications for the creation of dar al-islam and its 
relationship to dar al-kafir. This tradition stresses the importance of the territory
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colonised by hijras, and the total severance of property relations between dar al-kafir 
(Mandvi) and dar al-islam (Salaya). Thus, territory is vital in Hanafi conceptions of 
identity and the execution of law. Consequently:
a Muslim who does not migrate from dar al-harb, although a Muslim, is to be governed 
by the rules of dar al-harb. This is why Hanafis allow transactions by Muslims in dar 
al-harb that are not allowed in dar al-islam (Musud 1990:39).
This relationship is reproduced in relations between ship owners and their sailors, 
and allows seths to enter into usury relationships outside Salaya. By constructing a 
homeland in this way, they also create space outside of which predatory capitalism 
and other kinds of activity prohibited within their version of Islam can be conducted. 
So what differentiates the lands of the unbeliever from that of Islam? In Salaya this is 
taken to mean that no open restrictions are placed upon the sale and consumption of 
meat products (stopping short of beef), that Friday and religious holidays are 
observed, spiritual intermediaries are not patronised, the construction of mosques and 
religious monuments is not subject to the planning laws of the non-believers, and the 
call to prayer is not subject to restriction.
Haj and hijra are both defining realities and metaphors in the lives, practices and 
rhetoric of the ship owners. The hijra is the central idiom of geographical and social 
differentiation between the lands that lie to either side of the river estuary, while the 
Haj and the lesser pilgrimages of the shipping season ensure a circulation of people, 
goods and information between the satellite communities and the homeland. For 
many Muslims the Haj is a lifetime ambition, long-distance travel is thus part and 
parcel of Muslim identity. Central to these migrations, and to the whole Muslim 
tradition, is the ideal figure of the Prophet Mohammed. The migration from the land 
of the non-believer to form dar al-islam is one that is modelled on the life 
experiences of the Prophet himself. The Haj and ship routes take the pilgrim on 
journeys along invisible lines that Muslims create through religious and domestic 
architecture, prayer, and posture at sleep and burial. As Barbara Metcalf suggests, the 
Haj allows the pilgrim to ‘hone himself to the prophetic model, the person of the
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Prophet Muhammad, in whose footsteps on this occasion he can literally walk’ 
(1990:100-101).
1.54. The Prophet: charisma and performance
The ideal example of life offered by the Prophet Mohammed is a highly elevated 
model for social action among the Muslims of Mandvi and Salaya. This elevation 
contains within it notions of kingship and patronage as well as behavioural and social 
sanctions. Before exploring these issues, an outline is provided below of the social 
characteristics represented by the exemplary figure of the Prophet. Among Muslims, 
especially those of Salaya, the image of the Prophet is held in infallible esteem as a 
model of dignity, wisdom, temperance, levity, reputation and fortitude. His character 
is the basis for ideal human behaviour. His example forms the basis of canonical 
prayer, personal dignity, absence of hypocrisy, decorum, modesty, wisdom, and 
personal and social order. In sum, his charisma is of the highest human order.
Throughout this thesis various forms of social hierarchy are described that reflect 
the organisation of the ‘brotherhood’ of Islam. The case is made that this metaphor 
itself implies precisely ordered hierarchical social relationships within the fold. It is 
argued that all social relationships are expressed through various kinds of dyadic 
bonds of superiority and inferiority -  especially between brothers. The same 
relationships of the human world are reproduced in relation to God. In Mandvi, those 
who are seen as being closest to the divine realm are Saiyeds, who claim they are 
descended from Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter. They are also taken as the most 
elaborated example of corrupt Islam by the Bhadala. As argued in Chapter 3, Saiyeds 
are seen as being closer to Mohammed, and the divine, because of their blood. The 
inherent immutable qualities in this descent line are captured in the term barakat 
(commonly baraka), which is conventionally taken to mean the blessing, holiness 
and spiritual power inherent in a saint (Metcalf 1984:373). In this thesis, the term 
barakat is used in a broader social sense, as a quality that is not only reserved for 
descendants of the Prophet. Gellner argues that ‘baraka’ is also manifest in
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prosperity and magical powers (1969:xvii), which he further argues is about as close 
to the sociologist’s notion of ‘charisma’ as one could hope to find (1969:12), albeit 
routinised through kinship. It is argued that the material facts of prosperity and 
success are also infused with the quality of barakat. Although the ‘kind* of charisma 
to which such ideas are tied varies from Saiyed to seth both figures are seen as 
embodying barakat.
A living expression of barakat is the degree of congruence between the ideal 
model of the Prophet and the individual seth, Saiyed and some others. The relative 
status of individuals within the divine hierarchy is, to a large part, determined by 
their social performance. Public actions and the condition of the soul are seen as 
having a reciprocal relationship, likewise, social boundaries are based on wealth, 
status, and the natural facts of blood and substance. Equally important are the less 
tangible attributes, such as claims to august lineage, the possession of sacred 
knowledge and a reputation for piety and civility. For the most part, charismatic 
figures are attributed with positive aspects of all of the above. However, such claims 
are mutually reinforcing: traders (Bhadalas) acquire a reputation for piety through 
patronage of religious sites, just as Saiyeds also accrue considerable wealth from 
attracting large numbers of devotees. Likewise, there is the question of the 
appropriateness of behaviour. A young shipyard apprentice holding his posture and 
serenity as if he were a saint would be strongly disapproved of, and besides, he 
would not be able to labour.
In Mandvi, carefully measured behaviour modelled on the example of the Prophet 
is described as adat, which is frequently conflated with the term adab. Metcalf offers 
a very general definition of adab as comprehensively referring to knowledgeable 
discrimination, correct order, behaviour, taste, refinement and respect (1984:2-4). 
Although Metcalf never makes explicit the relationship between the image of the 
Prophet and adab, the implication in her work is that one is a reflection of the other. 
This perspective, that ideal behaviour (as a form of adat) is a reflection of the ideal 
of moral exemplification offered by the Prophet, is also taken here. However, into
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this equation the qualities of barakat, as signs of prosperity and magical (mediating) 
abilities, should be introduced. In this sense adat and barakat are to be considered in 
the same light as pervasive social qualities and attributes that, although concentrated 
in certain lineages, are not certainly restricted to those lineages. Charismatic 
individuals appear closer to the image of the Prophet for the reasons discussed above, 
which in turn means they have positively evaluated adat and barakat, but they are 
never equal to his image. It follows that those who appear next to eminent 
individuals also benefit from their proximity to the divine, and so on. In Chapter 7, 
this hierarchy is shown to have a pronounced material expression, evidenced by an 
analysis of commodity flows. The pervasive sense of social organisation is that if 
you cannot be a mountain yourself then you should attach yourself to one.
In the ethnographic material presented in following chapters parallels are drawn 
between the divine figure of the Prophet and other related conceptions of eminence 
such as kingship, sainthood and ship owning. Both forms of charismatic leadership, 
of saints and seths, are related to the figure of the Prophet Mohammed and both draw 
upon his image and his model for behaviour. However, the first relies heavily on 
notions of descent and patrimony, while the latter relies more on legitimising a 
model of religion among clients in which seths appear closer to Allah because of 
their abundant wealth and their ability to patronise a particular vision of Islamic 
purity.
1.55. Learning
The relationship between an individual and the divine model is prefaced with the 
idea that there is a reciprocal relationship between outer actions and the inner 
condition of the soul. However, the habits and postures of the Prophet exist in the 
hadith literature, which to predominantly illiterate shipyard apprentices remains in 
the abstract. Therefore, a key relationship is between those who embody exemplary 
characteristics and their aspirants. This in turn requires a conception of appropriate 
relations of learning between ‘masters’ and ‘apprentices’. Muslim social life,
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relationships and political life have a close relationship to religious law. Therefore, it 
follows that ‘expertise on proper social arrangements, and on matters pertaining to 
God, are one and the same thing’ (Gellner 1981:1). In this thesis three conceptions 
and styles of learning are addressed. The first is the recent anthropological literature 
on what has become known as ‘practice theory’, as exemplified by the work of Jean 
Lave and Seth Chaiklin (1993) discussed in Chapter 5. The second is an attempt at 
describing an ‘ethnographic practice theory’ through an examination of how 
apprentices in shipyards consider their attention to task and detail (see chapters 5 and 
6). The third, discussed primarily in Chapter 7, is the style of learning that has been 
traditionally dominant in Mandvi. The most common form of religious learning in 
Muslim society is at the Koran school, and while Koran schools are an important part 
of Muslim education in Mandvi, the dominant style of education remains the long­
term apprenticeship to a spiritual master, also reflected in commercial 
apprenticeships. In this relationship the student is supposed to behave as if they were 
a ‘dead body in the hands of its cleanser’ (Eickelman 1981:225), that is to say 
malleable in mind, body and wealth before the Saiyed. In Chapter 7, it is argued that 
this model underlies the basis of shipyard apprenticeship and that the same qualities 
of adat and barakat ascribed to the Saiyed also surround the seth -  although in 
different forms. The transformation from one system to the other is expressed and 
experienced in crossing the river, from dar al-kafir to dar al-islam.
1.56. Tradition: 1 say unto you ... but it is written
The kajir-islam opposition is equated to a traditional-modern dichotomy and marked 
by the river. ‘Tradition’ and ‘traditional’ are words that appear frequently in the 
following chapters and some word of explanation is needed before moving on to the 
discussion of fundamentalism below. The terms ‘traditional’ and ‘modem’ are not 
used in this thesis as referents to social evolution that gradually divests society of 
religious identity, and as such is a departure from Weber’s characterisation of 
modernity and Islam (see Huff and Schluchter 1999). It is common in 
anthropological writing to deny the legitimacy of the opposition of the traditional and
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the modem as false value-laden judgements (see Boyer 1990). However, religious 
tension is expressed in these terms in shipyards and appears as such within this 
thesis. This distinction is necessarily asymmetrical: ‘rationality’ (in a sense) ranks 
above ‘superstition’ and ‘corruption’. This division also carries with it a model of 
time that is based upon the biographies of movement of the Bhadala and their 
perceptions of the distant past when they lived in ignorance as Hindus. It is important 
to note that the Bhadala deny ‘tradition’ in their practices, rather, they see what they 
do as new and as a deliberate rejection of what they construe to be traditional. In this 
sense, the Bhadala seths deviate from Weber’s characterisation of charismatic leaders 
because they do not hark back to an idealised past, which for Weber was a key 
instrument of charismatic leadership.
It is shown in chapters 4 and 6 that the Bhadala do not hold a cherished version of 
the past as their model of social perfection. However, in order for the reform process 
to work they have to invent the traditions of ‘others’. These ‘others’ are Mandvi’s 
Muslims and Hindus, who are variously placed on a social evolutionary trajectory. 
Hindus are the most primitive life form, of middle rank are Mandvi’s Muslims, while 
the ultimate product of this trajectory are the Bhadala themselves. This language 
importantly gives a spatial dimension to time, where population movements, such as 
the Bhadalas’ hijra, plot onto the landscape their own past and their own modernity. 
This language uses idioms such as deshi (that of the country) to refer to the 
negatively constructed past; whilepak (pure), saru (good), ‘proper’, and line uppa 
chhe (on the line) refer to the positively evaluated modernity. These terms are 
pervasive and refer to people, religious practices, life styles and commodities.
The evaluative descriptions of ‘others’ are drawn from the experiences of Bhadala 
men with rival populations. In this sense, the invention of the traditions of ‘others’ is 
produced from social interaction that involves a specific distribution of roles between 
people, a specific type of criteria to evaluate their utterances, and specific kinds of 
representation about social categories, such as that offered by religious texts. One of 
the roles played by texts is to represent a particular type of legitimacy that is
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associated more with the power relations between men than it is to the text itself. As 
is shown to be the case with MacMurdo’s earthquake reports, text is an important 
marker of legitimacy. However, rather than textual inscription only acting as a source 
of fixed information (see Boyer 1990:114; and Goody 1968:1-3), the content of the 
text is often immaterial in relation to the material it is presented as containing. In this 
case the text is presented as saying that the earthquake of 1819 dammed the source of 
irrigation water for Kachchh. The fact that the text does not say this is immaterial, 
rather, legitimacy is drawn from the fact that this interpretation is attached to a text 
well known to exist. This process is further exacerbated by the power relations 
involved in conveying this kind of information. Typically, a teacher would inform a 
class or a journalist would inform the readership of a newspaper that the earthquake 
associated with Muslims caused the drought conditions that today prevail in 
Kachchh. In both cases the power relationships are highly skewed in favour of the 
narrator. Likewise, when a senior sailor says to an apprentice “it says in the Koran 
that you should not urinate in the direction of the sun because you will get a 
headache”, he is doing the same thing: I say unto you ... but it is written. Such 
mediation is not fully enchanted in the eyes of the recipient, because when a rich 
man does not tell the truth people will say that he does, and when a poor man tells 
the truth people may say he lies. But the examples of shipyard humour discussed in 
Chapter 6 reinforce this general point.
1.57. Fundamentalism?
The new minarets that tower above Salaya are signs of the Bhadalas’ new wealth and 
religious identity, and a reflection of the source of inspiration for their religious 
activities. The style of architecture is taken from the Gulf States. Mosques are the 
pre-eminent sign of Islamic piety and devotion in the village. The process of 
strengthening Islamic identity is variously called extremism, revivalism, 
fundamentalism or a return to the fundamentals. Throughout this thesis the term 
‘reform’ is used because the process that is occurring in Salaya is just that: a 
reforming of the structure of religious hierarchy and the markers of orthodoxy.
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There seem to be two broad positions on the nature of Islamic reform. The first 
sees it as something of an illusion because it has always been going on. The second 
sees it as a new phenomenon that is a recent product of nationalist politics and 
education. This thesis is based on the assumption that it has been going on for at least 
a thousand years in the region, but that the form it takes in the present is unique 
because of the particular biographies of its sponsors. The kind of reform movement 
under consideration is not well organised, does not have offices or officials to speak 
of, and does not appear as texts, banners or emblems. In this sense it is quite unlike 
the Wahhabist movement in Arabia in the eighteenth century, the Sanusi movement 
in Libya that battled with Turks and later with Italians (Evans-Pritchard 1954) or the 
Mahdist movement of Sudan who were pitched against the Egyptians and the British 
(Lewis 1961). Neither is it like the Tablighi-Jamat, Deoband or Bareilly schools of 
ulema in India (see Robinson 1997; and van der Veer 1992,1994). These religious 
movements and schools are based firmly on texts and to varying degrees attempt to 
invoke their own vision of purity in religious action and thought. In Salaya the aims 
are more modest, the scripture less cited, the methods less orthodox, and although it 
is clearly an elite phenomenon, such elites would scarcely be considered as such 
outside the context in which they are eminent. However, reform in Salaya has three 
things in common with these movements: there are identifiable ‘others’, which in 
Salaya means Hindus and Mandvi’s Muslims, all are part of the ‘universal’ aspect of 
dyadic tension inherent in Islam, and all have experienced problems in the 
containment of charisma.
Despite these similarities there are two important differences between reform 
among the Bhadala and other reform movements. The first, as has already been 
mentioned, is the absence of an idealised past; and the second relates to the process 
of identifying corrupt or foreign practices. A typical characterisation of Islamic 
reform would run as follows: select fundamental principles are evoked in response to 
perceived oppression that revolves around a politically expedient re­
conceptualisation of the past; and through this process society is purged of foreign
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complications, accretions and infiltrations. Both main elements of this process, the 
reinvention of the past and the location of the ‘foreign’, are given particular attention 
throughout this thesis. In the case of ‘the past’ the findings presented counter the 
assumption that reform movements are always based on an ‘ideal’ moment in 
history, while locating and describing the ‘foreign’ is shown to be one of the base 
metaphors of local Muslim society through which people, things and religious 
practices are understood. The social environment has been formed by historically 
contingent evaluations of the meanings of movement and migration, which has led to 
different values being ascribed to different origins. As a result, and as shown in 
subsequent chapters, defining what belongs and is authentic and what is adjunct and 
corrupt is a complicated process.
1.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, the tensions, conflicts and themes that produce and represent 
divisions among Muslims have been outlined. Although to understand the context in 
which religious reform has developed it is vital to emphasise migration and trade, it 
is also important to examine the ‘Indian’ context. The events that have conditioned 
Bhadala relations with local Hindus and the ways in which the language of Hindu 
nationalism depicts Muslims have also been described. However, Salaya’s Muslims 
are also Indian. Their historical consciousness is very significantly inflected by the 
fact that they operate from what was, until independence, a Rajput state. In this 
sense, to use a nautical metaphor, they inhabit the realms between the devil and the 
deep blue sea, or, to put it another way, between the social realities of India and the 
Islamic world. Saying that Muslim merchants and sailors of Mandvi inhabit a realm 
between regions and ethnographic traditions is one thing, but locating them within 
that lacuna is a different matter. This again leads back to the question of travel and 
migration. The lives of sailors and merchants are unlike those of landlubbers, for 
nine months of the year they are at sea or in foreign ports, they know different things, 
speak different languages and long for their home with passions unknown to those 
who have never left. They understand riffles and breakers, clouds, seabirds, the moon
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and the effects of these things for wooden vessels cradled in the lap of the ocean. 
They also know prices and fluctuations in different markets and they move between 
nation states and continents, staking their lives on profit, trade and voyage.
The next chapter explores the profundity of the division between those who sail 
and travel and those who do not. This discussion primarily focuses on the Hindu 
tradition that developed in the dual context of Rajput kingdom and diaspora. The 
focus is on Hindus because despite the enhanced salience of religious identity as a 
marker of social separation in the present, I believe that Kachchhi Hindus and 
Muslims have much in common, not least their love of home in relation to the perils 
of the Indian Ocean. The themes of contest between Kharvas and Bhadalas are 
primarily expressed in religious terms, but throughout the chapters that follow a 
number of signs and metaphors of social differentiation frequently occur that are not 
typically associated with religious polarisation. These include birds, horses, ships and 
colours (other than saffron and green), as well as more abstract associations with 
insanity, sexuality, immorality, acumen, blood, status and patterns of leadership. The 
fact that there is such competition to possess, dispossess and purge particular signs in 
social traditions points to common humanity of the men of Mandvi and Salaya.
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Chapter 2.
Royal endogeny and mercantile exogeny: a model 
of littoral society
2.1. Tradition in ethnography of peninsular Gujarat
This chapter lays the foundations for an argument that runs throughout subsequent 
chapters, on the domestication of foreign knowledge and how unregulated alien 
powers are transformed into a source of liberation or prestige. Highlighted is an 
ethnographic division in the population between ‘boundary maintainers’ and 
‘boundary transgressors’. Those in the latter category are the focus of the remaining 
chapters.
The ethnography of peninsular Gujarat (Kachchh and Saurashtra) repeatedly 
points to a structural division between religious, political and social ideologies of 
rulers and traders. In the nineteenth century Mrs Postens observed:
As a race they [Kachchhis] are proud, dishonest, indolent and cunning; sufficiently 
ingenious as workmen, and by no means indifferent to the possession of money. To 
explain this seeming inconsistency in the Cutchee character, it will be necessary to 
remark that, the population consists of two distinct classes: the military class; and those 
who reside in towns, and follow trade, or other civil occupations. The former devote 
themselves to luxurious sensuality, whilst the latter are ... grasping and avaricious 
(1839a:268).
Postens’ observations signal the start of a tradition in the ethnography of 
peninsular Gujarat in which the two populations are clearly demarcated and their 
opposition is viewed as constitutive of dominant social processes. In the shadow of 
James Tod’s monumental ‘Annals and Antiquities’ (1873), the same division is 
reiterated in various volumes of ‘Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency’ (1884—1901) 
and in R. Enthoven’s compendium ‘Tribes and castes of Bombay’ (1920). N. 
Thoothi’s 1935 publication ‘The Vaishnavas of Gujarat’ was the first work based on
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‘fieldwork’ to suggest a radical social divide based on forms of religious practice 
common among rulers and traders. A.M. Shah and R.G. Shroffs influential article 
‘The Vahlvanca Barots of Gujarat’ mentions a division between Rajputs and traders, 
in terms of the way that they construct their lineages (1958:270—271). David Pocock 
published two articles on caste configuration in Gujarat (1957a, 1957c), and an 
altogether less conclusive article on social differentiation among Gujaratis in East 
Africa (1957b). Together, these articles later informed ‘Mind, Body and Wealth’, in 
which Pocock argues that members of the Patidar caste are shifting from devi 
(goddess) devotional ritual practices and beliefs as they attempt to internally 
homogenise their identity and increase their status within Gujarati society (1973). In 
other words, Pocock viewed the Patidar as having shifted from identifying with the 
traditions of rulers to identifying with those of traders. Harold Tambs-Lyche takes up 
this mantel in his three-volume Ph.D. thesis ‘Power and Devotion, Religion and 
Society in Saurashtra’ (1992), which rigidly divides society into ‘kings’ and 
‘merchants’. In this work, as the title suggests, different religious orientations of 
dominant groups are seen to reflect a profound sociological schism: rulers evoke 
shakti (power) of feminine goddesses; while traders are associated with bhakti 
(devotion) as Vaishnavas (those following the incarnations of Vishnu). In a 
subsequent article he argues:
The frameworks for these [ruler -  trader] conceptualizations are different. One is firmly 
based in Rajput tradition, and assimilates Saurashtra to Rajasthan, not to Gujarat. The 
other centres on trade and an urban view of “civilisation”. Such frames, by reason of 
their difference, need to be studied and analysed separately (1994:749).
His thesis was substantially revised before its publication as ‘Power, Profit and 
Poetry’ (1997), and I take the analysis presented in this later publication as the 
archetypal model for social segmentation in peninsular Gujarat because it is based 
firmly in the ethnographic tradition outlined above. Here, Tambs-Lyche argues that 
religion and political alliance cement divisions between rulers and traders:
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Hinduism in Saurashtra is not a unitary phenomenon. Its constituent elements may be 
interpreted to form a ‘unity in diversity’ - a view held particularly by Brahmans in the 
traditional set-up - but, on the regional level, Hinduism tends to dissolve into several 
mutually conflicting sub-systems. The chief opposition, here, parallels the structure of 
power and economic relations; it divides the merchants from most other communities.
Thus there is a structural contradiction between rulers and merchants, parties which are 
nevertheless dependent on each other in forming traditional Saurashtrian society.
Behind the rulers stand the rural, agricultural population, in an alliance known as the ter 
tansali or ‘thirteen castes’. The opposition between merchants and rulers, then, is more 
than just a conflict between the elite; it integrates the rulers with ‘the people’ and 
isolates the merchants from them (1997:10).
In this view social division is not of equal competitive groups but a force that 
alienates traders from the political mandate of rulers and vassal. Tambs-Lyche’s 
‘merchant—ruler opposition’ (1997:228) is a difference of ‘two world views’ 
(1997:224) that encompasses residence, attitude, profession, social status, religious 
propriety and transactional preference. This division persuasively conforms to social 
stereotypes held in western India about the character of the traditional rulers and the 
accompanying ‘trading’ cohort. Rulers are famously known as ‘Rajputs’ of the varna 
category of Kshatriya. Traders are infamous as ‘Vanias’ or ‘Banias’ of the varna 
category of Vaishya. Generally, a ‘Rajput’ is regarded as belonging to one of the 
legendary ruling ‘clans’, while a ‘Vania’ is a trader. The former stereotype 
emphasises lineage, descent and territory, while the latter synchronically focuses on 
occupation. In Mandvi, ‘Rajput’ and ‘Vania’ are given a slightly different gloss and 
this, as argued throughout this chapter, reflects the alternative view of social 
organisation offered by the ethnography of the coastal regions of the peninsular.
2.11. Stereotypes and Cultural models’
The art of stereotyping is formulaic and contextual: physical and mental 
characteristics, location, dress, diet, linguistic colloquialisms, and general 
dispositions are commonly used to portray ‘others’. In this light, ‘Rajputs’ are sturdy, 
moustached, hot-blooded, mentally slow, turbaned, rural agriculturalists, consumers
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of meat and alcohol, Kachchhi speaking, and prone to violence. This is clearly not 
exactly how Rajputs perceive themselves. They may accept many of these 
accusations, but as positive traits. Generally speaking, Rajputs themselves use the 
term as an explicit association with nobility, royalty and courage — derived from 
Rajputra — the son of a king. In Kachchh, the dominant image of ‘Rajputs’ is akin to 
the image of ruling Jadejas, the highest in the hypergamic order of Rajputs of 
peninsular Gujarat (Shah and Shroff 1958:265). ‘Rajput’ (derogatorily bapu), also 
describes Hindu Kshatriya agriculturalists and pastoralists. Although in Mandvi, 
‘Rajput’ is not used interchangeably with ‘Kshatriya’, as in other parts of northern 
India. The main reason for this is that the vast majority of the population, both Hindu 
and Muslim, claim general Kshatriya ancestry. Thus, the salience of a claim to be 
Kshatriya, is of little import when it barely distinguishes the ancestry of a Hindu 
claimant from a Muslim neighbour.
Traders, on the other hand, are stereotyped as thin, mealy, clean-shaven, cold­
blooded, calculating, mean, cunning, urban, vegetarian, Kachchhi speaking, 
parsimonious, grasping and avaricious indeed. In Mandvi, ‘Vania’ refers 
predominantly to Jains, not to Hindu traders, moneylenders or brokers in general 
terms. Assiduous British Government servants of the nineteenth century were aware 
of this distinction, classifying Hindu merchants separately from the ‘Vania’ 
population (see G.B.P. Vol. IX. Part l:ii).
This chapter offers an alternative perspective, rather than an iconoclastic assault 
on ethnographic convention. Mandvi is a littoral town on the margins of peninsular 
Gujarat and data presented here conflicts with the premises on which the model 
outlined above is based. The view proffered from the shoreline is not obscure 
because the ports were of utmost importance. In the nineteenth century, rulers of the 
regional states, comprising modem Gujarat, grew increasingly dependent on the 
ports and on those who controlled the flow of resources through them. However, 
most reliant on those controlling the ports was the general population. Migration 
from Kachchh was undertaken predominantly by ship and, as a result, those with
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trading fleets had a monopoly on the distribution of Kachchh’s most precious 
resource: its people (the subjects of royalty).
Who controlled the ports and the flows of goods, wealth and people? The short 
answer is that it was neither the rulers nor traders stereotyped above. Tambs-Lyche 
argues that ‘Banias’ formed the ‘core of the traders’ and, although ‘this category 
never monopolised trade completely’; they are ‘the cultural model of the trader’ 
(1997:246). This is simply not true for littoral Kachchh. The traditional ports of 
Mandvi, Mundra and Anjar in Kachchh, and arguably Jamnagar, Porbunder and 
Vereval in Saurashtra (all with significant numbers of Vanias) are economically and 
socially dominated by Hindu and Muslim traders, who neither describe themselves, 
nor are described by others, as ‘Banias’. And while Tambs-Lyche (1997:245) and 
Pocock (1973:115) note the anomalous position of such groups, neither illustrates 
just how far the power and influence of these non-Vania groups extends into local 
populations or into the Indian Ocean region. These groups are enmeshed in complex 
networks throughout the Indian Ocean in which they function as merchants, brokers 
and financiers. They are traders in every sense (and I refer to them as such in this 
chapter) — but not ‘Vanias’ in any sense. This chapter focuses on the role of this 
small, but vitally important, aggregate of castes known as mahajan, which literally 
means ‘great man’, ‘great life’, ‘magnate’ or ‘great procession’. Here it refers 
primarily to a self-administering mercantile guild, its institutions and its members. 
There are two mahajans in Mandvi, Lohana and Bhatiya, and in each case, guild and 
population are coterminous and exclusive.
Although this chapter does not focus on the role of gifting and constituency 
building, important ideas throughout the thesis and in terms of mahajan organisation, 
it is relevant to briefly say something on them in relation to the debate outlined 
above. Following Gloria Rajeha’s distinction between the ‘right to give’ and the 
‘obligation to receive’ (1988), and McKim Marriot’s distinction between ‘maximal’ 
and ‘minimal’ transactors (1976), Tambs-Lyche suggests that the transactional aims 
and motivations of rulers and traders also differ:
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The first exploit the transaction to gain rank; the second avoid it to escape being 
outranked. While the Bania [trader], avoiding contact to escape impurity, is an example 
of the latter, the king or dominant caste exemplifies the former. Thus an aristocrat, and 
consequently a Rajput, should appear as a donor in as many situations as possible 
(1997:103).
In Kachchh, the ruler’s propensity to give is based on his religious position as 
sacrificer and his dominant position within the kingdom. The argument presented 
here relies on the ritual centrality of the rulers (see Raheja 1988), but, rather than the 
position of the dominant land-holding caste being grounded in a simple centre- 
periphery ritual configuration, it is argued, that in Mandvi the ritual centrality of the 
king is recreated by traders within the encompassing fold of rulers. In other words, 
traders’ ritual and social organisation replicates that of their rulers. Traders have 
vassals with whom they entertain relationships of transaction and their own sense of 
kingdoms over which they rule. Certainly the prestations of traders are related to 
gaining status and appearing as benefactors, but the poison in their gifts is drawn 
from foreign lands. Status gains are related to what Mattison Mines calls 
‘institutional big-manship’, where the big-man, typically the leader of a mahajan or a 
philanthropic institution that is part of a mahajan, attracts a following by the benefits 
he provides. In return, his followers reward him with prestige and an eminent 
reputation, attributes that give him influence and discretion among his constituents 
(Mines 1994:56—58). However, such prestigious gains are limited to social ranks on 
a par with the big-man and lower, and institutional giving does little to alter position 
within the social hierarchy -  outside of his caste or client group.
For the previous two centuries Mandvi’s traders have had vast economic, political 
and ritual client networks, and successful traders have always become philanthropists 
with varying degrees of success. There has been no eminent Mandvi trader in the last 
two centuries without a more or less eminent philanthropic reputation. Thus the ritual 
and social transactional patterns of both rulers and traders are remarkably similar 
within their own social fields. Status is gained and maintained by displaying a
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propensity to give and by creating recipient client networks. The ruler’s desire to 
maintain the integrity of his kingdom is calculated in making prestations — just as 
traders’ profits are balanced into the equation -  and in an ideal world, neither gives 
away all that they have. Among traders, the apparent paternalism of rulers is replaced 
with philanthropy, and there is also a considerable overlap between the transactional 
domains of the two groups.
The assertion that traders are benefactors and philanthropists calls into question 
the related assumption that traders are isolated and without constituency. Brokers in 
hinterlands may not entertain constituents (Fox 1969), but the success of Mandvi’s 
traders is based on developing and maintaining large constituencies within the local 
population. Mandvi’s traders have durable relations with shipbuilders and sailors, as 
well as with those they employed in their firms in Mandvi and overseas. This 
observation is not an incidental, because the following chapters rely on the empirical 
fact that traders, as merchants and as ship owners, had sizeable followings, over 
which they exercised considerable power and influence. The assumption is made that 
although the communities involved in ‘trading’ and ‘sailing’ have changed, the 
structure of the relationships that organise the various activities retains some degree 
of continuity over time. For now it is sufficient to say that traders have local power 
and support, which in part comes from their transactional intentions.
In terms of the stereotypes presented above, the division of society into rulers and 
traders poses very few problems, however, from the empirical perspective of an 
urban coastal trading centre, there are a series of difficulties in justifying such a 
division. These themes are explored in the following sections of the chapter in order 
to highlight the shortcomings of the dominant social model of peninsular Gujarat and 
to suggest an alternative.
The ethnography of Mandvi’s traders also poses a series of general problems for 
wider anthropological interpretations of Indian society. The term ‘Vania’ as a general 
gloss for Gujarati traders is simply not appropriate. It has no currency in indigenous
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understandings of Mandvi’s dominant traders, nor do those traders embody the exact 
sociological qualities against which ‘Vanias’ are stereotyped. Secondly, the 
separation of traders from rulers and agriculturalists, long thought of as a conceptual 
problem in understanding Indian society (Fox 1969; Mines 1984; and Tripathi 1984), 
cannot simply be sustained in terms of land-holding, religious tradition or social 
heritage. Of course tendencies towards particular religious or political affiliations 
exist among identifiable populations, however the problem posed in the remaining 
section of this chapter is to determine how far some of the supposed traits are 
empirically verifiable and how far they are stereotypical. The evidence presented 
suggests that there is no analytically sustainable division between rulers and traders 
taking conventional sociological measurements as a benchmark, but a division 
(broadly between rulers and traders) exists in terms of rituals and expectations 
towards the boundary of the land of Kachchh. In short, the alternative presented 
divides the population into categories of endogenous and exogenous tendency. The 
endogenous is exemplified by kingship, which is intimately related to the land and 
soils of Kachchh, while the ethereal realm beyond is outside limits of royal 
governance. Protection and power within the kingdom are reproduced through the 
interaction of its own constitutive elements (endogenous). In opposition to this 
traders draw on similar conceptions of power and lineage, but generate power and 
wealth exogenously (from outside the kingdom).
2.2. Kings and kingdom
Kachchh was one of around 565 semi-independent kingdoms in India. It was ruled 
by Jadejas from the sixteenth century until 1948. Within the principal domain were 
smaller Jadeja fiefdoms, which were ‘autonomous’ tributaries of the state, while 
others were provincial towns under direct rule from the centre. Also within these 
domains there were villages and hamlets with lesser headmen, who together formed a 
political unit known as the Bhayad (younger brethren and political subordinates of 
the main Jadeja lineage). Political authority, although having a centre at the royal 
court assembly (Durbar) in Bhuj, was dispersed throughout the kingdom into
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provincial political centres, which formed ritual and political microcosms of the 
central Jadeja lineage. Throughout this thesis the term ‘Durbar’ refers to rulers and 
their representatives, whose interests and activities ideally coincide at a gadi 
(‘throne’, central seat of power) in Bhuj. The Durbar is thus a broad collection of 
people, buildings and institutions connected through ritual and ideological 
elaboration. At the head of the Durbar, presiding over the kingdom, sat the King, a 
relationship succinctly described by Christopher Fuller:
the king’s first responsibility is to protect his kingdom and subjects, by guaranteeing 
their safety, prosperity, and well-being. But these depend on preserving the order of the 
kingdom in the widest sense, so that, for example, the king is responsible for 
maintaining the hierarchical caste system within his realm; he must protect the 
privileges of Brahmans and the rights of all the different castes, confirm their relative 
rank, and uphold the authority of caste courts. Order in the kingdom, moreover, is 
ultimately continuous with order in the universe; the kingdom is correspondingly 
conceptualized as a micro-cosm of the universe and ideally their boundaries coincide.
To put it differently, the order of the kingdom is itself part of the sociocosmic order or 
dharma, and it is ultimately preserved by king and deity together rather than by king 
alone (1992:106).
Together, Jadeja and the deity Ashapura Mata (hope giving mother) preserve the 
kingdom of Kachchh. Mataji (respected mother), as she is popularly known, is the 
Jadeja kuldevi. This literally translates as ‘lineage goddess’, however Mataji is 
simultaneously a tutelary goddess, a royal deity and a state deity. An integral part of 
ruling power, Mataji is the source (and representative) of shakti (power) in the 
kingdom, and is commonly linked to the earth as soil and territory (Fuller 1992:44). 
In this sense, she is identified specifically with the lands of Kachchh and with the 
rulers, who are literally sons of the soil. Vital in the relationship between deity and 
king is the royal lineage, which is also derived from and perpetuated by Mataji 
shakti. This relationship is complex and is informed by other symbols of royal power 
(throne, sword, turban, horse, palace and city walls) and non-Brahman mediators (see 
below). As the Durbar is to the Bhayad so the Mataji is to kuldevis of fief lineages.
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Thus, gradations of Goddess and territory are hierarchically ordered, but 
encompassed by the apical Mataji and Jadeja.
As with other kingdoms, the disintegration (after independence) of Kachchh as a 
political entity only partially eroded the Mataji’s power and the significance of 
kingship as a socio-religious institution. The importance of the Mataji remains strong 
(and is growing), replicating traditions of the past in the absence of actual political 
authority in the post-independence era. During Navaratri (nine nights), the festival 
most closely associated with kings, tens of thousands make pagyatra (pilgrimage on 
foot) into the barren interior of Kachchh to venerate Mataji in the hamlet of Matana 
Madh (Mataji’s place). The pilgrims’ slow progress (from Mandvi it is over 100km) 
is accompanied by shouts of ‘jay Mataji' (life to the Goddess), a slogan with 
communal and nostalgic overtones (also Tambs-Lyche 1996). As an evocation of 
Hindu power within a Hindu kingdom, it has become a rallying cry for Hindu 
exclusivity. Among the most popular camps providing free food and massage along 
the route, are those sponsored by Hindu nationalist organisations. The number of 
pilgrims has grown hugely since the mid-1980s, a reflection of the saffron wave that 
has swept through western India in recent decades. While taking rest in a roadside 
camp, I listened to a man encourage weary pilgrims to chant by saying: “If we shout 
loud enough they will hear the power of the Mataji in Pakistan.” However, the 
concern of most of the pilgrims has a more localised focus than the political 
boundaries of the nation state. The power inherent in the lands of a bounded kingdom 
is directed specifically towards the unwanted Muslim presence in the territory. The 
kingdom continues to be a ritualised ordering of gods, people and power, and the 
land boundary co-terminates with the cosmological construction of the kingdom. 
However, the relationship between rulers and traders can be defined historically 
(with traces in the present) through the role of the boundary.
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2.3. Traders and kingdom
Historically, Kachchhi traders disrupted the ideal social and ritual ordering of the 
kingdom, and those who voyaged to Zanzibar and Muscat generated autonomous 
power from realms over which the Durbar had no moral or physical influence. This is 
a general tendency in the history of Kachchh, which periodically led to disputes 
relating to taxation and allegations of corruption (see below). Additionally, the 
integrity of the kingdom traditionally rested principally at the fixed centre, but 
throughout the colonial period a greater emphasis was placed on boundaries. The 
boundary came to express the earthly limits of divine Jadeja sanction, and the 
activities of traders literally transgressed that boundary. They entered into other 
kingdoms, realms and hierarchical orders outside the jurisdiction of Jadejas.
Land boundaries are expressions of rival, and perhaps conflicting, claims to power 
and governance. Throughout the nineteenth century, a significant proportion of 
British involvement with Princely States in western India was with land disputes.
The popularity of British arbitrators reflected the expansionist tendencies of these 
states. Rulers converted traditional aggression through the sword into aggression 
through the courts, and ‘boundaryism’ became a strategic science. The geography of 
Kachchh creates a naturally bounded territory. The Rann to the east, north and west 
forms a buffer zone between Kachchh and the neighbouring states of Morvi, 
Jamnagar, Okha and the territories of the Sindh. Land-locked boundaries formed by 
natural features proved relatively easy to defend, however, the southern coastline of 
Kachchh stretches for many hundreds of kilometres. Military strategy did not extend 
to the protection of the littoral regions, and piracy was the only military tradition in 
the waters off the coast. Thus, the boundary regularly transgressed by the traders was 
the coastal one over which rulers had least control.
The traders (not ‘Vanias’) that voyaged from Kachchh were Hindu and Muslim, 
with the majority of the Hindus being Lohanas and Bhatiyas, while the Muslims 
were both Shia and Sunni. Shia groups were Vohra (Daudi), Aga Khani Khoja
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(followers of the Aga Khan) and Isna Ashari Khoja (followers of Irani Ayatollahs). 
The Sunnis were Kachchhi Memons. These groups share similar traditions of 
migration through the western part of the sub-continent. Starting in the Punjab 
around 1,000 years ago, they migrated south along Indus trade routes before settling 
variously in northern Kachchh. Once in Kachchh they became agriculturalists, until 
the beginning of the nineteenth century when they started to move towards the coast 
to trade. This is the popular version of migration history at the present time. The 
history and mythological traditions of traders is further inter-related because the 
Muslim traders are Hindu converts, and both Hindus and Muslims share this vision 
of the past. Memons claim to be converted Lohanas (Lohanas claim that Memons are 
converted Lohanas and so on), Khojas claim to be converted Bhatiyas, and Vohras 
claim to be converted Brahmans. At the time of these ‘conversions’ (placed variously 
between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries), the ‘identity’ of these ‘Hindu’ 
origin communities was clearly different from how they appear today.
The ‘trading’ groups follow exclusive sectarian practices that have been adopted 
at various times since the seventeenth century (thus only partially overlapping with 
the period of ‘conversion’). Lohanas follow the Saurashtrian saint Jelaram Bapu and 
have their own non-Brahmanical temple dedicated to the deity Dariyalal (Lord of the 
Sea), entrance to which is limited to members of the Lohana Mahajan. Bhatiyas 
follow the Vaishnava Pushti Marga (see below). The three Shia groups have distinct 
clerical hierarchies and constitutional frameworks (Engineer 1989), while Memons, 
as Sunnis, patronised particular shrines to the point of exclusivity. Frequently, 
religious congregation and trade association combined to form an exclusive 
information network based on trust. Violation of that trust invariably led to 
excommunication from the network.
These are not Mandvi’s only ‘trading’ communities. There are Jains (of which 
there are five divisions), Shivite Gosains, Hindu and Muslim Brahmkshtris (the latter 
being known as Khatris), Hindu Patels (of which there are two major divisions and 
numerous sub-divisions), and Hindu Sonis and their Muslim counterparts Sonaras.
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The Jain population of Kachchh, unlike their ‘brethren’ in Jamnagar (see Banks 
1992), seem to have been more reluctant to travel overseas, specialising in coastal 
routes, and trading agricultural products between mainland India (especially 
Ratnagiri) and Kachchh. Although very successful, especially in Bombay, the effects 
of the Kachchhi Jain diaspora are not as clearly marked as among the groups 
discussed here. The Gosains held an important place in trade networks (Postens 
1839a; and Bumes 1836), and it is possible that their Madh in Mandvi was a coastal 
node in a trade-network that stretched across northern India. The famous trader 
Sundeiji Sodagar (see below) was Brahmkshtri, and others of that caste conducted 
coastal trade, especially with Bombay. The Patels, particularly those that follow 
Swami Narayan (Pocock 1973; and Tambs-Lyche 1980a, 1980b), are the dominant 
rural community in Kachchh. Their emigration from the region occurred later 
(predominantly at the turn of the twentieth century) than the communities on which I 
focus, and they now form the single largest diasporic population. Mostly labourers, 
their migrations were not based on the organisation of mercantile capital in the 
Indian Ocean. Hindu Sonis largely followed the pattern of Jains. Sonaras were 
among the earliest modem traders from Kachchh, the majority of them from the 
fortified (and very beautiful) village of Sandan. Although some miles inland, this 
fiefdom probably had its own anchorage and had strong connections with ports of the 
Middle East long before Mandvi became a prominent port. However, the Sonaras’ 
success exists only in demagogic legend, as practically all that remains of them are 
derelict houses.
There have been many different migration patterns from Kachchh at different 
times, and the material presented here is not exhaustive, focusing mainly on inter­
connected populations based in Mandvi. These communities were sea-traders and 
seafarers and their organisation is unique because of the necessary division of labour 
between sea and land. The six traditional ‘trading’ groups have left indelible marks 
on the social topography of Mandvi. Rest houses, schools and charitable institutions 
bear individual and community names that attest to the generosity and success of 
‘trading’ patrons. Religious buildings, political monuments and street names display
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plaques commemorating the character and benevolence of long-dead dariyadils 
(those with hearts as wide as the ocean). Traders continue to dominate the character 
of the town, where Bhatiyas, Lohanas and Memons continue to live in considerable, 
if depleted, numbers. Khojas have all but left, while Vohras maintain a significant 
presence in the town because it is a pilgrimage site in their religious tradition.
The international patterns of population distribution found among these 
communities vary. For example, Aga Khani Khojas settled in large numbers in 
Zanzibar and Tanzania before settling in Canada, while Bhatiyas were concentrated 
mainly in Zanzibar and Oman. Broadly speaking, Hindu communities have 
maintained a relationship with Mandvi, while for Muslims, especially Khojas, this 
relationship has dwindled, and all that remains of them are their names, cemeteries 
and religious institutions. Occasional Khoja visitors temporarily awaken a sense of 
former grandeur in the homes of their ancestors’ former employees (clients). Hindus 
however, continue to have greater ritual and social obligations to Mandvi than 
Muslims. There are a number of reasons for this (for reasons why Muslims have left 
see Chapter 3). Throughout the early nineteenth century there was a strong social and 
ritual sanction placed on travel overseas by Hindu religious orthodoxy. For returning 
merchants this violation was, for the most part, compensated for with payments to 
religious institutions and pilgrimage to the Vaishnava sites of Ujjain, Nathdwara and 
Mathura. Although this clearly was not enough to prevent traders travelling overseas 
it does seem to have made them less reluctant to settle permanently abroad. Hindu 
women were not taken to East Africa until the 1870s, some fifty years after the 
mercantile expansion began, and vital Hindu ritual associations with Kachchh also 
necessitated regular return (see below). In summary, from the early nineteenth 
century the trading communities had clearly defined trade and finance networks, and 
international and transnational settlement patterns, that were firmly rooted in 
Kachchh.
In the decades following the 1819 earthquake mercantile social organisation led to 
group-specific patterns of migration and settlement in the Indian Ocean region.
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These groups were the commercial minds of the trade networks, each owning and 
managing fleets of ships, captains, crews and other labourers. Sailors were seldom 
traders; rather, they were drawn predominantly from three specialised groups. 
Hindus of the Kharva Samaj (society, community or caste) and Sunni Muslim 
Bhadalas were Kachchhi, while a third group of ‘slave’ or ‘indentured’ labour was 
recruited from Zanzibar and Oman. The overwhelming tendency was for Hindu 
traders to employ Kharva sailors, and to a lesser extent slave labour, while Muslim 
merchants recruited Bhadalas and slave labour in roughly equal numbers. Together, 
six groups of traders and two groups of ‘Indian’ sailors, form a distinct social group, 
which is referred to as ‘mercantile’ in the remaining chapters. The ‘mercantile’ 
communities shared similar, if competitive, interests, and they had common 
experiences of organising credit and trade networks through closed religious and 
commercial organisations. Furthermore, they shared experiences of travel, 
movement, the ways and vagaries of the sea, and of settling in foreign lands. During 
the nineteenth century a Hindu-Muslim division did not dictate interaction between 
traders. In Zanzibar, the merchants Bhatiya Jairam Shivji and Khoja Taria Topan, 
both influential figures within their respective communities, frequently protected 
each other’s interests against other non-Kachchhi parties. Indeed, the bitterest 
disputes occurred between the two groups of Khojas, both in India and in satellite 
communities overseas, yet both recruited from a common pool of Muslim sailors. 
The same is true for Lohanas and Bhatiyas, who although in competition, employed 
Kharva sailors. Ships were common to all groups, as were social and ritual cycles of 
wind and sea. The dominant social pattern is of dyadic relations between the six 
‘trading’ groups and the two groups of Kachchhi sailors, and not one of parallel 
‘caste’ hierarchies among Hindus and Muslims. In other words, each trading group 
operated discretely and had its own relations with a group of sailors. On the whole, 
however, trading communities operated autonomously from one another, seemingly 
displaying no more loyalty or distrust towards other ‘trading’ groups regardless of 
whether they were Hindu or Muslim. Sailors, on the other hand, were clearly split 
along a religious axis and were employed accordingly.
86
2.4. Bhatiyas
The following sections take as an example the population shifts and mercantile 
lifestyle of the Hindu Bhatiya Mahajan. They were the most successful indigenous 
trading community in western India throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries (Purandare 1997). Their main centre of population is presently Bombay, 
with lesser populations in Mandvi, Muscat, East Africa and beyond. The following 
ethnography is also a commentary on the division between trader and ruler outlined 
above.
2.41. Co-residence and urban—rural connections
Mandvi was founded as a trading port by Jadeja Khengaiji I and Bhatiya Topan Seth 
in v.s.1636 (Sampat [Guj.] v.s.l 990-1:108)2. The authority of ruler and enterprise of 
trader are seen as complementary in creating the town and within the fortified walls 
ruler and trader lived side-by-side. Jadejas ruled Kachchh from urban centres, 
principally from Bhuj, but also from over one hundred other fortified settlements. 
The model of ‘Rajputs’ used by aspiring rural folk (commonly ‘Rajputisation’) was 
essentially one of urban governance. It is accurate to connect Jadejas with ‘land’, as 
Tambs-Lyche does, but to see ‘land’ as rural and agricultural is clearly misleading. 
Jadeja seats of power were the only urban centres, and although Mandvi was for 
many years independent from Bhuj, it remained under Jadeja governance. 
Correspondingly, it is also inaccurate to associate traders solely with urban centres 
because all urban traders were landholders from rural villages with which they 
maintained important ritual and social connections.
2 For descriptions of the development of Mandvi port see: Bumes 1836; M. Postens 1839a, 1839b; T. 
Postens 1843; Sampat [Guj.] v.s.1990-1; Rushbrook Williams 1958:41-47; and Vaidya 1945. There is 
an extensive literature mapping the ancient history of trade in and around Kachchh, which is tied in 
with the literature on the Indus valley civilisations, the journeys of Alexander the Great and other 
early Greek and Arab accounts.
87
In the early years of the nineteenth century the age-old relationship between the 
ports of the Gulf of Kachchh and those of East Africa and The Persian Gulf entered 
into a new period of growth. The decline of Portuguese influence over western 
Indian Ocean waters and the expansion of British and the Imam of Muscat’s 
territories provided the necessary conditions for Kachchhi mercantile migration. This 
coincided with the rise of colonial Bombay as the principal port for the western 
seaboard. During this period Bhatiyas started to migrate from failing agricultural 
lands in the north and east of Kachchh. The origins of the formulaic life cycle of 
mercantile, caste-based apprenticeship, which characterises Bhatiya enterprise to this 
day, date from this time. By the 1870s it was normal practice amongst Bhatiya men 
to voyage by ship from Mandvi to Zanzibar, and, once there, serve a period of 
apprenticeship in an existing Bhatiya firm. In subsequent years the men would either 
move up the ranks within that firm, typically as an agent working on the credit or 
start trading on their own terms. After a few more years they would return to 
Kachchh to marry. Then they would spend the rest of their lives travelling back and 
forth between Zanzibar and Kachchh, before retiring to an extravagant bungalow in 
their homeland (often in a rural area). Up until the 1870s Bhatiya men lived in 
Zanzibar as single men, their affines remaining in Kachchh. These Bhatiya firms 
already established in Zanzibar employed, financed and managed the smooth arrival 
of Bhatiya neophytes. These firms, closely related to the organisation of the Bhatiya 
Mahajan, also organised religiously prescribed diets, provided suitable 
accommodation and arbitrated disputes (Neygandhi [Guj.] v.s.l993a:368-374).
The activities of the merchants overseas and the power of the Mahajan were at 
odds with the interests of the Kachchh Durbar. The following section takes two 
examples of rulers’ attempts at controlling the activities of Bhatiyas. The first is the 
issue of slave trading, the second the sub-contracting of Mandvi’s customs house. 
Broadly, the conflict can be characterised as the rulers’ attempts to control the 
traders’ attempts at autonomy.
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2.42. Case 1. The Durbar and the regulation of slavery
The first case is the issue of slavery and its regulation. The descendants of slave 
populations in Kachchh are discussed in subsequent chapters. Therefore, this section 
also illustrates part of the process through which African ‘slaves’ were brought to 
Indian soil.
The social and ritual construction of the kingdom emphasises the king’s 
responsibility for the protection of land and subjects. However, traders settled abroad 
and in the process they transcended the boundaries of the Jadeja kingdom. Moreover, 
they did not leave never to return, they left to return. Their commerce was conducted 
in and between foreign lands, and accordingly, taxation levied on their activities fell 
mostly into the coffers of other rulers. Consequently, Jadejas of Kachchh had little 
control over the activities of their own traders. The Durbar found it consistently 
difficult to extract revenue from their trade unless it came through Kachchh ports. 
Making extravagant (and threatening) claims to the traders’ loyalty to their homeland 
brought some relief to the Durbar’s finances. Until the 1870s, traders were, by and 
large, able to ignore the Durbar’s authority by claiming that they were citizens of 
other kingdoms. This can be seen in traders’ evocation of legalistic conceptions of 
‘nationality’ and ‘identity’ when they faced prosecution for ‘slaving’.
The records of the Bombay Presidency relating to the involvement of Kachchhis 
in the slave trade in the Indian Ocean were written by British Political Agents 
stationed in Zanzibar, Muscat, Aden and Kachchh, who were involved in negotiated 
and diplomatic manumissions. The tone of the archive documents suggests that the 
Kachchh Durbar was keen to put an end to the trade on grounds of enlightened 
humanitarianism and a realisation that the moral opposition to slavery on the part of 
the British was the correct attitude to adopt. However, the Durbar owned significant 
numbers of slaves and mercenaries of African descent and must have had other 
reasons for wanting to control the trade. The interpretation offered below suggests 
that the Durbar was interested in destroying the integrity of the Bhatiya Mahajan in
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Kachchh and overseas in order to bring the activities of the merchants closer to its 
own jurisdiction. The efficiency of the Mahajan, and the co-operative way in which it 
privileged the interests of Bhatiyas had, by the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
made it almost impossible for the Durbar to extract any revenue from the activities of 
Kachchhi Bhatiya traders.
Throughout the nineteenth century, Zanzibar was entrepot for the East African 
slave trade and home to thousands of traders from Kachchh (Burton 1872:313-336; 
and Colomb 1873:47, 97-99, 367 and 379). Their ships ran slaves to the small slave 
market in Mandvi3, which the Durbar officially closed in 1836. In subsequent 
decades, however, slaves were still being transported to Mandvi, frequently for 
service within the Durbar4. Kachchhis in Zanzibar financed slaving expeditions, 
levied taxes on slaves passing through the customs house, and held slaves on their 
plantations. The Government of British India was engaged in diplomatic and naval 
efforts to suppress the trade and holding of slaves, and Britain and the Sultan of 
Oman signed a series of treaties aimed at regulating the activities of Kachchhi traders 
between 1822 and 1886.
Kachchhi traders variously claimed to be British Indians or subjects of the Sultan 
while they were in Zanzibar. The British representative treated the Kachchhis as the 
former, and throughout the 1860s the traders were prosecuted accordingly for 
violation of anti-slaving laws. Appellate jurisdiction came from Bombay, but if any 
case made it that far the defendant would claim to be a citizen of Kachchh and 
therefore not subject to British Indian law. Similarly, Kachchhi traders flew different 
national flags depending on the destination and cargo of the vessel5. Traders also 
claimed rights of protection and jurisdiction of the Sultan of Oman (the Sultans of
3 F. O. 881/2314. 1860. Slave-dealing and slave-holding o f  Kutches in Zanzibar.
4 M. G. S. A., P. D. 1850. Cutch No. 85/2226. No. 1177. Kutch Slave Trade. A mussulman inhabitant 
o f  - purchased a Seedie female at Muskat and then brought her to -.
5 M. G. S. A., P. D. 1864. Zanzibar. Vol. 54. No. 435. Zanzibar. Vessels belonging to natives o f  India 
but who are resident in the dominions o f  the Sultan o f  - shouldfly a distinguishing flag  other than the 
ordinary red Arab flag', P. D. 1872. Zanzibar. Vol. HI. No. 201. No. 1015. Zanzibar. Notice. All 
vessels and boats sailing under English colours are cautioned against any attempt to conceal their 
nationality or papers as rendering them liable to seizure and confiscation.
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Oman and Zanzibar after the territories were annexed), the High Courts of British 
India, the French in Mauritius, and the Kachchh Durbar. Each ‘penal code’ carried 
different restrictions and penalties. Traders switched legal identities while remaining 
loyal to their own caste protocol and law. This contemptuous attitude towards 
fledgling international law was compensated for by strict adherence to moral and 
social codes upheld internationally by the Mahajan. The traders effectively attempted 
to operate internationally without allegiance to a particular ruler. The Mahajan was 
the effective legal and moral authority to which they were accountable.
The Durbar made a series of attempts to bring traders in Zanzibar under its 
jurisdiction. It issued proclamations in 1869 and 1873, encouraging Kachchhis living 
in Zanzibar to adopt British-Indian citizenship6. It was evident to the Durbar that it 
did not have the power, influence or resources to assert Kachchhi law in Zanzibar, so 
the next best thing was the law of British India, personified by the Governor of the 
Bombay Presidency. Consequently, British attempts at regulating slaving were 
‘welcomed’ by the Durbar. However, the application of British law outside the 
immediate realm of the Bombay Presidency seemed to be a matter of the local 
Political Agent’s personal integrity -  with vague reference to statute. In the early part 
of 1873 Bhatiya Kanji Lalji was deported from Zanzibar to Bombay, having been 
found guilty by the British Political Agent in Zanzibar of holding slaves7. In Bombay 
he was acquitted on the grounds that he was a resident of Kachchh. If Lalji was not a 
British citizen (Kachchh was a protectorate and not under direct British rule) then he 
could not be subject to British Indian law. When he was arrested in Zanzibar, Lalji 
had claimed to be a citizen of the Sultan and therefore entitled to hold slave labour, 
but the Political Agent had ignored this plea and tried him regardless.
6 The ineffective 1869 treaty ordered Kachchhis to: (i) let the British consul adjudicate in their 
disputes and (ii) stop bringing slaves to Kachchh (M. G. S. A., P. D. 1869. Zanzibar. Slave Trade. No. 
152. No. 121. Zanzibar, Slave Trade. On the subject o f  traffic in slaves by Kutchees in- ). The treaty of 
1873 again instructed Kachchhis in Zanzibar to stop holding and trading slaves, and to adopt British 
nationality (M. G. S. A., P. D. 1873. Zanzibar. Vol. IV. No. 232. No. 1906. Zanzibar proclamations 
regarding the slave trade).
1 M. G. S. A., P. D. 1874. Zanzibar. Vol. I. No. 277. No. 310. Zanzibar. CaseofKanjee Laljee o f  
Kutch charged with slave dealing and committedfor trial before the High Court o f  Bombay.
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Later in the same year, the case of ‘Regina versus Haji Omar’, a Khoja, came to 
the attention of the High Court in Bombay8. Omar was convicted on three violations 
of the Indian Penal code relating to capturing and holding slaves. Between the two 
cases the Durbar had issued a further proclamation stating that Kachchhis in 
Zanzibar were prohibited from holding slaves and were to take up British citizenship. 
This proclamation, unlike earlier ones, was held to be legally binding on the grounds 
that there was no naturalisation act between Kachchh and Zanzibar. The ambiguity 
that had for so long been exploited by the traders was now beginning to work against 
them. When Omar came to court in 1873 the Bombay Court had appellate 
jurisdiction over Kachchhis, and the Durbar’s actions had undermined the solidarity 
of the powerful Kachchhi cohort in Zanzibar. By placing them under British law 
(probably illegally), the authority of Bhatiya Mahajan was undermined. The 
jurisdiction of the large Bhatiya firms dissolved into the petty consular court. The 
Durbar had used the moral issue of slaving to gain assistance from the British to 
destroy the unity of Bhatiya Mahajan in Zanzibar and Oman.
2.43. Case 2. Mandvi Customs House
From their experience overseas, the Bhatiyas introduced a system of sub-contracting 
revenue collection to Mandvi Customs House, a tradition apparently imported from 
Muscat. Bhatiyas became the accountants and revenue officers of Mandvi port and 
the income from this post was the largest single source of revenue for the Durbar9. In 
the 1860s the unscrupulous activities of those holding the post attracted predatory 
attention from the Durbar, a typical example being that of Liladhar Moraji Bhimani. 
Bhimani’s family contracted the collection of port revenue in Muscat and Zanzibar in 
the mid-nineteenth century, and until the 1880s, when the position became 
democratic, held the hereditary title of nagarseth in Mandvi and in the satellite
8 M. G. S. A., P. D. 1873. Zanzibar. Vol. II. No. 230. Zanzibar. Hadjee Omar. Despatches o f  Political 
Agent to Government o f India and case o f  - convicted ofslave dealing.
9 It can be deduced that in 1829 35% of the Durbar’s revenue came from duties imposed at Mandvi’s 
port. M. G. S. A., P. D. 1829-30. Mixed Vol. No. 15/339. Cutch Government fo r 1829 and Scind for  
1829-30. “General statement showing the gross revenues and collections and balances, the gross and 
actual charges and the net balances remaining due, to, and by, the Kutch State Government”.
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communities. The important institutional position of nagarseth was normally held by 
the principal merchant in the town who acted as an ‘opinion leader of the entire 
population’ (S. Mehta 1984:175). The nagarseth would negotiate between disputing 
factions, organise philanthropic donations and represent the interests of Mandvi to 
the Durbar. He and his representatives monopolised control of all the key institutions 
in Mandvi in the nineteenth century, including the customs post. Bhimani held the 
post at Mandvi from v.s. 1925-1927, during which time he incurred heavy losses. 
‘Differences’ arose between Bhimani and the Durbar over unpaid debt (Sampat 
[Guj.] v .s .1995:131- 132) and the Durbar seized far more of Bhimani’s estate in 
payment than was owed. This turned into a bitter and protracted dispute, with 
animosity shown towards Bhimani contributing to an ever-widening gap between the 
Bhatiyas and the Durbar.
In the nineteenth century Rajput States found an increased need for cash, partially 
to pay tribute, but also to finance the modernisation of their kingdoms. The best 
source of cash was to appropriate the fortunes of traders. Holding land, although a 
source of power and prestige, was not flexible, mobile or readily converted into 
currency. In the traders’ satellite communities regulatory power was securely in the 
hands of the mercantile mahajans and not with the Durbar. This weakened the 
influence that the Durbar had on its wealthiest and most influential ‘citizens’. 
Bhatiyas moved outside the kingdom and into realms where they had autonomy, and 
this disjunction between the interests of rulers and traders begins to point towards 
how the two groups differ. Traders represented a threat to the kingdom by operating 
outside it and importing themselves, as wealthy, but polluting individuals, back into 
it.
The vast population of Bhatiya emigres has not forgotten Kachchh. To this day 
there is a constant exchange of people, money and ideas between Muscat and 
Kachchh. Charitable institutions that have functioned in Mandvi since the late 
nineteenth century continue to be funded and visited by descendants of their 
founders. Many Bhatiya families who have been present in Muscat for eight or nine
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generations maintain property in Mandvi and visit their ancestral lands regularly. 
Most of this land is barren and uncultivated but remains important as home to 
tutelary goddesses (see below).
2.44. Genealogical origins: is cooling Rajput blood an ‘ethnological problem’?
As has been shown, the interests of rulers and traders conflicted. Traders generated 
transactable commodities, most notably cash, gold and ivory, and they successfully 
disguised fortunes through the offshore nature of their enterprise and the capital 
mobility provided by trade networks and paternalistic policies of the Bhatiya 
Mahajan. The differences between men like Bhimani and the Durbar grew 
increasingly apparent throughout the nineteenth century as the political climate 
demanded of rulers’ cash for tribute, territorial expansion and modernisation. 
However, in the past the social status and social origins of rulers and traders were 
intertwined. Both mythic and historic accounts show that they frequently worked in 
complementary partnership (as in the development of Mandvi port), and 
significantly, claim to share similar ancestral heritage.
Bhatiya origin myths tell that they are descended from Bhatti Rajputs -  famous 
Kshatriya warriors (Sampat [Guj.] v .s .1989:836-840, v.s. 1990-1:622-624; and 
Purandare 1997). The most popular version is based on James Tod’s nineteenth 
century chronicles of Rajasthan, where Bhatiya genealogy is traced to the Yadav 
branch of the lunar lineage of Rajputs (chandra vansh). Bhatiyas share this claim 
with Jadejas. The dominant iconographic representation, found hanging in all public 
Bhatiya buildings, shows Narayan creating Brahma, who creates Atatrimuni, who 
creates Chandradevta, the primogenitor of chandra vansh. The ‘ethnological 
problem* that has occupied scholars of western India for the last two centuries (see 
Aitken 1907:182) is the question of how rulers became traders. The way the question 
is framed implies a transformation from Kshatriya to Vaishya, or, from hot-blooded 
warriors to cool vegetarian merchants. The literature cited at the beginning of this 
chapter also takes as its starting point this way of phrasing the question. The
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‘problem’ is premised on the fourfold Vedic varna categories of Brahman, Kshatriya, 
Vaishya and Shudra. In Mandvi, these terms (with the exception of Brahman) are 
used only as rather crude characterisations of ‘others’ and not as demographic 
denominators. As already mentioned, all those in the town not claiming foreign 
origins, claim instead that they are of ruler (Kshatriya) blood, but contemporary 
Bhatiyas do not voluntarily describe themselves as belonging to a particular varna.
Bhatiyas claim to maintain ritual practice that dates from their ruler heritage. 
These traditions are considered more fundamental to correct life than more recent 
additions such as Pushti Marga (path of grace) devotionalism. Bhatiyas also have 
tales that explain how their blood has ‘cooled’. Understanding the process of 
transformation, from ‘hot’ to ‘cold’, appears to be of primary importance in 
conceptualising ‘difference’ between kings and traders. However, this only works at 
the level of stereotype, and as the following analysis shows, although this question is 
important to Bhatiyas, there are serious shortcomings to such a view. There are two 
approaches to this question: textual accounts from the 1930s that clearly express this 
redemptive transformation in terms of a movement from Kshatriya to Vaishya varna 
categories throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; secondly, 
contemporary ethnography, which locates the transformative moment in the 1930s.
Dungersinh D. Sampat (1880-1967) was a prolific novelist, social commentator, 
and Bhatiya historian. He wrote a lengthy series of popular articles during the 1930s 
on many aspects of Bhatiya history, but his work has now slipped into obscurity. He 
claimed that in the past Bhatiyas were exogamous, meat eating, alcohol-imbibing 
warriors ([Guj.] v.s. 1989:622-624), a view that has clear echoes with Tod, who 
described Bhatiyas as belonging to the ‘equestrian order’ -  an ascription with heavy 
martial overtones. Sampat draws a sharp distinction between a wild, hot, untamed 
and non-vegetarian past, and the subsequent redemption found in Pushti Marga 
precepts (mercantilism, devotionalism and non-violence). Evidence for such claims 
can be found by tracing the mutability of caste names over time, which reveals that 
traditional ‘Rajput’ names also belong to traders (also M. Mehta 1991:70-71).
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Bhatiya caste iconography, also from Sampat’s period, shows a Bhatiya warrior 
forsaking horse, sword and land in favour of ship, cane and commerce. The 
representation of horses and ships is a recurrent one in the visual imagery of 
Kachchh. Such imagery is so prevalent that it is tempting to take it as analogous for 
the division between rulers and traders because this is the way that it is used in caste 
iconography. However, the images are not opposites because there is continuity in 
the way these symbols are used to represent people and space. I return to this theme 
in the final section of the chapter. Sampat further claims that community adoption of 
Pushti Marga values brought to a close their martial tradition ([Guj.] v.s. 1989:836- 
840). However, the evidence indicates that Bhatiyas were already involved in 
commerce at the time of their ‘conversion’, sometime in the early seventeenth 
century (Purandare 1997). This is corroborated by other sources, which state that 
recruitment to the movement was predominantly from established merchant castes 
(Timberg 1978).
The evidence presented in the following sections indicates that the break in the 
martial tradition and the cooling of Bhatiya blood was not an abrupt rupture with the 
past but a partial transformation. Although Sampat’s commentaries were influential 
in the formation of ‘official’ caste history at the time, the few Bhatiyas presently 
familiar with his stories express waning conviction in their truth. The dominant 
contemporary version of the past recalls how caste blood ‘cooled’ in the 1930s, the 
decade in which their declining wealth and dominance was most acutely felt. 
Contemporary Bhatiyas cite men such as Sampat as evidence for this claim.
Sampat’s own wealth stemmed from his ancestors’ commerce in the Indian Ocean. 
He is said to have squandered his inheritance and forsaken Bhatiya traditions by 
following such unproductive pursuits as writing and scholarship (for an equivalent 
view of community decline among Parsis see Luhrmann 1996). In the modem view, 
the trading ancestors of the past were Kshatriyas and literal kings of trade.
The two versions of the big chill rely on the presupposition that Bhatiyas had 
martial traditions to lose. Sampat’s origin stories tell of a glorious Bhatti (Bhatiya)
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kingdom in Jaisalmer. In his view Bhatiyas are dispossessed rulers who, after trial 
and tribulation, turned warrior heritage into commercial acumen through the 
‘cooling’ influence of Pushti Marga principles. The modem account assumes that the 
potency of their warrior-ancestors brought them success in commerce, the embers of 
which were finally extinguished in the decadent 1930s.
The vast literature on the ways in which caste is codified in India concentrates 
mainly on the way this knowledge is used by Indian people to ensure cultural 
authenticity. Claims to this or that noble origin are a part of all group claims to social 
status and social legitimacy. However, as shown above, the character of these claims 
can change over time, rendering them neither immutable nor impervious to scrutiny. 
Yet to see such claims as falsifiable is to miss the point. By the same score, to view 
these stories as reflections of what people really think about themselves or to see 
them simply as socially true because they are socially told is again to miss the point. 
Origin myths, whether or not they are grafted with historical fact, exist in a state of 
inscrutability, in the sense that they exist for purposes other than to be merely true.
The many caste origin myths (see Khatri [Guj.] 1996) share four striking 
similarities. First, they identify a divine origin (predominantly from the Ramayana 
and the Mahabharata), a royal descent line (from the sun, moon and fire lineages), 
and typically an anticlockwise arc of travel from northern India, south along the 
Indus valley. The second similarity lies in the way the exogamous clan reinvents 
itself as an endogamous unit with exogamous descent lines traceable to specific 
individuals or places. Thirdly, origin myths show arrival in Kachchh to be at the 
behest of a god, king or holy man and often combine this with displacement caused 
by victory or defeat in battle with Muslims. Fourthly, miraculous events display the 
affinity of the new arrivals to particular villages from which further common 
ancestors are derived. The structure of these narratives and iconographic 
representations replicates Rajput bardic tradition (Shah and Shroff 1958:256-257). 
Constructing an elaborate past in a particular form is a potential way of claiming 
elevated social status, and these stories weave together the social and ritual practices
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of the present through temples, revered figures and particular places in the landscape. 
Origin myths reveal what kind of claims are important, how authenticity is structured 
and cadenced in language and time, how the salience of claims changes overtime, 
and how claims of one group relates to those of other groups. The claims of a 
particular group do not exist in isolation from received conceptions of history, 
political expediency or related claims of neighbours and highly regarded patrons.
2.45. Religious propriety
In the previous section it was mentioned that modem Bhatiyas practice ritual that 
they consider to be more fundamental to a correct life than following Pushti Marga 
precepts. This section addresses this question and the role of the Pushti Marga in the 
social organisation of Bhatiyas. The religious traditions of rulers and traders cannot 
simply be separated out into structural oppositions, either in terms of shakti and 
bhakti or in terms of himsa (violence) and ahimsa (non-violence). Both traditions 
share much in common, are eclectic and are founded on similar ritual premises that 
include both sacrifice and devotion. Tambs-Lyche writes of Saurashtra that:
the states of traditional Kathiawar were held together by the exercise of power. It is apt, 
therefore, that their primary deity [the Goddess] should be the source and incarnation of 
power herself. As is usual where one value is central to the system, its negation is a 
constant presence too, in the shape of the non-violence of the merchant groups (Tambs- 
Lyche 1997:317).
The idea is once again of a structural social opposition, this time in the domains of 
ritual and lifestyle. In Tambs-Lyche’s characterisation traders are alienated from 
mlers and their subjects. Yet it seems strange that a community divorced from 
representation and constituency would take it upon themselves to counter the power 
of rulers in order to create ritual harmony in the kingdom from which they were 
estranged.
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Power {shakti) and devotion (bhakti) or the human counterparts, Kshatriyas and 
Vaishyas (as Tambs-Lyche would have it), are not de facto opposites. Pocock’s 
analysis of Patidar social organisation also struggles to make sense of seemingly 
contradictory religious practices. He reaches a similar conclusion to the one 
subsequently drawn by Tambs-Lyche, that as one tradition grows the other must fall 
(1973). However, in the daily ritual and social lives of many of Mandvi’s Hindu 
population the two forms exist seamlessly together. Hindu social life is characterised 
by division and differentiation, but these do not operate solely on the principles of 
doctrinal purity (A.M. Shah 1982). Shakti and bhakti are not categories through 
which others are evaluated.
This can clearly be seen in Bhatiya ritual practices which evoke power, while 
simultaneously drawing on the devotional principles of the Pushti Marga. The origins 
of this movement are attributed to Vallabha at the turn of the sixteenth century (see 
Bennett 1993; Pocock 1973:117-120; andPurandare 1997:55-76). He discovered a 
svarup (form or image) of Krishna (himself bom as Kshatriya Prince) as Shri Nathji, 
which became the order’s elevated deity. Pushti Marga havelis are the symbolic 
homes of Nandaraj, Krishna’s nurse, and the actual home of the custodians, known 
as Maharaja or Gosain because they are descendants of Vallabha. Initiates pledge 
mind, body and wealth to the Maharajas who are regarded as bodily incarnations of 
Krishna. Seva (service) in a haveli demands personal love towards Bal Krishna (as a 
child). Quite literally sevaks (servers) play the role of devoted parents caring for a 
helpless infant and for the Maharaja. The images in the haveli are often duplicated in 
the homes of followers, with the idols being full forms of Krishna and not mere 
conduits for his power. Thus, the relationship between devotee and sevak is a 
personalised one, which has frequently been understood as opposing the hierarchy 
inherent in Brahmanical Hinduism and evocations of shakti.
Bhakti refers to an attitude (Thoothi 1935; and Pocock 1973:100) of which prayer 
and adoration are manifestations of the self-surrender of mind, body and wealth to 
the deity. Ideally, within the Pushti Marga bhakti is elevated to the highest order,
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over and above sacrifice, renunciation and other ritualised ways to salvation. 
However, bhakti takes varied forms, so it follows that: ‘it exists throughout popular 
religion at all levels and virtually every ritual of worship or sacrifice performed for 
the deities is or may be an expression of devotion, to a greater or lesser extent’
(Fuller 1992:158). It is often assumed that divine equality exists among the 
Vaishnavas -  signalled by individual dedication to an individual deity (see Thoothi 
1935). However, the Vaishnava movements are not Hindu forms of Protestantism. 
Vaishnava movements support institutionalised inequality and do not pose a direct 
threat to widely held hierarchical values (Fuller 1992:161). The Pushti Marga 
defined, maintained and strengthened existing social boundaries, with initiation, 
strict notions of ritual purity and the wealthy reputation of the movement enforcing 
socially elitist divisions. Pushti Marga was the exclusive domain of Bhatiyas, 
encouraging internal group solidarity. The effect was to preserve and reinforce 
claims to exclusive status rather than promoting cross-caste equality. Furthermore, 
class inequality among Bhatiyas was perhaps exacerbated, as the ability to patronise 
the movement inevitably led the wealthy individual closer to the abode of the 
Maharaja.
In Mandvi the rise and fall of the movement can be seen in the growth and decline 
of the havelis. The two remaining in Mandvi, Moti Haveli and Limbalawali Haveli, 
were built between 200 and 225 years ago. The latter is crumbling, and Vallabha’s 
descendants have departed leaving less respected gor maharajas (Pushkama 
Brahmans the Bhatiyas’ ritual priests) as ritual attendants. Bhatiya power 
(coincidental with Jain interests) was enormous. In the early eighteenth century 
fishing was forbidden in the vicinity of the town. Article xii of an inconsequential 
treaty (1802) between the Durbar and British officials reads: ‘Mandvee being a 
sacred place, and those that live in it abstaining from animal food, the servants of the 
Company cannot dwell in the town’ (Lee-Wamer 1910). Whatever the motives of the 
Durbar for including this article, the fact that such a claim was even plausible 
indicates the extent of Vaishnava dominance in the town. In the 1850s there were 
five havelis in Mandvi. They became powerful land-owning and political institutions.
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From the early nineteenth century the management committees of the havelis 
exhorted a mandatory tax from merchants (Purandare 1997:72). They also policed 
the activities of Bhatiya merchants abroad. A Maharaja fined a Bhatiya merchant in 
Zanzibar 20,000 Marie Theresas for conducting trade contrary to the precepts of the 
movement (Burton 1872:330). Maharaja power encouraged Bhatiya antipathy 
towards Brahmans’ ‘false claims’ to religious authority (Naygandhi [Guj.] 
v.s.l993b:436-441). The havelis experienced their zenith in the late 1850s and their 
reputation and following was severely damaged by two court cases in the early 
1860s.
2.46. M aharaja Libel Case
Karsandas Mulji was the editor of the outspoken Gujarati journal ‘Satyaprakash’. He 
published a tract against the Pushti Marga in 1861, claiming that the Maharajas had 
forgotten the original principles of the movement. The Maharaja, Jadunathji, filed a 
libel suit for damages. Jadunathji’s lawyers feared that he would be exposed if he 
appeared in court and so they turned to the Bhatiya Mahajan in Bombay who passed 
a resolution stating that those giving evidence against the Maharaja would be 
excommunicated. Karsandas then filed a counter-suit of conspiracy against the 
Mahajan. Ultimately, he won the case, but it deeply split the caste, weakened the 
integrity of the Mahajan and dissipated the community focus on havelis. Large-scale 
migration of Bhatiya men in the nineteenth century had far reaching effects on their 
population. Many men became wealthy, the average age at marriage increased, and 
the relationship between the havelis and female devotees changed. In the absence of 
men, women grew more dependent on the cult and immersed in the maternal love of 
Bal Krishna. In court, the accusation that Jadunathji and his cohort were sexually 
exploiting dependent Bhatiya women proved most damaging to their reputation. The 
result was that the enormous power wielded by the Maharajas proved to be their 
undoing.
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Bhatiyas continue to be popularly associated with the Pushti Marga, and are 
sometimes called Pushtimargi or derogatorily, Haveliwala and Maharajwala. 
However, from the late nineteenth century, Bhatiya association with Pushti Marga 
has gradually declined. This in part explains the curtain drawn over Sampat’s 
accounts and the insignificant role of Pushti Marga teachings in modem renditions of 
Bhatiya heritage.
2.47. Bhatiya kuldevis
Bhatiyas’ ideas and feelings about the world may have changed but only through an 
internal process of transformation; new ideas and feelings are manifestly 
transformational variants of the older ones. The intimate relationship between 
Bhatiya and Maharaja has become less consequential. Contrary to Purandare’s thesis 
(1997:42-55), Bhatiyas did not come to Pushti Marga from a tradition of 
Brahmanical Hinduism. Many Bhatiyas worship non-Brahmanical kuldevis (lineage 
goddesses). This is intriguing because, in theory, the Pushti Marga offers a complete 
ritual view of the world (and beyond) in which shakti is degraded. Many Bhatiyas 
maintain that kuldevis were a vital part of proper caste life and that their ancestors 
had continued to draw on kulshakti throughout the period of their intense 
engagement with Pushti Marga. They spoke as if the bright apparel of Pushti Marga 
was an adjunct to fundamental ritual practices. Bhatiyas’ ritual relation with their 
kuldevi is identical to Jadejas: the kuldevi is simultaneously a tutelary goddess, a 
deity associated with royalty and a ‘state’ deity (see the final section of this chapter).
Bhatiyas are divided into eighty-four original nukhs (clans), which according to 
their origin myth were determined at a meeting in Multan sometime during the 
eleventh or twelfth century. Within each nukh are kuls (segmented patrilineal descent 
groups). All kuls have a purvaj (common ancestor) descended from the purvaj of the 
nukh. As a result each nukh is thought of as ‘one blood’ and carries the prefix ray 
(royal or kingly). The nukhs derive names from Sindhi rulers (ray Gajariya), warriors 
(ray Jia), those victorious over ‘Muslims’ and Turks {ray Suraiya), occupational
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groups (the shopkeeper ray Gokulgandhi), religious activity (ray Ved), physical 
characteristics (ray Mochha -  moustache) and villages {ray Panchal). Twelve of the 
eighty-four purvajs (common ancestors) were warriors killed in battle (from Sampat 
[Guj.] v.s. 1991:57-68). Thus, the entire Bhatiya tradition is clearly martial, royal 
and elevates the role of ancestors and their forthcoming lineages. Worship of a 
particular kuldevi is invariably shared by different kul. Segments of a nukh may also 
be united in allegiance to a common deity, but separated by the particular shrines 
they visit. The kuldevis stand for a royal martial past. When Bhatiyas were 
dispossessed of their kingdom at Jaisalmer, being of one clan, they were unable to 
marry. Before this time Chandradevta was the apical ancestor. The meeting in 
Multan re-segmented the population and imposed new parameters of nukh exogamy. 
The purvaj were reinvented and the caste became endogamous.
Protection is the essence of a kuldevi. In exchange for this protection the kuldevi 
demands sacrifice. Forty-three years ago it was reported that animal sacrifice was 
common fifty years previously (Shah and Shroff 1958:250). Thirty years ago Pocock 
reported that animal sacrifice to Ashapura Mata at Matana Madh had ceased some 
fifty years previously. During my own fieldwork I was repeatedly told that such 
sacrifice had stopped fifty years ago. Either fifty years designates a generic period of 
time or, with similar meaning, live sacrifices were performed outside living memory. 
However, the influence of Vaishnava movements and Jainism in Kachchh is 
profound (for Gujarat generally see Mallison 1992a, 1992b, 1996). Alcohol is illegal, 
animal sacrifice is rare, and Jadeja and Bhatiya Goddesses are vegetarian, enjoying a 
diet of fresh coconut and refined sugar.
Bhatiyas were consistently vague about the relationship between the kuldevi and 
their visits to the haveli. With the exception of one elderly vedanta (one 
knowledgeable of the Vedas), all Bhatiyas questioned on this subject perceived no 
contradiction between the two practices. No informant expressed it in these terms, 
but the relationship appeared complementary, rather than antagonistic. Bhatiya 
kuldevis, although dangerous and potentially angry characters, are not considered
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polluting as far as entrance to the haveli is concerned. The kuldevi is a source of 
strength, power and fecundity (for her kul), which is transformed into successful 
parental devotion to Bal Krishna. In other words, shakti underpins the social 
performance of bhakti. Pushti Marga precepts are supposed to offer a complete and 
exclusive devotional framework in which there is no room for martial traditions. 
However, underlying Bhatiya treatments of the tradition are the principles of a 
Rajput universe: lineage, sacrifice and protection. These patterns are not unique to 
the Bhatiyas because the majority of Hindu castes, regardless of their occupational 
specialisation, have elaborate origin myths and combine elements of devotional and 
sacrificial Hinduism seamlessly in their religious traditions.
2.5. Endogeny and exogeny
Intermingling of traditions is common throughout western India, as is the claim of 
traders to be descended from Kshatriyas (Babb 1996). However, these basic 
ethnographic facts are overlooked in broad sociological division. The ethnography of 
stereotypes is not sufficient to understand the relationship between rulers and traders. 
Stereotypes may represent them as opposites but, empirically, this division is 
impossible to sustain using the conventional markers of settlement, religion and 
genealogy. The remaining section of this chapter reframes the claim that there is a 
significant division between those who rule the land and those trading from it. This 
division, from the perspective of a coastal port town, is located in ritual and secular 
orientation towards the ‘bounded’ nature of the land.
The waves that roll gently onto the sandy shores of Kachchh belie the sea’s 
nature. It is a realm with no earthly king, and dangerous as an unregulated arena of 
death, piracy and destruction; it is also the medium through which wealth, religion 
and people have come to and gone from the land. Change and disruption have been 
brought and taken away from Kachchh by sea, and this is reflected in the vast 
numbers of oceanic myths that stress the ‘other’ and ‘outside’ nature of the sea in 
relation to the land. The corpus is countered by an equally large number of myths
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where the inverse is the case. To explain this seeming inconsistency it is necessary to 
remark that the population consists of two distinct classes: the ‘ruling’ class who 
maintain the boundaries of the kingdom, and those who conduct trade outside its 
boundaries. The two groups, engaged in different activities, have alternative versions 
of the same myths that reflect a disparity in their attitude to the boundary of the 
kingdom. This opposition can also be seen between different myths within each 
corpus and between myths common to both.
Common to both is the mythology surrounding the temple complex of Ravalpir. 
Raval is revered for his ability to perform a particular type of miracle, and the 
contrasts and structural oppositions evident in the recounting of his miraculous 
powers emphasise both the creative and destructive aspects of the sea. The complex 
that houses Raval’s personal shrine sits amid sand dunes a few kilometres to the east 
of Mandvi. The surrounding land is bleak, the soil saline, and the road leading from 
the nearest village, Gundiyali, to the temple, is infrequently travelled. The white 
domed building is divided in two, a main building which contains a series of orange 
stone horse statues and a smaller structure containing Raval’s ‘tomb’ (Plates 4, 5 and 
6). Next to the temple is a small electric lighthouse, which recently replaced an oil- 
fired lamp that was maintained by the custodians of the temple. The association 
between the temple and security of shipping is not coincidental.
The temple is central to the lineage claims and ritual practices of Gadhvis (an 
honorific title for Charan), who venerate Raval as a kulpir, a male equivalent to a 
kuldevi. Pir conventionally refers to a Muslim saint and not to Hindu deities. The 
architecture of the structure also has a distinctively Muslim aspect, and in the past 
Hindus and Muslims frequented it (Bumes 1879:48), but today there are only Hindu 
clients. Gadhvis were traditionally pastoralists. They are an integral part of the 
religious and political systems of ‘ruling’ Jadejas, serving as their bardic genealogists 
(Shah and Shroff 1958). They maintain the records of Jadeja and other Rajput 
lineages, and thus they oversee a system of kingship in which kinship formed the 
basis of political power. They are storytellers and human vessels in which the
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mythology of the kingdom is stored. Their knowledge and power, derived from 
recitation, is vital in succession and inheritance disputes, and in arranging suitable 
marriages. Linked by divine kinship with the Goddess, human bards are seen as 
being either deviputras (sons of the Goddess) or as living forms of the Goddess. 
Although this is an apparently impossible set of relationships for an individual to 
sustain the majority of goddesses are deified Charan women (Tambs-Lyche 
1999:64). Therefore, to be sibling, son (or daughter) or incarnation (given the 
emphasis on lineage) of a goddess is perfectly possible. Together the human bard and 
Mata uphold the sanctity and integrity of the royal lineage of kings. In this triad it 
follows that the Charan is the ‘unattainable sister’ of the king (Tambs-Lyche 
1999:76). Thus, elements of the cosmogonic system collapse into one another. The 
particular way in which political power is allied with the divine is self-referencing 
with power coming from within. The myths of Ravalpir are treatments of this 
relationship. In brief, the myth of Ravalpir runs as follows: Raval was bom at the 
behest of a saint to a woman who had given generous alms while the saint was in 
meditation. As Raval matured he developed miraculous powers, among which was 
his ability to create living horses from the elements.
2.51. Horses
The horse is a recurrent image in Kachchh and a recurrent theme in this thesis. The 
preponderance of artistic and stone depictions of horses is in stark contrast to the 
number of actual horses in the landscape. As key symbols in the warrior tradition, 
horses represent war and the sacrifice of life to the Goddess for the kingdom. Horses 
are an ancient symbol in the Indo-Aryan tradition (see Doniger 1990) and of 
widespread ritual significance throughout India (see Kramrisch 1964). In classic 
Vedic horse sacrifice a consecrated white stallion was released to wander for a year 
before it was returned to its point of origin and killed. Throughout the year the horse 
was accompanied by a group of soldiers that ‘guided’ it onto any lands that the 
sponsoring king had aspiration towards (Doniger 1999:946): the ritual serving the 
territorial desires of the king. The horse also facilitated aggressive conquest, but
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through its own wanderings in search of fresh pasture came to stand as a natural 
metaphor for territorial expansionism. In a literal way, the number of horses at a 
kingdom’s disposal also marked its martial strength.
The links between Vedic myth and the contemporary treatment of horses is 
unclear. What is clear is that from ancient times horses have been imported into 
India. They came as the vehicles of the conquerors and were imported as 
commodities by Moguls and British. But horses do not fair well in the Indian climate 
and breeding stock rapidly declines in strength and size (Doniger 1999:948-949). As 
a result there was a constant demand for imported beasts, which were highly prized 
and expensive. Thus they were out of the reach of all but the economic and political 
elite, which strengthened the association of the horse with power.
In many myths about horses the themes of creation and destruction are central, but 
throughout the mythology there are two clear ambiguities. First, horses attest to 
power, but also to the power of others and the perennial threat of invasion. Horses 
are necessarily brought from ‘outside’, whether or not they arrive bearing aggressors, 
and in this sense the horse is a powerful metaphor in tales of invasion and 
domination. Secondly, Hindu horse myths are ambiguous towards Muslims, who 
stand as living and breathing evidence of ideological ‘invasion*. However, horses 
practically always appear valorous in myths of Muslim defeat at the hands of Hindus. 
In other myths, ‘invaders’, who were in all probability Muslim, are stripped of their 
religious identity. These ambiguities are both evident in a particularly fascinating 
myth that narrates the arrival of the Jakhs in the thirteenth century. The Jakhs were 
shipwrecked at Jakhao in the southwest of Kachchh, from where the seventy-one 
men and a single woman made their way inland on horseback, mounts we are left to 
presume they saved from the wrecked ship. In other versions of the myth the Jakhs 
emerged from the waves at Jakhao on horseback -  miraculously appearing without 
ships. They headed inland to save the local population from the depredations of 
either King Punvro or a ‘demon’. Gifted in warfare, and benevolent with their 
knowledge of medicine, they became popular figures in Kachchh. Speculation as to
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the origin of these fair-skinned foreigners attributes them to Anatolia or Syria 
(Kramrisch 1964:55), or to Greece, Turkey or Central Asia (Rushbrook Williams 
1958:84-86); either way, whether Muslims or Zoroastrians, local renditions of the 
myth do not stress the religious identity of the invaders. The general fear of Muslim 
invasion is inverted and becomes a story of liberation. Images of the seventy-two 
riders appear in numerous temples throughout Kachchh. The story of the Jakhs is but 
one of the mythologies that focuses on the arrival of horses and strangers, and shows 
how ungovemed foreign knowledge entering Kachchh is domesticated and turned 
into a source of liberation or prestige.
Previously, it was mentioned that the depiction of horses in caste iconography 
intimated towards a division between Hindu rulers and traders. To return briefly to 
this point, the archetypal iconographic representation of the transformation from 
ruler to trader shows a central character leaving horses and war for ships and 
commerce. These kinds of representation are found in Bhatiya and Lohana Mahajan 
publications and in Kharva temples. The trader is pictured looking back from the 
seashore into a fertile land and into the past. He stands on the sand, the horse, sword 
and shield have gone. Instead, the merchant is armed with a cane and bag, and lying 
at anchor in the background is a ship. As narrative this is axiomatic within caste 
boundaries. However, in a broader sense something else is at stake in the 
representation of horses. The horse is not a neutral symbol. All Hindu mercantile 
temples either contain images of horses or are surrounded by myths to which horses 
are central. Muslim shrines and mosques do not share this equestrian devotion; they 
do however, contain pictures of ships and ships are also found in Kharva temples. 
Throughout the nineteenth century it was illegal for Muslim traders to ride horses. In 
the present, the horse, as symbol and vehicle, is systematically being culled from 
Muslim social practice with active campaigns waged against the use of horses in 
marriage processions; and Muslims no longer frequent shrines such as Ravalpir. For 
Muslims the horse has become a symbol associated with Hindus, Rajputs and their 
allies, and Hindu oppression of Muslims.
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The horse does not rear large in the literature on religious conflict, however horses 
and ships (the floating counterpart) are on the fault line of religious polarisation in 
Mandvi, a theme that recurs in subsequent chapters.
Returning to Raval’s story: he was employed to tend horses. One day his 
employer stumbled across him sitting in the jungle. Ready to scold him for his 
laziness, the employer was taken aback to see Raval fashioning horses from the soil 
and breathing life into them. The Charans were traditionally horse traders, brokers of 
the most prestigious symbol of royal power. In this way, their role in protecting the 
sacredness of the royal lineage also had a very real aspect through transacting both 
source, and dominant symbol, of power. Gifting horses to those responsible for the 
vital upkeep of one’s genealogy has a striking parallel to the role of the votive 
terracottas that stand in a line before Raval’s tomb, because the Ravalpir temple 
complex is best known as a source of fertility. The horse statues are consecrated by 
Ghadvis at the behest of Rajputs and others, in return for the promise of children: a 
direct ritual inversion of Raval’s power. The object of Raval’s fame is offered back 
to him in the hope that his creative powers will be channelled through the 
reproductive system of the patron. Raval was of course a Gadhvi and in this version 
of the myth his ability to manufacture power was self-generating: he could create 
horses (real and symbolic royal power) from the object of royal power (the land of 
Kachchh). He had no recourse to sources drawn from ‘outside’ the kingdom. This 
story epitomises the ideal of the ruler: power and legitimacy for governance came 
from within the kingdom, marked by the coincidence of land and cosmological 
boundaries. Although the temple stands at the boundary of the kingdom, it also 
stands as protection against external danger and is in complementary relation with 
the temple of the Jadeja Mata. Contained within the ritual complex of the temple 
(and the kingdom) are all the necessary forces for the autonomous generation of 
additional power.
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2.52. Mercantile patronage of Ravalpir
It is common to assume that Vaishnavas consider the devi worship as unclean (Shah 
and Shroff 1958:250). This has been shown not to be the case in the daily ritual lives 
of Bhatiyas. Given the importance Bhatiyas invest in kuldevis it should come as no 
surprise that they also seek protection from other deities demanding sacrifice for the 
evocation of their power, such as Ravalpir. However, the Bhatiya mythology of 
Ravalpir stands in opposition to that held by the Rajputs and their allies. This is also 
true of mythology relating to other temples that stand on the shoreline. The principal 
trader festivals invariably lead down to the sea and culminate with immersion of the 
deity. The main royal ritual event of the year is the procession to offer sacrifice to 
Ashapura Mata. Matana Madh, her abode, stands amid barren outcrops in the centre 
of Kachchh, and the contrast is striking. Of the numerous trader festivals that lead 
down to the sea, the main one is Nava Naroj (see Chapter 4). During Nava Naroj 
traders and their constituents venerate the sea, entering the waves to seek wealth and 
blessing for the forthcoming trading year. The example of Ravalpir is a small part of 
a general attitude and disposition towards the seashore and the realms that lie fore 
and aft of it.
Sundeiji Sodagar was a highly successful merchant, bom in Gundiyali in the 
eighteenth century. He became a horse trader and famously supplied both factions in 
the wars between British troops and soldiers of Tipu Sultan, a Muslim King of 
Mysore. Sodagar rebuilt the temple of Ravalpir as a gift to his birthplace, but by 
shifting its location, from village to seashore, he bestowed on it a new set of 
meanings. To Sodagar horses were trade goods and a source of wealth, which in turn 
generated prestige and indirectly power: a refraction of the idea that horses were 
symbols of martial power and thus legitimacy. Sodagar thus gave a ‘trading’ twist to 
a ‘ruling’ tradition.
Today, Mandvi’s traders and rulers visit the temple for different purposes. 
Sodagar was a merchant who owned ships and whose trade was subject to the perils
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and dangers of the sea, a connection that explains the link between the temple and 
merchant shipping. In the view derived from Sodagar’s patronage, the horse 
represents mercantile wealth rather than kingly power. Traders petition Raval for 
protection during voyages to foreign lands and for the procreation of wealth from 
outside the kingdom. I visited this temple frequently, as it was away from the 
business and noise of the town. The custodians of the temple, who were often 
around, commonly told the story of Raval making horses from the earth. They told it 
to me, and I was often present when they recounted the well-rehearsed lines to other 
visitors. One day I went with Vipul, a proud Bhatiya and, in the classic Indian sense 
of the word, of ‘wheatish’ complexion; Vipul resembles the stereotypical trader. He 
was a stranger to the temple. The main custodian asked, as she asked all strangers, 
where Vipul was from and what caste he was. She then proceeded unequivocally to 
tell him that Raval had summoned (or made) horses from out of the sea, and not, as I 
had heard many times before, from the earth. This was my introduction to the 
traders’ temple mythology. The basic story is the same: Raval is bom blessed and 
grows up to perform miracles. However, in the traders’ version, the climax of 
Raval’s life is his ability to conjure horses out of the waves.
On subsequent visits she told me of misfortunes that had befallen traders in 
foreign lands who had not taken Raval’s blessing prior to their departure. Many of 
them were reported to have returned home at once to redress their oversight. Such 
stories stress the protective element of Raval’s power. However, they also stress 
Raval’s power to assist traders’ success in overseas business ventures. In this 
tradition of the mythology, Raval’s power creatively draws on sources outside the 
boundary of the kingdom. The most obvious example is the horse, as wealth. In the 
ruler tradition the horse, as a symbol of power, is manufactured from itself, or, at 
least from the land. While for traders, wealth and power inherent in the symbol of the 
horse is drawn into the kingdom from the perilous realm beyond its boundaries or, in 
other words, beyond the temporal and ethereal power of the king.
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2.6. Merchant-Princes
Contemporary social differentiation between Hindu rulers and traders, and a parallel 
series of Muslim groups, is understood to have emerged from temporal social 
segmentation. Rulers have become traders and ‘Hindus’ have become ‘Muslims’, but 
in mythological time they were socially undifferentiated. Claims to share 
genealogical origins may reflect a general historical tendency to aspire to an 
association with the rulers of Kachchh through the widespread emphasis placed on 
the purity of patrilineal descent. But not all claim the lineage of the rulers; Lohanas, 
for example, and by implication Memons (as putative Lohana converts to Islam), are 
suriya vansh (of the sun). The high-ranking groups display and emphasise the 
integrity of their lineage, tracing it back to an ultimate point of origin. This is a 
practice associated with the bardic tradition and the emphasis on power successfully 
emanating from unbroken lineages. Today, the idea has a wide social appeal that 
marks prestige and social rank. Pure descendants of each vansh have inherited a 
certain set of attributes, dispositions and tendencies that make them a unique group 
of people. This pervasive tendency implies infinitesimal segmentation. An obvious 
example is the specialised origins of each Bhatiya lineage, which are thought to 
determine the character of those bom into the lineage. Just as specific castes have 
inherited skills and attributes so do specific lineages within them. Thus Jadejas are 
not radically different from Bhatiyas in mythology and they also share the general 
inherited characteristics that Bhatiyas invested in commerce rather than rule.
Muslims are also integrated into this model. The highest-ranking Muslims, converted 
‘Bhatiyas’, are regarded as chandra vansh with the same inherent and immutable 
characteristics as their Hindu counterparts. In Hindu eyes the highest-ranking 
Muslims groups are Khojas and Vohras. This may be a privilege afforded them 
because of their large-scale absence from the town or because Shia religion is 
relatively secretive and discrete and thus less offensive to contemporary Hindu 
sensibilities. However, Shias traditionally rank highest among Muslims throughout 
the region and in neighbouring Sindh. In Mandvi, they rank highly because of the 
pedigree of their genealogy, which corresponds with that of high-ranking Hindus and
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renders them good businessmen (an acceptable occupation) and efficient at 
organising their own trading kingdoms (socially discrete).
Clearly, this is a very different understanding of social organisation than 
conventionally cited varna classifications. In this system, status is specifically 
derived from a particular prestigious source of pure descent. In Kachchh, as I 
presume to be the case in much of western India, the purvaj (apical ancestor) is 
closely identified with Rajput tradition. Occupational identity and a particular 
group’s proficiencies have the ability to transform overtime, with rulers, for example, 
becoming traders. The logical implication of the model is that rulers, the 
encompassing (foundational) figures in the genealogy, originally embodied 
practically all skills, attributes and propensities necessary for a successful kingdom. 
From a concentrated ancestral source these powers are temporally distributed 
through an increasingly segmented population. Lineage segmentation is thus a reality 
and a metaphor for social division. Given the emphasis on pure descent, those 
considered to be of mixed origins are necessarily of low rank (see chapters 3 and 4).
To summarise this part of the argument: exemplary kingship draws on lineage and 
Goddess, the conceptual ‘boundedness’ of legitimate kingship and the kingdom, and 
endogenous production of power; while exemplary ‘trading’ draws on lineage and 
Goddess, the elitist Pushti Marga, and the exogenous production of power. Both 
systems are exclusive but premised on very similar principles.
Traders have not rejected their ruling heritage. They consider themselves to be 
royal traders, with kingdoms that transgress the boundaries of landed kings.
Although ‘stateless’, the power derived from their lineage allowed Bhatiyas and 
others to rule over autonomous landless states. Bhatiya accounts of the 1930s tell of 
an untamed Kshatriya past that was replaced by a cultured mercantile life-style. The 
redundancy of the schism for contemporary Bhatiyas, in the time frame that Sampat 
casts it, illustrates a changing salience. The modem explanation is not searching for 
an explanation of dominance and success, as Sampat was, rather it stands as an
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explanation for failure and decline. The sketch provided above is not a ‘history* of 
traders and their relationship to a ruling past, rather, it is a narration of the past from 
the perspective of the present, with one deviation into textual accounts dating from 
them 1930s. From the perspective of the present the characteristics that made 
Bhatiyas rulers also made them good traders. This is clearly at odds with popular 
stereotypes and academic models that invest too much faith in them. The seths of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are seen as having ruled landless kingdoms. 
Their subjects worked on their fleets, in their godowns and on the docks. Each 
employee had numerous familial, economic and political clients who also supported 
the trader and benefited from his patronage. Pocock describes Bhatiyas as ‘merchant- 
princes’ (1973:115). This passing reference to one of the great trading communities 
of western India conveys a clear understanding (albeit unelaborated) of the issues 
discussed in this chapter. The traditions of rulers and traders are not products of 
syncretic heritage, but they appear to be based on similar principles with different 
worldly interests, and exist as tendencies, but not as absolutes. Bhatiyas, like the 
other trading groups, both Hindu and Muslim, follow traditions that make them 
impossible to understand from within the tradition of ethnography that has developed 
in peninsular Gujarat. The material presented in this chapter has suggested an 
alternative way of viewing this difference.
The model of endogeny and exogeny is not only applicable to modem perceptions 
of the past. Subsequent chapters demonstrate the potential of the model through 
contemporary ethnography. Descendants of nineteenth century merchant-princes 
remaining in Mandvi have guaranteed careers abroad. Many direct descendants of 
the trader ancestors of Mandvi people are naturalised Omani citizens. They recmit, in 
order of preference, through the axioms of kin, caste, religion and village of birth or 
association. Those with relatives, caste brothers or patrons with powerful commercial 
and administrative positions, in countries like Oman, expect to leave Kachchh to 
work abroad when they are around twenty years old. This is a perfectly normal part 
of life for many young men from Mandvi and seems to have been so for a least a 
century and a half. Temporary migration, as a right of passage, is only prevalent
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among the established trader population. Many rulers, or, more precisely, 
‘agriculturalists’ went overseas to labour, but not to trade (van der Veer 1994:111). 
Their migration was transitory and without capital base or local political investment, 
which made it more difficult to return and to maintain meaningful social relations 
with Kachchh. Of the many different migrations from Kachchh the one that 
continues to affect the vigour and dynamics of the local economic and political 
landscape are the Omani settlements (see Chapter 4).
Traditional traders, and many of their constituents, remain highly mobile within 
the Indian Ocean. The ‘voyage’, as a life stage, and as an annual cycle, is a central 
social theme for the entire mercantile population. The analysis presented here 
suggests a further contrast between rulers and traders. The former hold a model of 
fixed centred kingship, which from the sixteenth century was characterised by 
boundary maintenance rather than territorial expansion. In opposition to this, traders 
expect movement and multiple boundary transgressions as necessary life stages.
There is one further problem with Tambs-Lyche’s model of dualistic society: 
there is no accommodation for the large percentage of Muslims in the region. Tambs- 
Lyche acknowledges this omission (1997:315). Yet, he argues that the picture he has 
created of traditional society in Saurashtra is a ‘reasonable grid for understanding 
what kinds of things Saurashtrians refer to in speaking of their society and its past’ 
(1997:315). Given the vast impact of Muslim heritage, governance, language and 
population on the region this cannot simply be the case. Furthermore, his model fails 
to account for the communal attitude of either Hindu rulers or traders towards 
Muslims. And it is this factor, more than any other, that has had such a profound 
impact on the direction and form of modem religious politics (both Hindu and 
Muslim) in the region.
Muslims, although not sovereign in Kachchh in recent centuries, are both rural 
agriculturalists and successful traders. Yet, they clearly cannot be comfortably 
assimilated into a model that takes different forms of Hinduism as the basic premise.
115
It has been shown that the dominant Muslim trading groups are inculcated in the 
mythical past constructed by Hindus. These trading groups form a small percentage 
of the Muslim population of Mandvi. Sunni Muslims are in majority, and they are 
seen as being of low status both by Hindus and the Shia traders.
The following chapter explores how Sunni Muslims and their high-ranking Shia 
mercantile patrons can be integrated into the model of ‘ruler endogeny’ and ‘trader 
exogeny’ and outlines the social hierarchy of Mandvi’s Muslims from which the 
Bhadala recruit apprentices while they simultaneously attempt to undermine its 
legitimacy.
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Chapter 3. 
Mandvi’s Muslim social hierarchy: segmentation 
and historically contingent migrations
3.1. Muslim population in Kachchh
This chapter examines hierarchy among Muslims in Mandvi. The ethnography 
presented indicates that the ethno-history of migration and trade combines with a 
model of corporeal substance and code to form a historically contingent hierarchy 
that transcends the majority of sectarian divisions in the population.
The argument presented in this chapter explains how Sunni Muslims fit into the 
endogenous/exogenous model outlined in the previous chapter. Origin claims and the 
status derived from them illustrate a complex relationship with the lands beyond the 
boundary of Kachchh. The origin, spread and demands of Islam place those 
professing the faith in a very different position to their Hindu counterparts. Islamic 
proselytisers came (and come) from overseas, and pilgrimage to Mecca necessarily 
involves transgressing boundaries to return to Kachchh improved and with greater 
piety. In this sense, for Muslims, ‘invasion’ of the kingdom’s boundary has for a 
millennium been a source of prestige, devoutness and liberation. Social hierarchy and 
social segmentation in Sunni Muslim society are taken as demonstrative examples 
that reveal how differential values are accorded to various areas of the littoral Indian 
Ocean. This discussion provides the context for the social origins of apprentices 
discussed in subsequent chapters. The hierarchy described here is denied legitimacy 
in shipyards by Bhadala seths yet, as shown in Chapter 7, is usurped in other contexts 
as a sign and model of Bhadala power.
Exemplary kingship is endogenous, drawing on lineage and the Goddess within a 
bounded kingdom, while mercantile wealth is exogenously drawn from outside the 
kingdom. Despite this profound difference, the kingdom (as land) remains the base
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reference point for both communities. The importance of lineage among traders 
replicates that of the rulers but does not result in the same claims to territorial 
boundaries. The trading ‘kingdoms’, or ‘empires’, are transnational, restricted only 
by the rules of the mahajan and enterprise (or courage) of those within it. Kachchh 
remains the homeland to which Hindu diasporic communities are intimately related 
through lineage and kuldevi, as well as dress, language and diet. Muslim diasporas 
have maintained less sentimental attachments with Kachchh than their Hindu 
counterparts for three reasons. First, Muslims do not have kuldevis (or associated 
lineage structure), and although a few groups are divided into nukhs, marriage within 
them is endogamous. There is thus no necessity to visit tutelage goddesses in 
Kachchh. Secondly, despite the contemporary preference among Sunni Muslims for 
endogamous marriage, there is clear evidence that in the nineteenth century many 
Kachchhi Muslims frequently married exogamously, which integrated them rapidly 
into the societies where they had settled. This trend was not restricted to the satellite 
communities. A report from the Political Agent stationed in Kachchh in the 1830s 
narrates how Muslims purchased African brides in Muscat or Zanzibar and brought 
them to Kachchh to live as second wives contracted through a left-handed nika (the 
ritual for taking a second wife subordinate to the first). The report goes on to state 
that the children of this union were accepted as members of the descent group10. 
However, the idiom of ‘mixed blood’, used to categorise men and groups in Mandvi 
(explored in this chapter) today, relies on a memory of these mixed marriages and the 
identity of their progeny. The lineages that incorporated significant amounts of 
slavish blood are of lowly rank precisely because of the ‘mixing’ of ‘blood’. In sum, 
Muslims were less reluctant to synthesise social life in Kachchh with the vagaries 
and hazards of life overseas than the majority of Hindus. Rather than maintaining a 
strict division between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of Kachchh, Muslims were more 
willing to transcend the boundary of the kingdom, which ultimately led to many of 
them settling permanently overseas. Thirdly, and as further discussed in Chapter 4, 
Sunni Muslims, with the exception of Memons (Engineer 1989), were subordinate to
10 M. G. S. A., P. D. 1869. Cutch No. 85/2226. No. 1177 Kutch Slave Trade. A mussulman inhabitant 
o f  -  purchased a Seedie female at Muskat and then brought her to -.
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the interests and movements of Shia patrons, which fragmented and distorted 
relations between Sunnis.
In the early nineteenth century James MacMurdo estimated that half the 
population of Kachchh was Muslim (1820a:233). The 1891 census shows that 
Muslims formed 24% of the population (extrapolated from G.B.P. Vol. EX. Part 1). 
The first census after partition (1951) indicates that Muslims comprised 18.92% of 
the population (extrapolated from Trivedi 1955:14). This compares to an average of 
11.35% of the population at an all-India level (Assayag 1995:19). The unusual 
concentration of Muslims in Kachchh is further intensified in Mandvi, which has 
traditionally had more trade, kinship, kingship and linguistic links with Sindh and the 
Middle East than with mainland India, a fact presently obscured by post-partition 
political geography. The majority of Muslims in Mandvi claim to have originated in 
Sindh, most notably the commercial town of Nagar Thatta. The partition saw many 
Muslims return, predominantly to Karachi (Ghani 1984:33). In the decades before 
the partition the percentage of Muslims living in Mandvi, must have been far greater 
than current numbers, which in the absence of any reliable demographic data, I 
approximate to be between a quarter and one third of the present population 
(including Salaya).
As discussed in Chapter 1, the history of Kachchh is defined broadly by the 
effects of various population movements, which have had a greater effect on evident 
social diversity among Muslims than among Hindus. None of the Muslims in Mandvi 
claim to be autochthonous. As Map 3 shows, claims to a particular origin, in a broad 
geographical sweep, range from mainland Gujarat, Rajasthan, Sindh and Punjab, to 
Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, ‘Arabia’ and ‘Africa’.
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Map 3. The littoral regions from where Mandvi’s Muslims claim to have 
originated.
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3.2. Muslim social organisation in India
Scholars writing on Muslims in South Asia have long noted differentiated, loosely 
ranked and named social groups that display a tendency for ‘endogamous’ marriage. 
Such findings inevitably provoked the questions: Do Muslims have hierarchical caste 
systems? If so, how are they organised? Reading the literature on Muslims in India, 
social hierarchy seems to be an empirical if variable fact. How such hierarchical 
ordering is legitimised is a subject of contention. The debates on the relationship 
between hierarchical Muslim and Hindu social organisation were inspired primarily 
by Fredrik Barth (1971), Louis Dumont (1970) and, subsequently, by Imtiaz Ahmad 
(1978, 1983, and 1984). As a result, contributions have been principally inspired by 
theory, and in the process the ethnography seems to have been drained of its ‘local 
colour’ (an apt phrase), becoming mere grist for theoretical mills. There are three 
broad positions. First, Mines has argued that Muslim social hierarchy in Tamil Nadu 
is not comparable to the Hindu caste structure because ranking occurs predominantly 
at the level of the individual (in terms of age, wealth and religiosity) and not at a 
wider social level (1975). Secondly, that Muslim social order is formed, in part, 
through interactions with Hindu populations (Jamous 1996), and thirdly, as outlined 
by Steve Barnett, Akos Ostor and Lina Fruzzetti (Barnett 1976), that Muslims are 
socially ranked, but that ranking is not based on an overall logic comparable to that 
underlying Hindu caste (also Barth 1971).
This last model is taken as the antithesis of Muslim social organisation in Mandvi. 
Barnett argues, in defence of Dumont, that caste does not exist among Muslims 
because of a lack of ‘integrative ideology’. Rejecting ‘caste’, Barnett argues that 
instead Muslims have ‘fluid systems of stratification’ (1976:645), which exist only 
within the context of Muslim society. Stratification is based upon male occupation, 
residential locality, occupation of in-marrying women’s brothers and fathers, and 
women’s rituals. He argues that such features can be isolated distinctively within the 
Muslim population for four reasons. First, Muslims lack an ideology of purity and 
pollution and therefore their system of stratification lacks an integrative ideology that
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accounts for differences among men. Secondly, Islam proclaims the equality of all 
men before one God, admitting neither hereditary privileges nor professional 
intermediaries between man and God. This equality is practised in joint prayers, 
inter-marriage among the four so-called ‘caste’ divisions and commensual relations 
between groups. Thirdly, Indian Muslims do not separate status from power as 
Dumont’s Hindu homo hierarchicus does (also see Dumont 1980:205-209). Barnett 
argues that among Muslims individual social mobility is possible regardless of their 
social position at birth. Fourthly, distinctions between Muslim communities are 
differences of class not caste, in the sense that:
An upper-class Muslim ranks high in the Muslim system as a member of the Islamic 
community. A lower-class Muslim ranks low in the same system of stratification, yet is 
equal to the high-class Muslim since both are members of the same community 
(1976:645-646).
Barnett’s model is taken as an example in this chapter because it reflects widely 
held assumptions about the nature of Muslim society that are commonplace in the 
abstract, but seemingly impossible to locate in ethnographic contexts. The following 
sections challenge Barnett’s four assertions through an ethnographic presentation of 
Sunni Muslim hierarchy in Mandvi against the backdrop of comparative literature. 
The analysis presented below also points to the fact that Muslims don’t have ‘caste’, 
but they do have social stratification that is based on an overall logic, which while 
radically different to that found among Hindus does display some similarities.
Literature that deals with Muslim social organisation in India frequently mentions 
social differentiation based on claims to ‘foreign’ and ‘indigenous’ origins (or more- 
or-less so) and a further division between those who came to India as Muslims and 
those who converted to Islam in situ. In study after study these divisions are carefully 
described and it is noted that those claiming foreign origins are of high status, those 
who claim to be from the lands immediately to the west of the Indus are of medium 
to high status, and those who claim indigenous origins are of middle to low status. 
These facts are seldom elaborated or are simply ignored in discussions on the
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underlying basis of varying Muslim social status (but see McGilvray 1998; and 
Vatuk 1996). Such divisions, it is argued here, are central to the organisation of 
social hierarchy in Mandvi. Of course, given the argument of the last two chapters, 
coastal populations may contain greater diversity than inland ones and particular 
origins may become more salient in a mobile trading environment. However, there is 
much historical and comparative literature (albeit predominantly reporting on littoral 
regions) that emphasises the diversity of origin claims as a way of structuring 
Muslim hierarchical social organisation (Barth 1983; Marlow 1997; and Misra 1963). 
This literature and the facts discussed within it are frequently overlooked in the 
contemporary Indian context.
One notable exception is Imtiaz Ahmed who, while tracing the development of 
egalitarianism in Islamic thought, observes that among Hanafite Muslims (the 
majority Mandvi’s Muslims) an Arab was superior to a non-Arab; amongst Arabs, all 
Quraishites were of equal social standing in a class by themselves, and all other 
Arabs were equal irrespective of their tribes; amongst non-Arabs, a man was by birth 
the equal of an Arab if both his father and grandfather had been Muslims before him, 
but only if he was sufficiently wealthy to provide an adequate mahr (marriage 
endowment). Additionally, he notes that Malikites, a great many of whom were 
negroes, were considered of inferior social status to Arabs (1978:14-15). Although 
simplistic, this taxonomy illustrates that birth, descent, ‘race’ and regional origins 
have precedence in the Muslim world and Mandvi’s Muslims are not an exception.
3.3. Social segmentation
Mandvi’s Muslims do not have ‘caste’ like Hindus, although they are grouped into 
ranked and endogamous units from birth. However, very few Muslims deny that 
there is a worldly social hierarchy premised on facts, which, although disputed, are at 
some level recognised by all. Rather than stressing hierarchy in absolutely defined 
terms, a more complex picture is presented in this chapter of an emergent 
hierarchical pattern based on pervasive social segmentation. This is primarily caused
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by the spatial movement of people against the contemporary benchmarks of preferred 
patterns of kith and kin organisation. This approach necessitates an examination of 
how kinship and wider ideas of race, human geography and blood feed into the 
ranking of Muslims. The following analysis focuses on the majority group of Sunni 
Muslims who are shown to have a segmentary model of society divided into four 
primary conceptual strata.
3.31. Jati
The broadest of these strata is jati, which encompasses, by its generality, the three 
following strata. Jati, widely considered in literature on India, corresponds to the 
taxonomic metaphor of ‘family’ or ‘kind’. Often translated as ‘caste’, it is more 
accurately thought of as ‘type’ and has a remarkably broad range of applications, 
from ‘black’ to ‘white’, ‘Indian’ to ‘African’, ‘Muslim’ to ‘Hindu’, and ‘Gujarati’ to 
‘Bengali’. It is a highly contextual and flexible form of classification. My own 
ascribed jati varied from simply being videshi (foreign), to being gora (white), criste 
(Christian), angrej (English), or ‘European’. On occasion when strangers heard me 
speaking Gujarati I became a naqli (counterfeit) version of all of the above. The 
commercial idea of ‘counterfeit’ is highly derogatory, implying that I was either of 
‘mixed blood’ or albino. Either way, it was inferred that I was unlikely to find a 
marriage partner and would therefore remain something short of a complete human 
being.
This broad sense of segmentation is reflected in the following specific 
classificatory orders.
3.32. Musalman
The second level of segmentation is Musalman (Muslim) and distinguishes Muslims 
from Hindus. The Musalman population is broadly divided into Shias and Sunnis, the 
latter being further divided into a large number of jamats.
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3.33. Jamat
Etymologically the third level of segmentation, jamat, relates to congregation and 
religious association. In terms of social organisation it retains these meanings by 
demarcating specific groups of Muslims within a general Muslim population. Jamat 
membership is determined at birth and in life an individual may reflect the identity of 
his jamat through distinctive use of language, dress, diet, ritual spaces and particular 
kinship terminology. Upon death the body is buried in a jamat- specific cemetery or 
in ay'<zma/-specific section of a general Sunni cemetery. At a general level all jamats 
are named, endogamous marriage groups and political units, which are often 
represented by social institutions (among the more wealthy these include mosques, 
schools and meeting halls). Although all jamats are endogamous, the ideals of 
endogamy vary considerably between them. A whole jamat can function as a 
marriage circle. However, given the preference for father’s brother’s daughter 
marriage, a jamat can also be an association of endogamous lineages.
The names of particular jamats are drawn from occupations, historical and 
mythological figures, regional origins, or from the amalgamation of two or more 
social groups. Jamats, which are hierarchically ordered, have only limited 
commensual prohibitions and no absolute idea of relative ritual pollution or purity 
given by birth. Members of a jamat tend to live in clusters around their communal 
institutions; high-ranking jamats live within the old city walls; low-ranking jamats 
live in less prestigious areas of the town or in the sand dunes outside the walls. This 
division no longer reflects the relative wealth of a jamat as it may have done in the 
past. Jamat is the dominant form of social organisation, but highest and lowest 
ranking Muslims are not associated with jamat organisations, yet they are ranked 
within the same social hierarchy. Therefore, jamat is not the same as ‘caste’ because 
there are Muslims who are not associated with any jamat, but are encompassed by 
the dominant social hierarchy. Furthermore, some jamats are comprised of groups of 
diverse social origins, a condition that is seldom seen among Hindu ‘castes’. There 
are two kinds of jamat organisation, which I chose to term ‘proprietary’ and ‘non-
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proprietary’. Proprietary jamats are corporate groups that maintain corporate 
identities, such as names, place of origin and customs. Non-proprietary jamats (the 
inferior kind) are composed of groups of diverse origins subsumed by a corporate 
jamat. The groups within non-proprietary jamats retain different symbolic identities 
(again names, places of origin and customs).
3.34. Atak
The third level of segmentation is atak (elsewhere biraderi), which is a patrilineal 
(sometimes referred to as nasab) descent group defined by a single apical ancestor. 
This generalisation can be complicated by pointing out that some ataks can trace 
common descent in Mandvi and among closely related populations in Bombay or 
overseas, while larger ataks may have many distant representatives that share names, 
and possibly affinity, but are unable to trace common descent ties. In the former case 
the atak is what Jonathan Parry terms a ‘maximal lineage’ (1979). In the latter case 
an atak forms the basis of a broad inter-settlement marriage pool. However, both 
maximal and inter-settlement ataks are putatively based on common descent even if 
this can only be traced at a local level. In reality, descent groups are prone to division 
and amalgamation and therefore are highly fragmented. When ataks divide it is 
normal for a segment to adopt the name of the apical living male figure. However, it 
is common to hear the explanation: ‘although we are called this we are really that'. 
The ‘that’ claim invariably creates an association with an established atak to which 
they belonged before their title was changed.
The diversity of social organisation makes it very difficult to generalise.
However, the pattern is broadly that common to northern India (see Parry 1979; and 
Werbner 1989), with variations according to marriage preferences and practicalities, 
demography, and geographical distribution. Despite considerable variance between 
groups and systems of classification it is argued below that there is a more-or-less 
consistent principle to hierarchical organisation, which is based on the qualitative 
evaluation of patterns of segmentation in Muslim society.
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3.4. Purity and pollution
This section outlines how transient ritual purity and impurity, permanent corporeal 
purity and impurity, and ambiguous occupational purity and impurity are understood 
among Muslims.
3.41. Transience
In Mandvi there is broad consensus that Muslim conceptions of ritual purity and 
pollution are transient and can be removed by purifying acts on the part of the 
individual (also Barth 1971:139; and Ali 1978:27). The termpak describes ‘general 
purity’, and the opposite, ‘general impurity’, is napak. Bodily products originating 
above the neck are less polluting (if not exactly pak); those emanating from below it 
are considered napak. This latter category includes the products of physical 
processes such as urination and menstruation, and growing pubic hair (which is 
assiduously shaved), as well as to the visible and metaphysical products of birth and 
death. These sources of pollution and their antidotes relate to the outside of a person, 
to the visible and tangible aspects of bodies as well as to digestion and consumption 
patterns.
3.42. Permanence
In Mandvi the same conceptions of pak and napak, used to describe these forms of 
transient ritual cleanliness, also describe qualities of blood (lohi). Pak stands for 
‘pure’ or ‘unmixed blood’ (nirbhal) and consequently ‘high rank’. Napak refers to 
‘impure’ or ‘mixed blood’ (bisser) and \ow-mnking jamats. Additionally, jamats of 
low rank are frequently referred to as being oigandu (dirty) and kharab (bad) blood. 
In other words, purity and impurity (if not to say pollution) determine the gradation 
of perceived blood purity and the emergent corporeal characteristics of individuals.
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Such metaphors are used interchangeably, which demonstrates the ways jamat, 
atak and men equate: individual bodily characteristics describe social characteristics, 
with social characteristics to a lesser extent also standing as a metaphor for 
individual bodily characteristics. However, metaphors for living bodies form, in a 
broad sense, social rank. In this sense, the body is not merely a collection of cells, 
chemicals and organs that form a torso and appendages, rather, the body has 
character as a collection of attributes and dispositions that stem from ascribed 
features conveyed through lineage.
These themes occur elsewhere in literature on Indian Muslims. In Calcutta 
Muslims emphasise purity of descent. This is evident in the use of terms such as sudh 
(pure) and birre (impure, mixed descent) in relation to men and groups, with those 
considered sudh ranking higher than those considered birre (Siddiqui 1978:258). 
Therefore, it seems safe to assume that prioritising purity of descent presupposes that 
a violation of the governing lineage principles is impure. Similarly, Muslims in 
Ranchi are reported to hold that inter-ethnic marriages result in impurity (Ali 
1978:26). From this example we can further assume that mixing ‘ethnic’ identity in 
marriage results in the degradation of the progeny’s blood. Additionally, Muslims of 
Old Delhi are organised into biraderis (‘one body*) and are socially governed by 
principles of purity of blood and bone in terms of descent, which in turn determines 
adat (behaviour, custom) as occupation and character (Goodfriend 1983:121-122).
In this example purity of blood descent is viewed as the basis for particular kinds of 
behaviour. A final example from Tamil Nadu indicates that more general traits and 
dispositions are also transmitted through blood. Tamil Nawwayats desire to marry 
among themselves in order to ‘maintain the blood’ and to ‘preserve the pedigree’. 
Blood transmits ‘qualities’: morality, ability and physical traits, which can be lost or 
diluted through admixture (Vatuk 1996:245). These examples show that blood is the 
central idiom of descent; the ascribed qualities of various kinds of blood are reflected 
in social status; blood transmits qualities and dispositions. Such ideas receive scant 
elaboration in the literature yet seem to be central to the social organisation of 
Muslims. Although the quality of blood can be partially affected by diet and lifestyle,
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blood impurity cannot be removed through acts of purification on the part of the 
individual: such impurity is permanent. Together, these examples show how pure- 
blood and mixed-blood populations are ranked, understandings of which are of 
central importance for Muslim society.
3.43. Substance-code hypothesis
Clearly, Indian Muslims emphasise the composition of ‘blood’, as a measure of 
social differentiation. It is surprising that Muslim kinship has not been married with 
the biogenetic ‘substance and code’ hypothesis (of Inden and Nicholas 1977;
Marriott 1976; and Marriott and Inden 1977). Despite the wealth of criticisms against 
this model (see Raheja 1988; and Mines 1994) it seems that the way in which the 
theory sets out the relationship between blood, substance and social rank is 
remarkably similar to how Muslims in Mandvi articulate social hierarchy.
In this model all actions (such as profession and speech) and intangible influences 
(such as perception, desires and posture) embody and convey essential qualities, as 
‘code-substances’ or ‘substance-codes’, which forever act against each other 
(McGilvray 1982). At a transcendental level all combinations make up continuous 
and graded-ranked beings ranging from the divine through the human to the immoral 
and the inanimate (Inden 1976). In this view, emphasis is placed upon the ways in 
which ‘reproduction’ (as a physiology) and morality (as part of the physiological 
condition) conjoin in particular ‘bio-moral’ combinations. A ‘caste’ from this 
perspective shares unique biological and moral substances, potentially intensified 
through the orthodox social transactions of occupation and ritual exchange. This 
model stresses the continuity of substance through ‘endogamy’ but, as discussed in 
the opening section of this chapter, Mandvi’s Muslims have not always stressed 
endogamy as they do now, and at one time ‘blood admixture’ seems to have been 
commonplace. If substances can be intensified, they can also be weakened and 
diluted, and it is the process of dilution (or mixing) through inter-ethnic and racial 
marriages that creates low-ranking and mixed-blood social categories. The previous
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section pointed to comparative ethnography to highlight the importance of pure 
blood as a feature of descent. In this section the substance-code hypothesis has been 
outlined. If ‘substance’ is blood and its corporeal correlates then what could be taken 
as ‘code’?
Some senior informants related how they considered people to be constituted as 
jism  (body) conjoined at the heart with ruh (soul). The ruh is comprised of two 
hierarchically ordered elements. The lower level is called nafs, which dictates an 
individual’s desires, potential for violence and other base instincts. The higher level, 
aql, relates to intellectual, spiritual and moral faculties. Together, these two ‘codes’ 
act against each other to form human mind and body actions in the world (adat). The 
distribution of these facets is seen to vary between individuals and more importantly 
between jamats. Broadly, high-ranking Muslims are seen as having a greater 
proportion of aql and the resulting propensity toward discrimination, discernment, 
commerce and the Prophetic ideal, which finds ultimate expression in barakat 
(spiritual efficacy and abundance) of Saiyeds. Conversely, those who are nafs heavy, 
as it were, are consequently seen as having a propensity toward base appetites and 
personal indulgence. Miscegenation, as a violation of segmentary principles, is seen 
as enhancing base aspects over the higher order of intellect. Furthermore, as shown 
later in this chapter, not all kinds of miscegenation are considered to be equally 
corrupting. Those with the highest concentrations of nafs are considered to be ‘hot’, 
while, those laden with aql are considered to be ‘cool’. Simply, the various 
combinations produce (through the transmission of blood as substance) people who 
are body heavy and others who are mind heavy.
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3.44. Jamat hierarchy
There are approximately twenty-one jamats of varying size, organisation and social 
integrity (shown in Figure 3.1.), and nine other clearly identifiable non-jamat 
divisions. Of the twenty-one jamats the nine highest ranked are uncontested 
proprietary jamats; ten middle-ranking jamats claim to be proprietary -  although this 
is contested; two are non-proprietary jamats, to which the majority of contemporary 
ship owners and sailors belong. Men in Mandvi can and importantly do rank all 
jamats with consistency. The ranking given in Figure 3.1. is somewhat 
impressionistic because the distance between ranks is not given, yet this general 
hierarchical order is remarkably consensual. My data collection was qualitative and 
descriptive, but ‘statistical ranking’ (Jain 1978) and ‘sociological ranking’ (Siddiqui 
1978) produce similar results in northern India. The area of greatest ambiguity 
appears among mid-ranked jamats (Jat to Lohar), and as a result these jamats have 
been amalgamated into one rank of approximate equivalence. In Mandvi there is 
little resistance to the idea that Muslims are socially ranked. Occasionally, in 
response to my questioning on the subject, men would say things like: ‘We do not 
really have social hierarchy because we are Muslims, b u t...’. The same men would 
also commonly use terms such as niche (low), gundu (dirty) and kharab (bad) to 
refer to men and jamats implying evaluative and qualitative ordering.
A number of further observations on this social ranking are of note. First, ataks in 
all jamats are also hierarchically ordered, as are sub-ataks within them. However, 
within the Laskri Jamat (itself an amalgamation of previously amalgamated jamats) 
there are significant differences in rank between the subsumed groups. This ranking 
is obviously more self-serving than general jamat ranking and for simplicity is 
excluded here. Secondly, knowledge of the social composition of the different 
Muslim communities is not evenly distributed throughout the population. General 
knowledge of the high-ranking jamats is widespread, however there was often 
uncertainty as to whether a particular named group formed an atak or a jamat.
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Figure 3.1. Jamat hierarchy
Shia (Isma’ili) Sunni
‘Indigenous’
Aga Khani Khoja 
Doudi Vohra 
Isna Ashari Khoja
Munshi
Memon
Khatri
‘Foreign’
Saiyed
Sheikh
Arab
Moghul
Pathan
Baluch
Turk
Jat Sanghar
Sumara Minyana
Agriya Lohar (wada)
Ganchi Bakali
Mir Dhobi
Bhadala* Bhadala-Pathan
Notes.
*The Bhadala Jamat is discussed 
in Chapter 4.
+Only some Sama clans marry 
within the Laskri Jamat.
Laskri Jam at
Saraki
Bhutti
Varpa
Sotha
Sota
Runja
Chavan
Kanat
Sama clans+:
Turk
Kachchhi Kareshi
Sheikh
Pathan
Bataach Manghara
Buta Mod
Butha Nai
Chanesar Nareja
Ghal Node
Haala Notiyar
Halepotra Rayma
Hingora Sabada
Hingoraji Samad
Hothi Sameja
Juneja Thudiya
Katiyar Unnad
Ker Ven
Koreja Vera
Wager
Khumbar Hazam Others (including Pathan) 
Siddi
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In condensed form what this figure shows is a hierarchy of professions: priests, 
merchants, agriculturalists, labourers, and those involved in ‘polluting’ professions. 
Highest are Saiyeds, who claim to be descendants of the Prophet’s daughter, Fatima. 
However, Saiyeds do not have jamat and neither are they lineage endogamous. 
Second in rank are Shia merchants. Arabs and ‘conquerors’ of foreign and 
indigenous origin follow. For example, Pathan, Baluch and Turk jamats are 
associated with having origins in Afghanistan, Baluchistan and Turkey. Next are 
artisans and agriculturists, for example Luhar refers to blacksmiths: such names are 
either derived from a particular craft or have become synonymous with it. Clearly, 
transient forms of occupational pollution play some part in the construction of this 
hierarchy, but the inherent qualities of blood are seen to determine such tendencies 
and dispositions. The traditionally low-ranking ‘professions’ of Wagers (fishermen), 
Khumbars (potters and mule caravaneers), Hazams (barber) and Siddis (ex-slaves of 
African descent) are firmly in the lowest orders of the hierarchy. However, 
‘profession* is not the logic that produces a ranking of such subtle distinctions.
What prevailing logic exists that allows men to make consistent evaluations of the 
relative rank of ‘others’ in the face of such diverse social organisation? The answer, 
as previously implied, is an individual’s embodiment of the principles of relative 
atak cohesion and strength, premised on the perceived purity of blood from ‘correct’ 
marriage alliances. ‘Blood’ is the measure of rank through which the coded 
propensities of the soul are transmitted. The prestigious form of jamat organisation 
keeps ‘blood’ within the jamat and, more prestigiously, within specific ataks and 
sub-ataks. Pure descent is the elevated marker of social status, so the more complex 
and diverse the social organisation of a particular jamat, the more mixed its blood, 
and the lower it ranks. Synchronic and diachronic marriage patterns are the primary 
determinant of this ranking. The greater emphasis a particular jamat places on 
notional endogamy (of various kinds), the higher it is ranked. Diachronic 
considerations include past ‘mixing of blood’ and the degree to which slavish blood 
has been incorporated into particular jamats. The non-proprietary jamats are of low 
rank because marriage, even if endogamous within the jamat, is considered
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exogamous in terms of blood (and can be seen as mixed blood marrying mixed 
blood) if marriage takes place between the encompassed social units.
The ranking presented in Figure 3.1. is dominant and transcends other contextual 
expressions of social aspiration. Such trends might include language (the adoption of 
Urdu by an individual or a jamat mosque), purdah (the increased seclusion of 
women in architecture and clothing) and high levels of mahr (payments given to 
incoming wives at marriage). These inflationary trends generally reflect levels of 
wealth and education, but do not alter jamat positions within the hierarchy in the 
short term. Prestation, a major theme of Chapter 7, is a common way of gaining 
status through displays of wealth and generosity. Given the structure of Muslim 
social hierarchy (its bias towards profession and purity), the possibility of a situation 
arising where a low-ranking man is able to benefit a high-ranking man (outside the 
sphere of ritual transaction) through gifts or philanthropy is extremely unlikely. 
Legitimate donations can be made to a jamat's communal institutions and to lower- 
order clients. Even a highly prestigious donation such as a mosque or the renovation 
of a shrine will only be received by members of the donor’s jamat, as all mosques are 
specific to a jamat or a group ofjamats and shrines also tend to be identified with 
clients from particular jamats. Therefore, in this social order, status obtained through 
giving is at the level of the jamat or at the expense of lower-ranking clients. When 
this social order is disrupted a whole series of opportunities ‘to give’ arise, as is 
shown in subsequent chapters; but, in Mandvi, philanthropic gifting does not affect 
status in terms of the overall hierarchy.
3.45. Pathans
To illustrate how hierarchy is understood in practical terms, the example of the 
Pathans is presented below (relative rankings given in bold in Figure 3.1.). Pathans 
comprise four groups: the high-ranking proprietary Pathan Jamat; two high-ranking 
ataks in non-proprietary jamats; and a fourth lowly group that belong to no jamat. As 
Pathans, they are linked by shared ideas of a common past that saw them migrate
134
from the northwest of the sub-continent into Kachchh as warriors and traders.
Despite the similarities between them, they are hierarchically ordered such that 
economic circumstances and position within the social hierarchy do not equate. The 
internal organisation of a jamat determines relative status. Within the proprietary 
jamats, such as the Pathan Jamat, there are a series of endogamous ataks that at the 
highest level of segmentation claim a common ancestor and place of origin, and 
origin myths. Within the low-ranking non-proprietary jamats, such as the Laskri 
Jamat and the Bhadala Jamat (see Chapter 4), there are varying endogamous and 
exogamous ataks sharing no common ancestry. Within these jamats there are ataks 
claiming diverse ethnic and regional backgrounds, accompanied by origin myths, 
dress and ritual customs. Lowest in rank are the Pathan ataks that do not belong to 
any formal jamat and who marry according to their own preference, situation and 
circumstance. The Pathan Jamat ranks highest because blood within it is seen as 
closest to the ‘original’, and therefore, the form of endogamy its members practice is 
seen as perpetuating pure descent. The blood of each atak remains at best within the 
same atak or at worst within the social parameters of the Jamat. This reflects the 
ideal that the boundaries of the Jamat are ideally inviolate. Moving progressively 
down the hierarchy, other jamats marry in ways that increasingly deviate from this 
ideal model (or did in the past). All groups, however, see their own marriage patterns 
as being endogamous despite variance in degree and organisation. What ‘endogamy’ 
means thus varies considerably, but variation is marked against elite considerations 
of atak and jamat.
In terms of blood, the scale ranges from ‘pure blood’ of the Pathan Jamat, through 
‘mixed blood’ of middle-rankingy'fl/nate to the ‘dirty blood’ of those not belonging to 
a jamat. I heard no dissension towards the idea that these four groups were ‘actually’ 
Pathan. Clearly, if all are accepted as being Pathan, that is as having had an 
essentialised ‘substance code’ in the past, their relative rank reflects how concentrate 
or how dilute that essence is within their ataks today. There are no connections 
between the four groups, no uniting sense of ‘Pathan’ identity or any attempt to 
explore similarly held genealogical connections or origin myths. Thus the ancient
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identity of Pathan has paled in relation to the historically contingent relationships of 
both atak and jamat.
Furthermore, not all mixed unions are thought to be equally corrupting. Broadly 
inter-atak marriage within a proprietary jamat, where at the highest level of 
segmentation there is a common ancestor, is held to be less corrupting than mlet-atak 
marriage in non-proprietary jamat where ataks share no common ancestors. The rare 
marriages between jamats are thought to be similarly corrupting to those that take 
place outside the jamat framework. Proprietary jamats are ‘genus’, in a metaphorical 
sense, and to some extent ataks within them are thought of as ‘species’ of that 
‘genus’. Literally, the blood of the common ancestor jamats is seen as being 
qualitatively different from that of others. This is reflected in the use of jamat names, 
which denote corporate and individual qualities emerging from ‘blood’. Thus the 
term ‘Bhadala’, simultaneously a noun and a descriptive adjective, refers not just to a 
specific group of men, occupation and residential locale, but also to numerous moral 
and qualitative judgements and a relative position within social hierarchy. In addition 
to having rank relative to one another, Pathans are ranked against the other jamats by 
the same principles. The ideal is that members of different jamats do not inter-marry. 
The greater ideal is that members of different ataks do not inter-marry. Meeting both 
requirements within historical memory coincides with a high status.
3.46. Segmentation
Society broadly based on lineage structure has, depending on the type and strength of 
lineage organisation, a built in metaphor to describe segmentation. As Jonathan Parry 
puts it:
Kangra people conceptualize their society in terms of a segmentary model and that 
neither in language nor in behaviour do they signal any radical distinction between the 
nature of the groups of different orders of inclusiveness. The boundaries which mark 
divisions within caste, divisions between castes, between ‘clean’ and ‘untouchable’
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castes and often between men and gods are different only in the degree of emphasis and 
elaboration they receive (1979:3).
Likewise, Muslims in Mandvi see the world as segmentary, although the different 
boundaries of social inclusiveness are seen as qualitatively different. Those marking 
distinctions between ataks Jamats and counterfeit Europeans or Christians are 
qualitatively different. This can be seen in the variable negative connotations that are 
attributed to the violation of these principles, which in an ideal world, should remain 
inviolate. In a broad sense, jati can be equated with ‘race’, which is another form of 
segmentary ideology. Peter Robb describes ‘race’ in the South Asian context as 
referring to stereotypical skin colour and concomitant inherent, heritable, persistent 
or predictive characteristics of individuals (1995:1). Thus it follows that 
‘miscegenation’, a violation of segmentary principles, is also discussed using idioms 
of ‘blood’, and the resulting gradation of men feeds into the ranking of jamats. Such 
classification crudely runs: pale men putatively from the ‘Middle East’ rank highly; 
brown men from ‘India’ are middle ranking; black men from ‘Africa’ are of low 
rank. Race, in the sense of jati, is conceived as a broad taxonomic classificatory 
system, and pure jamats, and ataks within them, are of the same categorical order. 
The darker the body the more dominant the base instincts of the soul.
The lowest ranking Muslims are the descendants of slaves who were brought to 
Kachchh from Zanzibar and Muscat in the nineteenth century (and possibly earlier). 
The jamats said to have incorporated slavish African blood into their lineages are 
also of lowly rank. Mandvi’s Muslims see miscegenation, which mixes the substance 
of different ataks Jamats and jatis, as unpredictable and potentially dangerous. 
Jamats, such as the Laskri Jamat, are attempts at disguising corrupting forms of 
marriage, but other groups have long memories and admixture cannot easily be 
glossed over with the creation of social institutions -  even when modelled on the 
dominant jamat form.
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Stereotyped skin colour and ‘pure’ blood are also seen as determining the 
character of the ‘mind’. Thus ‘pure’ Saiyed blood and substance stand for ideal 
barakat (charisma), divinity and piety. The pure blood of endogamous traders 
produces cool, controlled and calculating business minds. ‘Mixed blood’, on the 
other hand, is bad, rough and volatile. Blood purity has precedence in Islamic 
scripture and heritage, and in Mandvi is epitomised by the social status of Saiyeds 
(discussed below). They are hierarchically apical, their barakat most potent and their 
behaviour the most ‘naturally’ exemplary. At the lowest station of social hierarchy, 
opposed to Saiyeds, are slaves, or in this case ex-African slaves. All other men fall 
somewhere between these two extremes. Clearly, this ordering also reflects Ahmad’s 
outline of Hanafite social ordering discussed in Section 3.2. Such corporeal division 
is also entirely compatible with the model of transient purity and impurity that 
distinguishes between bodily substances from above and below the neck (outlined 
above), in the sense that those who work with the mind (Saiyeds and merchants) are 
regarded as purer than those who work with their bodies (slaves and sailors).
3.5. Egalitarianism and hierarchy
The relationship between social egalitarianism and hierarchy among Indian Muslims 
has received considerable attention from scholars and Indian Muslims themselves. 
This section reviews a number of elements within this debate that are of relevance 
for the discussion in later chapters through looking at Barnet’s contention that 
Muslims do not have caste because they lack an encompassing social framework in 
which to couch hierarchy. It should be clear by now that it is not being argued that 
Muslims have ‘caste’, but that Muslim social hierarchy is underpinned by a 
consistent logic concerning blood purity and the individual qualities that emerge 
from it. Barnett describes three features of Muslim social organisation to support his 
claims: Muslims emphasise the equality of all men before one God; inter-marriage 
between different groups of Muslims is common; among Muslims there is an 
absence of worldly -  divine intermediaries. The assumption behind each of these 
assertions is the universal equality of Muslims. But the data from Mandvi does not
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point to such universal equality (and scarcely in rhetoric) and thus contradicts each of 
Barnett’s statements. However, in Salaya considerable rhetorical emphasis is placed 
upon equality, not in terms of an individual’s condition at birth (because that remains 
very similar to the picture given for Mandvi), but in terms of the possibility of 
individual transformation within one’s lifetime.
The Islamicist Louise Marlow comments:
Islam is probably the most uncompromising of the world’s religions in its insistence on 
the equality of all believers before God. In God’s eyes, differences of rank and affluence 
are irrelevant, and all Muslims, regardless of their positions in this world, are equally 
capable of salvation in the next (1997:xi).
In theory this egalitarianism is extended in the large part to the social plane as 
well. However, in ethnographic terms there is clear evidence that lines are frequently 
drawn between social and religious equality (H. Basu 1993; Eickelman 1976, 1981; 
and Geertz 1968). In an Islamicist vein this is commonly expressed as: ‘women and 
slaves are regarded as religious but not the social equals to free male believers’ 
(Marlow 1997:1). In Mandvi, the category o f ‘free male believers’ is comprised of 
hierarchically ordered groups differentiated along the lines of blood, employment and 
knowledge, which relate to the ‘codes’ described earlier and to the criteria of 
behaviour, barakat and the Prophetic ideal described in Chapter 1.
The influence of scholars who have written about India in hierarchical terms, 
especially Louis Dumont who conceptualised ‘hierarchy’ as graded religious stations 
(1980:65-66), is evident in the literature on Indian Muslims. However, egalitarian 
values have their own social domains within hierarchical Hindu society (see Parry 
1974, 1979). Therefore, it is possible to argue that in Muslim ‘egalitarian’ society 
‘hierarchical’ values exist, while in Hindu ‘hierarchical’ society, ‘egalitarian’ values 
exist. For example: ‘the dialectic between the values of caste and hierarchy is 
arguably an inversion of a parallel dialectic within the Hindu caste system itself 
(Werbner 1989:288). However, this formulation seems dangerous and false. To
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oppose the principles of social organisation among Hindus and Muslims seems 
divisive in orientation, is not borne out by evidence, and assumes that all sections of 
Muslim society treat contrasting values in the same ways. Note the caution expressed 
by Veena Das: ‘In Indian society one finds controversies of anthropological theory 
not only mirrored in the ideological conflicts of modem Indian society but also as 
having provided new spaces for these conflicts to be articulated’ (1995:25). It strikes 
me that to oppose hierarchy and egalitarianism is to postulate an absolute and 
irreconcilable difference between the social worlds of Indian Hindus and Muslims. I 
am not disposed to see Mandvi’s Muslims as being ‘syncretic’, however there are 
many similarities between the two forms of social organisation that obfuscate the 
underpinnings of the ‘hierarchy-egalitarianism, egalitarianism-hierarchy’ opposition. 
Hierarchical social organisation among Muslims contradicts the basic tenets of Islam 
-  everyone knows that! The double ordering of hierarchy and egalitarianism implies 
contradiction, hypocrisy and a parochial disposition. However, it no longer seems 
expedient to dismiss ‘Muslims’ in Gujarat as ignorant of the basic tenets of their faith 
(as in Pocock 1972:44), when they define themselves as Muslims and importantly are 
defined by Hindus as such.
An alternative approach is to isolate hierarchical values and egalitarian ideology 
in Muslim society, treat them as different and contextual systems of thought, and 
examine the tension that emerges in society from holding seemingly contradictory 
perspectives. For example, Raymond Jamous writes:
It is as if we had to show that the Meo [of Rajasthan] were a Rajput caste and false 
Muslims or, on the contrary, that they were Muslims and not a real caste. In fact, the 
Meo case is not so simple: they are both a Rajput caste and a Muslim community 
(Jamous 1996:180).
In this example the Meo are caught between caste (hierarchy), religion 
(egalitarianism) and the conflicting interests of both. Frank Fanselow expresses a 
similar sentiment: ‘It is rather a matter of two competing interpretations and 
strategies for behaviour, which are employed to make sense of changing economic
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and political realities’ (1996:223). From this perspective it can be seen how the 
relationship between the social values can vary given different social contexts. This 
approach makes it possible to explain how among ‘universalist’ Muslims there is a 
greater stress placed on egalitarian ideology and values, while among ‘particularist’ 
Muslims hierarchical values may not be stressed but remain sociologically evident.
In Mandvi, Muslim society as a whole is clearly hierarchical and this is consistent 
with the way that all inter-personal relationships are conceived and in this sense 
hierarchy is both a value and an ideology. In contrast, hierarchy in Salaya is of a 
different form but no less evident, but a greater stress is placed upon egalitarian 
ideology and values. The different tensions that emerge from the relationship 
produce alternative social patterns. Importantly, the Mandvi hierarchy encompasses 
Salaya’s Muslims, but this is denied in Salaya through the stress placed on 
egalitarian values among ‘proper’ Muslims. This relationship is further elaborated in 
subsequent chapters, but raises an important point of relevance for the present 
discussion.
One of the most contentious debates on the social organisation of Indian Muslims 
is to be found in the journal Contributions to Indian Sociology (Das 1984; Lindholm 
1986; Minault 1984; Robinson 1983,1986; and Werbner 1989). These debates are 
concerned with the representation and characterisation of change and continuity in 
Muslim society. Broadly, the dominant perspective emphasises the diversity and 
plurality of religious views and social forms (especially Das 1984) and opposes 
Francis Robinson’s idea that Muslims of the sub-continent are gradually moving 
towards a model of Islamic perfection (especially 1983).
Despite differences in methodology and findings, all the scholars involved in the 
debate follow Robinson’s suggestion that social scientists study Muslim society 'as it 
is, not as it should be’ (1983:155). In its simplest expression, this involves looking at 
practices and social forms as they appear in ethnographic or historical contexts. But, 
in Mandvi as elsewhere, there is a tension between Islam as it is and as it should be
141
among the same people and within individual lives. This involves experiencing the 
contradiction between local ways and means of doing things and the abstract ideal of 
Islam. As discussed in later chapters everyone has a picture of what proper Islam is 
like and, although this is picture varies considerably, it is broadly similar to the 
‘universalist’ perspective outlined in Chapter 1. Yet despite this fact, merely 
changing religious practices is not enough to move within or to transcend the jamat 
hierarchy outlined in previous sections of this chapter.
However, other well-known models of textual orthodoxy and ritual orthopraxy in 
India shed further light on the problem. It is not merely a matter of defining the 
nature of the conflict between actual practices and ideal practices, but it is also a 
matter of defining the number of levels at which this occurs in any given situation. 
Gibb’s (1949) classic formulation of ‘degrees’ of Islam, when applied to the Indian 
context, might read as follows: (i) Traditional orthodoxy as the acceptance of a 
whole legal tradition, such as the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-Hind; (ii) Revivalist 
fundamentalism as the return to the original, purified principles of Islam, such as the 
Jamat-i-Islami; (iii) Religious modernism as the reformulation of Islamic doctrine in 
terms of modem thought, such as Sir Saiyyid Ahmad Khan’s Aligarh Movement; (iv) 
Humanist secularism as the maintenance of cultural values and the rejection of 
Islamic theology, such as the Marxist inspired social (naxalite) movements in the 
Bihar and West Bengal.
It has already been mentioned that theological discussion in Mandvi is seldom 
elaborated in terms of doctrinal differences between schools of thought. The 
exceptions are distinctions made between Shias and Sunnis locally and between 
Sunnis and Wahhabis for those who regularly visit Bombay. A second, less- 
taxonomic measure, orders hierarchically: (i) textual Islam, (ii) parochial practices 
and (iii) popular heterodox practices (Ahmad 1984:12-13). This formula better 
describes the pattern of religious practice in Mandvi, but these categories are also to 
be found at various levels of social segmentation: at the level of Muslim society, of 
jamat and atak, and at the individual level. In the following section a further
142
discussion of social organisation shows that of these different levels atak is the 
dominant form of social organisation in terms of religious practice and reform. The 
result is that local textual orthodoxy is as diverse as local orthopraxy and is a 
potential cause of sectarian division. God may have given the Koran, but its words 
are open to dispute and are taken as props for legitimising or dismissing social 
practice. Semi-literate men might not understand ‘text’ for what it contains, and 
literate men frequently disagree. However, texts are important signs through which 
social difference is mediated and interpreted.
Throughout the Muslim world the sunnas (the body of Islamic custom and 
practice based on Mohammed’s words and deeds) vary in priority and in terms of 
traditions of jurisprudence. Sunna are wajib (obligatory) and mustahabb 
(encouraged). The emphasis placed on sunna varies traditionally and regionally. 
Hadiths (sometimes classified as part of the sunna) are graded variously by 
authenticity, with each hadith divided into two sections isnad (the chain of reporters, 
ideally concluding with the Prophet) and matn (the saying). The potential for 
radically different interpretation, contest and refutation is clear given the inevitable 
ambiguity in genealogy, authenticity and meaning of both isnad and matn. Dispute 
extends to the ways in which hadiths are classified, as different schools impose 
different classificatory criteria on authenticity. With comparable sources of contest in 
jurisprudence and theological matters, the complexity and sophistication of textual 
interpretation within Islamic traditions makes it difficult to sustain a broad division 
between the ideal picture of textual orthodoxy and practice. Rather than the central 
relationship being between texts and practices it is perhaps better conceived of as one 
between ‘practising texts’ and ‘textual practices’. The former relating to social life as 
partially (but variably) derivative of text and the latter to particular contextual 
activities that focus on texts. In both instances authoritative intermediaries are vital in 
defining the nature of the relationship between text and adherent, and, as pointed out 
in Chapter 1, this can be more to do with power relations among men that with 
literacy, illiteracy or the content of texts.
143
Texts are important, but this varying importance is typically given by jamat- 
specific congregations in mosques and jamat- specific client groups at the shrines of 
Saiyeds -  both of which tend to be patronised by wealthy ataks within the jamat. All 
high-ranking jamats have their own mosques, communal halls and cemeteries, and 
prayer, majlis (congregations) and khutba (sermons) are specific to particular jamats. 
Thus ideas about proper prayer, ritual and life cycle rites vary between jamats. It is 
unlikely a man would be refused entrance to a mosque, and even less likely to a 
shrine, of a community that is not his own. However, if the man is local, he is 
extremely unlikely to visit the religious buildings of other jamats. This 
differentiation is acknowledged and is an uncontested part of life in Mandvi. There is 
no mosque in Mandvi that serves as a general meeting place for Friday prayers. The 
only time at which the town’s Muslims collectively congregate is during Eid at the 
eid garh (a stone wall, the focal point of which draws the congregation’s gaze 
towards Mecca). The eid garh is to the northwest of Mandvi. Conspicuously, the eid 
garh stands outside the regular confines of the town, away from the site of daily 
religious and social segregation. Prayer at this time is consciously constructed as the 
occasion in the year that the boundaries of atak, jamat and residence collapse into 
communal prayer.
This discussion raises an important point because on one hand it is possible, as 
argued in Chapter 1, to say that in Mandvi Islam is ‘particularist’ (i.e. as Das 
describes) and in Salaya it is tending towards ‘universality’ (i.e. as Robinson 
describes). This is certainly true, but the apprentices described in chapters 5 - 7  
move from one system to the other and find themselves becoming more ‘universalist’ 
accordingly. However, they find themselves in this situation because they become 
the material clients of charismatic Bhadala ship owners. For Muslims living in 
Mandvi who do not work on Bhadala ships the situation is different and nicely 
illustrates the profundity of the hierarchy outlined above and the conflict between 
egalitarianism and hierarchy, or to put it another way between Islam and jamat 
structure in a broad sense, the latter again being largely determined by the patronage 
of wealthy ataks.
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The problem can be expressed in the following way: social hierarchy orders and 
ranks men according to codes and substance -  those who are ‘mind heavy’ such as 
Saiyeds and merchants are of the highest rank -  but, there is also a widely held 
model of proper Islam, which partially, but not entirely, contradicts the premises of 
social hierarchy. The problem is that those who are clearly living and practising a 
form religious life closest to this model are the low-ranking Bhadala of Salaya. In the 
eyes of Mandvi’s Muslims this does very little to affect Bhadala status within the 
hierarchy because at a fundamental level they are physically corrupt and ‘body 
heavy’. This is not restricted to Bhadalas’ social mobility because within the 
hierarchy of jamats in Mandvi there is only a limited scope for social mobility within 
the middle sections (thus the ambiguity among the middle ranks) and between lower 
and middle sections. Such mobility can only be generated in terms of the hierarchy 
itself and the higher sections are out of reach, even for the most adroit climbers. 
Effective policing by high-status groups within a bounded geographical area means 
that status ambiguity (and thus potential social mobility) is hard to generate. In 
Mandvi, salient high-status claims are made to one of the sahaba (‘companions’ of 
the Prophet and the four Caliphs) or a notable tabiun (successor). However, the 
success of such claims is limited and variable. Those who, at some unknown point in 
the past, adopted the name ‘Kureshi’ (commonly ‘Quraishi’ -  a powerful claim given 
Ahmad’s outline of Hanafite social order) in an attempt at status mobility are today 
known as ‘Kachchhi Kureshi’. They claim that they are descended from the Quraishi 
tribe of Mecca who provided meat for the jihadis (religious warriors) during the 
lifetime of the Prophet. Other Muslims reject this genealogical claim, and 
derogatorily refer to them as ‘Kachchhi’, thus associating them with the local region 
and a syncretic past. This labelling checks the status they gain from being associated, 
albeit by name alone, with an honoured profession and valiant history that has roots 
in ‘Arabia’. Mandvi’s social hierarchy is fairly static. The established order of 
merchants, priests and foreigners reigns over other jamats, and fictitious claims are 
rejected by an order that itself may well be based on similar claims.
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Likewise, for the Bhadala the methods and intentions of their mosque building 
and proselytisation are thus denied legitimacy because they have emerged from the 
hopelessly corrupted physical and mental characteristics of mixed bloods. As 
subsequent chapters show, the Bhadala are aware of the impervious nature of 
Mandvi’s social hierarchy to their reform. Consequently, a number of conscious and 
unconscious strategies have emerged among the Bhadala that aim to undermine the 
legitimacy of the hierarchy rather than attempting the much harder task of rising 
within it. So although Mandvi’s Muslims have a model of what perfect Islam is like 
it is of secondary importance to the local and historically contingent hierarchy that 
orders religious and social life.
The example of Kachchhi Kureshis is an interesting one because it also reveals 
that salient claims for higher-status are made by an association with the land and 
people of the Gulf and not in terms of religious practice. The base metaphors of code 
and substance are more powerful than changes in religious practice. In other words, 
claims to high status are made against conceptions of code and substance and not 
towards the more ‘superficial’ markers of religious practice. Given that the majority 
of religious congregations in Mandvi arey'a/waf-specific, religious practice and 
donations to religious buildings and rituals also tend to beydt/wctf-specific, and thus 
limits the possibilities for general social mobility within the wider community.
3.51. Brotherhood of Islam?
The ideal of a jamat is that it forms a ‘brotherhood’. In the following section, 
segmentary ideology, as a way of expressing hierarchy in Muslim society, is 
explored first at a macro level and then in terms of kinship from where it is argued 
the metaphor draws on hierarchical ideas of kin within the broader egalitarian realm 
of jamat, which is crucially mediated by the atak.
In Mandvi, hierarchy is pervasive in all social situations. There is little rhetorical 
pretence that Muslim society is made of social equals. They deny ‘caste’ and express
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a restricted social parity through idioms of jamat. Respect and deference (and 
likewise patronage and political representation) are ordered around perceptions of 
social rank, lineage and age. Categorically, equals exist, for example members of the 
same jamat are all roughly equal when others are making aggregated claims about 
their status. However, in familial contexts men are ranked in terms of age and senior 
men within a jamat are ranked in terms of the power they wield and the social and 
religious accolades they have collected throughout their lives. It is not uncommon for 
Mandvi’s Muslims to say that they are all equal ‘as if brothers’ (dharam bhai -  
brothers of the same religion), and the term jamat also evokes a sense of 
‘brotherhood’. It is commonly assumed that this metaphor implies equality or 
egalitarianism. However, this assumption, despite the prevalence of the metaphor in 
diverse Muslim settings, ignores hierarchy inherent in conceptions of ‘brotherhood’. 
The actual form of relation conjured by the analogy is a common identity in which 
men are hierarchically ranked and socially segmented, literally as if they were 
brothers.
Relationships between brothers are among the most central, yet most delicate, in 
social organisation (Inden and Nicholas 1977:100). Typically, during the lifetime of 
their father, and while they themselves are unmarried, brothers will not normally 
enter into serious feuds. The eldest brother is a respected source of advice, 
governance and protection, who frequently acts as the public representative of his 
younger brothers. His siblings normally do not smoke before him and often will 
remain silent in his presence unless specifically addressed. He continues the most 
prestigious svfo-atak in the descent line of his father. It is the eldest brother’s 
prerogative to marry first and to be subject of the most prestigious marriage contract 
that his parents can negotiate. Brothers, although having a common genitor, are 
socially and morally ordered which also relates to a gradation of ‘substance-code’. 
However, upon the death of the father figure, brothers and their offspring typically 
segment. Here atak is an encompassing form of social segmentation that has an 
uneasy relationship with political and economic organisation. The following section 
explores these relationships in respect to conceptions of ‘brotherhood’.
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When I first started to think about the organisation of Sunni Muslim kinship, I 
was tempted to describe it, as R. Patai describes kinship in the Middle East, as 
‘patrilineal, patriarchal, [commonly] extended, occasionally polygynous and 
emphatically endogamous’ (1955:371). While these terms capture the essence of 
public social organisation they exclude the role of ‘mother’ in mixing blood. 
Additionally, these terms gloss over the importance maternal ties in kin reciprocity 
and affiliation. Relations with paternal kin and, especially, relationships between 
brothers are the most crucial to prestigious endogamy and descent. However, the 
prestige of this association has limitations. The preceding discussion of jamat 
hierarchy illustrates the central problem with describing Muslim kinship as 
patrilineal. Although the social organisation of names runs through the male line, 
perceptions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ descent rely heavily on the attributes of maternal 
blood. Marriage is patri-local, yet the ordering of social rank relies on the premise 
that admixture compromises blood purity.
The external connections of descent groups expressed in the web of marital 
exchange relations transcends in importance their ‘substantive and definitional 
qualities’ (Murphey and Kasdan 1967:1). When the Sunnis describe who they are 
and how they identify with others, they place much less emphasis on the links that 
are created through marriage than connections traced through the father. 
Consanguineous aggregation takes precedent over affinal division in general social 
discourse. However, whatever the genealogical relationship of a husband and wife 
each has distinct kin relations. Ego’s mother’s siblings are not the siblings of her 
husband. Such matrilateral ties are important and are often called upon for favours, 
employment and political and economic affiliations. The desired pattern is to marry 
women of the same blood, but given the propensity for minute social segmentation at 
the outset this would seem to pose significant problems. Actual marriage patterns 
reveal a counter-intuitive strategy for overcoming this problem, which points to the 
fact that kinship organisation and economic and political organisation are seldom 
homologous orders.
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All Sunni jamats have a preference for ‘close’ endogamous marriage. Explicit 
marriage prohibitions are placed on lineals, first order laterals and those nursed from 
the same breast. The composition of legitimate endogamous unions varies slightly 
between jamats, but, typically, the father’s brother’s daughter (hereafter FBD) is the 
preferred (but not prescribed) form. The dominant FBD marriage preference is not an 
isolated trait and must be viewed in conjunction with other patterns of marriage, 
social strategy and social division. Sunni Muslims in Mandvi are quite clear that 
there is no Koranic compulsion, or legitimate sanction in hadith literature, towards 
patrilateral first-cousin marriage (but see Aggarwal 1969:547-551).
Patrilineal descent has significant implications in the structure of jamat and atak 
in terms of public social organisation of names. Unilineal descent, traced through the 
male line in a stable or expanding population, constitutes a ramifying system where 
succeeding generations in many lines tend to be larger and more inclusive than the 
preceding (Barth 1954:164). The nature of this expansion leads to lineage 
fragmentation. This is a central feature of Muslim social organisation, which is 
partially counter-acted through FBD marriage. The largest actual or notional 
patrilineal kinship unit is a proprietary jamat -  when members claim a common 
ancestor -  however, in practice, atak (as maximal lineage and as inter-settlement 
organisation) is the common unit of kinship organisation and economic and political 
mobility. Ataks are thus divided into segments according to the fortunes and personal 
relations of its members.
Eldest sons are highly valued as blood-rich progeny and are predominantly 
contracted into FBD marriage. The literature assumes that this form of marriage 
keeps property within the family because of the girl’s right to inheritance (Murphey 
and Kasdan 1959:17). Taken as a single event (as non-reciprocal) FBD marriage can 
ensure sustained control over capital, but only if laws of inheritance are adhered to, 
and only if the exchanging brother’s economic and property interests are 
homologous. However, property is commonly divided between brothers after the
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death of a patriarch and inheritance laws relating to women are frequently (although 
not always) ignored. In practice, FBD marriage is ideally reciprocal, keeping blood 
within descent lines, but it does not keep property within ‘families’ given the 
propensity for segmentary fission.
Mandvi data shows that FBD marriage does not control the direction of outward 
flows of inheritance, but rather maintains property within a sub-lineage. Viewed in 
the long term, brothers establish mutually balanced levels of inheritance between 
women marrying ‘in’ and marrying ‘out’. Exchange is roughly of units of 
equivalence (although eldest brother’s daughters are hypothetically at a premium) 
through which the need for property loss is negated. In other words, through the 
exchange of women brothers mutually deny inheritance rights to their daughters. 
Superficially, it may seem that links through marriage are a form of alliance. 
However, the effect is to further the economic and interests of a particular lineage 
divisions among brothers, which by its very nature denies alliance through shared 
property or business interests. The result is a tension between the property and 
lineage interests of the patriline and the network of relations formed by affinal kin 
(who are also consanguines).
Ataks are subject to a constant pressure towards division and a ‘potentiality for 
atomistic fission’ (Murphey and Kasdan 1959:24). Both united and divided sibling 
sets are common. However, it is evident that kinship and political, economic and 
social relationships between sub-ataks are not always constitutive of one another. 
Brothers separate in business may well form political alliances, while brothers 
divided on political matters may well share business interests, thus the impetus for 
division does not only stem from disputes over capital and inheritance among 
brothers. For example, Bolim, who is in his forties, forcibly removed his daughter 
from a marriage with his elder brother’s son. News had reached the girl that her 
husband was in ‘love’ with a Russian prostitute in Dubai. She doused herself in 
kerosene and lit a match. She survived severe bums to her face, neck and chest. A 
year into her recovery her husband started to beat her, at which time Bolim
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intervened and removed the girl from his brother’s house. Bolim’s father was alive, 
sided with his eldest son, and stopped talking to Bolim because of the disrespect he 
had shown the affairs of his eldest brother (not the affairs of his eldest brother’s 
offspring). The compound in which they all lived prior to this incident was then 
divided. The patriarch, his three other sons and their offspring continued to inhabit 
their own houses within the sub-atak compound. Bolim bricked up the door of his 
house that opened towards a communal courtyard and made a new door that opened 
directly onto a public road. He and his brothers remained living side-by-side, but 
without shared space. Bolim also dropped his father’s name. Bolim’s dismissal of his 
eldest brother’s authority in favour of the interests of his daughter points to the fact 
that there are many other concerns in the organisation of kinship than mechanistic 
regulations and formal precedents.
In FBD marriage there is clearly a tension between two ideals. Carrol Pastner has 
argued that on the one hand consanguines make the best affines, while on the other, 
the lack of sibling solidarity is a prime constraint on first cousin marriage (1979). 
Analysis of the Mandvi data shows that frequently (but not always) consanguines 
make the best affines precisely because such marriages are compatible with the 
perpetuation of divided interests of siblings. FBD is the preferred choice for senior 
sons but not, nor can be, a possibility for all siblings. In reality, I estimate that such 
marriages constitute one in five Sunni marriages. The most common, perhaps two in 
every five, form of marriage is between members of the same atak or sub -atak who 
share a putative patrilateral primogenitor (these forms of marriage are less 
prestigious because of the dilution of blood). The statistical possibility of such a 
marriage being possible is far greater than it is for FBD marriage. Other marriages 
are typically ‘exogamous’ between members of different ataks within a jamat. But, 
given the variability of marriage patterns the ideal of keeping blood pure is inevitably 
compromised across generations. Although my own data on such marriage is based 
on a limited sample population (given that the Sunni Muslim population of Mandvi is 
around 10,000) it seems that FBD marriage is more common among those brothers 
who have divided their father’s estate and live separately. Therefore, FBD marriage
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is not a ‘cure-all’ for social rupture but rather a means of achieving a balance 
between the contradictory influences of schism and lineage, and is remarkably 
compatible with wider interests within segmentary society.
The metaphor of ‘brotherhood’ is a particularly apt one for describing segmentary 
and hierarchically ordered Muslim society, as well as one for describing a group of 
men with similar purpose. No social relationship, including those between brothers 
or between men within a jamat, is equal. Differences in rank as a ‘summation of 
multiple part statuses’ (Barth 1971) are constantly evaluated upon meeting and 
parting according to behaviour in group contexts. This is seen in who greets whom, 
who offers the first hand or embrace, and the style of words and titles that 
accompany the gesture. ‘Brotherhood’ gives an individual equality with others in 
terms of the relationship of the individual with God, and to a lesser degree in terms 
of ultimate reckoning at the time of death. The individual at prayer in a mosque has a 
unique relationship with God, which is of a similar quality to all other men at prayer, 
however, the worldly relationship with the men prostrated to his left and right 
shoulders is not one of equality.
To summarise the argument of this chapter thus far: segmentary ataks form 
proprietary and non-proprietary jamats, which are loosely ranked by a pervasive 
ideology of blood purity; hierarchy is more evident than equality; idioms presumed 
to evoke equality, such as ‘brotherhood’, refer to segmentary hierarchy, which is also 
seen in preferential kin patterns. Furthermore, marriage patterns between actual kin 
are similar among all jamats, with the exception of the Saiyeds whose blood purity is 
such that it ‘dominates’ when mixed with other blood. Among the majority of jamats 
the preferred form of marriage is with a male ego’s father’s brother’s daughter and is 
ideally reciprocal across generations (another expression of segmentation). Yet 
jamats are hierarchically ranked on the basis of kinship and blood. This ranking is 
determined by the historical memory of exogamous unions in the past as well as the 
mixing of blood in the present, which determines the substance code configurations
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broadly in terms of individuals within ataks, ataks within jamats and jamats within 
society.
Within this hierarchy of jamats there are two important anomalies that are 
addressed in the following section. Two groups, divine Saiyed intermediaries and 
Shia merchants, maintain dominant positions within the traditional hierarchy, and 
their presence is important for two reasons. First, the Saiyed is the apical figure in 
terms of religious status and power in Sunni Muslim society. His embodiment of 
supreme human qualities is given by his putative religious-geographic origins from 
the Gulf. Secondly, however, the presence of high-ranking Shia merchants within a 
predominantly Sunni hierarchy has a number of important implications for the 
traditional configuration of merchant-sailor relationships. Together these factors 
contribute to an understanding of how and why the pattern of patron-client 
relationships among Muslim merchants and sailors proved less durable than those 
among their Hindu counterparts (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, this also helps to 
explain the novelty and success of the Bhadalas’ modem constituency building 
among sailors who are also Sunnis.
3.6. Saiyeds and Shias in Sunni society
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, merchants are typically of high status and endowed 
with copious political power in clearly defined constituencies. Shah and Shroff go as 
far as to argue that among Hindus ‘Baniyas [traders] rank next to Brahmans in a 
ritual context’ (1958:269). In Mandvi ‘rulers’ are divest of popular power, and 
priests, unless cloaked in enchanting sectarian exclusivity, are, from the perspective 
of ‘traders’, marginal figures. Mercantile groups (Hindu and Muslim) have their own 
elitist networks of priests and closed ritual codes and spaces. Traditional traders, both 
Hindu and Muslim, maintain highly restricted social and religious organisations, and, 
as a result, are frequently, rhetorically and practically, opposed to ‘priests’
(Brahmans and Saiyeds) of a rank and file order.
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However, consider the Bhatiya example in the previous chapter. Although clearly 
powerful and influential figures they are ritually dependent on the figure of the 
Maharaja (essentially an elevated and specific form of Brahman), while for power 
Bhatiyas are dependent on a model of kingship (albeit without territory). Bhatiyas 
effectively reproduce, with some distortion, kingly power and Brahmanical status 
within an elitist fold. Hindu castes of high rank also employ the ritual services of 
‘general purpose’ Brahmans for household, life cycle and calendar rites. In these 
transactions prestige is derived from the exclusivity of the relationship. Bhatiyas 
transact solely with Pushkama Brahmans, while mixed-blood Hindu sailors, it is 
commonly said, will transact with any Brahman.
Bhatiya Mahajan dominance clearly corresponds with their sectarian affiliation to 
the Pushti Marga. However, exclusivity is premised on pervasive axioms of purity 
and pollution. Bhatiyas are integrated into generalised Hindu hierarchy through an 
intensification of dominant principles of purity, which are recognised by all. 
Furthermore, they maintain ritual relations with Brahmans that are firmly integrated 
into Hindu society. Dumont famously made the case for the distinction of ‘status’ 
and ‘power’ (1980:73-75). In his view the reality of Hindu caste society was 
premised on the ancient division between total ritual status (Brahmans) and 
contingent secular power (kings), and the opposition between the pure and the 
impure. The material presented in the previous chapter, although largely leaving to 
one side the question of Brahmanical status, points to the fact that the 
dichotomisation of royal power and mercantile preoccupation with purity is alien to 
the ritual lives of Bhatiyas and others. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that 
absolute divisions between religious, economic and political spheres cannot 
comfortably be sustained among Hindu populations. Trading castes are not simply 
socially isolated because they avoid conducting broader social and ritual transactions 
out of a fear of impurity. The dominant Hindu traders of Kachchh are merchant- 
princes with large exchange constituencies who sit uncomfortably within existing 
models of Indian society. Importantly however, Bhatiya Mahajan exclusivity is 
premised on a concentration of the wider principles of ritual purity and pollution
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within Hindu society. In this sense their high-status position is broadly supported by 
the principles of social organisation that simultaneously renders their clients of low 
rank. The case for high-ranking Muslim traders is rather different.
Mandvi’s Sunni Muslim social hierarchy is focused upon the prestige accorded to 
such divine mediators (Saiyeds) and the model of divine blood purity, behaviour and 
auspiciousness that their ancestry provides. Saiyeds claim to originate, as 
descendants of the Prophet, from what is present day Saudi Arabia. The many shrines 
scattered throughout Kachchh are burial places of the Saiyeds that embody the 
charisma of their deceased. Their sanctity seeps into the human world, to be 
harnessed and transferred into objects and people by the residing Saiyed to cure or to 
enhance the life of the client. Devotees do not consider the pir (saint), and often the 
living Saiyed, as a normal human being. Rather, they are viewed as inhabiting a 
realm closer to the divine from where -  privileged by inherited bodily substances, 
blood and saliva -  they have power to work positive miracles that transcend the 
boundaries between the living and the dead, this world and the next. They offer the 
potential for fulfilment of individual desire, and issue charms as antidotes to the 
perilous realms of spirits, witchcraft, bad health and infertility. The Saiyed is 
regarded as extra-human; his divine powers of mediation are not premised on the 
universal equality of Muslims. On the contrary, his position is privileged by his 
genealogical inheritance and ‘God-given hierarchy’ (Gardener 1993b:231). The 
Saiyed’s barakat is transmitted through blood, and is presented to the worldly order 
for curing and blessing through saliva (as a curing substance). Additionally, his 
personal charisma, which is elevated over that of normal men, allows him to mediate 
between the profane and the divine. Saiyeds are not apical because they mediate, 
rather they are sanctioned as mediators because they are apical in terms of 
prestigious bodily code and substance.
In Salaya, Saiyeds are derogatorily described as being akin to Hindu Brahmans 
because they serve as general intermediaries for the majority of the Sunni population 
between profane and divine realms. However, the traditional mercantile patrons of
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the Bhadalas and of other Sunni Muslim jamats were the Shia traders. Although 
Shias might respect the various claims of Saiyeds they are not implicated in their 
shrines or personality cults. Shia traders occupied a social realm with no connections 
to Saiyeds other than through having exchange relations with Sunni sailors who had 
ritual exchange relations with Saiyeds. From the perspective of Shias their own 
power and status went hand in hand, while the status (in Dumont’s sense) of the 
Saiyed was naturally inferior. Likewise, for sailors, the elevated economic and social 
status of Shia patrons was unrelated to the ritual and apical social status of Saiyeds. 
Given this situation the following section turns to the question of how the traditional 
Shia mercantile jamats fit into the broader social hierarchy.
Vohras and Khojas are in their own eyes, and in the view of the majority of 
Hindus, apical in the Muslim social hierarchy. In the eyes of Sunnis, Vohras and 
Khojas are of lower rank than Saiyeds and on a par with other Sunni ‘Arabian’ 
communities, but rank above the majority of the Sunni population. The anomalies in 
ascribed grades of rank point to the fact that the Shia mercantile jamats are isolated 
from the majority Sunni population. Each Shia community has its own institutions, 
constitution, ritual language, and residential area and is strictly endogamous. In the 
following section the example of Daudi Vohras is taken.
The Fatimid Vohra hierarchy is headed by the dai mutlaq from the al-Dawah al- 
Hadiyah (central administrative institution) in Bombay. An ahil (usually a graduate 
of the order’s institute of higher learning) is stationed in each town with a sizeable 
population of Vohras and leads the local congregation in religious, social and 
communal affairs. In Mandvi there is an exclusive mosque and an adjoining 
jamatkhana (for marriages and other social functions) where socio-religious 
functions are held. The local organisations that manage these properties and 
administer the social and religious activities of the local Vohras report directly to the 
central administration of the dai. At puberty, every Vohra pronounces an oath of 
allegiance that requires the initiate to adhere to the shariah and accept the leadership 
of the imam and the dai. The penalties for not obeying the edicts of the dai and his
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representatives usually result in excommunication. Through this organisational 
structure Vohras have a strong leadership to which they are accountable. This 
reduces their involvement with other communities and politics of a general nature 
because the platform to which they adhere is laid out by the central authority of the 
dai. Sectarian exclusivity is reflected in the rigid social boundaries of the Jamat, 
which controls access to Vohra religious buildings and traditions. The effect is that 
those outside the Jamat or those who have been excommunicated cannot participate 
in mainstream Vohra religious practices.
Vohra social organisation sets them apart from other Muslims, which is further 
elaborated by jurisprudence, religious tenets, ritual practice, time and dress. Vohras 
follow the Fatimid school of jurisprudence and seven ‘pillars’ of Islam (unlike the 
Sunnis’ five and the locally dominant Hanafite legal tradition). The most important 
tenet is walayah (love and devotion) for Allah, the Prophets, the imam and the dai. 
The others are taharah (purity and cleanliness), salah (prayers), zakat (purifying 
religious dues), sawm (fasting), Haj (pilgrimage) and jihad  (promulgation of faith). 
This religious organisation clearly sets them apart from the majority Sunni 
population. Further, Vohras are distinguished from other Muslims (and other Shias) 
by the use of an Arabic laden form of Gujarati (most of Mandvi’s Muslims speak 
Kachchhi) known as lisan al-dawah, the Fatimid lunar calendar (key days differ from 
Sunnis), and distinctive white gold-rimmed cap and facial barb. Historical 
connections with Egypt, Yemen and perhaps with Moguls, contribute to the high 
status of the Vohras. They trace their spiritual ancestry to schisms in the Egyptian 
Shia dawah (mission) in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. From this time the Indian 
Vohras regard themselves to have been allied with the Fatimi Tayyibi dawah of 
Yemen. By the late sixteenth century the dai had transferred the mission’s quarters to 
India.
The elevated social status Vohras command is not integrated exactly into 
dominant Sunni Muslim social hierarchy (see Engineer 1989), yet they maintain 
positions of influence within it. Sunnis and Shias frequently clash over matters of
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religious practice, the most well known example being the martyrdom of Imam 
Hussein, commemorated during the month of Moharam. However, Vohras and 
Khojas were traditionally patrons of Bhadalas and African ‘slaves’. These 
relationships placed them firmly within ‘Muslim’ social hierarchy and within 
enduring relations with Sunnis. Such relationships between merchants and sailors 
form a powerful and pervasive division in society that cuts across Hindu social 
hierarchy and the more fragmented picture of Muslim social organisation portrayed 
here.
Vohras (and Khojas) do not share religious or social relations with Sunni Bhadala 
clients. By way of contrast, Bhatiyas share common ritual dates, cycles, temples, 
practices and priests with client Kharvas. The ‘merchant-sailor’ dyad runs through 
Hindu and Muslim society, but in the Muslim case this relationship is not integrated 
into wider social arena to the same extent that it is among Hindus. Within the Hindu 
fold, conjoint practices provide cohesion and commonality to Bhatiya relations with 
Kharvas. In comparison, ‘Muslims’ (in the sense of the Sunni/Shia division) in 
Mandvi are not united by what they have in common, but by having Hindu 
neighbours and traditional relationships as merchants with seamen that transcended 
the Shia/Sunni division. The differences in the way that these relationships are 
constructed, sustained and maintained are explored from sailors’ perspectives in the 
following chapter. The different forms of social and religious organisation clearly 
have different implications for the structural distribution of status and power, and for 
the formation of specific patterns of social antagonism.
3.7. Conclusion
Barnett’s final point is that despite being divided by ‘class’, all Muslims are 
equal as members of the Islamic community (1976:645-646). Traditionally, in 
Mandvi, Shias and Sunni Muslims are ritually separate in terms of doctrine, kinship 
and jamat organisation, but economically related through commerce. Among Sunnis, 
there are significant divisions in terms of status that cannot be reduced to ‘class’, in
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the sense of wealth or as an attitude towards education, religion and social protocol. 
In Mandvi, significant social boundaries are given by putative origins, which are 
difficult to invent and even harder to convince others of their authenticity in the short 
term. The literature on Indian Muslims makes surprisingly little comparative 
analysis. This might be because of the historical formation from colonial times of the 
myth of a bounded continent socially and culturally isolated from the lands around it: 
a Hindu kingdom on a grand scale governed by the principles of boundary 
maintenance discussed in the previous chapter. However, the historical contingency 
of social hierarchy in Mandvi forces us to look beyond India for explanation and 
understanding because the diverse origins claimed by Mandvi’s Muslims largely 
determine their social ranking. In Mandvi, this process clearly has a very long and 
influential history and is perhaps the defining process that links the many diverse 
groups together.
A recent trend in the literature on Indian Muslims is to examine the role of 
overseas migration and trade on religious practice and social organisation among the 
origin communities (Gardener 1993a, 1993b; and Osella & Osella 1999,2000). This 
literature rightly stresses the value placed on ‘outside’ (what is not ‘Indian’) 
experiences of consumption and religious practice, which are imported (in original or 
transformed forms) into India. However, in Mandvi, the value placed on the 
‘outside’, in terms of the Muslim world and the ramifications of such ideas for local 
social organisation, is not homogenous. The origin of pure concentrated biogenetic 
substance is the principal means of evaluating relative positions within Sunni social 
hierarchy. An alternative expression of which is to stress the origins of ‘spiritual’, if 
not biogenetic, ancestry. The claims from which the greatest prestige is derived 
locate pure substance in the ‘Gulf and ‘Arabia’. Of second rank are those claiming 
genealogical origins from contemporary Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan; followed by 
those from India. Finally are those from ‘Africa’, who are hierarchically ordered 
through origin claims to ‘Abyssinia’, modem Tanzania and Mozambique (H. Basu 
1993). Although the Shia communities are of a different social order they too claim 
close relationships with places outside Kachchh: Vohras claim Yemen and Egypt as
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their places of spiritual origin, Aga Khani Khojas link themselves to many places 
throughout the Indian Ocean region, while Isna Asharis associate themselves with 
Iran. Despite the variance, all elevate Mecca and the role of Haj in religious life. 
Social and corporeal value draws on hierarchical representations of place and time 
from around the Indian Ocean. Pilgrimage, migration and trade have resulted in 
historically contingent exchanges of people and ideas, ideas that are fluid and 
disputed. The Gulf States and those who claim to originate from them, are held in 
high esteem’ while ‘Africa’ and ‘Africans’ rank lowest in the local population. It has 
been shown that in order to understand hierarchy among Mandvi’s Muslims the 
perspective taken must reach far beyond the political and geographical boundaries of 
land to an examination of the historically contingent movements and interactions of 
populations well beyond the sub-continent of India. Hierarchy, in local terms, is 
constructed through historical memories of place and segmentary social principles, 
which feeds into the encompassing base metaphors of substance and code.
The ‘modem’ sources of population diversity are the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century mercantile trade networks (Chapter 2). Traders and sailors are 
divided by their occupational specialisation within a very particular commercial 
structure. Simply put, merchants traded from their offices in ports; merchants 
employed a captain and crew, on whose loyalty they relied; sailors conveyed goods 
and occasionally merchants between ports. The simple division of labour was 
cemented through patron-client type relationships, which tied individual seamen 
over time to a particular merchant. Generations of merchants employed generations 
of seamen. Traders thus had considerable power over the dependent sailors they 
employed. Traditional ‘trader -  sailor’ relations were also cemented on unequal 
terms through the exclusivity of traders’ high status religious activities, as opposed to 
the popular practices among Kharvas and Bhadalas. This chapter has started to show 
how these key commercial and social relationships were formulated differently 
among Hindus and Muslims. The admixture and dilution of such diverse origins 
through inter-marriage has produced ‘mixed-blood’ populations. Regardless of the 
actual biogenetic components of the general population, some sections are explicitly
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identified as being of mixed blood. In the traditional scheme of things, traders are 
pure blooded of royal descent, while ignoble sailors are of mixed substance and 
unpredictable code.
The ethnographic data presented in this chapter resembles Muslim social 
organisation in other parts of India. However, unlike other commentators, I have 
attempted to show how claims and ascription to particular origins are understood in 
local hierarchical terms. At another level Muslim social organisation is premised on 
transgressions made of the boundary of the land of Kachchh. Islam is the example 
par excellence of workings of the exogenous processes. Broadly, all of Mandvi’s 
Muslims can be discussed using this exogenous paradigm, in which ‘wealth’ and 
prestige is drawn from sources outside the land of Kachchh. This state is heightened 
among the traders and sailors who regularly transgress the boundary and set to sea. 
The following chapter describes two groups of sailors, members of the Hindu Kharva 
Samaj and Muslim Bhadala Jamat. The analysis shows how sailors are socially 
positioned as boundary transgressors and as low-ranking ‘mixed bloods’ in head-to- 
head communal confrontation.
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Chapter 4
Mixed-blood sailors
4.1. Sailors
To the south of Mandvi the compound walls of a new Hindu temple rise from the 
earth at the edge of an ancient Muslim cemetery. The graves lying in the shadow of 
the walls are well maintained and kept clear of encroaching sand. The identities of 
the entombed are not certain, yet they have recently been resurrected and attributed 
with the miraculous powers of saints. The spent shells of coconuts litter the ground 
and each grave is shrouded in Muslim green cloth (Plate 7). On the other side of the 
wall is a temple dedicated to the Kharva deity Dariyalal, the Lord of the Sea (Plates 8 
and 9). In this location competition between Hindus and Muslims is clear and 
intense. In the past this location was the main ritual site for the town’s sailors, both 
Hindu and Muslim. The many cyclical rituals of the moon and tide were performed 
and celebrated in these sand dunes. The site is contested and plays a central role in 
the narration of social differentiation and violence among mixed-blood sailing 
communities. The nature of the contest is somewhat peculiar, because Dariyapir (The 
Saint of the Sea), the deity sailors flocked to venerate in the past, has subsequently 
disappeared. His image and repetition of his name are strikingly absent from the 
social lives of sailors.
In this chapter it is argued that Kharvas and Bhadalas narrate histories of different 
qualities and densities. Collective representations of the past, seen in the Kharva 
Dariyalal Temple and the narratives that surround it, are thick, detailed and stretch 
uninterrupted far back in time. By way of contrast, Bhadala conceptions and 
knowledge of the past are weak and incomplete. This divergence can be explained 
through the social consequences of different forms of kinship organisation. However, 
and perhaps of more import, contingencies of the past among sailors are related to
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the fortunes of merchant patrons and to the consequences for migration patterns of 
merchant’s kinship organisation. For the previous two hundred years Kharvas have 
entertained seemingly uninterrupted relations with Bhatiya and Lohana patrons, 
while Bhadala relations with their patrons have disappeared. The differences between 
these patterns are used in this chapter to explain the Bhadalas pre-eminence within 
contemporary shipping.
Previous chapters have contrasted two components of the diasporas of Hindu and 
Muslim merchants. First, it has been noted that Hindu merchants have maintained 
much stronger connections with Kachchh than their Muslim counterparts. Secondly, 
it has been argued that the Hindu merchants have more ritual and social connections 
with their client sailors than comparable groups of Muslims. The consequences of 
these observations are further explored in this chapter.
Ask practically anyone in southern Kachchh which communities in Mandvi are 
sailing communities and they will say ‘Kharva and Bhadala’. This answer, as 
discussed below, is not without ambiguity. At the risk of anticipating the argument 
that follows, at this point it is sufficient to say that there is much more to being 
known as a sailor than going to sea on a ship. Being a sailor relates to a social 
position, particular kinds of social relations and to a particular disposition towards 
the sea and the land. The sailors discussed in this chapter have an exogenic 
relationship to the boundary of Kachchh, and are importantly considered to be of 
mixed blood. The Kharva Samaj and the Bhadala Jamat populations inhabit Mandvi 
and Salaya respectively. Their houses and communal institutions face each other 
across the river. This opposition is a powerful metaphor for communal antagonism 
and for the related social processes of Islamisation and apprenticeship discussed in 
later chapters.
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4.2. Kharvas
The word Kharva perhaps comes from the Sanskrit kh from jcharash (salty) and war 
from vat (road or way). The Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency attributes the 
etymology as follows: ‘Khar’rvas... [are] Ksharavahas -  salt carriers’ (Vol. IX. Part 
I.:520). Colloquially, Kharvas are called malam (from the verb ‘to know’, in this case 
navigation) and dariya chhoru (sons of the sea). They form Mandvi’s largest samaj, 
constituting as much as a twelfth of the town’s 40,000 census population, and live on 
the southern edge of the town in an area that previously would have been within the 
safety of the town walls but close to the port. They are stereotyped as troublesome, 
dangerous and unruly, and their history and traditions are those of the sea, as are their 
names, gods and festivals.
The previous chapter laid out the ordering of Muslim social hierarchy in terms of 
putative blood qualities. Among mercantile Hindus a similar emphasis on purity of 
descent is evident. However, in the Hindu case perceived blood purity is not related 
to the qualities of foreign lands. Kharvas claim Rajput descent, evidence for which, 
they say, can be found in the shakha (principal lineages), which carry high-status 
Rajput names such as Solanki, Zala, Jethva, Rathod and Jadeja. This claim is 
supported by a number of non-caste publications (see Khatri [Guj.]1996). However, 
unlike Bhatiyas and Lohanas who claim a single mythical descent line, Kharvas 
claim descent from the Rajput lines of suriya (sun), the related ragu (fire) segment 
and chandra (moon). Kharva volatility is said to stem from this corrupt descent and 
their social character, which together with their mixed blood, determines their low 
social position.
4.21. Samaj organisation
The Kharva population in Mandvi is not an isolated one; they are to be found in most 
of the principal port towns between Mandvi and Diu. During the troubles of 1983 the 
Kharva Samaj were able to draw support from Saurashtra because the Mandvi Samaj
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is part of the Porbunder centred ‘Bar Gam Samaj’ (Society of Twelve Villages)11. 
This powerful pan-peninsular organisation has an elaborate legal code and 
autonomous court, which has sat regularly since the 1860s. The elected vanot 
(president) and mukadam (assistant) head the dayara (a meeting, typically of Rajputs 
and allies) in Porebunder and these positions are annually renewed on Nava Naroj. 
The mukadam administers justice and works to maintain relations between the 
geographically dispersed affiliate groups. The power of jurisdiction is derived from 
the madhi (seat of power within the temple). Each Kharva settlement in the Bar Gam 
Samaj is headed by a chovatiya (leader) who is appointed by the local Kharva 
constituency. In Mandvi the madhi sits in the temple of Murli Manohar (a temple 
dedicated to a form of Krishna playing a beautiful flute). The whole organisation is 
clearly modelled on the structure of Royal power, with court power being sanctioned 
by a deity.
4.22. Narratives of the past
Kharvas claim to have migrated south from Rajasthan into Saurashtra to fight the 
Muslim Ala-ud-din Khilji (or his representatives) in defence of the Shiva temple of 
Somnath in 1297. Somnath is an important site in the landscape of religious conflict 
in India today. The Kharva claim to have come to Kachchh via Somnath is a 
politically and religiously loaded one. In 1992 a rath yatra (chariot pilgrimage) 
organised primarily by the B JP, set out from Somnath to the northern city of 
Ayodhya, where Hindu activists claimed a mosque, the Babri Masjid, stood on the 
site of the birthplace of the god Ram. The choice of Somnath as a starting point for 
the yatra was no accident because the temple at Somnath had been rebuilt in 1950, as 
a symbol of Indian nationhood and Hindu dominance in western India.
Prior to its reconstruction in the mid-twentieth century the site had received 
considerable attention from successive Muslim rulers. Mohammed of Ghazni, one of
11 The ‘twelve’ (sixteen) villages are Porbunder, Veraval, Mangrol, Vanakbara, Mandvi, Mundra, 
Salaya, Jamnagar, Dwarka, Jam Salaya, Okha, Positara, Aarambhada, Goriyari, Varvala and Goghla.
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the first ‘Turkish’ conquerors of western India, destroyed the temple’s idol in 1026. 
The second struggle between Hinduism and Islam took place at Somnath in 1297 
when the ‘Turkish’ Sultan Ala-ud-din Khilji sent Afsal Khan to destroy the temple, 
which had been rebuilt after Mohammed’s return to Ghazni. In 1701 the Mogul 
Aurangazeb sent Mohammed Azam, the Governor of Gujarat, to destroy the temple 
once again. Victorious, Azam constructed a mosque on its foundation 
(Krishnaswamy 1966:81). The same idol, in the same place, had prompted three 
major battles over the course of eight hundred years. Each time the Muslims had 
been victorious and each time they had destroyed the image in the temple.
To many Hindus Somnath has become an elevated representation of their 
religious tradition and simultaneously a reminder of the threat posed by Islam. To 
many Muslims the site symbolises the victory of Islamic monotheism and rationality 
over Hindu idolatry. Sometime during the nineteenth century it seems that the 
mosque was destroyed and the temple again rebuilt. Somnath became an important 
site in the rhetoric of the Vishwa Hindu Parisad (VHP) as the temple was a striking 
reminder of Hindu-Muslim antipathy in India because the then leader of the BJP, Lai 
Kishan Advani, had characterised the rebuilding of the temple at Somnath as the first 
stage of a campaign to reinstate the ancient symbols of unity and amity in India -  the 
liberation of Ram’s birth place in Ayodhya was to be the second (see A. Basu 
1996:74-76; Das 1995:41-50; Kakar 1996:49-51; and Hansen 1999:172-199). In 
western India the sites of Somnath and Ayodhya are seen as being related by history 
and connected by the route famously etched into the landscape by the yatra. Both 
places have become elevated symbols of the struggle between Hindus and Muslims. 
The eventual destruction of the Babri Masjid played a role in the fractious relations 
between Hindus and Muslims in Mandvi as several local BJP and VHP activists went 
to participate in the demolition. However, of more significance here is the Kharva 
claim to have been involved in the original battle for Somnath. Naran, a retired 
Kharva sailor, told the story of Somnath in the following way:
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“Somnath was the most beautiful and powerful temple in India. Hundreds of Brahmans 
performed rituals to the huge lingam in the temple. There was singing and dancing. The 
temple had a vast wealth and was good to the people. Ala-ud-din Khilji came from the 
north to destroy the temple and to confiscate its fantastic wealth. Our people were living 
in Rajasthan as kings and warriors. We were a noble and courageous race. When we 
heard that Khilji was coming to Somnath we left our lands to fight him. We journeyed 
down through Rajasthan and into Saurashtra and met with the kings there. They greeted 
us and gave us their best horses. Some people believed that Shiva had invited Khilji 
[sometimes Kharvas also claim to have fought Mohammed of Ghazni at the temple] to 
Somnath to revenge him. Many thousands of us died in the battle to save the temple. In 
the end it was destroyed and the lingam was ruined. After the battle we were left weak 
and starving and fled to hide along the coast.”
Kharva discussions of violence with Muslims in Mandvi revolve around the 
theme of revenge for Somnath. In 1983 Kharva protagonists went to fight Bhadalas 
armed with swords, just as they claim to have gone to defend Somnath against 
Muslims many centuries before. Listening to stories of killing and death I was struck 
by how detached and almost surreal they seemed. The last half-century has been a 
time of great change for Kharvas, during which time they have reinvented their 
traditions, and part of this process has been to provide explanations for the events of 
the early 1980s. I am not suggesting that they were calculating the terms of their 
revenge as they cut flesh and watched blood pour from severed limbs into the sand 
on the road that runs down to the port. However, in the years after 1983 sense has 
been made out of the violence. Logical and justifying, this sense is couched in terms 
of revenge and retribution measured against ancient events. Kharvas first remember 
themselves defeated in battle, so revenging the losses of their ancestors at Somnath 
they equal an old score. While it is possible to place Kharva narratives of the past in 
a nationalist framework, in this instance they are better viewed at a micro level. Key 
sites, like Somnath and Ayodhya (a previous Solar Kingdom), are important symbols 
within nationalist rhetoric, but Kharvas are implicated in the actual events of such 
rhetoric. They situate themselves at the heart of the story, claiming their social and 
geographic displacement was a result of the battle for Somnath. From the perspective 
of such ex post facto rationalisation, rather than recapitulating somewhat abstract
167
nationalist discourse, they are rewriting and revenging their own displacement. In 
this sense nationalist history is very personal, and Kharvas express personal 
animosity towards the generalised Muslim ‘other’ who appear in their narration as 
responsible for atrocities against Hindu tradition and, more importantly, as 
responsible for their transformation from kings and warriors to humble sailors.
Kharvas claim to have been sailors for at least the last 500 years. After defeat at 
Somnath they took shelter along the coast and started to learn the ways of the sea, 
gradually moving into Kachchh. In the nineteenth century, and possibly long before, 
Kharvas were famous as sailors skilful in navigation and pilotage, working on ships 
owned predominantly by Bhatiya merchants. In this phase of their past they adopted 
their present form of social organisation and became associated with the sea and its 
traditions. In the aftermath of the violence of the early 1980s the Kharvas constructed 
a new temple, which involved collecting and assembling artefacts and signs that were 
salient to their seafaring ancestors, to renew their relationship with these ancestors 
and the traditions of the sea.
4.23. Dariyalal Temple
Of the mythology surrounding the many temples associated with the sea much is 
concerned with Hindu power over Muslims. Ravalpir (Chapter 2), for example, is not 
only reputed to have protected Hindus from predatory Muslim missionaries, he is 
also held to have been ritually superior to Muslims. Ravalpir’s custodian explained 
that:
“In Ravi’s time Muslims were making blood sacrifices to the sea so it would safely 
carry them. Ravi taught them that they did not need to kill a man to do this, cutting a 
finger and letting a drop of blood fall into the sea was adequate. The Muslims did not 
believe him and continued to sacrifice human life to the sea. A Muslim challenged 
Raval to see whose sacrificial acts were the most powerful. After making the necessary 
sacrifices Raval and the Muslim went out to sea. Raval returned alone.”
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The Muslim, we are left to suppose, drowned. Themes like this are recurrent in 
the mythology of the coastal temples and deities.
The temple wall in the Muslim graveyard, described at the beginning of this 
chapter, encloses the Kharva Samaj’s Dariyalal temple. Around fifteen years ago 
they chose to build this temple on the site where in times past Kharvas and Bhadalas 
had jointly celebrated Nava Naroj. The site is a ‘contested’ one, but it is now legally 
owned by the Kharva Samaj. In the compound, aside from the temple structure, are a 
small office block, a row of paliyos (hero stones) and a stone tortoise. The temple 
structure is small, square and domed, resembling the building that houses Ravalpir. 
Inside is an icon of Dariyalal, bearded and sitting resplendent on a fish. He is brightly 
lit and surrounded by silver windmills12. At his feet stands a series of orange horse 
statues.
The dedication of this temple to Dariyalal is an expression of social aspiration. It 
replaces anterior representations of the ‘syncretic’ figure of Dariyapir, but is also an 
appropriation of the mythology of the high-ranking Lohana Mahajan. Dariyalal is the 
Lohana’s central deity (ishtdevta). The story migrated from the Sindh with the 
Lohanas. Originally, Dariyalal was associated with the Indus. In Kachchh, unlike the 
common reference to water in many northern Indian languages, dariya refers to the 
sea. Dariyalal is also referred to as samudrastit or samudradev, ‘Lord of the Ocean’.
Dariyalal was a miraculous infant who transformed himself into an armed 
horseman and emerged from the Indus to rebuke a persecuting Muslim (Aitken 
1907:165-166). Bom to devotees of Varun (a water god), the boy was blessed with 
the protection and generosity of the deity, and from an early age displayed 
miraculous powers. The boy took to hawking dahl to people congregating along the 
water’s edge. While he was working Varun would appear and take the child deep
12 Mandvi’s beach is the site of a wind farm, which is one of the main tourist attractions in Kachchh. 
Windmills have become synonymous with Mandvi. Those in the temple draw on this association and 
create a connection between the monsoon winds that facilitate trade and the power inherent in the 
wind to destroy fragile ships and seamen’s lives.
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into the sea, always returning him to shore with twice the amount of dahl. The 
‘illegitimate’ King of nearby Nagar Thatta was a voracious Muslim named 
Marakhshah, whose court published an edict ordering people to convert to Islam or 
face death. The terrified Hindus went down to the ‘coast’ to ask Varun to appear to 
Marakhshah to prove the legitimacy of the Hindu religion. The King’s minister had 
been watching the hapless Hindus when Dariyalal appeared to him on horseback out 
of the waves and told the minister to cease his persecution. On hearing this, the King 
ordered the deity to be brought to him, but Dariyalal could not be found. Later 
Dariyalal resurfaced in the Indus River, from where he produced armed warriors 
from the water who so terrorised the King that he stopped his campaign of forced 
religious conversion.
This myth surrounds the temple complex of the Lohana Mahajan and has been 
appropriated by the Kharva Samaj. The parallels to the mythology of Ravalpir are 
obvious: creative power is exogenously drawn from the water, in this instance to 
stave off the predatory advances of a Muslim king towards a Hindu population. A 
printed version of the myth contains an additional elaboration, which further 
emphasises key elements at work in the story. A merchant devotee of Dariyalal came 
to Bakhar (an island in the Indus) by ship with his family. When the King saw the 
merchant’s daughter he wanted to take her as his wife but the merchant refused the 
King’s request. Subsequent threats by the King so troubled the merchant’s family 
that they fasted and prayed to Dariyalal for help. Dariyalal appeared in a dream to the 
merchant’s daughter and said that he would protect them by sending an earthquake to 
destroy the kingdom. In the destruction that followed the kingdom was left barren. 
The merchant and his family were unharmed and set sail to sea in order to pray and 
offer their thanks to Dariyalal (Maharaj and Dwivedi [Guj.] 1949:88-105).
In this story the devotion of the merchant’s family overcomes the temporal and 
corporeal power of the Muslim king. Fragments of this tale are evident in other 
myths and loosely reflect historical events and actual places. Claude Levi Strauss has 
famously argued that myths can either appear as disconnected elements, the result of
170
thematic deterioration and disorganisation, or as simply disconnected in original 
form (1978:34-5). The recurrence of particular themes in the myths surrounding 
temples of deities related to the sea make it clear that diverse fragments can also be 
assembled and presented to tell stories other than the one with which the fragment 
was previously associated. Some fragments are more powerful than others: the theme 
of the kingdom’s water drying up has many mythological expressions and has 
obvious parallels with the consequences of the 1819 earthquake. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the monsoon rains in Kachchh frequently fail to replenish the ground 
water, and as a result deep-seated anxiety about failing rains runs throughout myth, 
song and ritual in Kachchh. However, of the myth of Dariyalal, it is important to 
stress the mythological representation of the struggle between Hindu and Muslim 
ritual and corporeal power, wrapped in the theme of forced conversion campaigns. 
The central foundation myth of the Lohana Mahajan, as with many Bhatiya Mahajan 
ataks, has roots in Hindu victories over proselytising Muslims. This is strangely at 
odds with the Kharva myth of origin, which describes their modem social form 
emerging from a defeat at the hands of Muslims at Somnath. Of the three Hindu 
mercantile origin myths, the Bhatiyas and Lohanas claim victory over Muslims, 
while the Kharva Samaj attributes its current lowly social position to defeat by 
Muslims. It seems sailors are subordinate to merchants even in claims to prestigious 
origins.
The myth of Dariyalal shows how oceanic power can be harnessed to generate 
wealth (trade goods such as dahl) and to overpower Muslims. However, the 
recurrence of such fragments not only attests to their social and historical salience in 
collective representations of the past. The structural forces inherent in the myth (land 
and sea, land holding and commerce, and Hindus and Muslims) are made 
contemporaneous both in their retelling in the present and as metaphors that 
simultaneously reflect and create contemporary social division. Such myths may be 
archaic, and may or may not coincide with evidence from the archaeological record, 
but they are not primarily told as sequential narratives with a logical conclusion, 
rather they stand for a set of structural power relations that are salient in the present.
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Likewise, the appropriation of myths and deities also reflects and creates social 
division in the present. The point was made in Chapter 2 that the analysis of origin 
myths attributed to particular temple complexes can reveal (i) what kind of claims 
are important, (ii) how authenticity is structured and cadenced in language and time, 
(iii) how particular kinds of claim can change over time, and (iv) how the claims of 
one group relate to those of another group. How the Kharva Samaj temple relates to 
these observations is explored below.
The Dariyalal temple is the flagship of reinvented Kharva tradition. Older Shivite 
temples, such as the one dedicated to Ratnakar Sagar (the sea as a mine of jewels), 
are neglected and crumbling. The Kharvas’ marriage hall contains a temple dedicated 
to Ram, and their court is combined with a temple dedicated to Krishna. The 
marriage hall is located in the centre of the Kharva residential area and is presided 
over by kingly Ram, while the court is situated in a mercantile dominated 
commercial area just outside the perimeter of the Kharvas’ housing area. The 
Dariyalal temple lies away towards the sea. Together the temples of Krishna, Ram 
and Dariyalal and associated institutions of law, kinship and modem Samaj identity 
mark out the boundaries of Kharva dominance on the southern edge of Mandvi.
The Dariyalal temple serves as a museum for Kharva tradition and fame. The 
appropriation of the Lohana Mahajan’s deity is an aspirational claim, but 
simultaneously confirms to high-status merchants that Kharvas have neither integrity 
nor any legitimate claims to social status based on ritual exclusivity. From the 
elevated social position of the mahajans, appropriation and theft are the kinds of 
ignorant activities that can be expected of mixed bloods. However, the Kharva 
adoption of Dariyalal is also a way of distancing themselves from an association with 
Muslims. It is clear from oral accounts and gazetteer publications that in the past 
Dariyapir was venerated by Kharvas and Bhadalas but has now vanished and is 
neither represented nor venerated by either Hindus or Muslims (see below).
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On the internal walls of the temple are newspaper cuttings and other ephemera 
that detail the glorious history of Kharva seafaring. The horses standing before 
Dariyalal are said to have come miraculously from the sea, and are associated with 
the warriors that Dariyalal was able to conjure from the waters to defeat the Muslim 
predator. Before this temple was constructed the artefacts now contained within it 
had been lost and forgotten in the sand dunes. The horses and other images were 
uncovered and catalogued by an archaeologist from Bombay. The Samaj leaders 
arranged for the collection and incorporation of these artefacts in the construction of 
the new temple complex. On one level this appears like an extreme form of 
‘inventing tradition’ (Hobsbawm 2000), where forsaken images are couched in terms 
of a legitimate and established mythology. However, the traditions seen in and 
around the temple are clearly transformations of ancient themes, which have been 
given a renewed rigour through the construction of the temple. A particularly 
fascinating set of items in the assemblage is the row of paliyos (hero stones) that 
commemorate ancestors who died auspiciously in battle or sacrificially. Such stones 
are ubiquitous in Kachchh and stand as sources of protection for particular castes and 
villages. They are typically adorned with one of two symbols: stones 
commemorating women show a raised hand; those commemorating men show a 
warrior on horseback. The stones in the Dariyalal temple are extremely unusual 
because carved in relief are images of ships at sea, the stones commemorating 
ancestors who sacrificed their lives courageously at sea.
The construction of the temple and the activities and myths that surround it reveal 
the atavism that is central to contemporary Kharva Samaj identity. The stories of the 
lives of illustrious ancestors parallel the narration of contemporary biographies. 
Typical biographic forms isolate traits in the lives of ancestors, such as courage, skill 
and deep knowledge of winds, tides and currents, in order to integrate them into the 
biographies of modem Kharvas. The figures venerated through the paliyos were 
courageous and exceptional sailors. In their modem form paliyos commemorate the 
twenty, or so, Kharvas that lost their lives to Japanese submarines during the Second 
World War, and an array of personalities attributed with extreme knowledge and
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daring. Of this latter group there are two of particular note. The first, Kano Malum, is 
said to have guided Vasco de Gama from Africa to Calicut in 1498. His knowledge 
of navigation is held as superior to the Europeans of the time. The irony is that he 
brought a colonising power to India. The Kharva Samaj have glossed over this and 
have reinvented him as a ‘freedom fighter’, who upon realising his mistake 
campaigned tirelessly for the freedom of India. The second is Ramsinh Malum, who 
seems to have been a Wager from Okha, rather than a Kachchhi Kharva. 
Shipwrecked, he was rescued by a passing Dutch ship, and so impressed the crew 
with his courage in repelling the attacks of pirates that he was taken to Holland.
There he learned a bewildering array of craft techniques that he brought with him on 
his return to Kachchh (Postens 1839a: 14—15; and Rushbrook Williams 1958:43, 
137-42, 148). He is commemorated in the song:
You kept the memory o f your ancestors burning.
Like your ancestors you also ploughed the sea, son o f the sea.
The clouds o f death brought rain and pushed your boat.
Playing in the lap o f the sea your boat sunk.
You are the son o f the adventurous Kharva -  ploughers o f seaways.
The memory of ancestors mentioned in the song refers to reliving the essence of 
being a Kharva through the replication of ancestral actions and attributes. The song 
itself is another way of re-enacting and re-telling the ancestral heritage. The past is 
remembered and reinvigorated in other ways as well. Among the Kharva there are 
model makers, amateur historians and linguists, journalists, short-story writers, 
biographers and artists who depict small boats in big seas. They all share a similar 
preoccupation with ships, shipping and the grandeur of Kharva ancestors, and they 
catalogue and paint the past in nostalgic colours. Their outpourings appear in local 
newspapers, galleries and on the walls of the Dariyalal temple.
Adjacent to the paliyos, nestling in the shade of a tree, is a stone tortoise. 
According to Kharva topographers, Kachchh resembles an upturned tortoise 
(kachbo). Rapar and Bhachau form the lowered head; Anjar, Mundra, Mandvi and 
Abhrasa form the spine of the tortoise’s shell; Nakhtrana and Lakhpat form the
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bottom of the shell; Bhuj and the northern regions give the impression of a leg. This 
is a significant metaphor as Vishnu appeared to the world as a tortoise.
Vishnu has been incarnated in various forms in different texts and ages where 
either adharma (anti-religion) is present or where dharma (religion) is threatened. In 
modem form such threats stem overwhelmingly from Muslims. Vishnu is popularly 
held to have ten incarnations, which pass in a lineal sequence from lower forms of 
evolution to divinities that appear in the guise of men. Vishnu first appeared in the 
form of Matsya (a fish), which saved the Vedas from being consumed by the asuras 
(demons), and the fish on which Dariyalal sits is Matsya, giving him power to ride 
the waves. Vishnu’s second (or third) avatar was Kurma (a tortoise). After the flood 
(which first prompted Vishnu to appear as Matsya) the gods were weak and their 
power was lost in the ocean. To help them, Vishnu sprinkled the ocean with a variety 
of medicinal herbs, and advised them to chum the milky ocean for the elixir that 
would restore their strength. They attempted to use Mount Mandara to stir the waters 
but were not strong enough, and so they called on the help of demons. But even their 
united strength could not stop the mountain from sinking into the ocean bed. Vishnu 
came to their rescue in the form of a giant tortoise. He bore the weight of the 
mountain upon his hard-shelled back and stirred the ocean until the treasures arose 
from the depths. The tortoise in the temple compound makes an explicit connection 
between the land of Kachchh and Vishnu as the defender of Hindus, and the land of 
Kachchh itself being an avatar of Vishnu. A number of Kharvas told me that the 
mythology represents the fact that the land and those of it have the power to fight any 
threats to the Hindu religion.
The collection of artefacts in the temple makes explicit the core values of Kharva 
Samaj identity, which claims an association with the Vaishnava tradition of Kachchh 
and the traditions and heritage of seafaring. Central to these claims are ancestors, 
who epitomise the warrior-sailor tradition. The moral weight of dead ancestors, their 
ethereal powers, and the ideal model of Kharva life they represent are embodied and 
venerated in the paliyos and in the ephemera contained within the temple. The
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examples given of ancestral lives are clearly exogenic in their disposition but in all 
cases they are in someway integrated into traditions of courage and war. The 
Kharvas, like the Bhatiyas, attribute their success to their Rajput heritage: they are 
warrior-sailors.
4.24. Sailors that don’t sail
Having described the Kharvas Samaj, its origins myths and new temple complex the 
discussion moves to the question of Kharva livelihood. They are referred to as 
sailors. They refer to themselves as sailors. They build and worship in temples 
dedicated to the ritual cycles of the tides and moon. The internal social organisation 
of the Samaj reflects past degrees of seniority on ships. Old men are accorded status 
by the length and quality of their career at sea. Kharva social architecture, language 
and ritual are derived from the traditions of the sea, voyage and migration, but the 
cores of such signs are hollow because Kharvas no longer sail.
Kharvas may not sail anymore, but they lead the lives of sailors. They do 
everything that their ancestors did, but without recourse to ships. In the midst of 
changing employment patterns and shifting social boundaries, Kharvas have 
reinvented and concentrated the traditions of their ancestors. It has already been 
mentioned that there was some ambiguity in the naming of sailing communities. The 
fact that Kharvas continue to be known as sailors points to the fact that there is much 
more to being a sailor than going to sea on ships. Being a sailor means having a 
particular exogenic disposition towards the boundary of the kingdom, living in 
certain parts of a town that developed as a port, following the ritual cycles of the sea 
and being enmeshed in client relationships with a mercantile mahajan. This 
explanation is offered, rather than the other possibility that the language of social 
ascription has not changed as rapidly as employment patterns.
Kharvas are the service samaj of the Bhatiya Mahajan. In the past, Kharva men 
crewed Bhatiya ships and Kharvanis (Kharva women) served in the houses of their
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kin’s patrons. Such relationships have been in existence for generations and continue 
in the same form in the present. In some cases Kharvas can trace a relationship to a 
particular Bhatiya atak through seven named generations (of both client Kharvas and 
patron Bhatiyas) to the latter half of the nineteenth century. These genealogies also 
trace the success and failure of particular business enterprises in East Africa, macro 
population movements throughout the Indian Ocean, and identify men with particular 
ships that appeared at the nexus of patron-client relationships. Kharvas unify in 
speech (we, our) their own activities with those of their patrons. So the success of 
particular Bhatiya patrons in Zanzibar or Oman is a source of pride and status for 
Kharva clients. The strength of these relationships and the material benefits (loans, 
houses, weddings and political representation) derived from them are a source of 
abru (reputation, honour) among Kharvas. The generosity of the patron and the 
duration of the relationship are markers of prestige.
Kharvas do not inter-marry with mahajan populations. There is no legitimate 
common substance shared between them, although there are many stories of Kharva 
children fathered by Bhatiya patrons. Commonality is derived from the sea and from 
the social and ritual organisation of shipping. Bhatiya and Kharva are bonded 
through generations of patron-client relationships. Today, women continue to work 
as domestic servants in Mandvi, while men work as drivers, machine operators and 
labours for Bhatiya firms in Oman. The logic of these relationships originates from 
ancestors who established reciprocal exchanges of service, protection and patronage. 
Kharva women are very poorly paid for their work. The benefit of domestic service 
does not lie in financial remuneration but in past and future rewards for her male kin. 
To break the relationship would be to dishonour the agreement and patronage shown 
by previous generations of Bhatiyas towards Kharva ancestors. Seasonal Kharva 
labour migration to Oman follows the traditional pattern of nine months at ‘sea’ and 
three months at home during the monsoon. As emblematic sailors Kharvas have 
remained enmeshed within samaj -  mahajan relationships. They are working 
towards the unattainable goal of paying off the moral interest on the relations of 
reciprocity and social economy established by their ancestors. In summary, the
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Kharva Samaj, the largest single population in Mandvi, forms the constituency of the 
mahajans. Consequently, the economic and social position of the traders is supported 
by a large number of dependent Kharvas.
The term laskhar (lascar) means sailor, longshoreman, army servant or 
artilleryman and is also used to refer to Kharvas. The concomitance of these 
meanings points to the Kharva role within the political domain of the mahajans. 
Kharvas are the foot soldiers of the merchants, fighting their street battles and aiding 
in disputes when more than honed negotiating skills are required. This is not to say 
that Kharvas are the unquestioning recipients of mahajan orders because they also 
act autonomously in protecting their own interests. However, the general pattern of 
political and economic ties means that Kharvas are responsive to the demands and 
interests of their patrons. These days they are not called upon to protect and crew the 
merchant fleets, but their social position includes defending the generalised interests 
of Hindus from Muslim predation.
The eminence of the mahajans is broadly enhanced in wider Hindu society by 
their influence over the lascars. People from other castes can approach influential 
traders if they have particular problems. If the trader is sympathetic to the request he 
can call upon his dependent Kharvas (and their dependants) to rectify the problem. 
Today, the majority of such disputes relate to problems with Muslims. The Kharvas 
thus appear as the front-line men in the perennial battle with Muslims, albeit 
predominantly at the instruction of a patron. The Kharvas’ role as defenders of their 
Hindu patron’s interests is clearly seen in the violence of the early 1980s. However, 
they are frequently called into action to resolve disputes of a more familiar nature. 
For example, a Muslim man took a shine to the daughter of a Hindu goldsmith. The 
man would loiter without much discretion in the bazaar attempting to catch her eye 
as she made the daily walk home from her private tuition. The man’s persistent 
activities came to the attention of a number of shopkeepers who informed the girl’s 
father. He decided to wait a week to see if the Muslim lost interest. He did not. The 
goldsmith approached a Lohana trader with the problem. Three days later the
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Muslim, who did not have a reputation as a troublemaker, was beaten unconscious by 
five Kharva men armed with sticks. The series of events related in this anecdote were 
repeated many times during my stay in Mandvi. The majority of such incidents 
involved Muslims being beaten by Kharvas. This reflects the general hostility 
towards Muslims in the town, which is further intensified among Kharvas.
The following section describes how Kharvas see Muslims, and especially the 
Bhadala. The description is necessarily general and as presented is totally negative. 
Although simplified, I am not aware of any Kharva-Bhadala friendships or any 
Kharva-Bhadala social or economic co-operation that would compromise my 
representation.
4.25. Attitude towards Muslims, crows among flamingos
In the latter decades of the twentieth century the Kharva stopped sailing, although the 
decline started long before then. In their eyes they lost their dharma and betrayed 
their ancestral heritage. To add insult to injury, Muslims, the cause of their original 
displacement, defeat and humiliation, usurped their pre-eminence as sailors. In 
Mandvi in the early 1980s Kharvas could look over the river estuary and see the fine 
new houses of the Bhadala seths rising above the water, new elaborate minarets 
being erected and new ships being constructed along the water’s edge. They would 
also see young Bhadala men, well dressed and on new motorbikes, coming into the 
bazaars at night to taunt Hindu women. Kharvas heard stories, some true, some 
fictions, of smuggling and piracy being carried out by the Bhadala, who were 
rumoured to be involved in smuggling arms into Pakistan and other insurgent 
activities. The innovation and courage (roughly equating with smuggling and piracy) 
of Kachchhi sailors plays a central role in the aggrandisement of the Kharva 
seafaring tradition. However, when these stories were given an anti-Hindu tinge, the 
morality, nobility and legitimacy of smuggling changed and began to interfere with 
notions of political propriety.
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While sitting with Kharva men on the river’s edge and looking onto Salaya I 
frequently heard the lament that Bhadalas did not know how to ‘plough the sea’. 
Kharvas resented the facts that Bhadala ships were powered by engines and had 
sophisticated navigation equipment, and they dismissed Bhadala shipbuilding as 
shoddy and as de-skilled. It was not only the technology that Kharvas detested, they 
also disliked the methods and strategies the Bhadala used in business. As ‘crows 
among flamingos’ the Bhadala were opportunistic, their profits derived solely from 
illegality. This flighty metaphor was one that an elderly wizened Kharva named 
Ramji would frequently draw upon to describe the Bhadala. Looking out onto the 
estuary at certain times of the year flamingos and crows could be seen feeding 
together. The metaphor relies on contrasting statures, colours, demeanours and 
feeding habits of the birds. When I pointed out to him that Kharvas and Bhatiyas 
traded in slaves and opium, which were illegal in British India (and Kachchh), he 
would explain to me that this was of a very different order:
“In those days we were peaceful, we did nothing to harm our own kind -  even the 
Muslims. There was competition between us of course but that competition was about 
honour and proving to them [the Muslims] that we were the best sailors, and the same 
was true for our merchants. When we went to Africa [in the nineteenth century] those 
black men were running around naked, they had no kings and the land was lawless, 
what could they do other than work for us? That trade was illegal in the eyes of the 
British, not ours. We brought slaves for our kings and for our merchants; at that time 
slavery was normal.”
The ‘we’ in this extract of conversation with Ramji refers to both Kharva sailors 
and to Bhatiya merchants. Ramji continued:
“Our trade did not harm the Kachchhi people. The Bhadala are hurting Kachchh. They 
are terrorists, and their loyalties are not with Kachchh but with Muslims. They are 
harming our land and our people with the things that they do. They are not loyal and 
they are not really Indian.”
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The suspicion that the Bhadala are not loyal to the Indian State is informed by a 
number of sources. First, the facts of Muslim social hierarchy (Chapter 3) elevate and 
privilege foreign origins. Thus the stress or invention of Arab, Persian, or Turkish 
ancestry (rather than resting content with Indian origins) is seen as pointing to 
general Muslim antipathy towards India. Related to this, many Kharva make the 
claim that Muslims, and Bhadalas in particular, do not accept the current Indian State 
as a legitimate political and geographical organisation (also see Kakar 1996:128). 
Instead, Muslims are seen as being loyal to the interests of Pakistan and in times of 
crisis Muslims are united in their religion rather than in their ethnic, linguistic or 
regional origins. Empirically, and as shown in subsequent chapters, these accusations 
are far from true, yet they retain particular and powerful currency among Kharvas.
Ramji’s negative characterisation of ‘modem’ shipping is not simply the 
grumbling opinion of an old man who is unable, or unwilling, to accept and 
accommodate change. It is true that the technology, language and skills with which 
he matured have been transformed through innovation, but not beyond recognition. 
However, the resentment and frustration evident among many men similar to Ramji, 
old and young, is an expression of much more than nostalgia: it is an expression of 
Kharva failure, combined with bitter contempt for the men on the other side of the 
river that have become successful at shipping. This failure is in turn much more than 
the loss of individual or even samaj dharma, it is a betrayal of ancestors and 
everything that ancestors stand for. Ramji is a Kharva, who are sailors who don’t 
sail. The Bhadala sail very successfully, but are viewed by Kharvas as barely human, 
as a result, resentment among Kharvas fostered by the apparent injustice of the 
situation is clearly evident.
Kharvas, such as Ramji, refer to themselves as Hindus only when they talk of 
Muslims (the Bhadala), otherwise the conversation is of named samaj and mahajan 
populations. It seems that a Hindu is bom when a Muslim enters the room or the 
conversation. Kharvas do not talk about themselves as Hindus without a 
simultaneous awareness of the Muslim presence. The image of the animalistic
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Bhadala is constructed out of their perceived ferocity, rampant sexuality, immorality 
and dirtiness. The accusation of ‘dirtiness’ relates to what in Kharva eyes are 
incestuous marriage practices. Cousin marriages are not only outlawed for Hindus, 
they are also thought to have dire consequences for the moral and social constitution 
of resulting offspring. The inner pollution of Bhadalas is compounded by their 
consumption of tabooed foods, such as meat, and excessive consumption of ‘hot’ 
foods, such as chillies and onions. The voracious sexual appetites of Muslims are 
further reflected in the size of Bhadala families. Kharvas allege, as is common in 
India, that Muslims produce large families as part of a generalised conspiracy to 
eventually out-number the Hindu population, which is a sentiment frequently shared 
by Muslims themselves. The rampant sexuality of Muslims is also seen as an 
immediate threat to Hindu women, who are seen as somewhat feckless and 
susceptible to the allure of Muslim wealth, which religious conversion through 
marriage would bring. Muslim men are attributed with rather different intentions 
towards Hindu women. They are seen to desire the pollution and depopulation of the 
Hindu community through religious conversion. The negative characterisation of 
Muslims by Kharvas centres on the Bhadala and the particular view they have of 
them from across the river. The following section describes Salaya, social 
organisation, kinship patterns and views of the past from the Bhadalas’ perspective.
4.3. Bhadalas
The Bhadala claim that the graves in the shadow of the Dariyalal temple are those of 
their dead. The tombstones date from the days when they came to the site to venerate 
Dariyapir, and when they lived in the area of Mandvi that retains the name Bhadala 
Pod. This was before they started to settle on the opposite bank of the river in the 
village of Salaya. As previously mentioned, the entombed have been claimed by 
those living nearby as saints in order to counter the encroachment of the temple onto 
the cemetery. The Bhadala cannot identify the dead and view the elevated status of 
the dead with some amusement because only two categories of Muslims (Saiyeds and 
Siddis) can become legitimate saints (see below).
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4.31. Salaya
Giving an overall impression of the village requires looking at it from two different 
standpoints. From Mandvi, looking beyond the river and through the tangle of 
scaffolding in the shipyards, stand the grand waterfront houses of the Bhadala seths. 
From this standpoint the view is dominated by the wealth evident in the construction 
of the houses. The colours, shapes, and features of these structures make it clear that 
Muslims built them. Behind the houses, the skyline is punctuated with the brightly 
painted minarets of the village’s mosques, including the Jume Masjid (hereafter 
Friday Mosque). Lying to the north is a large Muslim cemetery, which extends well 
to the east, to flank a Parsi graveyard. Out of view, further to the east of Salaya, there 
are also Christian and Harijan burial grounds. Consequently, many in Mandvi regard 
the eastern riverbank as inauspicious, polluted and a suitable place for the Bhadala to 
live. This is the view that Kharvas have as they gather in the evenings to sit in the 
cool breeze that blows from the sea.
In contrast, is the view from within the village. Entering the village by road from 
the north one passes a recently reconstructed mosque, minaret and durgah (shrine). 
The entombed saint, Mukhdummi Sha, came to Salaya by ship from the Sindh, and 
the myth surrounding his arrival is commonly told by those visiting the shrine in the 
following way. When Mukhdummi Sha arrived on the shore he found the Hindu 
farmers tilling the land unresponsive to his religious message. He persevered and 
successfully foretold rains and drought. He gradually attracted such a large following 
that the Hindus were forced from their land and ever since it has belonged to 
Muslims. This mosque-shrine, as will become clear in subsequent chapters, is an 
important location for religious change and vision among Salaya’s Muslims. Moving 
into the village through the recently walled graveyards, the first open public space 
one reaches is bordered by the prestigious Friday Mosque (Plate 10), the Kachchhi 
Shipping Association and a Koran school. Moving still further into the village one 
reaches a second, larger public space, which is bordered on one side by the Bhadalas’ 
jamatkhana, and on the other by the Minara (Minaret) Mosque (Plate 11). The
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separation of space and function between these two areas reflects the central social 
cleavage and the distribution of power among the Bhadala (see below). The public 
areas away from the main thoroughfare are mostly narrow, litter-strewn alleyways, 
formed between the high walls of clean private courtyards. In these areas only the 
houses of the poor have windows at street level. For the most part, heavy gates and 
solid doors veil the private world from the public. What lay behind the high walls 
initially surprised me: the bedroom with a pervasive nautical theme, glass-fronted 
cabinets displaying hundreds of unopened packages of imported soap, mirrored 
ceilings, sunken baths and subterranean video halls. These features may have been 
concealed behind high walls but everyone in the village and in Mandvi knew that 
they were there. The role of such commodities and consumption patterns among 
seafarers is returned to in Chapter 7.
The two perspectives given of the village are clearly contrasting, yet from both 
standpoints Salaya owes everything (mosques, houses and infrastructure) to the 
fortunes made from owning ships. Everyone living in the village is connected with 
ships. In houses there are paintings, models and photographs of ships. Relationships 
with ships determine marriages, business partnerships and social hierarchy, and the 
coming and going of ships lays out the ritual cycle of the year. From the Kharva side 
of the river the view is dominated by the ostentatious displays of wealth (the seths' 
houses) that shield the courtyards and serene mosque gardens from view, yet the 
minarets are a visible reminder of their presence. While in the village, the public 
spaces formed between social institutions and mosques are dominant, and private 
wealth is concealed behind high walls.
The village was settled over the last century as the Bhadala gradually moved 
across the river. Fifty years ago, as half the village’s population left for Karachi at 
partition, all that stood on the site was ‘a collection of huts’ (G.S.G. 1971:138). 
Discontinuities and displacements of population (such as the partition) are known, 
but are not stressed, when Bhadala men narrate the past. The local past of Bhadalas is 
flattened, shallow and obscure. Hanging in the balance of individual life cycles and
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long-term shifts in population is an illusion of social stasis, one that contrasts sharply 
to the reality of population movement and social disorder. After the Second World 
War, as the villagers became wealthy, they began to construct dar al-islam by 
renovating old mosques and building new ones. In the 1980s they again rebuilt and 
renovated the mosques — in this latter wave of building they also constructed Koran 
schools and a hospital. The Bhadala, like the Kharvas, are widely regarded sailors -  
unlike the Kharva many of them continue to sail. However, rather than crewing the 
ships of high-status mercantile patrons, today they crew for senior members of their 
own jamat. Until the middle part of the last century Bhadalas were bonded sailor 
clients of Shia merchants. After World War Two the terms of trade changed in the 
Indian Ocean, and Kachchhi shipping fell into decline. The Shia merchants (Chapter 
3) had left Mandvi behind. The Bhadala, who had always owned small ships, 
continued to trade on a small scale in water pots and foodstuffs with Gujaratis 
resident in East Africa. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the terms of trade changed 
again and the Bhadala rapidly became wealthy by trading out of the newly 
established duty free port of Dubai. Many of them passed from being bonded crew 
on merchant ships to owning their own fleets within a lifetime.
4.32. Social organisation
Bhadalas form a non-proprietary mixed-blood jamat. Numbering around 2,000, they 
are the dominant group in Salaya. The Bhadala Jamat, reputed to have its origins in 
the nineteenth century, is unified through a continuing tradition of commercial 
seafaring. The Jamat is comprised of forty ataks of various ethnic and regional 
origins13, and divided horizontally by a series of pervasive social categories that 
reflect the division of labour on ships. Seths and their sons and representatives are of
13 Given the segmentary nature of social organisation the number and form of ataks is liable to change 
with social fission and fusion. The ataks with putative Sindhi origins are Thaim, Juneja, Jusnani, 
Karani, Gohel, Say, Fatvani, Sodha, Bholim, Jumani, Koreja, Katheja, Sim, Kundiya, Sameja, 
Chauhani, Rumi, Pali, Panjra, Rukani, Bavar, Sangani, Chana, Sanyani, Sindhi and Maniyar. From 
particular ports in Saurashtra are Jafrabadi, Jafrani and Madavani ataks. Jadeja, Bhatti and Rathod 
ataks claim to have originated in Rajasthan but to have come to Kachchh via the Sindh. From foreign
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highest rank as ship owners. Moving downwards through the hierarchy rank captains, 
navigators, foremen and sailors, this last category form around half of the Jamat’s 
population. These social categories, which tend to correspond to particular ataks, are 
discussed in a broader context in the following chapter.
The Jamat is endogamous. In practice this is highly restricted and the dominant 
pattern is towards endogamous sub-groups within the endogamous Jamat. This 
tendency reflects the major vertical social schism in the Jamat between Pathan and 
Thaim ataks. Each atak has a single apical figure who is the public representative of 
their respective atak. These two ataks control all the major public institutions in 
Salaya. These figures are institutional big-men.
The concept of the institutional big-man in India has been developed in a series of 
publications by Mines (1988,1994; and Mines and Gourishankar 1990). The 
‘institutional’ qualifier signifies the galactic polity of the kinds of institutions 
(temples, rest houses, educational facilities and the like) through which the big-man 
attracts followers. Sudhir Kakar notes of Indian institutions that:
individuals who head them are believed to be the sole repository of the virtues and vices 
of the institutions; as human beings, such individuals in authority are thought to be 
accessible to appeal, open to the impulse of mercy and capable of actions unconstrained 
by the rule of the ‘system’ (1981:40-l).
Likewise, for Mines and Gourishankar the big-man is eminent within a 
constituency, the parameters of which are defined by his redistribution of benefits 
and prestige. From within the circle of followers the big-man is also seen as an able 
political and legal broker (Mines 1994:35). Mines and Gourishankar note two 
interesting parallels to their model. The first is Gloria Raheja’s analysis of the 
dominant caste in a northern Indian village around which service castes cluster, in 
what she calls the ‘central-peripheral configurations’ (1988). The second parallel is
lands are Pathan and Turk ataks. Finally, two ataks whose Sindhi origins are conflated with particular 
professional specialisation are Nakarani (captains) and Khediya (farmers).
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to models of kingship found in South India. This latter point is taken up again having 
been previously discussed in Chapter 2. Kings, like Mines’ big-men, represented the 
redistributive potential of the Durbar in terms of worship and symbolic gifts. Kings 
also apportioned lands, titles, honours and rights (Dirks 1987), but Mines and 
Gourishankar caution the comparison by pointing out that there is a key difference 
between big-man and king because: ‘a big-man stands out as an individual, known 
for his deeds in the minds of his public’ (1990:764). Kings in this model are not 
characterised by their individuality, they are: ‘the state anthropomorphized’ 
(1990:764).
Mines’ reluctance to push further the similarities between the caricatured big-man 
and the figure of the king may be a result of the Tamil Nadu ethnography, or a 
reflection of his own long-term interest in individuality in South Asia (1975; 1978, 
1988,1994). In Chapter 2, it was argued that the dominant model of social 
organisation in Kachchh was the one famously associated with Rajput kings. It seems 
that dominant big-men in Kachchh draw upon the royal model of power, patronage 
and distribution, and that big-manship and kingship are based on the same principles. 
Mines perhaps over emphasises the individuality of the big-man because he is 
essentially arguing that the big-man is the institution anthropomorphised, which is 
not so very different from his characterisation of a king. Or to argue the point from 
the opposite direction: the individuality of the king is underestimated in Mines’ 
comparison because the ex-kings of Kachchh are replete with extravagant 
personalities, recorded and eulogised by the Durbar’s bards and captured in 
portraiture that emphasises their personal characteristics. The big-man may be 
individually personified, but his kin and his constituents are socially classified along 
with him, which is a very ‘un-individual’ state of affairs. As such institutions tend to 
be associated with particular castes, the constituency of the big-man will, in all 
likelihood, be homologous with the social boundaries of the caste and thus part of the 
tendency towards social conglomeration in India against which Mines is writing. 
Furthermore, all big-men, unless they are the biggest big-man, are part of the 
constituencies of other big-men.
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Despite these criticisms, Mines’ model is of tremendous of value in thinking 
through the social organisation of Muslim merchants and sailors in Mandvi. These 
points are elaborated in Chapter 7, but briefly, every sailor and seth associated with 
shipping is a big-man to a degree. Each man is the pinnacle of his own transactional 
pyramid, while simultaneously being in the lower orders of others. However, until 
Chapter 6, the term ‘big-men’ (in Mines’ institutional sense), is used with the 
provisos that ships are institutions of sorts and all ship owners are big-men. In other 
words the big-man of the institutional big-man model equates to being a seth. These 
transactional pyramids are presided over by big-men who maintain client 
relationships, which are not so much discipleship relations but patron-client patterns 
in which a leader supplies booty in return for adherence (enchanted by barakat and 
power).
Thaims are regarded as the authentic Bhadala who migrated from the north into 
Sindh, from where they ran commercial ferry services to Kachchh before gradually 
moving into long distance commercial shipping. They are the principal patrons of the 
Bhadala Jamat’s communal institutions. Pathans have a similar putative migration 
history, are the main donors to all the new mosques, minarets and Koran schools in 
Salaya, and they also manage and preside over the affairs of the Kachchhi Shipping 
Association. The dominant ataks are largest in terms of numbers and the capital 
resources they control. Between them Thaim and Pathan ataks control around half of 
the sixty ships registered in Mandvi port. The majority of the others are owned by 
Bhadala seths of lesser standing, who politically cluster around the two dominant 
ataks. The contrasting styles of business and philanthropic patronage of the dominant 
ataks are expressions of divergent social trends. The Pathans and their allies are 
focusing on strengthening Muslim identity and are purging social practices and 
institutions that they consider to be corrupt. This places them in competitive 
opposition to the popularist Thaim coalition who continue to sponsor social and 
religious institutions, especially durgahs (shrines), which in many ways are deemed 
to be redundant by Pathans and their allies. Thaims and Pathans own commercial
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property in Bombay and Dubai, trade internationally, build ships in the Rukhmavuti 
estuary, and employ large numbers of non-Bhadala Muslims from Mandvi. Despite 
these parallels, the two groups are not in direct commercial competition. Thaims tend 
to plough routes in Gulf waters, and from there to Somalia. Pathans in comparison, 
trade predominantly between India and Dubai. Thus the two networks of offices, 
communications and business contacts do not frequently overlap. The Pathan atak is 
the more prosperous of the two. While the Thaim owned ships tend to operate on 
seasonal contract or on contract tonnage, the Pathan ships often carry their own 
speculative cargoes, which they trade from godowns in Bombay and Dubai. The 
senior segment of the Pathan atak has resources invested in each part of the supply 
chain moving onions from Gujarat to Dubai. They own the agricultural lands in the 
east of Gujarat and the haulage company that transports the crop to the port. Once in 
the port, the onions are loaded onto Pathan-owned ships, before they are wholesaled 
from Pathan godowns in Dubai.
Thaim and Pathan businesses are also differentiated through varying degrees of 
kin involvement. Of the 230 or so men afloat on Thaim ships, almost half of them are 
consanguinal or affinal kin. In contrast, the Pathan fleet has a comparable number of 
crew, yet only around twenty men are kin, of which only a single man is a 
consanguinal relation of the apical figure. The ratios revealed by these statistics also 
roughly apply to Thaim and Pathan controlled shipyards. Consequently, the Pathan 
atak has over 400 non-Bhadala sailors and shipbuilders bonded to it in various forms 
of client relationship. The majority of these men are from Mandvi and have their own 
economic and political dependants. The result is that the political base commanded 
by Pathans is far broader than that commanded by Thaims. Furthermore, Pathans 
have invested heavily in education, while the Thaims have invested very little. Such 
a difference results in a greater prestige for the Pathans, and literacy and knowledge 
of commercial law has allowed them to expand their business in ways that up until 
now have been out of the reach of Thaims.
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Thus far the two groups have been portrayed as roughly equivalent in terms of 
social influence within Salaya. However, Pathans are not clients of the social 
institutions patronised by Thaims. Thaims are, however, dependent on the services of 
the Kachchhi Shipping Association (which is controlled by Pathans) for literate legal 
and political representation. Pathans dominate the competitive political environment, 
not through their numerical strength, but through their monopolisation of critical 
social, religious and intellectual resources, and through their broad client base.
4.33. Bhadala-Pathans
The remaining chapters of this thesis focus on the Bhadala-Pathans and those who 
are dependent on them. The following section describes the social biography of 
segmentation among Bhadala-Pathans, which also serves as an example for the way 
in which FBD marriage operates to keep property interests within segmented ataks 
(continued from Chapter 3).
Haji Haroon (deceased) was the eldest brother of Haji Hussen (the apical figure of 
the atak). Together they started their working lives on the ships of a Vohra merchant. 
When Kachchh joined the Indian Customs Union shortly after Independence, the 
lenient (if elaborate) taxation system in operation at Mandvi port was subsumed into 
a national standard. This put a stop to most trade from the port and made it 
prohibitively expensive to construct new ships because of the taxes levied on raw 
materials. In the ensuing industry decline the brothers were able to buy their own 
small vessel at a low price. For the next twenty years or so they traded foodstuffs and 
earthenware with Gujaratis resident in East Africa. By the late 1970s they were 
wealthy from trading from the newly opened duty-free port of Dubai. In the early 
1980s the brothers divided their property because of a dispute over inheritance and 
business strategy. Among Haji Haroon’s sons it is clear that economic, political and 
kinship organisations are not necessarily homologous with maternal and paternal kin 
patterns and that these divergent trends are predominantly based on the recent 
concern with school education.
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Haji Haroon’s two sons, Haji Daud and Haji Ibrahim also quarrelled over 
inheritance and business strategy when their father died in the 1980s. Like their 
father, the brothers established separate residences and businesses. For a few years in 
the late 1980s they did not speak to one another. Haji Ibrahim started to complain of 
crippling stomach pains, but was unable to find a medical cure. Visits to shrines 
known for their healing powers also did nothing to alleviate the symptoms, but a 
visiting fakir, who claimed to control a number of powerful jinn, eventually brought 
an end to the pain. The family’s suspicion that some form of hostile magic was to 
blame for the illness was confirmed by the fakir, who told them that in all likelihood, 
a chain had been buried in the ground, and its weight had been magically transferred 
to Haji Ibrahim’s sizeable gut.
A few months later, Haji Ibrahim started to rebuild his house. His grand plans 
included a huge first floor meeting hall for marriage parties and other socio-religious 
occasions. In common with other Pathan segments, Haji Ibrahim’s family no longer 
used the facilities of the Bhadala Jamat. That they took such stringent action in the 
wake of the bewitching is interesting because the family is now among the most 
prominent voices in the reform of local Muslim practice. They vehemently oppose, 
what were described in Chapter 3, as ‘popular heterodox practices’ and have elective 
dispositions towards ‘parochial practices’ (1984:12-13). Just what these practices 
are, and how and why they are opposed, will become clear below and in later 
chapters. For the present it is sufficient to say that they emphasise the Koran and 
Mosque, but are not without highly personal interpretations of Muslim religious 
practice. Haji Ibrahim’s family was victim to the popular heterodox practices (magic) 
that they now dismiss as improper. The power evoked by the buried chain is a vital 
part of Bhadala-Pathan Islamisation. Their dismissal of heterodoxy and parochialism 
does not undermine the efficacy of such practices, but focuses attention on the 
legitimacy of such practices and their rightfully low position within the hierarchy of 
religious practice. This theme is recurrent in the following chapters, but in short, 
Bhadala-Pathan Islamisation is premised on a social model of time, place and
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population that casts the past, locality and Hindu population in the same negative 
light. Magic, ghosts and religious intermediaries are placed within the same 
categorical order as the Hindu population. In counter-distinction to this is the 
Bhadala interpretation of modernity, valorisation of Gulf lands (but for different 
reasons to those discussed in Chapter 2) and the potential for salvation Islam offers.
Haji Ibrahim’s journey, from victim to denouncer of ‘magic’, was a reaction to his 
pain and the socially destructive potential of the evil eye and jealousy within the 
village. His genuine response to the situation was to say that the Bhadala Jamat was 
in enough trouble in the 1980s without internal divisions being further exacerbated. 
However, a more complete explanation can be found in the differences between the 
biographies of Haji Ibrahim’s generation compared to those of his sons. Haji Ibrahim 
has five sons, three of whom are married. The youngest, presently in his early teens, 
is pledged to the daughter of Haji Ibrahim’s father’s brother’s son’s son. The fourth 
son is unlikely to be found a suitable marriage partner because his brain is diseased. 
The eldest (blood-rich) son was contracted to the daughter of his father’s only 
brother -  despite their business interests being separate. Reciprocally, Haji Ibrahim’s 
eldest daughter married Haji Daud’s eldest son. Haji Ibrahim’s second son was 
contracted, before his birth, to his matrilateral cross cousin in a lower ranking atak, 
men from which are captains on Pathan ships. This marriage was part of reciprocal 
arrangement that stemmed from twenty-five years before, when Haji Haroon had 
married a daughter to the captain of one of his vessels. The captain of the smaller of 
Haji Ibrahim’s two ships came from the atak of the wife of his second bom son. He 
reciprocated by marrying his second bom daughter back into that atak. Haji 
Ibrahim’s brother also married his second son to a daughter from the same captaining 
atak. From these exchanges it is clear that despite economic segmentation Haji Daud 
and Haji Ibrahim go to considerable lengths to maintain atak blood purity through 
first-bom FBD marriage, and extend a web of allegiance (that also denies inheritance 
rights) with captains of their ships.
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Haji Ibrahim and other seths strategically make marriages of different qualities 
that entail different economic and political strategies. The preferred marriages for 
seth's offspring is for the eldest son to be contracted to FBD (and that the eldest 
daughter is married with her father’s brother’s son). Likewise, reciprocal cross­
cousin marriages with those who captain the ships are common among most ataks 
that control ships. Such reciprocity is considered after the first-bom son has been 
married. In Bhadala marriage the patrilineage remains the pre-eminent concern, 
which coincides with mutually negated inheritance rights through reciprocal 
marriage contracts. This is most obviously the case with FBD marriages, but is also 
true of matrilateral cross-cousin marriages with captains and their offspring.
4.34. Education among Bhadalas
There was no tradition of formal school education among the Bhadala until the 
1970s. Professional education in the ways of shipbuilding, sailing and navigation was 
through informal childhood apprenticeship. The generation of Bhadala-Pathan bom 
after 1970 were mostly sent to expensive English medium schools in Maharashtra. In 
the school holidays they would return to the tense atmosphere that prevailed in 
Mandvi at the time. They heard rumours that their fathers were ‘insurgents’, and in 
the Christian boarding schools popular with wealthy Maharatis they experienced 
anti-Muslim sentiment and were taunted about the illegal activities of their fathers. 
Despite obvious differences among Bhadala-Pathans, the sons of Haji Daud and Haji 
Ibrahim, and Haji Hussen’s son’s sons found themselves to be classmates. Recently, 
as this generation of men have taken over a greater portion of their ageing father’s 
business interests, the once divided economic position of the segments has become 
less apparent. The firms nominally headed by Haji Ibrahim, Haji Daud and Haji 
Hussen now share offices in Bombay and Dubai and when bidding for less 
prestigious contract-shipping they are unified under the name of a single company 
that also offers tender on behalf of other Bhadala seths.
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Yet despite the weakening of economic boundaries, the core and prestigious parts 
of the business (those concerned with speculative cargo) remain firmly organised 
along the lines of segmented ataks. The technology of education has had significant 
effects on social organisation and has created new possibilities for allegiance. 
However, neither Haji Ibrahim nor Haji Daud sent their eldest sons to school. This 
points to the ambiguous role of elite education. Although valued as a consumption 
good in the organisation of shipping, its effect has been to elaborate the division of 
labour within business operations. Eldest brothers tend to operate and manage ships 
at sea and in the construction yards as their fathers did in the past. Their younger 
siblings, those with elite education, are more involved in the administrative, 
bureaucratic and legal aspects of the business. The ‘uneducated’ sons unquestionably 
remain of the highest status because of the prestigious resources they control. The 
education of younger brothers reinforces sibling hierarchy, and simultaneously 
broadens their control of key resources. However, the allegiances between those who 
shared long train journeys to Maharashtra, dormitories, algebra and religious 
discrimination in schools have formed other kinds of allegiance outside the economy 
of running ships. The educated Bhadala-Pathan, although clearly sometimes at sea 
with conversation in shipyards, are the ones who most stress their ethnic and 
linguistic identities as Pathans, Bhadalas and Muslims. They are the most respectful 
of age propriety in the shipyards and they speak the purest and crudest Kachchhi (in 
addition to being literate in Maharati, Gujarati, Hindi and English). They constitute 
the section of the Bhadala Jamat most dedicated to the promulgation of a particular 
religious vision.
However, despite the variations of allegiance presented above, the segmentary 
model retains an important position in Bhadala social organisation. Political and 
religious allegiances are clearly much more fluid than kin allegiances, which in turn 
are more fluid than the core of economic organisation. Despite variation, 
segmentation remains an actual fact. Economic and political fission and fusion 
among Bhadala-Pathan appears to involve a high degree of independence from any 
preferred, let alone prescribed, rules of behaviour, and although this is also partially
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true for allegiances in terms of blood and descent there is far less flexibility. The 
underlying importance of segmentation is clear in patterns of commensuality and 
where the dead are placed. At marriage dinners, segments of particular ataks will eat 
from dedicated communal plates; at death bodies are entombed in segmentary 
clusters, either in open or walled sections of a general Sunni graveyard. In both these 
revealing situations division is maintained over and above allegiance.
The success of the traditional merchants stemmed from the homology of jamat 
organisation and commercial association through which the flow of business 
information and credit was restricted. In the Bhadala case jamat and commercial 
organisations are separate and socially competitive for popular support. The Bhadala 
Jamat encompasses a highly stratified society based upon capital ownership, age and 
graded labour hierarchy, which is also vertically segmented. Divisions within ataks 
are never so severe that Pathans have formed allegiances with Thaims or with non- 
Bhadalas. In order of segmentary priority the following categories variously become 
salient when threatened from the outside peta-atak, atak, related atak, jamat, Sunni 
Muslims and Muslims. The boundaries between these segmentary categories of 
social differentiation are the fault lines along which resistance to outside threats are 
variously organised. Segmentation thus emerges as the fundamental principle of 
social organisation among the Bhadala and this has clear effects for the ways in 
which the past is remembered and conceived and for the ways in which patronage of 
Islamic reform operates as a social process.
4.35. Narratives of the past
The historical narratives of the Bhadala run only a little way into the past.
Befitting of sailors, who traditionally spent at least nine months a year away from 
home, all of the events that constitute meaningful history happen outside 
Kachchh. Individual and community biographies are structured by particular 
phases of migration, the Second World War, the development of African 
nationalism, the oil crisis of the early 1970s, and the development of Dubai port.
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Among the older seths ancestral memory stretches back around a century. Among 
younger men the past is expressed with clarity from the start of the working lives 
of the generation of men represented by Haji Ibrahim (from the 1940s) and to a 
lesser extent by Haji Hussen, the sole survivor of the previous generation. Unlike 
the relative homogeneity of Kharva narratives those recounted by Bhadalas are 
diffuse. Each atak has its own set of claims to the past, which reflects the non­
proprietary nature of the Bhadala Jamat, and there is no continuity between 
ancient claims (to have come from Turkey or Afghanistan) and biographical 
histories from the twentieth century.
The discontinuity of past events can be explained through the interaction of 
four social processes. First, the recent prosperity of the Bhadala has led them into 
styles of life that were not shared with their ancestors. The big-men among them 
have predominantly become land-based merchants, while their ancestors were 
sailors on Shia ships or on their own small ships, which they sailed on contract to 
a big merchant. Bhadalas ‘know’ the technology of shipbuilding and the 
conditions under which ships operate, but the majority of their elite no longer 
traverses the waves. Thus the traditions of seafaring, navigation and courage that 
the ancestors possessed cannot be channelled directly into the activities they 
pursue today. In this light the ancestral past is one of impoverished, if heroic, 
sailors. Secondly, ancestral ‘traditions’ are deliberately ignored. The Bhadala have 
abandoned Dariyapir and the numerous shrines that flank the Mandvi coastline as 
both are demonised within their religious rhetoric. However, these traces from 
their past are not without value in locating ‘others’ in the landscape because 
accusations of corrupt and superstitious Muslim practice are primarily levelled at 
those living in Mandvi. Having left the town, and the affectations associated with 
Dariyapir, behind, the ancestral past is discordant with their present project. In this 
sense the ancestral past is literally in another land that lies over the river. Thirdly, 
an unknown number of Bhadala migrated to Africa throughout the nineteenth 
century as lascars. The extent and destinations of their migration is unknown 
because they were not socially organised or self-publicising merchants.
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Occasionally, twice migrants (to East Africa and onwards) from London arrive in 
Salaya to see the land of their forefathers, but they seldom have known relatives in 
the village. As mentioned previously, Muslim kinship practice in the nineteenth 
century proved ideally suited to movements of population, as it has done for 
centuries before. In the nineteenth century however the movement was from east 
to west, the opposite direction to the historical flow of Muslims in the Indian 
Ocean region. Whether Kachchhi Muslims really integrated into satellite 
communities is less important than the idea of acceptance found in the shared 
language and customs of the Muslims scattered around the Indian Ocean (see 
Chaudhuri 1985). As a result, Muslim migrants did not return to Kachchh in 
search of suitable marriage partners or for tutelage rites. All of these trends have 
left gaps in the genealogical and historical memory of Bhadalas. Fourthly, the 
Bhadala owned more of their own small boats than the Kharva (Bumes 1836), 
which gave them considerable autonomy, despite the presence of many of their 
number on the ships of Vohras, Khojas and Memons. Furthermore, there was no 
legal or moral prohibition on overseas travel, as there was for Hindus, and travels 
outside India, at least on pilgrimage, were part and parcel of being Muslim. Thus 
the Bhadalas’ shallow past is related to the organisational imperatives of their 
ancestors and their previous mercantile patrons. When the merchants left Kachchh 
forever the reciprocal relationships that made history, and provided narrative 
continuity, lapsed.
The fact that within the Jamat there are two clearly dominant ataks whose 
apical figures were bom in the 1920s reflects the Bhadalas’ conception of the 
depth of the past and their place in it. The pasts of other ataks also coincide with 
the lives of these famous patriarchs. Men from subordinate ataks use the careers 
of the apical big-men as reference points in their own rendition of autobiography. 
The Bhadalas’ view of who they are in history seems to accord well with their 
view of kin. Segmentary descent groups transmit essential and immutable 
qualities, given by a distant past, that transformed into the courage of the sailors 
of the nineteenth century. More specifically (and recently), the known biographies
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of Bhadala big-men mark both a break with a little known amorphous past, and a 
significant change in the lifestyle. In occupational terms, the Bhadalas moved 
from being sailors towards being merchants, while the traditional separation 
between Shias and Sunnis, which reflected the central social division between 
merchants and sailors, ceased to be important in the organisation of shipping. 
Bhadala Sunnis started to employ other Sunnis to crew their ships, with 
widespread consequences for the traditional social hierarchy and the dominant 
religious practices, themes explored in chapters 5 - 7 .  The client relationships 
formed with Shia merchants throughout the nineteenth century collapsed as Shias 
went into other businesses and left the Bhadala adrift. The past from the present is 
then given a new lease of life and continuity as Bhadala ship owners themselves 
took on their own long-term client sailors, which provides narratives with a 
consistency, stability and continuity. Kinship and history are related, and are 
given meaningful content through a further set of non-consanguineous 
relationships formed with particular merchant patrons. But in the absence of 
continued relations with merchants the past is sparse.
The previous discussion of marriage practices among the Bhadala seths made it 
clear that the reproduction of society and the reproduction of technology were 
intimately related. In the era of traditional Kachchhi shipping, when Kharvas and 
Bhadalas were sailors, recruitment and crew composition were based on kin 
connections and relative age hierarchy. Kin hierarchy and propriety ashore was 
reproduced on ships, allowing for the development of cohesive and cogent 
relationships to be maintained at sea and on land. Thus, men present biographies 
of themselves, and of others, in terms of the ships they crewed or owned, the 
friends they made, the ports they sailed to, and the dominance of particular ataks 
among the crews of particular merchants. This picture, further elaborated in the 
following chapters, has been transformed by the Bhadala who do not recruit on 
the basis of land based social hierarchy. This practice prevents coalitions of sailors 
developing, generates conflict between sailors and their landlubber relatives, and
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disrupts patterns of land-based jamat hierarchy. Consequently, the Bhadala 
recruitment practices are a powerful tool in their attempts at religious change.
The argument thus far is that Kharvas and Bhadalas situate themselves in relation 
to the past in differing ways. For both groups history really refers to seafaring, 
commercial migration and the formation of meaningful relationships with merchants. 
For the Kharva, the recent past extends back through many generations of 
remembered ancestors whose traditions presently appear in reinvented forms. In 
contrast, Bhadalas have conspicuously little knowledge of the past because their 
social life is segmentary, and relationships with their mercantile patrons have 
collapsed -  perhaps never having been as elaborate as the Hindu equivalents.
4.4. Comparison
This section addresses other forms of social and historical divergence between the 
groups. Dariyapir, the traditional deity of sailors, has disappeared from Muslim ritual 
and language and Kharvas today venerate Dariyalal, who is importantly not 
Dariyapir. It is described how and why this process is so central to social 
differentiation of Kharvas and Bhadalas, followed by an analysis of Nava Naroj, 
before the discussion returns to the issue of how sailors conceptualise the past.
4.41. The god that disappeared
Dariyapir, as the name implies, is today regarded as a low status amalgamation of 
superstitions derived from Hindu and Muslim sailors. There is little doubt that 
Kharvas and Bhadalas lived, worked and worshipped in greater proximity, and with 
greater commonality, in the past than they do today. Dariyapir was the deity that 
came to stand most prominently for these associations. As Hindu-Kharva and Sunni 
Muslim-Bhadala identities have become increasingly salient the syncretic deity 
Dariyapir has disappeared. Mentioned by Postens (1838a) and in the Gazetteers 
(G.B.P. Vol. IX. Part 1), Dariyapir seems to have been powerful throughout the
199
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the majority of the population of 
Mandvi continue to hold that sailors are devotees of Dariyapir. Sailors, however, 
have sacrificed this syncretic figure to the processes of social and religious division, 
and his image does not appear and his name cannot be heard among sailors.
Bhadalas have turned away from such ritual associations because personified 
elemental deities sit uncomfortably in their modernist Islamic vision, which is itself 
partially an attempt to deny commonality with Hindus. Kharvas on the other hand 
have purged the deity of any association with Muslims. They have dropped the suffix 
pir (commonly used to denote Muslim saints) and added suffix lal (a high status 
Sanskritised term of respect). However, the change from Dariyapir to Dariyalal 
involves more than a change of name because it is accompanied by the appropriation 
of a fitting mythology for the Sanskritised Dariyalal. Through this transformation 
Dariyalal has become a figure renowned for protecting Hindus from predatory 
Muslim advances. Throughout western India it is relatively common for Hindus and 
Muslims to participate in each other’s festivals, and even for local saints to be jointly 
honoured (see Khan 1997). In other parts of Gujarat, Hindus participate in Muslim 
shrine festivals (van der Veer 1992). However, in Mandvi, Hindu and Muslim 
festivals, temples and shrines are not jointly patronised. I never witnessed a Hindu in 
a mosque or in a Muslim shrine or a Muslim in a Hindu temple or shrine. In the light 
of the Dariyapir’s transformation it is worth noting that the name of the buildings 
dedicated to Raval have not been changed to remove traces of Muslim association. 
Those who venerate Raval are not on the front lines of battle between Hindus and 
Muslims, and the desire to delete associations with Muslims is not an important part 
of the identity of the temple or of those who patronise it. The deities associated with 
the sea and with sailors are subject to such sanction because the seafaring 
communities are the ones inculcated in religious violence. Dariyapir is a reminder of 
the past when Hindus and Muslims are held to have shared festivals, most obviously 
the celebration of Nava Naroj.
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4.42 Nava Naroj
Nava Naroj is the only festival that continues to be marked by mercantile Hindus and 
Muslims and especially by Kharvas and Bhadalas. As a result, the claims made, and 
ritual practices advocated, during this festival are central to understanding the present 
relationship between the Kharvas and the Bhadalas.
In every house and office in Mandvi hangs a calendar with tear-off pages 
displaying daily words of wisdom or a popular saying. Each page is printed with the 
following systems of reckoning: Hindu (vikram savant), Gregorian, Sunni Muslim 
(ano hijra), the Vohra (Fatimid) and a system commonly called Nava Naroj. The 
mercantile population favour the Nava Naroj calendar for the organisation of their 
business. It divides the year into around 365 sequentially numbered days with the 
first day of the year, which falls in August, being Nava Naroj. Other names for the 
festival include: Dariyanu Nava Varas (New Year of the sea), Kachchhnu Nava 
Varas (Kachchhi New Year) and Nariyel Purnam (Coconut Moon), and those groups 
characterised as mercantile and exogenic all observe it to varying degrees. On this 
day the monsoon season is considered to be at an end. Traditionally a coconut was 
offered up to Dariyapir to gain favour for those who had to trust themselves to the 
vagaries of the sea for the forthcoming sailing season. The sacrificial coconut is of 
course a key element in most Hindu worship. The use of coconuts in Muslim ritual 
has ceased among the Bhadala who see coconuts as an outward and visible sign of 
inwardly corrupt meaning. Prayers at most Muslim shrines in Mandvi, such as the 
ones around the perimeter of the Dariyalal Temple, typically involve the splitting of 
a coconut. In Salaya this is not the case, here coconuts have powerful negative 
associations with Hindus and with ignorant Muslims.
The Nava Naroj calendar structures work, the marriage season and the traditional 
system of accounting. At one time the accounting year, commencing with Nava 
Naroj, was also used in Zanzibar and Muscat, where Bhatiya merchants were present 
in large numbers. Nava Naroj falls at about the time when the monsoon has travelled
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into the interior of the sub-continent and the waters of the Indian Ocean quieten. 
However, at around the end of October there are frequent squalls and unsettled 
weather as the monsoon recedes from the interior. The sailing season is reckoned to 
run for around 301 days (Vaidya 1945:53), an arbitrary number as it is rare for ships 
to leave harbour before the squalls have subsided. In 1998 the majority of the ships 
left port on, or around, the sixtieth day of the Nava Naroj calendar. The remaining 
sixty-four days of the year are counted as the ‘off-season’ and it is during this time 
that marriages take place. Despite the technological modernisation of shipping, and 
the present dominance of Muslim ship owners, the meteorological patterns that 
swing backwards and forwards over the Indian Ocean continue to structure the 
sailing season and ritual cycle of the year.
The following section compares and contrasts the ways in which Kharvas and 
Bhadalas celebrate Nava Naroj today. Kharva celebrations of Nava Naroj are focused 
around the Dariyalal Temple described in previous sections of this chapter. It is a day 
of abandonment that marks the time when the sons of the sea start to make the 
preparations for the forthcoming sailing season (or for labour migration). The rituals 
performed pay homage to Dariyalal, but more importantly Nava Naroj (and the 
preceding day gofol) is reserved for venerating Kharva ancestors. Vegetarian 
sacrifices are offered before the paliyos, and the stories and songs that accompany 
such offerings elevate ancestral personalities and accomplishments. The day 
culminates with a wild and drunken musical procession from the Dariyalal temple 
into the Kharva neighbourhood. The Dariyalal temple has become the Samaj-wide 
focus for Nava Naroj celebrations despite its relatively recent construction. The 
collection of artefacts contained within it is especially significant on this day, as the 
performance of Nava Naroj emphasises the fact that the Sanskritised deity Dariyalal, 
known for defeating Muslims, presides over the ancestral traditions in a space 
socially and ritually reclaimed from Muslim influence.
In comparison, in Salaya senior Bhadala seths and selected members of their 
crews congregated outside the Friday Mosque after lunch-time prayers and wandered
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down to the sea -  on the opposite side of the estuary to where the Kharvas’ Dariyalal 
temple stands. The men sat in two groups in the sand, one composed of ship owners 
and the other of men who worked as crew, and were mostly Bhadala-Pathan and their 
supporters. The moulana (prayer leader) of the Friday Mosque led the recitation of 
the zikra (remembering): subhanallah, al hamdu lillaa, allahu akbar (‘glory be to 
Allah, all praise is due to Allah, Allah is greater’, repeated 33 times), laa ilaha 
illallah (‘there is no God but Allah’, spoken once). It was a hot day and the breeze 
that was blowing off the sea could not disguise the sweat seeping through clothes and 
skullcaps. Gulls tumbled and squawked over the breakers that were rhythmically 
pounding the beach. From the opposite riverbank the sound of drumming and an 
occasional shrill cry of delight could be heard. After the recitation had finished, there 
were a few moments of silence before the men stood. Some offered private prayers in 
the direction of Mecca (which somewhat ironically involves facing the opposite 
riverbank), but most wandered slowly back into the village and home. Having 
reminded themselves that there was no God but Allah the view onto the opposite side 
of the river, and the walk back to the village, were stark contrasts to this assertion.
On our return to the village we passed a shrine. The dry foliage had been cut back 
from around it and the low walls that surrounded it had been freshly painted. There 
was no actual tomb, only a flat concrete platform surrounded by the wall onto which 
had been daubed in thick white paint ‘Apu Pir’. Around the shrine, ice cream and 
sherbet vendors had gathered, along with a few small hand-operated fairground rides. 
Here some of the Thaims and their followers had gathered to offer coconuts. 
Sometime later a Thaim man told me that Apu Pir offered protection against the 
perils of the sea. As the congregation of men who had been down to the seashore to 
‘pray’ passed the only comments they made were disparaging ones about those 
‘playing’ around the shrine (also van der Veer 1992).
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In Mandvi, only Muslims of the highest (Saiyeds) and lowest (Siddis) social- 
divine ranks can become saints14. Likewise, they are the only ones who can act as 
legitimate intermediaries between the human realm and the divine (Chapter 3). While 
not all Muslims in Mandvi are devotees of particular saints the majority are. The 
Bhadala-Pathans are of low rank within the sanguine -  divine hierarchy headed by 
Saiyeds, and accordingly, they seek to undermine the legitimacy of this hierarchy. 
Bhadala-Pathan are not opposed to all Saiyeds and all shrines, rather they offer a 
reappraisal of the hierarchy and of the status accorded to various shrines. But they 
vehemently reject the idea that living Saiyeds, who often preside over shrines, have 
powers of intervention between human and divine realms. Francis Robinson makes 
the important distinction between the worship of a saint and the worship of God in a 
saint’s presence (1983:188). Those who claim, or are ascribed, intermediary powers, 
and claim elevated social status as a result, are the perennial focus of reformers in 
many religious traditions. The Bhadala campaigns are no exception, singling out 
Saiyeds as particular vestiges of religious corruption. However, in this case 
Robinson’s distinction is not comprehensive enough to isolate the negative traits that 
Bhadalas ascribe Saiyeds. Broadly, there are five kinds of intermediary roles 
performed by Saiyeds, shared between living Saiyeds and dead Saiyeds: (i) the 
worship of a deity without human form (such as Dariyapir) through the agency of a 
living Saiyed; (ii) the worship and attribution of miraculous powers to a living 
Saiyed; (iii) the worship and attribution of miraculous powers to a dead Saiyed 
through a living Saiyed descendant; (iv) the direct worship and attribution of 
miraculous powers to a dead Saiyed; and (v) the worship of God in the presence of 
either a living Saiyed or a dead Saiyed of fame. The first three categories are singled 
out by Bhadala-Pathans as corrupt forms. Thus the veneration of entombed figures 
such as Apu Pir, the graves of their own anonymous ancestors, or the amorphous
14 The role of the Siddi (the lowest ranking Muslims) as a religious figure was outside the scope of my 
research. However, Helene Basu writes: ‘The role of Siddi fakirs is defined in opposition to the 
religious discipline of Sayyid pir-s at the top of the hierarchy and reflects principles governing 
relations between superior and subordinate in the political sphere as well as in the worship of Sufi 
saints’ (1993:290). This opposition is couched in terms of mental and physical heat, as people with hot 
minds the Siddis behaviour is unpredictable and not assessable by norms valid for honourable people. 
This characterisation sits comfortably within the model of substance and code presented in the 
previous chapter.
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(non-human) figure of Dariyapir have become overt signs of corrupt Muslim 
practice. The fourth category is treated ambiguously by Bhadala-Pathans. They reject 
most claims to power made for the majority of shrines, while continuing to hold 
some others, such as Haji Pir in the northwest of Kachchh, in particular reverence 
and as sources of auspicious blessings. The final category is respected by Bhadala- 
Pathans with the proviso that the dead, as with living Saiyeds, are judged on merit 
and evidence rather than their condition at birth.
However, the Bhadala Jamat is not united in a particular vision of the role of 
Saiyeds in the construction of good Muslim practices. Broadly, there is a division 
between Pathans and Thaims (and their respective followers). The former profess 
what they term as ‘modem practice’, associated with mosques, the Koran and 
personal and ritual modesty. They are against idolatry, songs to worship by, religious 
intermediaries (of categories i-iii) and any signs associated with Hindus and used by 
some Muslims (such as the coconut). In comparison, Thaims and their allies are not 
so concerned with proselytising or with reforming local religious practice. As a 
result, many of the institutions and activities they sponsor (see discussion of 
Moharam in Chapter 6) place them in tacit opposition to Pathans. These observations 
begin to point to the conflicting status of competition within and between groups in 
the process of Islamisation.
As descendants of the Prophet, Saiyeds are described by their devotees as vessels 
of uncorrupted religious and moral knowledge (aql). Herein lies something of a 
contradiction, because as many Bhadala-Pathans are aware, knowledge of religious 
law and the execution of judicial wisdom (functions Saiyeds perform for clients) 
require learning and study, and are not automatically given by descent. Educated 
Bhadala-Pathans are thus inclined to see the majority of Saiyeds as fraudulent and as 
corrupt, passing off ignorant advice to those so blinded by their devotion that they 
cannot see the falsehoods they are being fed.
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The Bhadala-Pathan attitude towards Mandvi’s Saiyeds raises a further issue 
related to descent. In Mandvi, accusations of corrupt descent against Saiyeds are rare 
and exist at the level of speculation among friends. In Salaya, at regular meetings 
held at the mosque-shrine of Mukhdummi Sha, particular Saiyeds are denounced and 
their elevated social status is alleged to be based on false claims. The most severe 
accusation levelled at a Saiyed is that he is a complete fraud and is perhaps the 
descendant of an oil presser from Uttar Pradesh, whose father moved to Gujarat and 
claimed to have holy blood. Furthermore, it has been shown that for Muslims the 
purest line of descent emerges from combining maternal and paternal blood of the 
same atak. Bhadala-Pathans claim that many ritually active Saiyeds have descent 
lines that rely solely on maternal blood ties to the Prophet and that the dominant male 
blood is derived from non-Saiyed sources. Such characters are seen as having denied 
their paternity in order to claim elevated Saiyed status in the world. The denial of 
legitimate paternity is seen by the Bhadala-Pathan as one half of the moral evil of 
Saiyeds; the other half inevitably leads to the accusation that most Saiyeds are of 
mixed blood. The cult of Saiyed blood thus emerges as an illusion generated by the 
false Saiyed claim that their blood is not weakened by admixture. The Bhadala- 
Pathan counter to this is that Saiyed blood is just like the blood of all men. This does 
not mean that Bhadala-Pathans dismiss the possible eminence of pure Saiyed blood, 
rather it is just that most Saiyed blood in Mandvi is bad blood -  rather like their own.
Nava Naroj is observed in different ways on opposite banks of the river and is a 
powerful metaphor in communal rhetoric. Neither Kharva nor Bhadala enactment of 
Nava Naroj contains any explicit ritual or linguistic symbolism relating to Dariyapir. 
Yet Nava Naroj is a contested day that the Kharvas celebrate on a contested site, 
which has been deliberately abandoned by the Bhadala. The Muslims living around 
the temple, many of whom work on Bhadala-Pathan ships, are aware that the site was 
once in their ownership and that the perimeter boundaries of the temple are gradually 
encroaching on the neighbouring Muslim cemetery. I sat with some of them in the 
evening of Nava Naroj outside their houses to watch the crowds making their way to 
the Dariyalal temple. They were dismissive of the Kharvas as Hindus and as the
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protagonists in the silent battle for control over the temple site, but they enjoyed 
meeting the eyes of passing groups of women. The conversation swung around to the 
Bhadala celebration of Nava Naroj. Very few of the sailors had been invited to attend 
despite the fact that many of them worked on Bhadala-Pathan ships. They were 
impressed that I had been invited and wanted to know what happened at the event. 
Sitting some distance away were some other Muslims of high rank within the town. 
Overhearing our conversation they suggested that the Bhadala were ignorant and had 
spent the day praying to the sea. One man characterised what he thought they had 
been doing with a sarcastic hand clapping and a swaying of the body accompanied 
by the chant of ‘O Dariyapir, Dariyapir’.
In Mandvi, it is commonly assumed that both seafaring classes venerate 
Dariyapir, but this is more an affirmation of the low status of sailors than it is 
assumed to be an empirical fact. Dariyapir has become a sign through which the 
integrity of others can be conveniently degraded. It is somewhat surprising that the 
Bhadala celebrate this day at all. It is not a recognised Islamic festival and is 
associated with the Hindu and syncretic traditions to which they are (all to varying 
degrees) opposed. In Salaya there were expressions of uncertainty about the validity 
of coming down to the water’s edge to pray for safety and profit in the forthcoming 
trading season. But they were clear that their prayer was to remember Allah and not 
other deities, which was affirmed in the recitation of zikra. The majority of the 
Bhadala do not regard their regional origins, customs and time frames of their local 
environment as things that should be disguised or hidden. Therefore, the 
commemoration of Nava Naroj is seen as legitimate so long as its observance falls 
within the parameters of what the dominant Bhadala-Pathans construe as the 
universal aspects of Islam, which are suited to any occasion and to any cause because 
they are the basic tenets of the faith and cannot be corrupted. Permitted aspects 
include a strict interpretation of the five pillars, but more important, it seems, are the 
things to be excluded, such as iconographic representation, polytheism and spiritual 
intermediaries. It is evident from this list of priorities that religious reform is as much 
about the things it opposes, as it is about the things it represents. Nava Naroj, in the
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Bhadalas’ terms, is not a commemoration of ancestors or a veneration of the dead 
and the method and the location of its practice are new. The event is a redefinition of 
what the Bhadala represent and what the shipping season entails. In general terms, 
both the form and the content of the commemoration have changed within the 
broader structure of the annual cycle of the sea and the monsoon. Nava Naroj is 
described and enacted as a Muslim event that uses Arabic language of prayer and 
bodily posturing to reinforce monotheism and pure Islam.
Returning to the question of knowledge and truth and descent, Saiyeds claim a 
right, given by their bloodlines, to be the bastions of specialised religious knowledge. 
However, experiences of education and the rapidly shifting fortunes of the Bhadala- 
Pathan have taught them to question the idea that individual propensity and potential 
is given solely by birth, because such notions are discordant with their own lives.
The Bhadala performance of zikra on Nava Naroj is not an affirmation of their 
ancestral heritage because their society has transformed within a generation. 
Ancestral tradition and the ideas that prevail in Mandvi of professions and individual 
attributes being given by genealogical inheritance have been transformed in Salaya. 
They have questioned the validity of worshipping like sailors, when they require the 
luck and blessings required to make them successful merchants. Their ‘new’ way of 
seeing this potential is to be good merchants and good Muslims. Importantly, the 
successful Bhadala merchant has the power and influence to determine what 
constitutes being a good Muslim. Anything that does not quite fit the ideal can be 
dismissed as inferior. Thus the Bhadala-Pathan see themselves as living up to their 
potential and tend to dismiss Thaims, Mandvi’s Muslims, Kharvas and Mandvi’s 
broader Hindu population as increasingly deviating from God-given greatness. The 
consequences of this model are further explored in Chapters 6-8. On one level the 
performance of zikra is an explicit device of social separation and a counter­
enactment to the observances of Thaims and Kharvas. On another level it appears as 
a counter-enactment of Bhadala-Pathans’ own past. Simply, they have a new, 
appropriate and religiously authentic way of commemorating the event that 
distinguishes them from their forefathers and others. Legitimacy for this performance
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is drawn from their move away from Mandvi, their abandonment of Dariyapir, and 
their social rise from sailors to traders. The landscape of shirk (polytheism) that lies 
over the river is contrasted to the pure land of correct religious practice in Salaya, 
and this loosely reflects the division made between dar al-kafir and dar al-islam in 
Chapter 1.
4.5. Conclusion
For the Bhadala, the recent past is shallow and, in most cases, is typically either two 
or three generations deep (from the living). Kharva and Bhadala have similar stories 
of ancient history through which they relate claims to a particular origin or ethnic 
identity. However, among Kharvas there is considerably more continuity between the 
mythical past and the present than there is in the case of Bhadalas. This is directly 
related to ongoing relationships with Bhatiya patrons, which can often be traced back 
to the nineteenth century. Individual kinship and recollections of the past are 
intertwined. Kharva kinship is broadly lineage exogamous and although Kharvas do 
not employ bards, the various ritual Brahmans they employ maintain records that 
often convincingly, stretch back over two hundred years or more. Thus, 
fragmentation and segmentation of descent lines is not such a pronounced trend as it 
is among the Bhadala. This difference provides both groups with a very different 
understanding and consequent narration of the actual violent conflict of the early 
1980s, the post-event justification for it and the resulting community polarisation.
For the Kharva the past is cogent and recollected, and the betrayal of the traditions of 
their ancestors remains an important issue for them. The violence is described as a 
settling of ‘old scores’ against the destruction of the temple at Somnath by a 
generalised Muslim ‘other’, and against their marginalisation from shipping by the 
Bhadala in the latter half of the twentieth century. The past is used as a form of 
justification and as an explanation for the present. For the Bhadala the past is 
immaterial, not etherealised, and to a surprising degree it is forgotten. The violence, 
and their ‘defeat’, rather than marking their fall from grace, marks the start of a new 
era of prosperity and Islamic development in their village, autonomous from the
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‘traditional’ mercantile social organisation in Mandvi. They do not look into the past 
for their inspiration; the Bhadala and their apprenticed recruits look to their own 
futures as a source of potential.
The intensity or paucity of the past in collective representations is not only related 
to the internal kinship organisation of groups, but also more importantly, the 
contingencies of the past are related to the internal kinship and ritual organisations of 
mercantile patrons, and in this case to the merchants on whose ships the Kharva and 
Bhadala were employed as sailors. The collapse, in the case of the Bhadala and Shia 
merchants, and the continuation, in the case of Kharvas and Bhatiyas, of patron- 
client relations modelled around the contingencies of shipping, continue to be 
instrumental in how the past and future are conceived and in the development of 
communal hostility between groups of sailors.
Opposition of Kharva and Bhadala is given by the river and religion, but also by 
the different methods they have deployed to make Dariyapir disappear. The Kharvas 
turned towards a known past and embellished it with the ritual and mythological 
complexes that now surround their new temple, and they drew upon signs from 
prestigious sources within the town. The reinvention of tradition concentrated aspects 
of the past, such as ancestral veneration, which they claim had become dilute in the 
years of their ‘cultural poverty’ after the Second World War. The stable residence 
patterns of Kharvas and their enduring relationships with Bhatiyas provide a 
continuous basic infrastructure onto which elaborated tradition has been grafted. In 
contrast, the Bhadalas have taken a radically different approach. They have rejected 
the past and past associations with Hindus and shared deities in order to reinvent 
themselves. They have drawn on the pervasive exogenic ideology of pure Islam that 
differentiates them from Hindus, their past and from other Muslims. This power has 
not been drawn from existing or prestigious sources in Mandvi, but is modelled on 
their experiences in Gulf ports.
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The following chapter examines the mechanisms through which apprenticeship 
conveys communal antagonism in the production of technology, in anticipation of 
this a brief review is given below of the social context into which neophytes are 
apprenticed. The seafaring tradition of Mandvi is dialectical, constructed through the 
homogenisation of ritual, economic and political authority, as well as through kinship 
networks within the social categories of ‘merchant’ and ‘sailor’. These two groups, 
into which all other subsidiary categories (shipbuilders, craftsmen and dock 
labourers) are collapsed, are defined by the historical contingencies of shipping. This 
dialectic has profound consequences for wider social organisation. ‘Traditional’ 
merchants appear as apical figures in Kachchhi society, ranking higher than 
landowners and the ruling classes. This is reinforced by the way in which their work 
is conceptualised, the ‘propemess’ of their diet, marriage patterns and behaviour, and 
by the fact that they paradigmatically appear closer to God through their ability to 
patronise religion. Sailors on the other hand, despite sharing the exogenic tendency 
with merchants, are of mixed-blood, low rank and firmly associated with the physical 
work of the lascar. Contemporary political authority does not rank as highly as 
mercantile power in Mandvi and although it is true that for traditional Sunni and Shia 
Muslims spiritual intermediaries rank higher than both merchants and rulers, rulers 
come a poor second to the mercantile elite in local hierarchy. In short, real power 
comes from mercantile activity taking place outside the kingdom and this power, in 
its modem form (Bhadala-Pathan), not only has the influence to usurp the influence 
of local rulers it also has the ability to usurp the traditional source of status in 
Muslim society. Thus, the influence and social position of the Saiyeds is under direct 
attack from modem mercantile capital, which has an agenda very different to that 
held by ‘traditional’ Muslim society. In this sense, the negation of the past places 
social currents evident among the Bhadala in a very different light from what is 
typically thought of as ‘fundamentalism’ because they have no fitting past to call 
their own to resurrect in the name of religious or social perfection.
Within the general context of Hindu nationalism, and the Muslim response in 
India and beyond, there are a series of social and material conditions that dictate the
211
direction, depth and content of the Bhadala-Pathan’s vision of Islamisation. First, the 
communal hostility of the 1980s provides a necessary ‘other’ for their religious 
vision. Predominantly, these ‘others’ are Kharvas who, as shown, represent the 
Hindu population of Mandvi in a general sense. Secondly, the Bhadalas’ low-ranking 
(mixed blood) position in Mandvi’s encompassing social hierarchy cannot be 
transcended from within the conditions of that hierarchy, so their religious message 
counters the principles on which such hierarchy is based and in the process creates a 
further ‘other’ that is Muslim. Thirdly, their exogenic relationship to the boundary of 
Kachchh gives the goods and trends they import an elevated status in their religious 
practices and social interactions. Fourthly, the powerful high-status patrons of the 
past have emigrated to the point of local extinction, leaving a power vacuum in 
Muslim society into which the Bhadala have been drawn. Furthermore, their 
dominance of the shipping industry has developed a trans-Indian Ocean web of 
Muslim connections through which they create political and ideological allegiances. 
Fifthly, they have large amounts of disposable wealth with which to build and 
patronise salient institutions and religiously learned personalities. Related to this is 
their dominant position in the recently settled village of Salaya where they have 
uncontested space in which to build mosques. Sixthly, their control of a large 
dependent constituency of sailors (mostly from Mandvi) gives them audience, brawn 
and a wider influence across the river. Finally, the education of a portion of the 
Bhadala Jamat (including sections of other ataks aside from Pathans) has created a 
set of allegiances that periodically transcend the otherwise segmentary nature of the 
Bhadala Jamat, which Bhadala-Pathans successfully channel into their religious 
program. The brotherhood-type equality found among the educated section is also 
evident in a community-wide football tournament (held during the off-season), at 
Friday prayers and through the Bhadala-Pathans’ choice of a public school.
However, these are but illusions of equality: on the football field pre-existent 
hierarchy does not disappear into the rules of the game, while prayer in the mosque 
evokes an equal relationship of all men before God there is no pretence of earthly 
social differentiation collapsing into joint prayer. Thus, there is the temptation to 
argue that Islamisation among Bhadala-Pathans promotes universal equality of all
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men (seen in their dismissal of Saiyeds elevated blood), but this ultimately falters 
because social hierarchy based upon the contingencies of shipping equates broadly 
with religious hierarchy in the village.
In the final section of this chapter I have deliberately conflated Bhadala-Pathan 
conflicts with Hindus and with Mandvi’s Muslims. This is the way in which the 
conflict appears on the ground. The enemy is Hindu, but in the long term the only 
way in which Bhadala-Pathans can attain a dominant position is through attacking 
both the Muslim society that subjugates them and the principles, on which that 
society is based, that place them in structural opposition to Kharvas as the lascars of 
the struggle between religious traditions. Old men in Mandvi recall that in their 
youth while Kharva and Bhadala seafarers were in competition with each other this 
did not extend to actual violence. The powerful and pervasive social division was 
between merchants and sailors crosscut a range of seldom intersecting patron-client 
type relationships, such that Lohana and Bhatiya merchants employed Kharva sailors 
and Vohra, Khoja and Memon merchants employed Bhadala sailors. From the 
perspective of the present, men collapse fifty years into a few events in order to 
explain the Kharvas’ current inability to control shipping and the Bhadalas’ rise to 
fortune, culminating in the violent acts of the early 1980s. From that time on things 
have been different and the social map of Mandvi has changed. The Bhadala, 
communal enemies of the Kharva, have started to recruit new groups of men to sail 
for them. This workforce is susceptible to, and influenced by, the Bhadalas’ 
ideological and political positioning in the world. Apprenticeship in shipyards has 
become a matter of learning the basics of a new sociality and bodily practice through 
the redefinition of the ‘traditional’ merchant-seamen type relationship. The 
relationship continues to rest on the experience of travel (of home and away), the 
ritual cycle of the sea (culminating with Nava Naroj), and on the contingencies of 
crewing a ship. However, the ideological content of the relationship has changed to 
one that focuses more on an individual’s potential within his life cycle, rather than on 
propensity given by birth. This is a direct reflection of changes that have occurred in 
the fortunes of the Bhadala within a single generation. However, as shown in Chapter
213
5, the seths may tell their apprentices that, if they work hard, one day they will also 
own ships. But this ‘gift’ is, for the most part, an illusory one.
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Plate 1. The Rukhmavuti estuary at dawn looking onto Salaya.
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Plate 2. The Rukhmavuti estuary at dawn looking onto Mandvi.
Plate 3. Waiting for the tide at the start of the sailing season.
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Plate 4. Ravalpir temple complex.
I
Plate 5. Horses in Ravalpir temple.
Plate 6. Raval’s ‘tomb’.
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Plate 7. Muslim graves adjacent to Dariyalal temple walls.
Plate 8. Dariyalal temple complex.
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Plate 9. Dariyalal.
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IPlate 10. Jume Mosque -  Salaya.
Plate 11. Minara (Minaret) Mosque -  Salaya.
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Plate 12. Apprentices on shipyard scaffolding.
Plate 13. Apprentices and others swimming with mast.
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Plate 14. Refitting a rudder.
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Plate 15. Scaffolding around a hull.
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Plate 16. Sailing from Zanzibar in the 1950s (photograph courtesy of Naran Damji
Kharva).
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Plate 17. Sailing from Dubai in the 1990’s (courtesy of Anis Khatri).
Plate 18. The view from Mukhdummi Sha over Mandvi.
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Chapter 5. 
Apprenticeship I: shipbuilding
5.1 Practice theory
This chapter presents an analysis of social reproduction through apprenticeship 
within the context of the production of technology in shipyards. Through this process 
the seth’s capital is converted into social status through the reproduction of a 
workforce. In the presentation of this argument the analysis focuses on how 
apprentices value their learning within the hierarchical context of shipyards.
However, the ethnography leads to a different conclusion about the nature of learning 
to ‘practice theory’ models current among anthropologists. The initial sections of this 
chapter review anthropological literature on the acquisition of skill and suggests what 
practice theory in the context of shipyards in Kachchh might look like. Subsequent 
sections of the chapter examine the kinds of physical and social techniques that 
apprentices learn to think and act with as they engage with the materials, tools and 
hierarchy of shipbuilding. The question posed is: Why are the bodily techniques and 
the organisation of space and time ignored in describing the process of assembling 
components?
In answering this question two descriptions of shipbuilding are presented. The 
first is a sequential description, the second concentrates on the particular aspects of 
the process. The discussion then turns to describe the evaluations and decisions a 
ship owner engages with before, during and after a ship’s construction, and to the 
ambiguous position of the master craftsman in the shipyard. It demonstrates that far 
from lazing around doing nothing, the work of the ship owner requires that he plans 
the flow of finance and materials, develops organisational strategies to divide and 
unite the labour force, and that he negotiates contracts and pricing with timber 
merchants, accountants and government officials. The final section of the chapter 
brings together the activities of all those engaged in shipyards who continue to work
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on the ship once it has left the dry dock through describing how a ship is floated off 
the riverbank and into deep water; showing the bodily techniques of the labourers, 
the mental strategies of the ship owner and the hierarchical command structure 
operating in unison.
Paul Connerton has argued that the past is preserved by representing it in words, 
images and actions, of which commemorative events are a pre-eminent instance 
(1995:72). In this chapter it is argued that it is not only through commemorative 
‘events’, such as ritual and festivity that are re-enactments of the past, but that the 
past is recollected, and the present created, in the body’s ability to perform certain 
skilled actions. Connerton distinguishes between incorporating and inscribing 
practices (1995:72-3). The former relates to movement of the body, which he further 
subdivides into ceremonies, properties and techniques. Inscribing practice relates to 
the technologies of storing and retrieving information. This section is concerned with 
incorporated practice, which is eventually inscribed in the identity cards given to 
sailors. Work in shipyards is habitual. Habits are more than technical abilities: in a 
Weberian sense they are affective dispositions that develop from an elective affinity 
between the interests of apprentices and their masters. As in prayer and mnemonic 
learning, repetition is an influential process in generating elective affinity. Again, in 
Connerton’s words: ‘Habit is a knowledge and a remembering in the hands and in the 
body; and in the cultivation of habit it is our body which ‘understands” (1995:95). 
Over this and the following chapter this ‘understanding’ is shown as a transformation 
of the colours of the soul, as apprentices move from, what is in the Bhadalas’ eyes, 
dar al-kafir to dar al-islam.
‘Habitual’ work practices and ‘learning’ skills are not abstract signs, they carry 
with them moral and political sway. It is argued that the minutiae of shipyard work 
are bodily ceremonies, properties and techniques that carry with them particular ways 
of being in the world. The skills and procedures of shipbuilding provide apprentices 
with a certain set of bodily postures and deportment that separates them from others. 
These skills and procedures provide apprentices with experience of hierarchy and
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command structure within shipyards, thus shipyard interactions are not only 
linguistic they are also conducted through the body. This experience of hierarchy and 
command provides apprentices with a certain way of seeing the past, landscape and 
communal relations. The hierarchy, materials of construction and the aspirations of 
apprentices, create the ‘context’ in which new ways of seeing the world are acquired 
as he performs the minutiae of his labour.
Underlying the presentation of ethnography in this chapter runs a criticism of 
the many variants of ‘practice theory’, in order to show that learning is regarded in 
very specific ways in shipyards. Theories of situated everyday practice (for 
shorthand called ‘practice theory’) insist that persons acting and the world of 
activity cannot be separated (Lave 1993:5). What can be known in any given 
context is in a constant state of change. Production processes and the production 
of social relations are historically contingent and socially specific. In the sense 
that those involved:
improvise struggles in situated ways with each other over the value of particular 
definitions of the situation, in both immediate and comprehensive terms, and for whom 
the production of failure is as much a part of routine collective activity as the production 
of average, ordinary knowledgeability (Lave 1993:17).
The ‘context’ of practical everyday activity is prioritised and is given through 
conceptions of action, interaction and activity. Thus practice theory and its 
theoretical variants are situated against the tradition that knowledge and learning are 
abstract ‘things’ situated in the mind of the learner (Ingold 1992; and Palsson 1994). 
Any notion that ratifies the dichotomy between ‘mind’ and ‘body’, or ‘learning’ and 
‘not learning’, is an obstacle in the way of a theory that ‘encompasses mind and 
lived-in world’ (Lave 1993:7).
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5.11. An ethnographic practice theory
Despite the claims of the practice theorists to incorporate the conceptions of those 
engaged in production and the acquisition of skill, what people think and say about 
what they do remains subordinate to the theory. When the men who labour in the 
shipyards use distinctions that the latter decades of the twentieth century and my 
training in British Social Anthropology have taught me to find irksome, they do so 
with intent, sincerity and meaning that not only contradicts the spirit of ‘practice 
theory’ but force a reconsideration of the premises on which the intellectual project is 
based. Practice theory seems to impose our own theoretical anxieties onto the 
ethnography of others. This is not to deny the merit of the anthropological theory, but 
if those who work in shipyards present details of their lives and work that fly in the 
face of our contemporary urge to collapse dichotomies where does that leave the 
project and the analytical conclusions of practice theory?
The many dichotomies that permeate this thesis (Hindu and Muslim, mind and 
body, traditional and modem, and good and bad) are not of my own invention, or 
even my analytical inference. However, rather than arguing that the tendency to 
produce ecological or social dichotomies is ‘natural’ it is argued that they are socially 
and historically contingent. Dichotomous thought is a product of social organisation 
and its reproduction, and of various forms of social transaction, which may well be 
emergent manifestations of the architecture of the human mind, but are based in the 
particular realities of the time, the space and the technology to which they refer. 
When the divisions that some anthropologists wish to deconstruct appear in the 
language of those who inform this thesis, it is those divisions that are used for the 
analysis of ethnography. ‘What the natives think’ about minds, bodies and wealth is 
given priority within this chapter. So although the bodily techniques of labourers are 
impressive feats of co-ordination, involving mind and body, labourers do not 
consider them so. They denigrate their own bodily mastery of techniques to the 
mental work of the merchant. In other words, the work of the merchant’s mind is 
prioritised over the ‘easy knowledge’ of an apprentice’s physical labour. The
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ordering of this hierarchy obviously reflects the patterns of social differentiation 
described in previous chapters.
5.2. Shipyards (Plates 12-15)
At first shipyards appear as noisy, smelly, chaotic places. The air is full with the 
sounds of hammers on iron and wood, and with the mixed odours of mud, sawdust 
and chemicals boiling over open fires. Men clamber over and around ships in ways 
inconceivable and incomprehensible to anyone arriving for work in the shipyard for 
the first time. In time these sensations cease to be salient, as the neophyte (or the 
anthropologist) becomes familiar with the techniques, technology and processes of 
the production process.
It has been shown in previous chapters that the shipping industry is based on a 
structural social division between merchants and sailors, and in the Kharva case there 
is much more to being a sailor than going to sea on a ship. The ethnography 
presented here examines another aspect of being a sailor: apprenticeship in 
shipyards. This form of apprenticeship is unusual because neophytes are training to 
become sailors not shipbuilders, yet the first stage of apprenticeship takes place in 
shipyards, during which time the apprentice is known as ‘khalaasV (sailor). The 
division of labour within the shipyards is the same as when the ships are working at 
sea, but the land-based hierarchy is not directly transposable onto ships because the 
expectations and qualifications needed to fill each position vary slightly from land to 
sea.
Men work in shipyards from 8.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m., with Fridays and Sundays 
off. Shipbuilding is labour intensive, and the forty to fifty men who work over two 
years to build a ship use few power tools. The workforce is divided into five 
horizontal ranked grades, split vertically between labourers and carpenters. The 
following section describes these divisions, the kind of work each category of man 
undertakes, and the ways in which the divisions are related; these graded ranks are
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the dominant terms of social description on ships and overshadow the social ranking 
of jamats described in Chapter 4.
5.21. Assistants
Lowest in rank is thepetoriya (labourer’s assistant, tea boy, or general assistant). 
Each shipyard has one or two petoriya responsible for maintaining a fire, serving 
bitter black tea every few hours and running errands. Onboard ship they assist the 
cook.
5.22. Labourers -  sailors
The khalaasi (labourers and sailors) are responsible for the hard manual labour in 
shipyards. They form more than half the workforce. They are the group on which 
most of this chapter focuses because some of them will eventually crew the ship they 
are building15. They lift, drag and stack wood before it is needed for a particular part 
of the ship, and become expert in moving raw materials with pulleys, ropes and 
scaffolding. They also learn how to bend and manipulate materials with heat and 
force, and how to secure materials through the processes of drilling, bolting and 
caulking. The initial years of such labour, the start of a potentially long relationship 
with the ship, are spent learning elementary principles of construction. Apprentices 
take this work because they expect eventually to become crew. In order for this to 
happen they learn the ship’s constituent parts and stages of construction and begin to 
appreciate the overall integrity of the vessel. In addition to which they have to grasp 
and respect the channels of authority that operate around a ship. Being obedient, 
deferential and affable are qualities that seths value when recruiting sailors, because 
work on ships is characterised by co-operation and interdependence. A successful 
crew is one that works within the rigid command structure to which they are initially 
exposed in shipyard apprenticeship.
15 The word khalaasi is reported to come from the tradition of paying sailors in grain and a lump sum 
known as ‘khalds’ for the season’s work (G.B.P. Vol. VHI.:232). Thus the one paid ‘khalas’ is known 
as khalaasi.
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A successful apprenticeship is eventually ascribed in the form of a government 
issued identity card that allows men to legally go to sea. It affords fewer privileges 
than a passport, but is easier to obtain. To procure a card involves a tangle with 
bureaucracy, application and discretional payments, and obtaining entry into the port 
offices, which are restricted areas. These offices, the required literacy and necessary 
social influence, are outside the social orbit of most sailors. The ship owners mystify 
the process, the effect of which is to further bond sailors to their own interests. Seths 
are the sole decision-makers when it comes to employing crew, and are the only 
source of ‘identity cards’, power that allows them to keep unusually productive 
workers in their shipyards rather than sending them off to sea. The seth plays short­
term gain off against long-term loss. If the apprentice feels that he is not being given 
the rewards to which he aspires, or there is a hint of transparency in the promises of 
the ship’s owner, then the apprentice can leave for work in another yard and another 
set of promises, or join the crew of another seth. Such an outcome is not in the 
interests of a seth because employment is based on trust and proven responsibility 
grounded in shipyard apprenticeship. If a labourer then leaves, the seth loses his 
investment of time and energy spent in cultivating a fitting sailor and will have to 
start afresh with another recruit. The result is a balancing game between the 
immediate returns of labour and potential long-term relations developing between a 
seth and a member of the crew on one of his ships. The seth is training men who can 
easily leave his employment to work in other yards. This is possible because there is 
a general shortage of suitable labour, but apprentices know that it is possibly in their 
own ‘self-interest’ to keep working for the same seth until an identity card is 
produced. The awe that this piece of government bureaucracy generates amongst a 
group of predominantly illiterate men also binds them to their labour. Obtaining an 
identity card is having proved suitable for the job and to be trustworthy in the eyes of 
a seth.
Once reciprocal relations have been established between an individual and a seth, 
this paves the way for more of the labourer’s kin to work for the same seth. Older
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men from a certain lineage or jamat police the younger ones to make sure that they 
too work in the interests of the seth. However, the kin relations that are found 
amongst the labourers are of secondary importance to the hierarchy that is 
engendered within the shipyards. The labourers also find that despite the occasional 
brutality of senior men the hierarchy also acts paternally towards them, advancing 
money ahead of payday, making gifts towards wedding expenses, and using their 
influence to intervene in local disputes affecting the labourer. The seth literally 
becomes a patron of the khalaasi. His demands structure time, economy, 
consumption patterns and expectations of the families of their crew. Although the 
hours that labourers work are limited in shipyards, when working as crew, hours are 
unrestricted and dictated by tides, contracts and seasons. Sailors are away from home 
for around nine months of the year, literally giving most of their time to the seth and 
ship. The household economies of sailors are dependent on the seth and often a 
sailor’s wages will be paid directly into his household and not to the individual -  this 
also takes the form of bonds paid to the apprentice’s father in return for labour; and 
advances for house improvement, business ventures and rites of passage. Such 
advances commonly take the form of loans, but sometimes they are given without 
expectation of return. The sum of a sailor’s wage, including his own small scale 
personal trading, will support many people. Those households with two or more men 
working for the same seth are usually entirely dependent on him for their income; 
non-sailing siblings frequently do not work locally for low wages, relying instead on 
the sailor’s income.
While it is not unknown for sailors to be in the employ of a particular seth for 
their entire working life, most men eventually jump ship and find work either in the 
Gulf or on international ships. Employment by a seth and being granted an identity 
card is the first rung on a potentially fruitful journey to employment overseas and 
wages in dollars. While many labourers are Bhadala a greater number come from 
other jamats. However, the majority of the navigators, captains and owners are 
Bhadala. As ships are being built, the vertical division of labour is between 
carpenters (suthar) and labours (mahjor). The result is two parallel hierarchies
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respectively overseen by the master-craftsman (gaidor or mistri) and the foreman 
(,sarang). The carpenters are predominantly Hindu migrant labourers from Andhra 
Pradesh, while the labourers are all Kachchhi Sunni Muslims. It is the hierarchy of 
labourers that is the most important in the long-term production of technology as 
they form future crews.
5.23. Andhra Pradeshis
There are around 200 Andhra Pradeshis recruited through labour agents, working for 
continuous periods of around six months in Mandvi’s shipyards. Some of them are 
provided with basic accommodation and food, others work, sleep and eat in the 
shipyards. There is little interaction between the labourers and the Andhra Pradeshis 
either in or out of the workplace, and they seldom work together on the same section 
of the ship. In effect, in most yards, there are two working hierarchies separated by 
language and labour specialisation. Some migrants who have done many seasons of 
carpentry speak some Kachchhi and are conversant with the language of ships and 
shipbuilding. However, the majority of the interaction between carpenters and 
labourers is in stilted Hindi. Further, the Andhra Pradeshis do not work with the 
expectation that they will one day go to sea as sailors and are not employed as 
sailors.
Carpenters are paid more than labourers because their work is skilled and 
specialised. However, the labourers dismiss them as ‘black monkeys’ or as 
‘Telugus’. The labourers express an inherent superiority towards them because the 
Andhra Pradeshis are Hindu, speak a strange (‘monkey’) language, supposedly have 
darker skin, live in all-male households and eat strange food. It is rumoured that 
Telugus come from a coastal town where they prostitute their daughters from home, 
displaying them on balconies at dusk for the perusal of visiting sailor clients. Once 
the client has made his selection and a price has been set he is invited into the house 
and treated like a son-in-law for the night. Around forty Bhadala men work for 
international tanker companies, and some claim to have called in at this port and to
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have enjoyed its women and whiskey. Kachchhi labourers make frequent reference 
to the supposed immorality of their Telugu colleagues and take particular pleasure in 
suggesting that Bhadala sailors are clients of the Telugus’ sisters. The Kachchhis 
thus claim moral superiority over their Telugu work-fellows, who are regarded as 
immoral, low status and as ‘black’ Hindus, who pimp their own daughters and 
sisters.
The Telugus are a small group of Hindus working in a Sunni environment, the 
only Hindus to do so. They are expressly forbidden to post images or build shrines 
within the workplace, and the only sign that there are Hindus working in shipyards 
are small trishuls (tridents) painted around the doorways of their huts. Although 
Hindu, they are not part of the wider Hindu community of Mandvi, and are 
considered low-rank outsiders, who are further ridiculed because of their strange 
customs and the rumours that surround their lives in Andhra Pradesh. They hold an 
ambiguous position within local society because they work for Muslims, and 
Muslims can publicly denigrate them without fear of reprisal from other Hindus.
5.24. Foremen
The sarang (foreman) manages the labourers, mediating between them and those 
more senior. Sarangs motivate, discipline and negotiate conflicts among khalaasis. 
Typically the sarang is experienced in shipyards and has some seasons of sailing 
experience. The sarang is always well known and trusted by the seth. He is also 
responsible for the elementary informal instruction of apprentices in ship design and 
the technologies of production.
5.25. Captains and navigators
The highest ranks at sea are nakhuvas (captains) and malams (navigators). Both are 
recruited to a particular vessel long before it is afloat. The Kachchh traditions of 
navigation are famous and elaborate (see Bumes 1836:25-26), however, in the age of
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the global positioning satellites, a knowledge of the stars and use of a sexton and 
compass and has become somewhat obsolete. Navigators command respect and, 
although they labour with the crew in port, have more connection with the captain 
and the prestigious domain of the cabin than they do with the crews and the decking. 
This position requires that the man be literate in order to complete the logbook and 
port bureaucracy.
On some smaller ships the position of navigator has been merged with that of the 
captain, but most ships still put to sea with a specialised navigator onboard.
However, there are further considerations other than the size of the ship in the 
division of elite labour. Import and export procedures require literacy, and when a 
ship is in a port where the firm has offices a literate man need not be on the ship 
because representatives of the seth conduct the paperwork. When a cargo demands 
that a ship visit ports where no literate representatives of the firm are present the 
work has to be undertaken by someone on the ship. Most commonly this falls to the 
navigator of the vessel, and the most common arrangement is that captains are the 
sons of seths and navigators are drawn from ataks within the Bhadala Jamat that do 
not own ships. Again, as in Chapter 4, this situation illustrates a further instance 
where education is ultimately subordinate to the control of the prestigious ship 
capital.
Captain and navigator adopt supervisory roles in shipyards, intimating something 
of the nature of the relationship between them and the ship. They participate in its 
construction and get to know the materials and order of its construction. The captain 
will accompany the ship owners to negotiate for the price of wood and manage the 
labour force, and seths and captains are frequently consanguines, affines or both. For 
a new ship the captain will participate in various stages of its construction, using his 
experience of previous work in shipyards and at sea to assist in the overall design. 
Whether consanguine or affine to a seth, the captain knows from an early age that 
one day he will be master of a ship. If he is working on another of the seth's ships
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when a new keel is ritually laid, he is called ashore to supervise the ship’s 
construction.
The hierarchy among the crew is broadly structured by age, captaincy is 
predominantly only held by Bhadala men, and the remaining stations are sharply 
differentiated by income (see Figure. 5.1.).
Figure. 5.1. Minimum incomes on land and at sea.
Rank Monthly amount in Rupees
Land Sea
petoriya 390 500
khalaasi 1040-1560 2000*
sarang 2080-3000 3000-3500
malam 3000 4000
nakhuva 4000 5000
* This amount is the industry standard as given in the 
statutes of the Kachchhi Shipping Association.
This hierarchy is inflexible. As the ship is built so are the channels of 
communication and patterns of power and subordination among the future crew.
5.3. Shipbuilding
The kind of question asked frames the kind of response given. When I asked, out of 
context, men who worked in shipyards what they did in them they would reply with 
their rank as khalaasi or sarang. These labels hover between descriptive adjectives 
and nouns, connoting the kinds of work that men do in shipyards. A more accurate 
picture of what a labourer does can be gained by assessing his age and by asking how 
long he has worked in a shipyard. Generally, the longer he has worked and the older 
he is the more responsible tasks he will perform. When I asked men how to build a 
ship they would provide a technical description of how the parts of the ship were 
sized, shaped and assembled. The account provided below is a bricolage of the 
descriptions provided by informants.
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The following process takes on average two years. To build a ship that will carry 
450 tonnes of cargo, the keel (the part of a ship that extends from stem to stem) is 
made from three pieces of straight-grained hardwood with a square cross-section of 
about 45cm. The sections are joined by hooked scarfs (joints between pieces placed 
end to end that are cut to overlap) and through-bolted to form a keel of around 20m. 
The ship is built around the keel; the length and dimensions of which determine the 
size and proportions of the rest of the vessel. The stem (the timber that forms the 
prow of a ship) and stempost (the timber that forms the hind part of a ship) are the 
same kinds of wood and are of similar length -  around half the length of the keel. 
They are stepped into the keel and are bolted into place; the internal angles formed 
with the horizontal are 90° and around 120° respectively. The top two edges of the 
keel and the inner edges of the stem and stem are bevelled to form a groove into 
which the frames sit on the keel, and the planks fit into on the stem and the stem. The 
garboard planks (in this case the first four or five sharply twisted planks next to the 
keel), between the horizontal keel and vertical stem and stem, are nailed into place 
and are bracketed together across the breadth of the keel. Planking timber is around 
5cm thick and 25cm broad, however narrower sections are used for the first planks.
A mortise (a square hole) is cut for each pair of frames (ribs) at intervals of 35cm, or 
less, along the length of the keel. From the keel to the gunwales (the upper edge of a 
ship’s sides) frames are made of three or more scarfed and bolted sections with the 
butts staggered to avoid creating a weak spot in the hull.
The lower sections of frames are made from heavy gnarl and crook timbers, the 
natural shapes of which are honed to form the curve at the turn of the bilge (the 
lowest internal part of a ship’s hull) and the initial curve from the keel. Starting at the 
stem the frames are fitted in pairs angled close to vertical from the keel. They fan out 
to almost horizontal angles from the keel in the middle sections of the ship before 
inclining steeply again towards the stem. The ends are cut to tenons (a projection at 
the end of a piece of wood) and a tongue (a ridge of wood that fits into a groove in 
another piece of wood) is carved to project from the raw face of the rib to correspond
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to the groove on the keel. The angles and dimensions of the mortised timbers vary -  
the angles and dimensions of the joints do not -  all are around 7cm and are square 
with the keel timber. Around half of the fifty-five pairs of bilge frames are fitted into 
the topside of the keel timbers before any further planking starts.
As construction progresses up the flanks, frames and planking are done together 
with only a few frames initially fitted as a guide to the overall height and sheer of the 
hull. One section in the centre of the ship, at turn of the bilge, is not planked or 
framed so as to provide easy access to the inside -  it is filled when all the heavy 
timbers are in place. Holes of 2cm diameter are cut through the frames close to their 
base on either side of the keel for drainage. As more frames are added the space 
between them shrinks to only a few centimetres, so at this point frames are predrilled 
before they are fitted. A further drainage hole is cut into the stem planking, which 
allows water to drain out of the bilge while the ship is being built and later when it is 
in dry dock. This hole is plugged before the ship is launched. Two heavy beams 
(around 45cm by 30cm) that run two thirds of the length of the ship from the stem 
are notched into the frames as engine mounts to distribute the weight of the engine 
over the length of the ship. Heavy brackets are bolted into the internal angles 
between the keel, stem and stem post and a hole for the propeller shaft is drilled 
through the stempost. Further horizontal brackets are bolted into place between the 
stempost and the nearest two pairs of frames. Once the bilge frames are in place they 
are roughly planked. Much of the planking is fitted before the later frames are cut. A 
set of handheld portable moulds is used to get the curves of the hull symmetrical and 
consistent. Chalk and plumb lines are used to mark where wood is to be cut.
Unseasoned planks are cut from the log as needed and bent and twisted into shape 
by oiling and heating over small fires and by sustained pressure from a system of 
clamps and ropes embedded in the riverbank. Each plank is joined to the next with a 
tapered scarf with square ends, which extends over the equivalent of three frames. 
The planking is roughly trimmed and temporarily fastened with a nail driven through 
a small wooden block for easy removal. A gap of less than a plank’s width before
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and after the turn of the bilge is left for the shrinking and subsequent repositioning of 
the planks. Once this point is reached, some upper frames are fixed and left to 
protrude at random lengths above the bulwarks (the side of a ship projecting above 
the deck). Further frames are added as the planking progresses. Stringers (an interior 
horizontal plank supporting the beam ends of a ship) are laid all the way from the 
keel up to the deck level and further strengthening timbers and transoms (cross­
beams) are positioned half-way up the flanks of the hull to allow for secondary 
decking to be added or removed once the ship is complete.
The system of temporary fastenings is used to allow for plank shrinkage as the 
unseasoned timbers dry during construction. By the time the planking is complete, 
the lower planks have dried out and are unfastened one by one and eased down 
towards the garboard. A seasoned plank is then inserted in the now enlarged space 
left before the turn of the bilge. Any irregularities in the hull planking are removed 
and other pieces of timber are scarfed in to fit the remaining space. The topside 
section of planking is unfastened and moved down so that all the planking fits 
snugly. To prevent the wood splitting, the nail-holes are predrilled. The nails 
themselves are caulked (seams and gaps rendered watertight), with a length of raw 
caulking cotton wound around the head before they are countersunk into the wood.
Heavy deck beams are run the breadth of the ship, notched to hook over the larger 
stringers. Lighter beams are positioned to form three hatch coamings (raised 
framework around the hatch). Hatch cover planks sit directly in the hatch coamings; 
a diagonal pattern is painted over them so each always plank sits in the same place. 
When they are removed the pattern is reproduced when the hatch planks are re-laid 
in the correct order. This ensures that the holds remain watertight.
The main deck planks are cut to follow the line of the ship and are laid 
lengthways. The bilges are only roughly planked. A heavy step is built for the mast, 
which when stepped is raked slightly to the fore. A square section is cut out of the 
top of the mast into which a block is fitted. The boom runs the length of the main
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deck and is tied to the mast and the sails tied beneath it. The hull and decks are 
caulked twice with lengths of cotton soaked in vegetable oil. Fish oil is applied to the 
topsides and insides to preserve and seal the wood. Seams and nail heads are sealed 
and a mixture of mutton fat and lime is smeared over the hull following the line of 
sheer rather than the waterline. The fo’c’sle deck (short raised deck at the front of a 
ship) is built between the elevation of the main deck and the cap rail and is linked to 
the main deck by steps either on the port or starboard side of the ship. Beneath it 
storage areas are built with access from the main deck and foundations for a capstan 
are bolted into the decking. The capstan (a form of winding gear) sits in the centre of 
the fo’c’sle deck. Two mounting boards are run down the length of the stem to which 
the mdder is hinged. The frame ends are sawn off and a cap rail and bulwarks are 
built around the main deck. Huge strakes, or wales (lines of protective planking 
running the length of the hull), are fitted at deck level and at the cap rail. The poop 
deck (the high deck at the stem) is built above the level of the cap rail and is linked 
to the main deck with staircases on both sides of the ship. Carved balusters are 
placed around the embellished wheelhouse and two box toilets are roped to the stem. 
Drainage holes are cut around the deck. This is as far as shipbuilding goes in Mandvi 
because once they reach this stage they are floated and fitted in Dubai.
For posterity, that is how ships were built in Mandvi’s shipyards at the end of the 
twentieth century. This is a standard and quite detailed description by the yardstick 
of informants’ descriptions of how to build a standard and quite detailed ship. But 
what do descriptions such as this one this tell us about how to build a ship? In this 
respect there are two striking observations to be made. First, there are no men 
performing the tasks and the description does not remotely reflect an individual’s 
experience of constructing a ship. Secondly it is impossible that a ship would get 
built if you merely followed the instructions given above, because there is so much 
missing from, or at best implicit in, the description. In other words, a ship is a 
product of more than the assemblage of its constituent parts; it is through the actual 
processes involved in shipbuilding that knowledge and skill are acquired. Missing 
from the description is labour and skill, both of which are denigrated by apprentices
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as ‘easy knowledge’. The following sections attempt to place men within this 
abstract description by looking at what they do while building a ship
5.4. Non-linguistic practices
Much knowledge of shipbuilding is non-linguistic, only under certain circumstances 
can this non-linguistic knowledge be rendered into language and in doing so 
becomes an explicit form of discourse, but changes its character in the process (as in 
Bloch 1991:186). There is no doubt that apprentices have a pretty clear idea of what 
they are building because representations of ships are common in the homes of all 
those who work in the yards, completed ships lie at anchor in the river and both 
riverbanks are strewn with prototypical ships in various stages of completion. 
Shipyard workers can see what it is that they are building, a fact that is reflected in 
chalk sketches made on hull timbers during idle periods in the yards.
A great deal has been written in recent years about the skill and complexity of 
learning in apprenticeship (Bloch 1991; Hutchins 1993; Keller and Keller 1993; Lave 
1984,1988a, 1988b, 1993; and Lave and Wenger 1991). These studies attempt to 
show that great feats of computational imagination and ingenuity exist outside the 
privileged sphere of formal education. Practice theory focuses on everyday activity 
and its constitution in relations between social system and individual experience 
(Lave 1988b: 14-15). Knowledge-in-practice escapes the ritual either/or choice 
between objectivism and subjectivism by investigating the mode of production and 
the functioning of practical mastery, which makes possible both an objectively 
intelligible practice and also an objectively enchanted experience of that practice 
(Bourdieu 1977:4). Implied in this aim is a unifying approach to the relationship 
between ‘mind’ and ‘body’. At a first glance shipbuilding would seem to be a first 
class example of this kind of knowledge and process. Ocean going ships of 
considerable weight are built from thousands of constituent pieces without the use of 
plans, technical drawings or sophisticated machinery. Men learn the sequencing, 
proportioning and techniques of shipbuilding over many years of non-formal
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instruction. The magnitude and scale of the ships is impressive. Wooden ships are 
built accurately and with sufficient strength that they can be fitted out with powerful 
marine diesel engines. Apprentices are drawn into the workforce and learn, through 
‘participant observation’, the techniques of shipbuilding. However, the work 
environment oscillates between brutality and joviality. The unpredictability of the 
atmosphere, dictated largely by the moods of those in charge, adds to the precarious 
position of the apprentice. What is known and is familiar can rapidly become over­
turned, subverted and dangerous.
The remaining sections of this chapter are written from the perspective of 
practices in shipyards. The conclusions drawn are that the ‘work of the mind’ is 
superior, and more sophisticated, than the ‘work of the body’. This reflects the broad 
distinction made in previous chapters between merchants and sailors. All men in 
shipyards have working minds and working bodies, but they describe the two in a 
hierarchical relationship where work associated with the mind is more prestigious, 
evidently more lucrative and conducted from the shade of a terrace, rather than under 
a hot sun. The nobility of labour comes a poor second to mercantile capitalism, a 
reflection of the bodily constitution of nafs and aql and the social division between 
merchants and sailors.
The following section of this chapter presents the apprentice’s experience of 
shipbuilding and points to some bodily nuances involved in the many tasks they are 
expected to perform. The majority of work in shipyards is routine, repetitive and 
quite frankly somewhat tedious. For apprentices, building a ship is to learn many 
skills for the first time and then releam them -  to the point of habitude -  through 
repetition. The differences between novices and men with expertise place them in 
hierarchical relationships. Those with more experience and skill in the techniques of 
shipbuilding are accorded more prestige than the novices. However, those who are 
seen to be able to do the ‘work of the mind’ ultimately overshadow all grades of 
manual labour, however skilled they are. The privileged ‘work of the mind’ over the 
‘work of the body’ is a further way in which hierarchical relations are legitimised
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and understood. The ‘work of the mind’ is not conceived of in terms of education, 
although an increasing number of ship owners do have university degrees, but is 
valorised by accountancy, bookkeeping, business strategy and calculation. When 
practised efficiently, these skills bring wealth and an ability to consume and 
patronise prestige.
5.5. Life in the sun: the khalaasi
The technical description opening this chapter conveys three kinds of information 
each based on an assumption about the task of building a ship: management, 
replication and sequencing. Through a comparison with labour in shipyards, each of 
these issues is addressed below.
Sukhet had worked in a shipyard for two months before work was abandoned 
because the ship owner could not raise any further capital. The hull of the ship was 
sold to another ship owner who did not re-employ Sukhet once work resumed. 
Sukhet had heard that a Thaim was planning to start work on a ship called the Al 
Ibrahim, and his older brother, who had previously worked for the Thaim, went to 
his yard and asked him to employ Sukhet. He agreed, and one month later when 
Sukhet crossed the river, from Mandvi to Salaya, the keel and the garboard planks 
were in place and a team of twenty Kachchhi men and nine Andhra Pradeshi 
carpenters had already been assembled.
Descriptions that focus on the assembly of materials neglect the role of human 
activity. It is men who build ships, not abstract narrators who transcend the division 
of labour. The organisation of space and time and the very human activity of social 
relationships are necessary to construct a ship. Men involved in building a ship enter 
into a sophisticated series of inter-related tasks and relationships. The technical 
version given above is not one of human experience -  it is one of informants’ 
abstractions filtered through my writing. No man working in a shipyard has this kind 
of experience while building a ship. For different men building a ship means and
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involves different things. The level of planning and foresight of men at different 
levels of the hierarchy varies, as does the intensity of labour, the degree of physical 
exertion and the way in which the overall representation of the finished ship is 
conceived. Below the example of Sukhet’s labour is taken.
For Sukhet, and the many like him, building a ship involves a range of skills, 
tasks and organisational strategies under the instruction and authority of men above 
him in the hierarchy. At first he was told what, when and how to do things, and he 
was given little responsibility or autonomy. Instructions were given to him primarily 
from more experienced labourers who had been instructed primarily by the 
labourer’s foreman and to a lesser extent the craftsman, captain and ship owner to 
carry out a particular task. This did not exclude the possibility that he would be asked 
directly by anyone ranking above him to do something. As the construction of the 
ship progressed so did Sukhet’s ability to predict what, when and how things should 
be done. When instructions were given to him they became increasingly less specific 
and only implicitly incorporated the what, when and how of the task.
5.51. Moving materials
In the first months that Sukhet worked in the yard he moved materials. He removed 
wood from waist high handcarts and placed it on the ground. Later he lifted the same 
wood and moved it the fifty metres from the road-head into the yard, in the process 
negotiating the tight comer formed by the rear of the yard’s supply shed. He stacked 
wood into different piles depending on the type, destination and the time that it 
would be required. He lifted wood into the hull through the hole left in its flank. He 
hoisted wood into position inside the ship while the shape was marked out by the 
foreman with chalk. He also held wood in place while joints were secured with bolts.
Lifting and moving wood is heavy work that requires organisation, technique and 
skill. Bmte strength is not enough. The handcart drivers that bring the wood from 
Mandvi over the river into Salaya are experts in handling wood, some of them have
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missing fingers or toes attesting to the fact they have painfully learned how to do so. 
The skill is to let the wood do as much of the work as is possible. Handcart drivers 
get angry if their carts are not unloaded with due care. A handcart is a wooden 
platform around 2m by lm, with slightly raised edges, which is supported by a 
simple iron framework and four reinforced bicycle wheels. They are designed to 
carry loads that weigh vertically down onto them. If the wood is not removed from 
the cart correctly it can tip and the cart’s frame and wheels will bend. Angry handcart 
drivers encourage correct lifting. The techniques of lifting and moving wood vary for 
different sizes, shapes and weights. Below, the bodily techniques are described of the 
men who move a cross-member from a handcart, carry it through the yard and into 
the ship. Moving heavy objects through confined space requires an understanding of 
space, movements of the other men, destination and practices that make the task 
easier.
A cross-member is a structural element of a ship that is hoisted into place once the 
main hull of a ship has been roughly completed. It supports the decking and cross­
ties the two flanks of the hull, it is around 7m by 45cm by 30cm and is very heavy. 
When it arrives on the handcart, as many labourers as are available are sent, or go, 
from the yard to collect it. They position two large pieces of wood on the ground 
around lm  from either end of the cross-member. They stand either side of the 1.5m 
that overhangs the ends of the handcart and grip the underside of it with their fingers. 
On the instruction of either the handcart owner or an experienced labourer it is lifted 
a little way off the surface of the handcart. On the next instruction it is moved over to 
the edge of the handcart, half the lifters shuffling backwards, the other half forwards. 
On the final instruction the cross-member, is allowed to fall but supported by the 
hands of the labourers onto the blocks on the ground. Experienced lifters make this 
look very simple. Fingers are used rather than palms because as the wood falls palms 
are bent by the action of the falling wood onto the flank of the cross-member which 
gives it stability and reduces the risk of it rolling from the supporting blocks. For the 
cross-member to fall evenly and not get damaged the pressure exerted by the lifters 
against its fall has to be equal. The co-ordination and homogeneity of the movement
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is something that men learn through the repetition of the task: it becomes ‘easy 
work’. The blocks positioned on the ground not only remove the possibility of 
damaged digits, they also mean that it is easier to lift the timber again as there is still 
space underneath it to grip. The cross-member is then turned on its narrower face 
because this is the only way that it will fit around the comer behind the yard’s hut. 
Because the yard is difficult to access by road, during high tides such timbers are 
strapped to old oil drums and floated across the river into the yard. When there are no 
tides and the timbers are urgently required they are brought by handcart.
In order to lift the cross-member the labourers drive heavy nails into its sides and 
position battens underneath it. One man stands at each end of the timber and the 
others in pairs along each side. The handcart driver leaves and a labourer assumes 
charge of the commands and the direction of the timber’s travel. Two further 
labourers are responsible for moving the supporting batten further along the path 
once the timber is lifted. On the command to lift the labourers shout in unison 
‘lombi!’ (equivalent of ‘heave!’) and lift the timber to slightly below waist height. 
Curses and exclamations fill the air. On the next command they shuffle forward 
towards the repositioned battens. They repeat this process five times until they reach 
the tight bend between the yard’s hut and the wall of a house. Here there is not 
adequate room for the timber to be lifted by men standing either side of it. Once they 
have carried the log as far as they can, they position it on the battens and shuffle it 
around the comer. This requires that the leading labourer makes it known to less 
experienced labourers how far and in what direction they are lifting. To experienced 
labourers there is no need to give explicit verbal instruction because they know that it 
takes eight or nine shuffles and small lifts of equal duration in order for them to get 
round the comer.
Once around the comer the path turns downhill and they repeat the process of 
lifting the timber and repositioning the battens until they reach the yard. On the 
journey down they have to be careful that the cross-member does not slide forward 
off the battens. There are as many as twenty pieces of timber of this size used to
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make a ship, and many more that are slightly smaller. This is a process that they 
repeat many times. Once in the yard, if  the timber is not going to be stacked, it has to 
be moved through the access hole left in the hull of the ship. This hole is at about 
chest height and too high for the timber to be lifted into because there is not enough 
space at the end of the cross-member to allow enough labourers to get a grip. The 
timber is placed on battens perpendicular to the access hole. Typically, the foreman 
will take charge of moving the timber now because of the risk of damage to the 
flanks of the ship around the entrance hole. A geared pulley is set up on the 
superstructure of the ship just above the access hole. The pulley’s chain dangles 
down through the hole and is wrapped around the end of the cross-member to 
prevent it slipping. A plank is placed on the ground under the other end of the cross­
member to prevent it from sinking into the mud and getting dirty. Two labourers 
heave on the chains of the pulley and others steady the timber. They hoist the end of 
the timber until it is pointing into the ship and above the bottom of the access hole. 
For this to happen the cross-member had to begin its journey from the ground at just 
the right distance from the ship. Had it been too close it would have hit the bilge 
planking; if it had been too distant it would have hit the planking of the flank above 
the access hole.
Two further labourers then position a heavy piece of timber across the lower lip 
of the access hole; this timber takes the weight of the cross-member and prevents any 
of the planking being damaged. Other labourers are called outside the ship to push 
the cross-member into the hole. But because the pulley chain is holding the cross­
member tightly in place to simply push would be to push against the pulley and the 
superstructure of the ship. In a moment of tight co-ordination and control the 
foreman instructs the labourers gathered outside the ship to push the cross-member 
as the pulley operators release its chain, one link at a time, until the cross-member is 
resting on the timber at the lip of the access hole. The pulley chain is removed from 
around the cross-member. A further geared pulley is then strung up from the opposite 
side of the inside of the hull, but some metres away from being directly opposite the 
access hole. The pulley chain is brought across the ship and nailed around the end of
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the cross-member that is poking into the ship. Heavy nails give the labourers 
something to push against, which if they have not already been hammered into the 
cross-member are at this stage too. The second pulley drags the cross-member into 
the ship while the labourers simultaneously push. It slides in, one end resting on the 
protective timber at the lip of the access hole, the other suspended in mid-air. At the 
instruction of the foreman the pulley chain is slowly released until the cross-member 
comes to rest against the frames of the bilge, which now serve as battens. The cross­
member is now in the ship, but still has to be hoisted into a space as wide as the 
cross-member is long. Lifting the timber to such a height involves a further set of 
techniques and practices.
From this description it is clear that there is more to moving timber from 
handcarts to ships than simply carrying it down the hill. The process involves co­
ordination of techniques that make the process easier and prevent damage to the 
timber, the ship or to the men moving the material. Sukhet spent the first few months 
of his time building the Al Ibrahim, experiencing such techniques.
5.52. Scaffolding
The ship that was built at the beginning of this chapter was built without scaffolding. 
This is an impossible feat. The abstract ship was also built on the assumption that 
some processes are identical and replicable and need only to be described once. This 
applies to the construction of a ship as a whole, in the sense that other ships have 
been built like this in the past so the pattern can be repeated. It also applies to 
procedures at a specific level. For example, fitting a frame’s tenon into a mortise on 
the keel is a process described once rather the 110 times that this actually happens. In 
fact, each time this procedure is carried out it is done differently, under different 
circumstances. The task is never physically or technically the same. The angles from 
which the frames leave the keel differ and have to be aligned with different sets of 
templates depending on their position within the hull. The performance of the task is 
influenced by: the quality and ease of shaping the wood, which varies with its grain
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and age; the tightness of the space available to work in; and the sharpness and quality 
of the marking out and of the cutting implement. For those performing the task the 
environment in which it occurs is never the same. The quality of light, the 
temperature of the air, the temperament of colleagues and the amount of time 
available for the completion of the task make it a different process for those involved 
every time this procedure is undertaken. It is also possible that a particular procedure 
is abandoned due to the irregularities in the wood or the tenon was over-zealously cut 
or a knothole appeared in the frame at the point of contact with a garboard plank. 
Likewise, a fight could have broken out while the measurements were being taken. 
Extend these example variables to all the other tens of thousands of procedures 
involved in building a ship and the process ceases to be one of mechanical 
replication. The performance of the task becomes, with experience, a matter of 
contextual improvisation within a framework of the similar but different tasks that 
have been completed.
Each task within a ship varies, as does each ship. Ships develop ascribed 
characters, personalities and temperaments as they are being assembled. An 
asymmetrical hull, round fat stems or straight sleek flanks all give ships a different 
feel. No two ships are the same. Ships float differently, handle differently in varying 
conditions at sea, and age and warp differently. Building a ship is also an interaction 
with materials and environmental conditions. To say that there is a mechanical 
replication of tasks, which the opening description implies, is to simplify and to 
ignore these kinds of interactions.
Scaffolding rises with the sides of a ship. The first scaffolding is erected to 
support the stem and the stempost. This scaffolding determines the height and 
orientation of the remaining scaffolding, and was in place before Sukhet started his 
work in the yard. After a few months Sukhet was told to assist a more experienced 
labourer in repositioning and extending a section of scaffolding that ran around the 
outside of the ship. Scaffolding is not permanent because the walkways have to be 
constantly adjusted as different layers of planking are measured, positioned, nailed,
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and then removed and repositioned. Scaffolding is made from wood that is variously 
splintered, cracked, old or warped, and it is secured with rope. There is no 
homogeneity in the materials, yet there has to be homogeneity in the result; platforms 
have to be level and stable. Falling from scaffolding is the most common form of 
serious injury in shipyards so it has to be secure. The uprights are positioned around 
a metre from the hull, which allows space for men to work and for drills and saws to 
be used without impediment. Cross-members are tied to the uprights and rest in gaps 
in the hull of the ship, or are wedged in place by a further support from the ground or 
a lower platform. Planks further support these wedges on the ground, preventing 
them from sinking into the mud. The gaps in the hull are irregular and have to be 
worked around because they offer the securest method of fastening the cross­
member. This requires a great deal of skill and improvisations because both the 
materials and the spaces they must traverse are irregular.
Making good scaffolding is a complex task. It requires an appreciation of the 
space that has to be scaffolded, and an anticipation of how work on the ship will 
progress and the amount of room that men will need to work on the outside of the 
hull. It also involves a grasp of the strength and tolerance of the materials. For 
example, scaffolding is stronger and more secure if a plank used for a cross-member 
is positioned vertically rather than horizontally. Scaffolding requires a sense of time 
and foresight. Experienced scaffolders can assess the rate of work on planking on the 
outside of the hull and predict at what level the platforms will be positioned for the 
next stage in the work. The positioning of platforms also requires that evaluations be 
made about the highest and lowest points on the hull a man can work on from a 
platform of a given height. This allows the platform to be aligned for the work that is 
to be undertaken next. The scaffolding is constantly shifting so rather than nailing a 
cross-member into an upright (a common beginner’s mistake) the nail will be placed 
below it to support the cross-member while allowing it to be removed easily. 
Securing cross-members to uprights also involves the use of knots and binding that 
can be undone easily but not accidentally if snagged. Scaffolding also requires a feel 
for the kinds of gaps to leave between levels to allow then to be easily traversed. A
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gap too great or small means that the scaffold is difficult to climb and movement 
around it is cumbersome and time consuming.
Knowledge of gaps, spaces and reach comes from the experience of climbing 
around on scaffolding. It does not come from measuring the average span and reach 
of the arms and legs of men who work in the yard nor can it come from formal 
instruction. It is one thing to be told to position the rungs of a ladder 45cm apart 
when the rungs are regular and fit between two parallel rails, but producing even 
scaffolding from random materials in random spaces that curve with the line of the 
ship requires a feel for materials, and for what it is like to move on such scaffolding.
5.53. Planking and caulking
The longer men work in shipyards the more responsibility they are given. A year or 
so into the construction of the Al Ibrahim, Sukhet was called upon to drill holes in 
planks to temporarily secure them to the frames. The foreman demonstrated to 
Sukhet how a work a drill, and also marked each hole that he wanted Sukhet to drill, 
making sure that they were positioned so that when the nail was inserted it would 
pass through the central point of both the plank and the frame. The drills used on the 
Al Ibrahim were hand-operated. The central shaft was 60cm long with a fixed bit at 
one end and a chest rest at the other. In the centre of the shaft is a wooden cylinder 
with a groove spiralling around its circumference. String is wrapped tightly into the 
grooves around the cylinder and the ends are tied to a bow. Moving the bow at right 
angles to the main shaft of the drill makes it rotate. The drill bit is screwed so that it 
cuts into timber when the bow is pushed from right to left and when the bow is 
moved from left to right sawdust is ejected from the hole.
To operate such a drill is not simple and the conditions in which it is used may 
add to the complexity of the task. The string has to be wrapped tightly around the 
cylinder or it will slip once the drill bit bites. Varying densities of wood require that 
varying amounts of pressure be applied to the chest plate. If the hole is below waist
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height then this pressure may be exerted by a leg or pelvis. The knack is to get the 
pressure on the plate adequate to cut into the wood but not so severe that the string 
slips around the central cylinder. Sukhet practised on waste wood before he started 
on the planking. Literally thousands of such holes have to be drilled and the work is 
painstaking and laborious. After two days the foreman no longer marked the holes 
for Sukhet, who was now able to drill through the plank and a few centimetres into 
the frame without supervision. He notched the bit with a chisel so he would know 
when he had reached the right depth and instructed those working on the scaffolding 
when and how the platforms would have to be positioned for the next section of the 
hull. Sometimes the plank would not sit firmly on the frame; the foreman showed 
him how to loop ropes around the both, insert a wooden batten into the centre of the 
loop and to rotate it, tightening the rope and pulling the plank against the frame so it 
can be drilled. A nail hammered into the frame holds the batten in place and prevents 
it from unwinding until after the hole has been drilled and nailed.
These descriptions do not exhaust the range of Sukhet’s tasks. He removed the 
temporary fastenings that held the planks in place and helped reposition them further 
down the hull, before finally caulking and countersinking a securing nail. He also 
worked for around a month with a caulking iron as a member of a team that filled the 
space between the planks on the hull with strands of raw cotton treated with lime. 
The skills and bodily techniques involved in these activities are as complicated and 
as subtle as they are for the other tasks that have been described.
5.54. Inter-changing tasks
When Sukhet first started to work in the yard he was given clear and constant 
instruction. If he was stacking wood and a handcart arrived he would be told to stop 
stacking wood and instead help unload the handcart then bring the wood on it down 
into the yard and place it in the pile of timber waiting to be stacked. Only then was 
he told to resume stacking. Gradually, such specific instruction desisted. If he had 
not seen that a handcart had arrived and its driver was irritated at waiting for
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someone to help him unload it; Sukhet would be told to go to the handcart driver. As 
he became accustomed to looking out for the arrival of the handcart driver he went 
without instruction to fetch the timber. The same kind of relationship also applies to 
other kinds of work, but the inter-change of task is not based on the premise that all 
tasks are equal because some have to be performed with more urgency than others. 
The example of the handcart shows that not keeping the handcart driver waiting is 
more important than stacking wood; stacking wood is a low priority task and can be 
performed at any time.
Sentential representation necessarily compresses non-linguistic activities into a 
linguistic form. The gap between this form of representation and actually conveying 
how to build a ship clearly highlights the gap between linguistic knowledge and the 
other forms of knowledge. The ‘what goes without saying’ (Bloch 1998) in a 
description of how to build a ship is what people who labour in shipyards call sahelu 
kam (easy work) or sahelu gnan (easy knowledge). This is a form of knowledge that 
they see no need to include in a description of how to build a ship. In shipyards such 
knowledge is communicated in many ways that sometimes includes linguistic 
instruction. ‘Easy knowledge’ includes qualities like skill, technique and experience 
as well as propriety with the forms of hierarchy and respect. Scaffolding, moving 
materials, drilling and nailing are all forms of ‘easy knowledge’, mastered by 
participation in the activity of shipbuilding through repetition, observation, practice 
and humiliation, framed within the hierarchy of the crew and idioms of respect and 
patronage. It is the ‘easy knowledge’ that is missing from the initial description 
above, and it is a lack of ‘easy knowledge’, which unless you are a marine architect 
or have experience of Indian shipbuilding techniques, stops you being able to build a 
ship by following the opening description.
Relations between different kinds of work can become complicated. Sukhet 
gradually learned how to evaluate the priority of a particular task. Priority is not 
simply distributed through different types of task. Stacking wood is of low priority; 
scaffolding is of higher priority (especially if work cannot progress on a certain part
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of the ship because the scaffolding is incorrectly positioned); planking work is of a 
medium priority; and holding and positioning frames is of high priority because of 
their structural importance to the integrity of the ship and the large amount of 
preparation work involved in getting them into place. Sukhet learned that priority is 
ultimately given by what other men are doing in the yard at the time he was 
performing a certain task. So that, if he was scaffolding and another man was 
stacking wood when a handcart arrived, he would not leave the scaffolding because 
scaffolding is a higher priority task. However, if the handcart arrived with a large 
timber, or with a timber that the craftsman needed in order for work to progress any 
further, then he would leave the scaffolding in order to go and assist moving it. These 
kinds of evaluations are made all the time in shipyards. Clearly hierarchy also plays a 
role in the way that priority is determined. The higher up the hierarchy then the less a 
man is expected, or expects, to have to go and receive the handcart driver. So if 
Sukhet was stacking wood with a more experienced labourer and the handcart driver 
arrived with a few small pieces of wood, Sukhet and his companion would know that 
it was Sukhet’s task to go and collect it. Broadly, a similar series of evaluations is 
also made by the foreman on behalf of the labourers, the less so the more 
experienced the labourer. In turn the craftsman makes similar evaluations for the 
foreman and so on.
What is the logic and positioning of the narrative voice in the description at the 
start of this chapter? This kind of description is an abstraction, a peculiar form of 
knowledge that says nothing of the actual bodily techniques involved in building a 
ship or of the ways in which a ship is built. It further assumes that there is space and 
time in which the ship can be built; that the materials and finance for them exist and 
are available; that the work will be undertaken and the skill is available to construct 
accurate and effective mortise and tenon joints; and that the knowledge of a timber’s 
grain, density and malleability is pre-existent and given.
If the work of labourers is ‘easy knowledge’ then what forms of work take 
precedence? The short answer to this question is ‘the work of the mind’, which in a
254
reduced form means business. Throughout the two or so years it takes to build a ship 
the owner will be around the yard inspecting the progress and quality of the work. He 
will pass the time sitting in the shade on the terrace of the yard’s shed conducting the 
‘work of the mind’. The ‘work of the body’, which shipbuilders describe as ‘easy 
knowledge’, is a matter of learning bodily techniques that allow them to solve 
problems and perform tasks. Bodies also physically change. Hands, feet and knees 
become hard and callused from contact with splinters, ropes, wood and tools. Skin 
darkens in the sun and muscles strengthen through repetitive heavy work. Men leam 
to move around ships, how to climb carrying heavy loads, and possible pathways 
from one section of the ship to another. Those selected to work as sailors once the 
ship is floated will have conducted a range of different tasks, giving them a broad 
understanding of how a ship is built and the relationships between the constituent 
sections of the vessel.
The context in which learning takes place determines what is learned (after Lave 
1988b). The environmental context is increasingly given by the emerging structure of 
the ship, while the social context is overwhelmingly hierarchical, Muslim and 
masculine. Apprenticeship is a means of imparting specialised knowledge to a new 
generation of practitioners (as in Coy 1989:xi-xxi), a process that transforms novices 
into men with expertise in the techniques, materials and sequences of shipbuilding 
through repetition of tasks, humiliation, instruction, observation, imitation and 
experience. Ships and sailors are the two products of shipyards. In the short-term, 
apprenticeship reproduces a workforce of sailors and in the long-term skilled 
shipbuilders. The apprentice does not have a single master from whom he learns the 
ropes, rather all of those who rank above him legitimately instruct him. The ‘easy 
knowledge’ that apprentices acquire does not exist independently from either the 
human hierarchy in the yard or the materials and design of the production process, 
but is structured around the logic of the production process. The low priority tasks 
and basic skills, such as handling wood, scaffolding and planking are learned first. 
Skills are cumulative and the basics of moving materials are mastered before more 
specific skills are attempted.
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‘Work of the body’ in shipyards is wage labour, which is sometimes violent, 
humiliating, sexually predatory and exploitative. The ‘work of the mind’ is 
opportunistic, calculating and derives profits. All relationships in the yard are 
hierarchical, and hierarchy is organised, in principle, by the amount of experience 
and ‘easy knowledge’ a man has of a ship. This is true among ‘sailors’ (labourers and 
sailors) but among the higher orders of the hierarchy different forms of knowledge 
take precedence. ‘Navigators knowledge’, ‘captains knowledge’, literacy and 
linguistic abilities are viewed by those who do not possess them as mysterious 
sources of power. In these intermediary positions the boundary between the ‘work of 
the mind’ and the ‘work of the body’ is blurred and somewhat ambiguous. Ship 
owners, as merchants, are the most elevated of men and are engaged in the ‘work of 
the mind’. This gradation treats bodily skills and techniques as a form of 
accumulative property that commands respect within a hierarchy, albeit with certain 
limits. The limits are given by ultimately subordinating ‘work of the body’ to ‘work 
of the mind’.
This division, between ‘mindly’ and ‘bodily’ forms of work, broadly dissects all 
those -  Hindu and Muslim -  who are, and have been, associated with the sea. 
However, in the past, vocation was ascribed by birth into a particular group. The 
Bhadala were the sailors who did the ‘work of the body’ for the high-ranking Shia 
mercantile jamats, and for many in Mandvi the Bhadala are still regarded as such. 
Their wealth and power have not come from ‘pure’ mindful business technique or 
calculation, but from illegality, violence and volatile strength, and they remain of 
‘mixed blood’.
The Bhadala ship owners do not see themselves in this light, nor could they, in 
order to command the respect that they do from their workforce. The Bhadala have 
transformed the model among those who labour on their ships and use their own 
lives are exemplars of how sailors can become merchants. The ‘work of the mind’ is 
not given by birth and can come with age and experience. Rather than such qualities
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being ascribed at birth by the kind of blood flowing through descent groups, the 
Bhadala ship owners characterise transformation as a potential within individual life 
cycles. This enchanted portrait of potential opportunities is presented to the 
apprentices in shipyards. It contributes to the allure of a life at sea and the perceived 
romance of a sailor’s life. All seths can genuinely say to aspiring apprentices that: ‘I 
laboured like you when I was young and look at me today.’
The idea that if a man works hard he can become rich is one that is given to 
shipyard apprentices while they labour. Aspiration ceases to centre solely on going to 
sea and bringing back consumer goods, and becomes directed towards the hierarchy. 
The years that men labour in shipyards are only part of a much longer apprenticeship, 
during which they learn how to crew, navigate and pilot a ship. Returning to work in 
the yards each year (during the off-season), they gradually master the complexities of 
ship production. These initial years, and perhaps their childhood years before that, 
give them grounding in the social organisation of shipping. They leam that despite 
becoming sailors they are at the bottom of a long, steep but potentially fruitful 
hierarchy, which becomes an ideal life-projection. For apprentices in shipyards going 
to sea comes to mean life within a notionally transcendable hierarchy, and not being 
bound by a position given at birth.
5.6. Life in the shade (cool): seths
While Sukhet, and the hundreds of other men like him, laboured in the sun, what was 
the owner of the ship doing while he was sitting in the shade working with his mind? 
All of Salaya’s ship owners had organised for ships to be built before I arrived in 
Mandvi. They all had experience of the process and their own unique criteria for 
doing it; they are involved in a series of other procedures, evaluations and decisions 
that, although less tangible than joining sections of timber together, are equally 
necessary in the construction of a ship. Leaving aside the events in the ship owner’s 
life, and the lives of his forefathers, that placed him to be in a position both to want 
and to be able to build a ship, his work still starts long before the keel is laid and
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involves four kinds of inter-related decision making involving economy, finance, 
labour and other practicalities; each of these is explored below.
5.61. Economy
In 1998 the price of onions in India rose sharply because underproduction and poor 
weather conditions resulted in an irregular supply16. During the worst months of the 
‘onion crisis’ the price per kilo rose to around Rs. 60 from the norm of around Rs.
10. Onions are a staple food in India and the price rise became a major political 
issue, culminating in the government imposing an export embargo. Onions were the 
major export commodity of the Kachchhi ships and the crisis affected the trade, with 
least one ship not being built that year as the ship owner waited to see what happened 
to the exports. This kind of evaluation is at best speculative because a ship takes 
around two years to build by which time economic circumstances may have changed 
again.
The Indian Rupee has weakened considerably in the last few years making 
exports cheaper and thus more competitive in the ports of the Gulf. Conversely 
imports into India have become more expensive. Fluctuating exchange rates have 
marked effects on the demand for low value bulk commodities, such as onions and 
cattle fodder. Simply, if they are too expensive they cannot be sold and a hold full of 
rotting onions in Dubai creek is a common and expensive story.
5.62. Finance
The success or failure of trade determines the cash flow of the ship owner. Building a 
ship is expensive, and although it is possible to arrange credit with timber suppliers 
and haulage contractors, labourers and others have to be paid regularly with cash. 
Planning, arranging and determining credit and cash flows plays a defining role in 
how the pace of a ship’s construction progresses. It is also an easy way to dispose of
16 T.I. ‘If apples could do for onions’. October 5th 1998.
258
money that is incongruous with the demands of tax inspectors. But it is not only the 
conditions of trade that are vulnerable to fluctuating exchange rates -  the cost of 
building a ship also varies. Around 80% of the timber used in constructing a ship is 
imported from Malaysia. Thus, monitoring the price of raw timber and choosing a 
time to buy when the price is low can greatly reduce the cost overall of the ship. 
Timber has to be brought 110km from the wood yards at the container port of 
Kandala in the east of Kachchh. It is selected in advance and brought by truck to 
Mandvi where it has to be stored. For most ship-owners this means taking the timber 
to a sawmill in Mandvi where it remains until it is needed for the ship. The large 
timbers are prepared by the sawmills on a contractual basis and have to be 
transported by road, by handcart, to Salaya.
Ships vary in size and cost, and decisions have to be made about both. A large 
ship, perhaps up to 700 tonnes, requires a great investment of time and money, and is 
likely to be beset with technical problems, while ships under 250 tonnes are today 
deemed uneconomical because of the price of fuel, port costs (flat rate duties) and 
other running costs in relation to the amount of profit that can be gained from such a 
small cargo capacity. Most ships are built to carry around 450 tonnes and to be 
powered by a single engine.
The design of the ship also has to be decided before construction commences. The 
major design variant, size apart, is in the stem. A hull with an even taper to the 
stempost is cheap and strong, but makes the ship slower, less fuel efficient and more 
difficult to manoeuvre. Stems that overhang the stempost and rise from the keel 
horizontally before bulging out are more expensive, potentially weaker, more 
vulnerable to the corrosive powers of saline water, and take longer to build. But they 
make for a faster, more efficient and more responsive ship. The question is whether 
the cheaper and simpler hull design is offset by the increased running costs once the 
ship is operational. The decision is a difficult one and both designs are equally 
common, but as with the size of the ship finance is often the determining factor.
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5.63. Labour
Before construction of a ship commences, it is named and the future captain is 
selected. The captain works alongside the seth in making decisions over the 
construction of the ship. In the initial stages of a ship’s construction -  laying the keel 
and fixing the garboards -  only a small, skilled, workforce is required. In the past the 
ship owners built ships themselves. They no longer do so but do have an intimate 
knowledge of the techniques of construction and can evaluate the quality and 
competence of those who now work as specialised shipbuilders. There are a dozen or 
so families that specialise in shipbuilding from a variety of jamats, and they are 
known as gaidor or mistri (craftsmen). Selecting a shipbuilder is not a simple 
decision as some families of ship builders have long-term relationships with families 
of ship owners and will only work for them, and others will be already engaged in 
building a ship. Some shipbuilding families oversee the work of more than one ship 
at a time. The ship builders are wage labourers who are paid daily -  they make no 
formal contractual agreement with the ship owners about the duration or 
management of shipbuilding. The shipbuilder will bring with him to a job a number 
of his own workers, who are typically kin or relatives from another lineage within his 
jamat.
5.64. Gaidor
The master craftsman does not command as much respect in a shipyard as might be 
assumed. He is firmly associated with the ‘work of the body’ (albeit in a supervisory 
and consultational role), life on the land and with the fact that he has not been 
successful enough to become a ship’s captain. The gaidor is paid at about the same 
rate as navigators on ships (around Rs. 4,000 per month), but does not receive the 
same opportunities to generate other income. Craftsmen’s salaries are three times as 
much as those of labourers, but are less than the income generated from a responsible 
position working at sea. Furthermore, the craftsman is not associated with the 
prestige accorded to life outside Kachchh and the ability to procure prestigious
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consumer goods. Some families hereditarily specialise in shipbuilding, but most 
master craftsmen have risen through the ranks of the hierarchy surrounding ships.
Carpentry and the bodily practices associated with saws and adzes are not skills 
Kachchhi apprentices learn in shipyards. Carpentry is well paid but it is not socially 
valued by the seths or their crews. For them it is the social and material prowess that 
a life-style at sea commands that is valued. Likewise, for the ship owners, 
shipbuilding is not an end in itself. The objectives are trade and the production of 
sailors for this end. Carpentry is peripheral to the key relationships that are being 
constructed along with the ship. These evaluations and strategies may take many 
months or years to organise and involve long-term decision-making and forecasting 
that are of a different order from cutting and shaping wood, but once the decision has 
been made to build a ship there are still further considerations before the keel can be 
laid.
5.65. Practicalities
Suitable estuarine ground on which to build a ship is scarce and the Port Authority 
leaseholds for such land are in the hands of those families that already own ships. 
The land has to be level, below the mark of the highest tides, close to a road-head 
and, ideally, adjacent to the house of the owner of the future ship. Once such land is 
available it is cleared and levelled, and low pillars of sandbags supported by huge 
wooden blocks are built to form the foundations for the keel. The sand has to be 
brought from the beach, which is some distance from the shipyards, and a Khumbar 
(traditionally a potter) is contracted with his team of mules to fetch and bag the sand. 
Before any wood is brought to the site these pillars are submerged by at least one 
high tide see if they are stable and that they do not collapse or shift. If land 
preparation involves moving a large amount of earth, such as terracing the riverbank 
or filling a channel into which a previous ship was floated, gangs of piece rate 
agricultural labours will be called through a gang leader from nearby villages.
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The yards that are continually used will have a hut, a tool shed, tools and a night- 
watchman. If the yard does not have these things they will also be built, collected and 
hired before the materials for the ship are brought to the yard. The hut, a rough 
wooden shed or concrete office, is the place where the ship owner and his associates 
will gather and from where work in the yard will be controlled, managed and 
planned. They are also important social places where ship owners will come to read 
newspapers, meet their friends and pass the time when the yards are not working. A 
number of them are also equipped with ship-to-shore radios so that ship owners can 
manage the passages and hear the progress of ships at sea, and relatives and friends 
of those at sea, can come and say ‘hello’ and request that things be brought back 
from Dubai.
The ship owner’s work involves managing and negotiating accounts, rates and 
delivery times with sawmills, blacksmiths, tool manufacturers and accountants. He 
pays the workforce on Thursdays and logs absenteeism and lateness. He sacks bad 
and irregular workers, cajoles lazy employees to work more and recruits more labour 
when it is required. He arranges the strategic arrival of timber, equipment and to 
some extent the distribution of work and time in the yard. For the ship owner the 
problem is how to organise the activities of many different men so they can do what 
is necessary without spending too many idle hours in the shipyard, while at the same 
time creating potential sailors. Hierarchy is structured in more-or-less the same way 
in all the shipyards. The division of labour within the hierarchy restricts the 
potentially infinite number of possible combinations for distributing human effort 
across the many tasks in shipbuilding. The design of the hierarchy spreads the 
workload across members of the workforce and avoids overloading any particular 
individual, while at the same time creating potential sailors with knowledge of ship 
construction. The structure of work incorporates a sense of task, which removes the 
possibility of one man undoing another’s work or working at cross-purposes, and 
distributes tasks throughout the workforce so that men are not competing for the 
same set of tools or space on the scaffolding. The most obvious divisions are the 
parallel work of carpenters and labourers within the hierarchical pyramid and the
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ways in which the subtle nuances of seniority amongst labourers inter-relates with 
the priority of a particular task.
Throughout the construction of the ship decisions are taken about the quality of 
the materials, design and the pace at which the work should progress. Few of these 
decisions ship owners make alone, most being made jointly or in consultation with 
the craftsman, other ship owners or the owner’s family. Once the ship is nearing 
completion decisions have to be taken about the quality of the finish of the ship, its 
decoration and colours.
The image of the fat capitalist sitting in the shade reading the newspaper or 
picking his teeth is a popular one in studies of labour and work relations in India. It is 
an image that only has power when contrasted with the physical labour and sweat of 
those who work for him. The work of the ship owner is not mentioned in the 
technical description of how to build a ship that opened this chapter. This begs the 
question: is the work of the ship owner ‘easy knowledge’? Are forecast evaluations 
made about the price of onions very different to evaluations made about the qualities 
and relationships between different pieces of wood? It has been shown that, although 
the fat capitalist is sitting in the cool of the shade while his ship is built before his 
eyes, he is not idle and that he too is engaged in a series of tasks and evaluations that 
require similar kinds of representation and strategy to those involved in manipulating 
pieces of wood. But this is not the same conclusion as my informants express. For 
them knowledge and work are hierarchically structured. Labourers (as potential 
seamen) are engaged in the ‘work of the body’ and ship owners (as merchants) in the 
‘work of the mind’. The evidence is there before apprentice eyes: while they sweat 
for Rs. 50 a day the ship owner sits in the shade supposedly amassing a fortune.
It must not be forgotten that the primary objective of the ship owner is not to 
build a ship, but to make a profit through trade. The completion of the ship is not the 
end of the affair because a ship standing on a riverbank represents a large investment 
of time, money and organisation. The longer it stands idle during the sailing season
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the lower the potential return on the investment for the year. The process of getting 
an object afloat that weighs many tonnes from a position where only the bottom few 
inches of its keel may be submerged at the highest tide is painstaking, ingenious and 
perilous. Moving the ship out of the water places a tremendous strain on its 
superstructure, one for which it was not designed, and thus the ship owner will wait 
for the highest tides of the month to approach. For the captain this involves making a 
decision, depending on the time of the year, as to when the ship should be launched. 
Depending on the tide, work continues around the clock. Once the ship is afloat it is 
surveyed by officials from the port, registered and its taxes paid. This involves 
negotiation both with bureaucrats in the port and with a private agent who arranges 
the survey. The survey determines the carrying capacity of the ship and the level of 
the Plimsoll line, after which the owner can organise the materials and labour for the 
ship to be painted.
5.7. Floating a ship
All three descriptions of how to build a ship (abstract, sailors and seths) have left it 
high and dry on the riverbank. In this section it is shown how the long-term 
organisational strategies of the mind frame the bodily techniques of labour via the 
command structure surrounding ships, through a description of how a ship is moved 
from the riverbank and into the water. Ships are built through the interaction and 
mediation of human abstraction, the minutiae of the ‘work of the body’, the minutiae 
of the ‘workings of the mind’, and through both bodily technique and linguistic 
exchanges. Knowledge and access to the different levels of decision-making and 
instruction are unevenly distributed throughout the hierarchy, which is 
encompassing. Of the many men who work on ships the focus in this chapter has 
been on the Kachchhi labourers who come to work in shipyards in order to become 
sailors. Months before the ship is ready to be floated the carpenters, and many of the 
labourers, leave the yard to find other work: floating a ship is the work of its future 
crew. The topology of the riverbed and the distribution of mud banks, and channels 
within it, determine the exact ways in which a ship is floated. Some yards are much
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closer to navigable water than others and the slopes of the riverbed vary from yard to 
yard, which contributes to making the task different each time. The description that 
follows is of the launch of a ship from the northern end of the riverbank in the spring 
of 1998.
Floating a ship is an impressive and ingenious task. It is delicate, but involves the 
use of considerable force. Floating a ship is framed by a series of decisions made by 
the ship’s owner and captain. Among the decisions is the selection of five or six of 
apprentice labourers as junior crew. The remainder of the crew is drawn from an 
existing pool that works, or has worked, on other ships. There is a considerable 
amount of juggling to be done to maintain an even balance of inexperience and 
expertise on more than one ship. Strangers are rarely employed and whatever their 
experience they are put to work in the shipyards before they are permitted to become 
crew. The ideal is that the fifteen or so crew that are selected all have knowledge of 
shipbuilding, moving materials, improvising scaffolds, and fixing and securing 
planks. This knowledge helps keep the ship afloat and well maintained. Sailors know 
what it is they are sailing on, they know what went into its construction and they 
know how the component parts of the ship are assembled and related. They have 
learned how this hierarchy is structured, and the ways in which commands are 
prioritised and communicated.
Apprenticeship in shipyards also equips men for the kinds of work they will do 
when they are at sea. Labouring at sea involves improvising within the structure of 
command in order to perform certain tasks with clear objectives. Most strikingly, 
labouring at sea involves maintaining the ship, moving and stacking materials, and 
using the scaffolding of blocks and pulleys that hang from the mast to load and 
unload the ship. Work at sea involves a transformation of the skills and tasks that 
apprentices spend years learning in shipbuilding. The parallels between working in a 
shipyard and working at sea on a ship are what make the organisation of shipping so 
effective. Apprenticeship contributes to the production of technology while socially 
reproducing the social agents of that technology (sailors).
265
Launching a ship is not just a matter of the new crew carrying it down the hill. It 
is a task with a specific objective that requires the co-ordination of the crew, captain 
and ship owner. The only channel of the creek that carries enough water for a ship to 
float in runs to the west of the estuary, on the Mandvi side. Floating the ship is the 
first task that the crew of a new ship will perform together. However, it is not just a 
matter of co-ordinating labour. It is a matter of co-ordinating labour within a longer- 
term series of decisions and plans made by the seth within the framework of 
prevailing environmental conditions. Floating a ship is framed by the time of year, 
the tides, interaction with the bureaucracy of the port office and the progress of 
preparations in Dubai for a dry dock, an engine and tackle, and for the final fitting 
out of the ship. When these processes coincide to produce the correct conditions, 
allowing an interval of a couple of months for the timbers to swell, the ship is 
floated. The work of the ship owner frames the work of the labourers, which are 
mediated by the captain and the foreman in turn.
At this stage the ship is sitting on blocks above the ground and, as with moving a 
cross-member, it is critical that this height is maintained. If the ship touches the 
ground it is very difficult to lift and practically impossible to move. Floating a ship 
starts a week-or-so before a spring tide. Once the scaffolding is removed the ship is 
secured with ropes from both sides of the hull to stop it toppling. Three or four large 
oiled logs of a slightly smaller diameter than the gap between the keel and the ground 
are placed perpendicularly under the hull. The wood and sandbag supports that have 
supported the keel for the previous two years are dug away and the remaining holes 
are levelled. Additional props are placed around the lower sections of the hull to give 
it further stability. The pace and timing of the work is now largely dictated by the 
tide, and work can only continue when the tide is neap or is out completely. This 
often means working at night under floodlights and in shallow water. The captain, 
who is now in charge of the work, instructs the foreman where to dig a hole in the 
creek to lay the foundations for a huge capstan (usually around 30m distant from the 
end of the ship). Sand is scattered thickly around the base of the capstan to prevent
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the tread path around it from becoming slippery. The captain and the owners of the 
ship survey the potential path that the ship will take down into the estuary, which 
must avoid sharp undulations and deep mud that could hinder the progress of the 
ship.
The aim is that either the prow or stem -  but ideally the prow -  of the ship is 
turned towards the direction of its future travel without tilting or getting stuck. Once 
the capstan is in place in the middle of the creek a rope is run from it to the end of the 
keel, and a further one to a corresponding position along the hull. The captain and 
ship owner stay with the ship, while the foreman and labourers position themselves 
at the capstan. Other labourers tie secondary ropes to the ship with a small amount of 
slack to allow the ship to move. They remove the props holding the ship in place 
before taking positions by the ropes that are now holding the ship in place. To 
attempt to drag the ship with the capstan at this point would be to drag against the 
ropes that are preventing the ship from falling. The captain instructs labourers to 
release a very small amount rope and signals to the foreman to start turning the 
capstan. Slowly (millimetre by millimetre) the ship starts to slide over the logs on 
which it is supported. The captain co-ordinates the work of both sets of labourers, 
while paying attention to the progress of the ship, the lay of the land and the tightness 
of the supporting ropes. After each movement all of the ropes are re-tied and the 
captain and ship owner inspect the hull for potential cracks and timber movement.
The role of both captain and foreman at this stage is a matter of co-ordination, 
because all the crew already know how to tie knots, judge the tension on ropes and 
lay supports for props in the mud -  they do not need instruction. The ship owner is in 
constant conversation with the captain as the vessel is being moved, but he does not 
shout instructions across the riverbed to the foreman, that remains the captain’s task. 
The two-way communication between the ship and the capstan is only between the 
foreman and the captain. The captain and the ship owner share the responsibility of 
organising the labourers who are around the ship. At the capstan the foreman stands a 
small distance away supervising its rotation. Experienced labourers lead the cries of
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' lombi!\ which increase and decrease in rapidity depending on the amount of 
pressure required. The same labourers provide a commentary to the foreman on the 
tension on the capstan wheel and instruct other labourers how to guide the rope 
around the central axle and when to lock the capstan wheel when the pressure 
becomes to great for the labourers to hold. When this work is carried out at night the 
ship is illuminated, but the labourers at the capstan work in semi-darkness and the 
organisation of commands has to be tighter as the visual clues of potential accidents 
are less obvious.
The process of tightening the ropes, propping, inspecting slackening the ropes and 
dragging the keel with the capstan is repeated many times until the ship points at the 
desired angle from the riverbank. The logs under the keel do not roll with the ship 
because the ship is too heavy and the ground too soft, rather the ship slides gradually 
over them. Even if additional planks have been laid under the logs, when they are no 
longer supporting the keel they will have to be dug out of the mud and repositioned 
at the front of the ship. Once the ship is away from the riverbank it becomes more 
difficult to secure it with ropes. Temporary tie points will be dug in the mud, which 
are moved with the progress of the ship. The topology of the riverbed determines 
how far a ship has to be moved and what organisational strategies are deployed to 
move it. Once the ship is at a point in the riverbed where the depth of water is 
sufficient to provide buoyancy it can either be towed by another ship or winched 
with a capstan. Old oil barrels are the tied to the undersides of the hull to reduce the 
draft by giving the hull extra buoyancy. Once the ship is in the main channel of the 
estuary it will float freely on a spring tide, which again, remembering that the ship 
has no source of power, involves a further set of organisational strategies and skills 
to prevent it from turning, listing or getting carried by the current into a mud bank.
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5.8. Aspiration within hierarchy
All the Bhadala built ships are launched in this manner, allowing the slope of the 
riverbank to carry the weight of the ship into the main creek. Floating a ship, as with 
most other tasks, is framed within the long-term organisational strategies of the 
ship’s owner. These objectives are moved forwards by relaying instructions through 
the chain of mediators, eventually finding expression in the bodily techniques of 
labour and the assembly of constituent parts, which in turn have a reciprocal 
relationship with the objectives of the ship owner. From the perspective of a shipyard 
labourer, building a ship is a matter of wage labour for the subsistence of his family 
and a longer-term plan in which he will go to sea to bring back wealth.
Roles are specifically distributed amongst men both horizontally and vertically. 
The vertical distribution of labour is divided into different categories of work, so that 
all those within the category of labourer are also ranked in relation to one another. 
Vertically too there are hierarchically ordered command structures, with labourers 
prioritised over carpenters. The horizontal axis intersects the vertical within the 
various levels of labour and carpentry, and parallel tasks are allotted to different 
groups of men within either category. This social framework is built along with the 
ship: through the production of technology the social form of that technology is also 
created.
The various components of this social system are brought together through the 
complementary flows of order and action; the upward flows of respect and aspiration 
correspond, more-or-less, with the downward flows of command, expectation and 
instruction. The aspiration of the apprentice is directed towards the ship owner, 
especially towards his power to consume and his social prowess. In moving towards 
this aspiration the various stages of the hierarchy are open to him at the discretion of 
the ship owner and the captain. In order to earn the merit to gain such a promotion 
the apprentice has to meet various criteria, which obviously includes the ‘easy 
knowledge’ of moving materials and knowing ships. Thus, through adequate
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‘incorporated practice’ the apprentice is rewarded with a certificate: the government 
identity card. This is a form of ‘inscribed practice’ (Connerton 1995:72-73). The 
identity card states that a man is legally entitled to go to sea, but it also symbolically 
attests to his proficiency in technical, social and religious matters.
Previously in this chapter a seth was quoted as telling an apprentice how he 
laboured when he was young and had become wealthy and socially powerful. When 
statements such as this are compared with the material presented in Chapter 3, a 
contrast is evident between ways of presenting individual skills and capabilities. 
Apprentices come from an environment in which they know that propensities are 
given at birth into an environment where they are told they can work their way up 
and out of the hierarchy. In this way the Bhadala use their own life histories as 
examples of what is possible given good fortune and hard work, which contributes to 
further enchanting ship work in apprentice eyes and raises doubts about the 
legitimacy of particular claims made about propensities being given at birth.
5.9. Conclusion
The practice theorist Jean Lave suggests that theories of situated everyday practice 
insist that persons acting, and the world of activity, cannot be separated (1993:5). 
Lave also says that what can be known in any given context is in a constant state of 
change, and that actors improvise struggles in situated ways with each other over the 
value of particular definitions of the situation, in both immediate and comprehensive 
terms. The production of failure for them is as much a part of routine collective 
activity as the production of average, ordinary knowledgeability (1993:17).
However, production processes and the production of social relations are historically 
contingent and socially specific. Thus, in this chapter, the actual context of practical 
everyday activity has been given priority in combination with individual conceptions 
of action, interaction and activity.
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Despite the claims of practice theorists to incorporate the conceptions of those 
engaged in production and the acquisition of skill, what people think and say about 
what they do remains subordinate to the aims of the theory. The distinctions in this 
chapter between ‘merchants’ and ‘seamen’, and ‘mind’ and body’ are not 
classifications used by Muslim shipbuilders who are too lazy to refine their 
categorical world. They are potent categories into which the world is divided, which 
in turn inform the world in which they live. There is no evidence presented in this 
chapter to point to the fact that such dual conceptualisations of the social world are 
‘natural’. Rather, this chapter, and the ones preceding it, have shown the historical 
conditions of trade, migration and communal hostility that have given rise to the use 
of dual conceptualisations through the practice of shipbuilding and sailing as both 
‘context’ and determining environment.
Such divisions are not only linguistic constructs because they find expression in 
social, religious and philosophical matters that reflect the linguistic nature of such 
utterances. They are socially and symbolically rooted, socially and historically 
contingent, and are products of social organisation, reproduction and transaction. 
Furthermore, such dualisms are based in the particular realities of time and space 
(environment), and the technology to which they refer. The elaboration of shipping 
technology is finite, as are the ways in which the sociality of it can be organised. 
What has been presented in this chapter is an unusual construction of labour in 
relation to technology, but only to the extent that apprentices learn about ships and 
the social organisation of ships before they set sail. There are a limited number of 
ways in which effective trade can be organised -  and this one of them. But given the 
communal atmosphere within the town, and the village beyond, it seems to be the 
most effective way to improve the status and local power of the seths, in terms of 
their standing in local Muslim society and in terms of their moral and political 
positioning of hostile Hindus. Both relationships are primarily given legitimacy by 
their ability to draw upon powerful ideas from outside Kachchh, which are mobilised 
through the constituencies of seths. Different configurations of ‘mind’ and ‘body’ 
and to some extent ‘wealth’ order mercantile society on both sides of the river. These
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are the base concepts through which all other aspects of sociality are ordered and 
explained, and are inseparable from the encompassing metaphors of ‘religion’. Any 
attempt made on the lives of these dualistic metaphors would impair the extent to 
which we could understand the ways in which social difference and the logic of 
religious reform are understood given that they are elaborated metaphors of trade, 
capital and social structure.
Kachchhi shipbuilders are mind -  body dualists. Some men have more mind than 
body, while for others the reverse is the case. The lascar thus becomes the physical 
expression of the seth's mental activity. To put this from their point of view: the soul 
is of two parts, one (nafs) is related more intimately to the body (Jism) and the other 
to the higher levels of intellectual and moral faculties (aql). The result is a closely 
related triad of mind, body and dialectical soul. As I have shown in chapters 1 and 3, 
the intellectual faculties are ranked higher than those of labour. The relationships 
between the constituent parts of men are not fixed, and although in shipyards the 
relationships between these elements continue to have some connection to status at 
birth, the emphasis is overwhelmingly placed on the transformation of the soul over 
the course of a lifetime. The idea is that one’s actions in the world transform the 
constituent parts of one’s soul. The following chapter examines the transformation of 
individual action and attitude over the course of a long-term apprenticeship; while 
the final chapter looks at the technical composition of this transformation.
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Chapter 6.
Apprenticeship II: the biography of a sailor
6.1. Biography
In this chapter it is argued that Bhadala-Pathans nominate select Islamic practices as 
‘pure* and give them authenticity by attributing their origin to the ‘Gulf. However, 
as mentioned in previous chapters, their reform is motivated by what it opposes in at 
least equal measure to what it represents. Central to this opposition are the practices 
associated with Mandvi’s Saiyeds and the social hierarchy over which they preside. 
Further, it is argued that despite their opposition to this social order, after a fashion 
they recreate such a hierarchy within the structure of the vahaanvatta.
Apprenticeship under Bhadala-Pathans thus transforms sailors’ conceptions of 
hierarchy from one premised on divine mediation (Chapter 3) to one premised on the 
seths’ commodified mediation of wealth and religious purity. This chapter is a direct 
continuation of the previous one and focuses on the other aspects of apprenticeship 
that are appreciated while the neophyte is learning how to move and stack wood. The 
attention to task and action of the previous chapter has a direct reciprocal relationship 
with the material of social and religious apprenticeship described in this chapter.
Apprentices, who are also migrants and initiates, leave Mandvi for Salaya, where 
things are different. A few years later they make their first voyage to sea and to the 
ports of the Gulf. As long as they remain sailors during each year that follows they 
will spend nine months aboard ship away from Kachchh. During these rites of 
passage they are transformed. Those who remain in Mandvi, but who send their sons 
to the Bhadalas’ shipyards, see and know little of what men learn on ships. They do 
see that sailors ‘puff up’, ‘change colour’ and return with consumer goods and 
hostile ideas about their home. This chapter is loosely based around the biography of 
a sailor. It stresses his changing attitude towards religious practice and social
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propriety within his home environment through descriptions of the time he spent in 
shipyards and at sea.
The ways in which sailors narrate their biographies suggest two important themes. 
The first is the importance of particular kinds of social relations, the role of 
reputation and the significance of certain forms of transaction in constructing social 
relationships. Secondly, it is apparent from the biographical narration of conflict that 
apprenticeship in shipyards, and later at sea, forces sailors to change their religious 
behaviour in relation to the practices of Hindus and other Muslims. In the following 
two sections these themes are elaborated before introducing the biography of a sailor.
6.11. Knowing others
Knowing the names, occupation, jamat, atak, kin allegiances, and the moral and 
immoral activities of large numbers of people is important social capital. However, 
knowing, and being able to make claims on the support and following of a wide 
range of people is a greater form of social capital. Men invest a lot of time in 
updating and exchanging information about others. Mines suggests that such 
networks are integral to forming meaningful social relationships as well as an 
informal means of social control in what he calls ‘trust based society’ (1994:35). In 
the case of employment in shipyards this is certainly true and, as shown in this 
chapter, networks of information determine the moral and religious abru (reputation, 
honour) of individuals. However, gossip networks are not only a means of informal 
social control because gossip can also enhance social reputation, or is 
inconsequential to it depending on the status of the individuals concerned.
In situations where the illicit activities of others are being described there is often 
a sense of condemnation. But, depending on circumstances and audience, equally 
often immoral activities are described with a sense of envy. Counter-factual solutions 
are actively suggested that would have prevented the person in question from being 
exposed. In this sense, gossip frequently addresses the motivations and wisdom of
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the protagonist and is not merely an idle defamation of character. Typically, given 
the strictures provided by the age and status of the audience, the narrator attempts to 
appear as the bastion of wisdom and perfect moral judgement. This typically 
involves: a narration of the circumstances that led to a known outcome and a 
reappraisal of the circumstances to show what the subject should have done given 
those circumstances. This type of counter-factual argument is intended to 
demonstrate the superior deductive and analytical skills of the narrator. For example: 
when a man is caught making eyes at a woman in the bazaar the counter-factual 
argument will suggest alternative sites from where he could have caught her gaze 
without being exposed.
An individual’s knowledge of an inter-related collection of others is unique. 
However, all such individual knowledge coincides with that of others when it comes 
to particularly influential characters. Among Muslims this commonality includes 
politicians and Bhadala seths, who as prominent and wealthy figures are subject to 
intense scrutiny. Furthermore, the large client-base of big-men allows their names 
and reputations to travel widely. Among sailors, gossip, as a mechanism of informal 
social control, has little effect on the status of the seth. In Mandvi everyone knows 
that politicians are corrupted and that mixed-blood Bhadalas are of low rank and 
questionable integrity. But in face-to-face social situations who would deny a 
minister of the government, or the owner of a ship, his due status?
These observations have three further consequences. The first is that the 
collections of facts about others that sailors know best are those that relate to other 
sailors. A sailor with a few years experience can recall the names of the captains, 
navigators, foremen and many of the crew on most of the sixty ships that sail from 
Mandvi. However, because sailors spend nine months of the year at sea they have a 
relatively small knowledge of the reputations of those in their jamat, or in the town 
in a broader sense. The result is that the salient (friendly) ‘others’ of sailors are 
predominantly sailors. Secondly, to become successful, a sailor must develop a 
trustworthy reputation within the biographic records of those who employ and vouch
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for him. The content and parameters of trust are obviously contextual, and codes of 
honour and moral behaviour are defined within the particular activities of the 
vahaanvatta. The kinds of behaviour that generate trusting relationships between 
sailors and seths are often in contradiction to the morality of the landlubbers. A 
propensity towards discretion and the ability to conceal goods and knowledge in the 
interests of a seth are attributes that contribute to trust relationships, but obviously 
mask activities that are immoral in the eyes of others. As demonstrated in previous 
chapters, what constitutes a rewarding relationship with a seth is in part reputation. 
But this stems from a collection of personal attributes unique to life aboard ships. 
These attributes include deference within strict hierarchy, religious propriety and the 
adoption of values that are often in contradiction to the sailor’s home environment. 
Thirdly, the activities and proclamations of the ship owners are subjected to scrutiny. 
How they perform and what they do is therefore central to the conversations of 
sailors and others alike. However, the aspiration fostered by apprenticeship, and the 
power imbalance between seth and sailors, makes the seth a focus of imitation for 
sailors.
The sailor’s narration of biography conforms to the idea that to know (and to be 
known) is a marker of reputation. Sailors present their lives through making explicit 
associations with the widely known names of seths and ships, and they gain prestige 
from an association with eminent social big-men. Gossip also forms a direct part of 
biography, and sailors implicate themselves in the successful heroism and illegality 
of others. A central idea of this chapter is that transactions between men generate a 
stronger sense of relatedness in the receiver than in giver, and it is this that builds 
successful constituencies among ship owners. This is discussed at length in Chapter 
7, but is evident in the material presented here. In biographic accounts it is evident 
that social connections and loyalties among sailors are created by what they receive 
from their patrons.
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6.12. Social division
In sailors’ biographies three areas of conflict are consistently outlined. The first 
relates to their initial period of work in the shipyards. The second and third conflicts 
occur some years later with Muslims in Mandvi (including their families) and with 
Kharvas. These conflicts stem from the dual hierarchy of religious practice and 
occupational status that operates on ships. This chapter seeks to explain where the 
impetus for Islamic religious reform is generated, a theme continued in the following 
chapter where it is shown to directly relate to the power differentials generated by the 
processes of giving and receiving. In the literature on Indian Muslims there are two 
starkly contrasting solutions to this question (and many others that fall between the 
two camps). First, J. Benson argues that among the Muslims of the Telangana region 
of Andhra Pradesh the growing intensity of Islamic ‘identity’ is a consequence of the 
loss of Muslim power and social status in a wider system (1983:42-3). In this 
example relations with neighbouring Hindus are seen as the primary motivation that 
leads to an extra stress being placed on Muslim religious values and practice. In 
contrast, Mines argues that among Muslims in Tamil Nadu ‘ethnicity’ and 
Islamisation have developed in response to needs internal to the Muslim community. 
In this example the increased emphasis on religious identity is a result of status 
competition between Muslims and the struggle to define legitimate orthopraxis 
(1975:404). Importantly, Mines sees Islamisation as a process that is not a response 
to Hindu antipathy or a vehicle for economic gain (1975:410-11). The former 
position stresses the significance of the relationship between the dominant Hindu 
community and the minority Muslim one; while the latter emphasises autonomous 
needs internal to the Muslim community that produce elaborate ethnic and religious 
identities.
In Chapter 1, Bhadala relations with Hindus and Muslims were presented as being 
simultaneously an inspiration and trope of religious reform. These relationships were 
further contextualised in chapters 3 and 4. This chapter looks at the ways in which 
these conflicts are presented in the biography of sailors. However, it is argued that
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this conflict is not based on primordial religious differences, but on the contingencies 
of the pervasive social division between merchants and sailors.
6.2. Majid
The biography of Khadir Abdul Majid Timbhai Khatri, commonly Majid, resembles 
that of hundreds of other sailors, exhibiting the connections between sailing, 
migration, transnationalism and the formation of big-man status. Majid’s biography, 
around which the rest of this chapter is loosely structured, contains many themes 
familiar in anthropology: apprentices (see Keller and Keller 1993), migrants (see 
Gardener 1993a, 1993b) or initiates (see Bloch 1992) leave the familiar for another 
place where things are different, only to return to the original place transformed. 
Central to Majid’s burgeoning status are the kinds and qualities of relationships in 
which he is involved. Social, economic, ritual and political relationships with kin, 
non-kin, strangers, friends and enemies run throughout Majid’s story. Central to the 
maintenance and quality of such relationships is the reputation of the parties 
involved. To all those living in Mandvi, Majid’s name reveals three things. First, he 
is a Sunni Muslim. Second, he is part of the Khatri Jamat, traditionally manufacturers 
and brokers of tie-die cloth, and thus one of the most prestigious classes of Sunni 
Muslims in the town. Third, his atak, Timbhai, is one of the most prestigious within 
the Khatri Jamat.
Bom in 1970, Majid left school at the age of ten after completing fifth standard in 
Gujarati medium. At the time we became friends he could speak Kachchhi and 
passable Arabic, and read, write and speak quite fluent Gujarati, Hindi and English. 
He was bom in a small one-roomed house, which was owned by a local durgah 
(shrine), and Majid, his mother, father and three younger brothers had lived together 
in the house, which had no running water or power. When I knew him he lived in a 
house with five rooms, each with an electric fan. On the ground floor there was an 
ornamental dining-room table and chairs, beds and a whole host of electrical gadgets, 
including a sophisticated Sony television. The transformation of the living conditions
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and financial position of Majid’s family, from poverty to relative affluence within the 
last fifteen years, is common to many of Mandvi’s Sunni Muslims who send their 
sons to sea. Majid, like many other young men who make their way over the river to 
the Bhadala shipyards, was the first in his family to do so.
Upon leaving school Majid went to hawk sugared water to passengers in the local 
bus station where his father was employed as a porter. He was the eldest son and felt 
pressure and duty to earn money for his family and younger brothers. A year later, an 
acquaintance of his father offered him a job in a shop owned by a Kachchhi merchant 
in Andhra Pradesh. Majid left Mandvi to make the journey across India at the age of 
eleven. He returned all of his Rs. 250 monthly salary to his family. Working, eating 
and sleeping in the shop he contracted severe amoebic dysentery and had to return to 
Mandvi. In 1982, at the ripe old age of twelve, he was offered another job in a 
provision store in a red-light district of downtown Bombay. At the end of three years 
service in the store he was earning Rs. 750, of which he sent home Rs. 700.
On Sundays the provision store closed. On his free day Majid started to pass the 
time in Dongri Channel, an area of the city associated with criminality, smuggling 
and most importantly with Muslims. There he initially met other Khatris from 
Mandvi who knew his father and brought news of events in Kachchh. As his face 
became increasingly familiar, his web of contacts expanded to include those outside 
the Khatri Jamat. Now, as then, the area remains a popular meeting place for 
Kachchhi sailors whose ships are visiting Bombay port. Majid listened to the stories 
of foreign ports, exotic experiences and employment opportunities in the foreign 
countries. The sailors were evidently wealthier than Majid was ever going to be if he 
stayed working in the store and he admired their life-style and the sense of fraternity 
that prevailed among them.
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6.3. Apprenticeship
Inspired, Majid returned to Mandvi. Through a senior member of the Khatri Jamat he 
approached one of Salaya’s ship owners. Very few of Mandvi’s Muslims had contact 
with the ship owners at this time, but their fleets were expanding and they were 
recruiting more and more labour from Mandvi. They were considered to be rough, 
vulgar and dangerous. They were mixed-bloods who had married inter-racially, 
which it was said, weakened their minds and strengthened their bodies. Majid’s 
family spent a long time trying to dissuade him from going to work at sea because it 
was a dirty and dangerous job. His prospective employers were not the kind of men 
that a young man like Majid should associate with because, although poor, he was 
from a traditionally high-ranking community. Majid knew that going to sea and 
becoming wealthy was a long way off. He had learned much from his Sunday 
conversations in Dongri Channel and knew that he would have to apprentice himself 
into a shipyard before any of that was possible. The fact that Majid learned of ships 
and sailors in Bombay attests to the social separation of Mandvi and Salaya.
6.31. Shipyards
Majid, in common with hundreds of other apprentices, started work in the 
shipyards by making tea, carrying timber and learning the ropes. As a neophyte he 
found most social interaction in the shipyard to be brutal and humiliating. In the 
vahaanvatta social hierarchy is given by the gradation of seths, captains, foremen 
and crews. The greater control a man has over a ship then the higher his status.
These categories order life at sea and on land. Majid worked for three months and 
received no wages. Only later did a representative of the seth start to give Majid 
irregular payments of between Rs. 25 and Rs. 50 per week, much less than he had 
been earning in the grocery store in Bombay. Years later, Majid found out that his 
father had taken Rs. 5,000 from the seth as a bond for six months of Majid’s 
labour -  his family say they were desperate for money and had no choice. At that 
time Majid’s new job was a source of both anxiety and hope for all his family.
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Anxiety because of the low status of the work and those who own the ships, the 
danger, and of what happens to sailors in the long run: sailors ‘puff up’, grow 
strong and proud, no longer respect the customs and ways of their parents, and 
significantly they ‘change colour’. High-status Muslims traditionally occupied the 
area of the town where Majid’s parents were living. However, in recent years 
many families had sent their sons to Bhadala ships, and the consequences of this 
trend were just beginning to be felt and Majid’s parents could see this all around 
them. They were also hopeful because Majid’s chance to go to sea represented an 
opportunity to earn higher wages than he could in Kachchh, and would potentially 
lead to him finding work that paid in dollars in the Gulf.
His first days in a Bhadala-Pathan shipyard were nervous and awkward. The other 
men in the yard were largely indifferent to him, and he could not understand much of 
what was being said. For the first few days he stoked the fire and made tea. In the 
second week he passed hammers, nails and chalk to the foreman. One afternoon the 
two of them worked through the tea break, not pausing to join the other labourers 
who were chatting and smoking in the bilge. They were fitting planks high on a 
platform in the stem. The foreman turned to Majid and asked him for a chappal, 
which is the standard Kachchhi word for slipper, or flip-flop. In the bilge 
conversations tailed off, heads turned and faint smiles were exchanged. Not knowing 
what to make of this unusual request Majid did nothing, assuming that he had 
misheard the foreman. But when the foreman again shouted at him to pass him the 
chappal, Majid, who was barefooted, bent down and attempted to remove the 
foreman’s flip-flop. The foreman kicked out at him, knocking him off the scaffold 
into the bilge. The other labourers, who had been trying hard to contain their mirth, 
burst into raucous laughter. The foreman went down to join the others for tea and a 
discussion of how perfectly the humiliation of Majid had been staged.
Majid, like apprentices on building sites in England, had been asked to fetch the 
proverbial left-handed hammer. Chappal, in shipyard language is a small wooden 
wedge, which is hammered into crevices to position planks -  not a slipper or flip-
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flop. This incident, and the many others that resemble it, display in a condensed form 
much of what is revealed through apprenticeship other than the bodily techniques of 
moving materials, erecting scaffolding and hammering nails. The violence inherent 
in the act is common in shipyards. Fights break out occasionally between individuals, 
but daily violence occurs within the parameters of the hierarchy. The kind of 
violence Majid was exposed to is the most common form of all, where senior men 
are aggressive towards junior ones. There is also a threat of sexual violence from 
senior men in the yard towards the younger ones, which in day-to-day situations is 
discussed in a veiled language of predation. The one ‘giving’ is superior to the one 
‘taking’. Boys are seen as fair game by older men for actual sexual predation, which 
is revealed in the constant insinuations made about ‘taking’. The strongest form of 
abuse is to call someone ‘guikator’ (the one who takes). In these ways, insults, 
violence and insinuation primarily flow downward through the hierarchy.
Such violence is painful humiliation for neophytes such as Majid. In Mandvi 
respect and patronage are ordered around perceptions of social rank, lineage, age and 
occupation. The aggregation of status implied in the use of jamat and atak names as 
collective nouns is not a reflection of relationships within these social categories.
Like brotherhood, social relations within jamats and ataks are inherently unequal. In 
Mandvi Majid is contextually superior to the son of his father’s younger brother 
because of his age. Conversely, despite Majid being younger than the yard’s 
foreman, Majid is from a much higher-rankingy'amctf and would never be expected to 
acknowledge him as a superior. This way of conceiving hierarchy is pervasive, 
broadly cutting across gender, kin and social rank. In contrast, in the shipyards 
hierarchy is ordered around ships. Thus in the shipyard Majid’s father’s brother’s son 
is an experienced labourer and ranks higher than Majid. The foreman, despite what 
Majid and his parents may have thought about him, is of much higher rank than 
Majid. Hierarchy in shipyards thus contradicts Mandvi’s social and kinship 
hierarchies, and is a source of conflict and tension in the lives of apprentices. From 
Majid’s Mandvi perspective he was humiliated by a low-status man, the foreman, 
which provoked the ridiculing laughter of the other labourers, including his younger
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cousin. Humiliation, and the gradual reconceptualisation of hierarchy it prompts, is 
part of the initiation into the world of ships. In return for respect Majid was given a 
hierarchical lesson, where he started to leam that hierarchical propriety in Mandvi 
was subordinate to the hierarchy inherent in the vahaanvatta.
There is, however, more to this incident. Footwear is regarded as dirty and 
polluting. It is removed upon entering private realms such as houses, ship cabins and 
places of religious denomination. Touching footwear is demeaning and indicative of 
subservience. As Majid touched the feet of the foreman he was welcomed to the 
lowest position within the hierarchy. In a performance of his own marginality from 
the language, religion and technology of shipbuilding he became part of the 
hierarchy that surrounds ships. However, in normal circumstances Muslims do not 
touch one another’s feet. Touching feet is a Hindu practice, which displays inherent 
inferiority. More commonly, Muslims stoop to touch their eyes and mouth to the 
hand that is held out before them when they meet a Saiyed in a shrine, or a seth when 
they start work on his ship -  but seldom do they touch another’s feet. The 
humiliation in Majid being tricked into touching the foreman’s feet implies that 
Majid is not a good Muslim and is part of the ignorance and stupidity that the 
Bhadala consider to constitute the Hindu world -  he was, after all, from the town 
frequently referred to by the Bhadala as dar al-kafir. Apprentices experience their 
own marginality from the world of shipping in their dress, limited knowledge of the 
Koran, the fact that they do not pray with the regularity of the ship owners, and 
through poverty. They also hear it and see it in other ways. They are told that they 
belong to Mandvi’s ‘syncretic’ past when Muslims were Hindus. Much Hinduism, 
unlike the form of Islam that predominates in Salaya, postulates no absolute 
distinction between human and divine beings. Stooping to touch the feet of a superior 
reflects the inherent human hierarchy in Hindu society, which continues seamlessly 
into the divine realms of the deities. Therefore, of this incident it can be concluded 
that humiliation reveals linguistic incompetence, the legitimate channels for the 
devolution of knowledge and skill, and a particular form of parody, which belongs to 
a larger set of parodies that Muslim shipbuilders use to denigrate themselves and
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others. The parody posits a hierarchy of religious practices into which the apprentice 
is drawn.
This incident is but one of many that characterises the life of the apprentice. The 
biographic approach adopted in this chapter relies on the assumption that it is the 
cumulative effects of small events that leads to individual transformation through 
apprenticeship. In other words, the chappal incident and the lessons of hierarchy 
involved in moving a cross-member influence the ways in which apprentices view 
religious and social practice. When these effects are amalgamated in the biographies 
of hundreds of apprentice sailors then large-scale social and religious change is easy 
to understand.
Two months later, when another apprentice started work, Majid laughed with the 
others as the recruit attempted to pass the foreman his own flip-flop.
6.32. Language
The discussion now turns to other apprentice lessons and experiences to which the 
neophyte is exposed as he learns to handle and manipulate the technologies of 
production. It has been shown in the previous chapter that a large component of ‘easy 
knowledge’ is non-linguistic. However, language plays an important role as a 
medium of instruction, a form of identification, a manner in which friendship and 
camaraderie are communicated, and as a way of passing the time while the body is 
working. This section examines the uses of language in shipyards and the effects that 
particular linguistic processes have upon apprentices.
Throughout Kachchh there are considerable differences in the pronunciation of 
the language, and while it is difficult for a Gujarati speaker to follow Kachchhi, the 
variant of Kachchhi spoken by Mandvi’s Muslim seafarers is widely understood 
along the western seaboard of India and beyond. This way of speaking is variably 
called dariyani bhasha (language of the sea) and vahaanvattani bhasha (language of
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sailors). Kharvas speak a Gujarati laden version and the Bhadalas emphasise the 
Kachchhi element with heavy borrowing from Arabic. This is a language spoken 
between men that has developed to convey specialised technical information about 
ships, places, people and trade. The technologies of shipbuilding, as in other 
languages, are articulated with a large and precise vocabulary. The grammar is 
identical to Kachchhi, but pronunciation and meaning vary considerably. As has been 
shown, in Kachchhi a chappal is a slipper, while in the speech style of the shipyards 
it is a ‘wedge’. There are many equivalent examples, and distinct technical words, 
for example, for the first fifteen planks of a hull, and an array of different terms for 
rope, for wood grain, meteorological and wave patterns, commerce and navigation.
Among the Bhadala this language draws on religious idioms, seen in ship names 
such as Al Barakat (wealth and abundance), Azadi (freedom), Mahmudi (goodness), 
Naseri (help) and Salamati (safety). The language of greeting and departure is also 
explicitly Muslim in style. Salam aleikum (peace be with you) starts, and kudha hafiz 
(God’s faith) ends, most formal conversations as people pass by the shipyards. 
Likewise, in ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship radio communications the international 
standards of ‘do you read me’ and ‘out’ have been replaced by salam aleikum and 
kudha hafiz. However, in the daily grind of shipyard work hierarchy dictates how 
such greetings are conferred. In work situations this broadly means that younger 
labourers can greet their seniors in this fashion but the reverse rarely occurs. If the 
hierarchical distance between men is too great then casual greetings are not 
exchanged, for example labourers do not greet the owner of the ship, unless it is 
unavoidable, or they have something specific to request. The formal language of 
welcoming high-status business contacts and friends into the yards is in a stark 
contrast to the coarse and colourful language used among those building ships. But in 
the yard’s office and in the ship’s hull men are constantly evaluating when it is 
appropriate to use certain kinds of language and behaviour, and when it is not. For 
example, a Bhadala-Pathan may loudly ask for a cigarette from a European 
anthropologist but then disappears out of sight to smoke it. As ships take around two
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years to build the degrees of appropriateness are established quickly and transform as 
men gain experience and elevation within the hierarchy.
In the description above, Kachchhi is the standard from which shipyard language 
deviates. The relationship between Kachchhi language and the speech community at 
sea has been described in this way because it is how apprentices in shipyards 
understand it. Kachchhi, in one form or another is typically the language of the 
home, and starting to work in shipyards necessitates having to learn the vocabulary 
and style of the shipyard language. The longer men work in shipyards the greater the 
difference there is between talking at work and talking at home. This difference is 
not only one of vocabulary it is also one characterised by differing evaluations of 
hierarchy and respect. The language of shipping and perceptions of hierarchy unites 
the vahaanvatta. Others, not familiar with the language, are restricted to the degree 
to which they can understand and participate in vahaanvatta conversations. The 
language thus provides degrees of secrecy and commonality, which allows those who 
are not associated with the sea to identify those who are by the way that they speak. 
However, the extent to which individuals have power over language and forms of 
address is dictated by their position in the vahaanvatta hierarchy.
This can be seen in joking, which is a significant part of linguistic exchange in 
shipyards. For jokes and parodies to provoke laughter, amusement and shame, the 
social principles on which they are based have, to some degree, to be shared by the 
joker and the listener. Here ‘joking’ refers to linguistic constructs that subvert or 
distort knowledge of the social world. Jokes in shipyards degrade, humiliate and 
question the intelligence and moral character of ‘others’. Who tells jokes in shipyards 
and how they are received is largely dictated by the hierarchical context. As with 
greetings, not every man has the same right to speech or to an audience. Joking in 
shipyards broadly covers three themes: hierarchy, kinship and sex and religion.
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6.33. Playing with hierarchy
Jokes that parody hierarchy are the most common method of provoking laughter. 
Among the Kachchhi labourers the common targets of ridicule are the Hindu Andhra 
Pradeshis who work alongside them as carpenters. However, there are subtler forms. 
A labourer’s foreman sprained his ankle between two frames and could not return to 
work for a week. In his absence this incident provoked much comment and laughter: 
“How stupid that foreman is to have made such an elementary mistake”; “He should 
have known better -  perhaps the sister fucker is stupid”; and “He has no more sense 
than a labourer so why is he the foreman?” The foreman’s temporary absence 
disrupted work so the seth brevetted a labourer to fill the role. The foreman’s 
accident provoked laughter among the labourers, but the labourer’s promotion 
produced mild hysteria. The labourer was younger than many of the others, but more 
experienced. He was not properly qualified to do foreman’s work because he had 
never been to sea, nor had his apprenticeship taken him through all the stages of ship 
construction. The other labourers mocked him constantly when the ship owner was 
out of earshot. They started to call him sarang (foreman), parodied his instructions 
and commands, and made comments on the quality of his work. Despite the fact that 
the labourers did as the temporary foreman instructed them, he was uneasy with his 
sudden, albeit temporary, elevation. He knew that he did not know how to be a 
foreman and was relieved when the real foreman came back to work. This is an 
unusual example, because in most circumstances jokes allude to men being of a 
lower status than they actually are. The most common form is for experienced 
labourers to call other labourers ‘petoriya’ (cook’s assistant), implying that they were 
not adequate labourers. Similarly, older men derogatorily call younger men ‘boy’ and 
boys call other boys ‘boy’. In the case of the temporary foreman the humour was 
justified, as it was not insulting someone who was actually of higher status than those 
making the jokes. The fact that such a seemingly innocuous and temporary change of 
status could provide so much fun points to the importance of hierarchy and the 
qualities embodied by those at the various stations within the vahaanvatta.
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6.34. Kinship and sex
By far the most common forms of address in shipyards are mayudder (mother 
fucker) and bahen chod (sister fucker). Mothers and sisters are the two central incest 
prohibitions for Mandvi’s Muslims. At first it is strange listening to brothers calling 
each other ‘mother fuckers’, but like most expletives the terms are seldom used with 
their original meanings in place and can almost become terms of endearment. Joking 
about the moral status of other men and their associates is common. This falls short 
of actual commentary on the mothers and sisters of those who work in the yard, but 
does extend to women who live in the same areas of Mandvi as the shipyard workers.
The shipyards are good surveillance posts. From the gantry outside shipyard huts, 
or from the scaffolding surrounding the hull of a ship, the whole of the estuary can be 
seen. The comings and goings of people provide a constant source of amusement for 
men working in the yards. As men and women cross the river throughout the day, 
stories will be told, real and Active, about where individuals are going, whom they 
are going to secretly liase with, and how long the affair has been going on. These are 
sometimes creative fictions that involve a cast of characters that make regular 
journeys. Those who make regular crossings, and the creative stories that surround 
them, become markers of time. Girls and women who return from the market or from 
school at a fixed-time are particularly popular timekeepers. When such-and-such 
took his comb from his back pocket and straightened his hair everyone in that yard 
knew that it must be five past three, and that shortly, such-and-such a girl would be 
crossing the river with her friends, a journey that she made every weekday.
Broadly, hierarchy in shipyards also corresponds to marital status and experience 
of sex. Most of the labourers are unmarried, have seldom been outside Kachchh and 
have no experience of sex. The majority of men who work in shipyards eventually 
loose their virginity in brothels in Bombay and Dubai. Apprentices are told about 
brothels: how much they cost, where good ones are, and how to get the most from 
such a visit. Knowledge plays with ignorance as older men tease younger men about
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what sex is and how sex is done. All within the hierarchy are united in their mockery 
of the Andhra Pradeshi men who live communally together without women.
6.35. Neophyte questions
Experienced men devoted a considerable amount of time to telling tales about 
foreign ports, of brothels, bars and scams. Apprentices, rather than risking having 
things thrown at them for their stupidity, asked about behaviours on ships and 
whether they would be allowed to take shore leave. In answer they would be told of 
cleaning, maintenance duties and the tedium of weeks spent in port waiting for cargo, 
customs clearance or the resolution of immigration technicalities. Apprentices also 
asked if they could watch videos in the cabin at night and talk on the radio to their 
family. The answer to these questions was usually an abrupt ‘no’, occasionally 
followed by a list of exceptions. Apprentices also asked: “Where will we sleep when 
the sea is rough?” and “What happens if someone falls overboard from the toilet?” 
For these kinds of questions it is more difficult to be specific about the response, for 
the types of knowledge drawn on are a specific to a ship’s protocol, which people 
would be less willing to divulge, perhaps because they did not know how they knew 
the answers to such questions themselves. Moving around ships at sea is thought of 
as another form of ‘easy knowledge’, the type of thing men get to know through 
experience and verbal questions and answers revealed very little. Those new to 
sailing are given no formal instruction about the regulations and safety procedures 
aboard ship. When I asked sailors about their first time at sea they would recall the 
excitement and trepidation, which turned to a mild form of fear as soon as they left 
the safety of the estuary and the sea started to roll. For most, when they returned 
home from their first season at sea, they had become vahaanvatti and were proud.
These exchanges are more candid than in the apprentice’s home environment, 
where social pressure and patterns of respect and deference tend to filter out much of 
the more colourful material. When sitting at home with one’s sisters and mother, the 
price of a Russian prostitute in Dubai is not a legitimate topic of conversation. But in
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shipyards such conversations only serve to enhance the enthusiasm of the potential 
sailors. This period of time introduces them to: the delights of foreign ports; the 
dream of escaping the pressures of local social restrictions, and the many ways in 
which it is possible to subsidise their wages. When they come to the yards they know 
that a certain amount of small-scale personal trade is permitted while they are 
working at sea. Their families might be recipients of goods from such activity. Most 
of this trade is illegal because it relies on avoiding payment of import duties, and as a 
result such trade remains something of a taboo subject. This is not the case in the 
shipyards where young recruits, eager to learn the secrets and the best sources of 
such goods, let more experienced workers brag about their own exploits. These 
examples show that apprenticeship gradually alters the parameters of legitimate 
conversation in parallel with a changing horizon of expectations.
6.36. Jokes about Hindus
In shipyards jokes about Hindus are frequently and repetitively told. A typical 
example, which circulated for a few months in mid-1998, is a joke about Hindu 
religious integrity. It went like this: a Hindu man wants to find out what is ‘truth’, in 
order to complete his quest he decides to consult saddhus (renouncers). He journeys 
to visit a series of them, each more powerful and located further from the man’s 
home than the last, and importantly, each is wearing less clothing than the last. The 
saddhus offer the man their own versions of ‘truth’, but the man is unsatisfied with 
all the answers until he finds holiest saddhu of all -  who is totally naked. The joke 
ends there and evidently needs some explanation! Jokes, like this, are told in a 
Muslim environment: the shipyards. They are not recounted in public places where 
Hindus (Telugus don’t count) may overhear. The joke degrades the Hindu ‘truth’ in 
three ways. First, the man has to go to visit other men (saddhus) in order to find out 
what the ‘truth’ is. For the shipyard workers the truth increasingly belongs in the 
Koran and with Allah. Secondly, each saddhu has a different version of ‘truth’. For 
shipyard workers this implies the chaos and illusions of Hinduism, in which ‘truth’ is 
something that men can control and dictate. Thirdly, the ultimate ‘truth’ is relayed to
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the man by another man who is totally naked. Even men labouring under a hot sun in 
shipyards dress modestly in shirtpant (typically, tailored nylon trousers and shirts), 
nakedness is immodest and improper. More importantly nakedness is the most 
powerful sign of insanity, thus, the joke tells that the Hindu version of truth comes 
from the insane. The insane do not know how to behave; they are asocial beings that 
live by their own rules; and they are dirty. It is told from a perspective where Islamic 
practice is the antidote to the perilous realm of Hinduism. Of course not all those 
who work in the shipyards react to the joke in the same way because they have 
different understandings of both Hinduism and Islam, but I heard this joke frequently 
and always told by ship owners to those labouring on their ships.
Jokes about Hindus are also derived from the commentary ship owners provide on 
the constant stream of Hindus and Jains (who to Muslims form one social category), 
who come down to the river to pray and feed dogs, gulls and crows. The ship owners 
inform the labourers what the Hindus on the water’s edge are doing. One particular 
Bhadala-Pathan seth was a master at this kind of humour. The following five 
examples all come from his repertoire, but less masterful commentaries could also be 
heard in all the other shipyards. His commentaries show a clear understanding of 
Hindu religious thought and an implicit antidote to be found in Muslim religious 
practice. It is also interesting to note that the themes of crows, respect for money, 
dirtiness, and particular deities have already appeared in previous chapters as 
metaphors and accusations that attested to the low status of Muslims.
Hindus come to the river as sevaks for animals, to dispose of dangerous offerings 
made to angry gods and goddesses, and to perform puja to deities associated with the 
sea. The spoils of these offerings attract the attention of birds. As commentary, the 
seth might say: “You see that woman? She thinks that her dead husband is a crow, 
but she cannot recognise him and feeds them all.” The implication is that in death the 
woman’s husband has been miraculously reincarnated as a crow, but the woman is of 
such a moral character that she does not recognise him so feeds all the crows and in 
the process she promiscuously gives herself to them all. Or he might have said: “That
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man loves dogs. He feeds them well so we can throw sticks at them. They think that 
dogs are gods -  what kind of people are they that see their gods running around in 
packs?” Dogs, because they are considered dirty, have a notoriously hard time in 
Muslim society. The packs of scavenging dogs that roam around the estuary are not 
welcome in the shipyards. It is common to see dogs with open wounds full of live 
maggots, they are often killed as a form of sport by projectile throwing shipyard 
workers. Apprentices learn to watch out for dogs and to scare them away before they 
are bitten. Part of the puja offered to sea deities, in keeping with the model presented 
in Chapter 2, is money (mostly in the form of obsolete coinage) given up to the sea in 
the hope of greater returns. Such regular offerings prompted the comment: “These 
people come down to the river everyday to throw their money into the water. They 
have no respect for money and recklessly throw it away. You [apprentices] can pick 
it out of the mud on your way home when the tide is low.” Related to this is the fate 
of the other ritual puja items (rice, incense and flowers) that wash into the shipyards. 
This debris is collected and incinerated by apprentices along with the rest of the 
flotsam. He said of this: “They come over here and throw rubbish in our place 
showing that they have no respect for us.” He also had a series of comments to make 
about the deities to which the offerings were made, the one repeated most frequently 
was: “They believe that god rides a horse under the sea, which is why they come 
down to our place to demand things from him.”
These litanies are constant and create a derisory picture of what Hindus do and 
the superstition on which Hindu action is based. The commentaries are mocking and 
sentient. They are enmeshed in a more powerful linguistic commentary on Islamic 
practice and reform. One validates the other. Through linguistic commentaries on the 
actions of people in the landscape, ship owners and others well positioned within the 
hierarchy, present a model of the world that is both amusing and persuasive to 
apprentices. This model is not based on abstract speculation, but on what can be seen 
and heard while men are labouring to build ships.
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When I first met Majid he was twenty-seven and had been learning this language 
for more than ten years. He clearly recalled going to the shipyards for the first time 
and not being able to understand much of what was being said, because the words 
and the approach to conversation were alien to his previous experiences. 
Apprenticeship in shipyards involves learning this language and the specialised 
vocabulary of ship parts and procedures. There is no manual to help them do this, 
they learn the vocabulary and pronunciation through hearing words and idioms 
repeatedly. But the linguistic transformation from novice to master is more than mere 
vocabulary. The way in which the language is used is symptomatic of attitudes 
towards hierarchy, masculinity and religion. Majid, as with other apprentices, was 
presented with linguistic commands and commentaries, which, in order to carry out 
his work, he had to react and respond to. Hierarchy is represented in the objects of 
production through task performance, command structure, the right to ridicule and 
the mastery of appropriate linguistic commentary. It is shown later that wealth (like 
the examples of humiliation, commands and sexual predation discussed above) also 
flows downward through the hierarchy and eventually lands at the feet of the hapless 
apprentice.
6.38. Mukhdummi Sha
There are other forms of language used to convey meaning in apprenticeship in 
addition to the language of praxis in shipyards. These other forms include the 
religious discourses sponsored primarily by the Bhadala-Pathan at the mosque-shrine 
of Mukhdummi Sha. Mandvi’s main shrines contain modest mosques. In contrast, 
the new mosques of Salaya stand in isolation from shrines. The exception to this rule 
is the tomb of Mukhdummi Sha, the saint whose mausoleum stands at the entrance to 
Salaya. Rebuilt with money donated by Bhadala-Pathans in the mid-1980s, it is 
managed by a non-Saiyed committee. It serves as a model for religion without 
intermediary Saiyeds, and is the site of a formal weekly meeting addressed by 
prominent religious figures, which apprentices are encouraged to attend. The 
meetings offer Koranic interpretations in Kachchhi and Urdu, and outlines of ideal
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models for Muslim weddings and prayer that the congregation is encouraged to 
adhere to. Emphasis is placed on the role of the Friday Mosque in Muslim religious 
life. As mentioned in previous chapters there is no Friday Mosque in Mandvi, where 
mosques are 7 a/-specific. In Salaya, the Friday Mosque is portrayed as the correct
focus of Muslim religious practices.
In the language of these meetings Saiyeds are portrayed as ‘magic men’, ‘Muslim 
Brahmans’ and as relics of former times. Contact with splashes of cow urine on the 
way to the mosque is described as the worst pollutant for Muslim ritual purity. This 
example obviously takes the animal most sacred to Hindus as a key symbol. The 
selection of this example is clearly politically expedient and became a frequently 
cited maxim among sailors. Cows, common on the streets of Mandvi but totally 
absent from Salaya, are to be avoided on the way to the mosque because splashes of 
urine render the man impure. This contrasts with the purity ascribed to bovine urine 
by many Hindus. Drumming and other forms of music are also dismissed as 
improper for Muslim ritual practice. Interestingly, given the discussion in Chapter 2, 
the horse is also singled out as an unfitting sign for Muslims. Horses carry the groom 
in most Hindu marriage processions and in the marriages of wealthier Muslims in 
Mandvi. However, in the model of correct marriage practice presented to apprentices 
at the Mukhdummi Sha meetings the horse is not portrayed as a sign of status but as 
a sign of ignorance -  a sign of Hinduism, and, as shown below, a sign of being a 
‘traditional’ Muslim. The meetings start and end with thanks to the benevolence and 
piety of such-and-such a ship owner who made the congregation possible.
In the mosque complex, above the heads of the congregation, there is large 
painting (Plate 18 for a poor reproduction). It depicts the view from above the tomb 
of the saint overlooking the river and Mandvi town. In the estuary are ships flying 
Muslim-green flags. The perspective taken does not look out onto a wondrous 
landscape. The obverse is the case: the standpoint is the divine source of power. The 
further the viewer’s gaze is transported into the landscape the further from sanctity 
and piety they are taken. This picture is a representation of religious propriety in the
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landscape. At these meetings much of what apprentices hear takes as a negative 
example the practices of their own jamats and neighbourhoods. They hear of what 
makes ‘good practice’, which is significantly wrapped in a particular way of 
conceiving time and space. The terms ‘traditional’, ‘modem’ and ‘syncretic’, as 
problematic as they are in anthropological discussion, are words that shipyard 
workers hear at these meetings describing social transformation and the Islamic 
vision of Salaya’s ship owners. ‘Tradition’, sometimes glossed with the phrase ‘the 
teeth of a donkey’, refers to the order of hierarchy and religious practice that they 
perceive as characterising the social life of Mandvi. It is opposed by the ‘modem’, 
metaphorically described as ‘the teeth of a comb’, which is the social ordering of 
Salaya, ships, commodities and what are construed as new forms of Islam. The 
irregularity and heterogeneity of one half of the metaphor is contrasted sharply with 
the uniformity and homogeneity of the latter. In other words, the hierarchy principled 
on blood purity and jamat separation, over which Saiyeds preside, is contrasted with 
the employment hierarchy of the vahaanvatta, which is focused around the Friday 
mosque. While ‘syncretic’, translated loosely from the Kachchhi word 
ugulumbugulum, meaning ‘all mixed up’, refers to a distant past before the Bhadala 
became Muslim and lived as Hindus.
Crossing the river, as Majid did to start work as an apprentice, means crossing the 
border between ‘traditional’ and ‘modem’, and from dar al-kafir to dar al-islam. 
Thus modernisation is at the centre of the Bhadalas’ attempt to reform local Muslim 
society, and in some ways also stands as a source of legitimisation. In the language 
of the Mukhdummi Sha meetings the ‘impure’ are described as such not because of 
miscegenation or ‘mixed blood’, but because they are afflicted with Hinduism 
(another form of miscegenation). It is only ‘impure’ people who are troubled by 
ghosts, fall victim to the ‘evil eye’ and patronise intermediaries that provide them 
with access to Allah. These things are associated with Mandvi and the ‘syncretic’ 
past. The ‘pure’ Islam of the reformers invokes the mosque and the Koran. This 
invocation not only details correct action before Allah, but also describes the way in 
which apprentices can escape the perilous and precarious accretions of Hinduism.
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The reformers acknowledge the existence of Hindu cosmology in order to posit it as 
antithetical to the Islam that they promote. Hinduism and Islam are presented to 
neophytes in an hierarchical relationship: Hinduism is corrupt, polytheistic, 
idolatrous and impure, and is paralleled among Mandvi’s Muslims by a hierarchy 
premised on the axiomatic blood of the Saiyed; while Islam of the mosque is 
monotheistic and pure in its brotherhood. Muslims in Mandvi and the lower orders of 
the shipping fraternity are associated with corrupt forms of Islam, which lean 
dangerously towards the kind of cosmological model that reformers attribute to 
Hinduism.
In this sense, Hinduism and ‘traditional’ Islam are seen as engaging with very real 
human and metaphysical realities. They are not seen as being based on hollow 
illusory principles. Ashapura Mata, Ravalpir, Dariyapir, Dariyalal, Kurma, Krishna, 
Ram, Vishnu, fakirs and Saiyeds are all seen as real, and as engaging with forces and 
channels of power that exist in worldly and non-worldly forms. However, they are 
not gods in the sense of Allah, the god elevated as transcendental through the 
Bhadalas’ patronage. The kinds of Islamic practice advocated by the Bhadala- 
Pathans offer something of a fragile path through the perilous realms of corrupt and 
demoniac beliefs. For example, one of the Mukhdummi Sha meetings was held on 
the subject of ghosts, magic and jinn. At this meeting the congregation learned that it 
was only the impure who saw ghosts and who could be afflicted with negative magic 
forces. Those most prone to being haunted were of course Hindus, followed by 
‘traditional’ Muslims. The message was that ghosts, benign and malicious, were out 
there, but they could be avoided through maintaining pure ritual practices. This is 
what was meant in Chapter 4 when the Islam advocated by the Bhadala-Pathans is 
described as offering the potential for salvation. The examples given at this meeting 
concerned purifying ablutions after contact with defiling substances, such as urine 
and the products of sexual intercourse. Unless these substances are removed 
correctly they attract ghosts and other negative forces. At another level the practice 
of regular prayer and reading from the Koran was presented as a routine that prevents
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individuals from improper speculation and from wandering into the realms of false 
gods and demons.
Non-Bhadala apprentices from Mandvi find their conceptions of what constitutes 
‘being Muslim’ and ‘being in a hierarchy’ at variance with that posited by their new 
employers. They are encouraged to renounce their lackadaisical approach to prayer, 
their relationships with supernatural intermediaries and the use of ritualistic 
paraphernalia and music. In effect they grow into the Islamic model posited by the 
men who own the ships on which they work. The idioms that grade Mandvi’s jamat 
hierarchy (pak and napak) have been taken by the Bhadala and transformed into a 
hierarchy in which Muslims are to Hindus as the Bhadala are to their crews.
Hindus and Mandvi’s Muslims are bound together in a model of time -  where 
‘original’ is definitely not best. From the Bhadalas’ perspective the content of their 
reforms are not solely a product of a divide between Muslims and Hindus, rather they 
are a result of divisions among Muslims based on archaic and corrupt principles that 
deny them the status they feel that they are due. The Bhadala do not see the violence 
of 1983 as a result of their volatile blood, but as the result of an earlier betrayal by 
Mandvi’s Muslims from which they eventually and fortuitously prospered when 
Dubai opened as a free port in the 1970s. The highest ranking of Mandvi’s 
mercantile jamats, for whom the Bhadala were bonded sailors, deserted them, 
migrating to East Africa in large numbers and giving up shipping. This, the Bhadala 
say, left them unemployed and starving until they unwittingly fell into the power 
vacuum that was left. Religious reform, as a form of social opposition, is on one 
level directed against Hindus, but it is also directed at Muslims who deny the 
Bhadalas’ claim to high ‘mercantile’ status because of their ‘mixed blood’. The 
Bhadala see their best chance of escaping the violent relations with Hindu lascars as 
a sustained attack on the Muslim social order, rather than through the accumulation 
and elaboration of random signs of Islam. Through these processes the apprentice 
labour force also takes home hostility towards their jamat organisation and their 
Hindu neighbours with whom they grew up.
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6.4. Life at sea (see Plates 16 and 17)
After four months of working in the shipyard the seth informed Majid that he had 
applied for an ‘identity card’ on his behalf. A few months later Majid set to sea on a 
decrepit old ship. After eighteen days of making little headway the ship’s crankshaft 
broke and the crew had to use the auxiliary sail. One man fell overboard and was lost 
as the monsoon winds whipped up the sea. Majid helped with the cooking, handled 
ropes and attempted to collect rainwater. The rotten sail quickly tore in the gusty 
winds, and after many days drifting they ran out of drinking water. The crew was 
afraid because the Pakistani navy regularly impounds ships with Indian flags and 
imprisons the crews indefinitely. This time the crew was lucky and the ship was 
towed to Mandvi by a fishing boat. Majid received no payment for the voyage. 
Indeed, his second experience at sea was no more lucrative or enjoyable than the 
first, and he began to doubt the wisdom of his decision to make a career at sea. Back 
once again in Mandvi, Majid started to look for a position on another ship, but the 
captain of the ill-fated voyages refused to release Majid’s identity card. Majid 
worked for a further three months on the ship in dry dock before his identity card 
was returned. By this time he had worked for around seven months for hardly any 
personal remuneration.
Disheartened, in 1987, now seventeen, Majid returned to work in the provision 
store in Bombay. From there he joined the Al Karimi, a ship that had a contract to 
haul a regular cargo of melons from Bombay to Dubai. Majid received no salary, but 
because the cargo was regular he received cash for loading and unloading. Again he 
grew disillusioned after he was cheated by other members of the crew who took a 
larger share of the profits than Majid thought was fair on some clothes and watches 
they had brought from Dubai. Becoming a sailor has a powerful allure for young men 
in Mandvi, stemming from the fixed wages (higher than they could locally earn) 
supplemented through this personal trade. The allure also comes from expanding 
webs of influence, the attraction of foreign ports, access to prestigious goods and 
American Dollars, and the possibility of being recruited to work in the Gulf States.
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Although the focus of this chapter is primarily concerned with the biographies of 
sailors, their life-style is intimately connected with labour and commercial migration. 
Many sailors jump ship to find work in the Gulf where as their language skills and 
technological competence increases so do the prestige and rewards derived from their 
employment. Many sailors later find work on supply ships servicing offshore oilrigs, 
and as manual labourers onshore. In addition to cargo, the ships seasonally carry men 
to and from work between Kachchh and the Gulf. The routes ploughed by the ships 
have become cultural corridors for the flow of goods, men and ideas. Majid found 
other work on other ships, and gradually, as he gained further experience at sea, he 
was able to earn increasingly large and regular salaries, until he was earning as much 
as he had been in Bombay three years before. He lost his virginity in a Russian 
owned brothel in Dubai, tasted whiskey and learned how to transport goods from 
Dubai to India without paying import tax.
6.41. The off-season
Each year, when his contracts allow, Majid returns to Mandvi for three months, 
preferably during the off-season. During this time, Majid, as with many young men 
from Mandvi, has spare time and disposable income. His dress, swagger, speech, 
consumption patterns and clothing became increasingly ostentatious. In the initial 
years of his apprenticeship he wore religion on his shirtsleeves, changing counterfeit 
sports clothes for a freshly laundered salwar kamis for prayer on Fridays. Among the 
generation of sailors after Majid the rather fitting fashion, given their lifestyle, was a 
shell-suit embroidered with the slogan ‘Just do it International’. On Fridays, Majid 
also removed his heavy gold jewellery (otherwise considered haram), and sprinkled 
rose water on his wrists and around his neck, rather than the counterfeit after-shave 
he wore throughout the week. Fridays are devoted to Allah and to displaying 
imported religious garb and knowledge. Majid and his like play at being seth, oiling 
their hair, and wearing white robes and leather slippers. Their posturing becomes 
more dignified. They lose the sailors swagger for the day and imitate the posturing 
and demeanour of the seths. In their local mosques, the time and effort they have put
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into dressing and smelling, makes them stand out from their poorer (non-sailor) 
brethren. For Mandvi’s younger sailors, going to the mosque is a performance of 
their wealth and new-found awareness of consumption and Islam. However, as men 
mature (as they marry and gain promotion) this pomposity recedes, the counterfeit 
clothing is handed down and the salwar kamis is worn all of the time.
Many of Mandvi’s younger sailors have little work during the off-season. They 
spend much time parading around the town and congregating in teashops. They 
roister, pose and show off their counterfeit finery, all of which frequently leads to 
fighting. The majority of these fights occur with Kharva men (who are also home for 
the season) over disputes typically between sailors and non-Kharvas. Illicit ‘love 
affairs’ between sailors and women they see in the bazaar or with whom they were at 
school can continue for many seasons. Typically, Muslim sailors are attracted to 
Hindu girls because they are given more freedom to move around than their Muslim 
counter-parts and are viewed as more fitting subjects for lustful thoughts than fellow 
Muslims (they are also seen as ‘easier’).
The Bhadalas’ reform process is persuasive, and the degree to which it influences 
the sailors is evident on the streets of Mandvi during the off-season. Bhadala sailors 
are encouraged to pray and take part in a daily football tournament that runs 
throughout the off-season. Football matches sponsored by the Bhadala Jamat take 
place in Salaya before dusk. The timing is not an accident because it keeps young 
men from straying into Mandvi’s bazaar, and after the game the teams and spectators 
go to magrib namaz (fourth prayers of the day). In this sense, the seths are keen to 
keep young Bhadala men away from Mandvi. However, non-Bhadala sailors are 
given more autonomy and this frequently brings them into conflict with Kharva men 
in Mandvi. Many Muslim sailors are of the opinion that Kharva women are willing 
game, derived from a rumour in shipyards which states that one of the rules of the 
Kharva Samaj is that if a Kharva does not return to his wife within a year of going to 
sea (or taking a plane to Oman) then she is allowed to turn to other sources for sexual 
gratification. In his life Majid had a series of fights with Kharvas and in 1998 he
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courted further trouble by pursuing a Kharva woman whose husband was a migrant 
labourer in Oman.
Modem shipping produces sailors for whom both Hindus and the Muslim jamat 
society are necessarily inferior. Bhadala reform informs and is informed by religious 
violence and subjugation to merchants and Saiyeds alike. These processes are 
altering the relationships between Muslims of the ‘modem’, and Muslims of the 
‘traditional’ social orders, as well as differentiating Mandvi’s Muslims from their 
Hindu neighbours by creating ambiguity and uncertainty about the nature of Muslim 
society. As the Bhadala continue to expand their fleet they draw more of Mandvi’s 
Muslims into the spell of a life at sea. Through these mechanisms the hierarchy that 
revolves around the Bhadalas’ religious practice, wealth and internationalism, 
expands. This process is gradually deflecting hostility away from them and towards 
the new generation of sailors. How some of these relationships are played out can be 
seen in the various ways in which the Muslim festival of Moharam is 
commemorated.
6.5. Moharam
When Majid was young he lived in the northwest of Mandvi in an area known as 
Mutchi Pith. He recalls participating in the organisation and festivities of Moharam 
at the shrine that owned his house, but gradually, as the years, passed he has 
participated less and less in the festival. During Moharam in 1998 Majid went to the 
mosque at lunchtime and stayed in his house for the rest of the day. In the light of the 
process of religious and social transformation that is evident among sailors this 
section looks at the contrasting celebrations of Moharam and examines further 
sources of legitimacy drawn upon by the Bhadala-Pathans in their quest for social 
and religious perfection.
Outside India Moharam is a Shia event marking the martyrdom of Hussein, the 
third apostolic Imam. In India the event is widely observed by Sunnis. Generally,
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among elite Sunni communities throughout western India there is hostility towards 
Moharam, which also sometimes finds expression in conflict between Shias and 
Sunnis. The differences between Sunni Muslims that are evident in the ways of 
marking the festival were concisely expressed by a senior sailor on a Bhadala-Pathan 
ship: “During Moharam we should pray at the mosque and be sad in remembering 
the martyrdom of Hussein. It is not a time to flirt and dance in the street.” This is the 
typical attitude of those who ‘pray’ towards those who ‘play’. The ‘players’ commit 
a series of acts that defile the orthopraxy defined by the ‘praying’ Bhadala. Playing 
involves: exaggerated public exhibitions of ‘pseudo grief (for the martyrs), the 
performance and amplification of music, the fabrication of replica shrines, which 
become conduits of individual desire, and the inter-mingling of men and women in 
spaces where they are not architecturally or morally segregated.
Despite the prominence of those who oppose Moharam, it remains the most 
popular of Muslim festivals. Thousands of people come from the surrounding 
villages to watch the musical processions and follow the dancers through the streets. 
The first days of the lunar month of Moharam are reserved for mourning the death of 
the Imam Hussein on the battlefields of Kabala (see Sharif 1921:157). The days that 
are thought to have special significance during this period vary considerably, with 
each mosque in Mandvi having a slightly different set of observances distinguishing 
it from other mosques. It will be recalled from previous chapters that mosques in 
Mandvi are jamat- specific, or the congregations are formed by a majority from one 
or a number of related jamats. Therefore the details of the different days set aside for 
fasting and prayer are expressions of jamat distinctiveness. However, regardless of 
whether the first twelve or thirteen days of the month are reserved for austerities, the 
Muslims who participate in the festival come together on the tenth day on the 
Mandvi bank of the estuary.
During the first few days of the month the buildings (imambaras) that house the 
tazias (the mock shrines of the martyrs) are opened and decorated. In the following 
days tazias are competitively decorated with bright paper, plastic ornamentation,
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electric lights and loudspeakers. Replicas of the horse on which Mohammed is said 
to have ascended to heaven lead the processions. Here again the horse is an important 
symbol, singled out by the Bhadala as a false image that reflects the ignorance of the 
‘traditional’ Muslims.
The three main imambaras are located in Mutchi Pith, Bhadala Pod and Salaya. 
Together they represent the martyr Ali and his sons Hussan and Hussein. On the 
tenth day of Moharam the tazias are paraded round the town, surrounded by 
flagellants who perform a slow rhythmical dance to the accompaniment of drums and 
to cries of ‘ya Ali, ya Ali, Shah Hussan, Shah Hussein’ (friend Ali, friend Ali, King 
Hussan, King Hussein). Towards dusk, amid large crowds, the different processions 
congregate at the river. Before each tazia there is a flurry of activity as men and 
women jostle for the chance to break a coconut and to offer a wish or a prayer. The 
tazias are carried into the centre of the estuary as the tide turns, where they are 
swiftly rotated alternately clockwise and anti-clockwise three times. In the minutes 
before, the crowds fell silent, only to let forth a huge cry as the rotations commenced. 
The number of rotations again signifies the number of martyrs, while the coincidence 
with the changing tide is thought to be a custom that remains from the days when the 
Bhadala were the main participants in the event.
The seths gathered along the Salaya side of the estuary. Their visibility was an 
expression of their absence from the celebrations. They watched the events from a 
distance, but their white-clad figures were clearly visible against the dull colours of 
mud and ship timber. For the Bhadala-Pathans the public performance of Moharam is 
a vulgar expression of the ignorance of Mandvi’s Muslims, who show their true 
nature in public, Hindu-style behaviour. The Bhadala-Pathan watch Muslims pray to 
false shrines, sing, dance and flirt without modesty. On another level the Bhadala- 
Pathan regard Moharam as an explicitly anti-Muslim practice. At a meeting at 
Mukhdummi Sha, a few days before Moharam started, the speaker told how the 
assassins of Ali’s sons marched triumphantly back to their city, mockingly shouting 
the names of the martyrs whose heads they had mounted on poles. The Moharam
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processions had turned tragedy, and the display of Muslim defeat, into a celebration. 
The standards (baring hands and other symbols of the martyrdom) carried before the 
tazias are seen as paradoxically commemorating the victory of the enemy -  not the 
sadness of martyrdom. This is a heterodox interpretation of events, but it left a 
lasting impression on the congregation. Additionally, the Moharam processions are 
described as having been ‘borrowed’ from Hinduism and it is argued that they should 
be abandoned as a sign of Muslim progress and modernity. Whatever the historical 
contingency of the event, the seths deliberately portray the festival as having roots in 
the ritual tradition of Hindus. The sermon that presented these two critical 
perspectives on Moharam among Mandvi’s Muslims conflated the two issues. Many 
of those present left having made the association between the historical tragedies of 
the Muslim tradition and the presence of Hinduism in their lives. These forms of 
religious discourse do not invest any store in unpeeling historical contingencies and 
mutual influences of Hinduism and Islam. More generally, as seen in the portrayal of 
Moharam, they present Hinduism as archaic and corrupt, and Islam as modem and 
pure.
Although many of the Muslims of Mandvi and Salaya are linked in their 
observance of prayer and fasting during Moharam, the Bhadala-Pathan tend to 
overlook this commonality. They see no continuity between the way in which they 
commemorate the festival and the way in which it is celebrated by Muslims on the 
opposite bank of the river. Moharam in Salaya is regarded as a new phenomenon that 
is practised in new mosques under a new Islamic ethos. Here, as with Nava Naroj, 
the presence of the past is consciously evaluated as departing from the ancestral way 
of doing things. Thus, for the Bhadala, ‘ancestors’ take on a peculiar and displaced 
relationship in the present, especially when it comes to the festivities of Moharam. 
The continuity in historical memory that could have been given by patrilineal 
genealogy and the observance of ‘traditional’ festivals has been deliberately 
overshadowed by the effects of a series of migrations. The most significant migration 
was crossing the river, from dar al-kafir to create dar al-islam. In doing so they left 
behind the seasons of labour bonded to mercantile capital. Later came the seasonal
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migrations (lesser pilgrimages) to the ports of the Gulf States, which generated the 
potential for social migration from ‘sailor’ to ‘merchant’. The result of these 
migrations, as I discussed in Chapter 4, is that the ancestors’ way of doing things is 
construed as negative. In the mythical past the majority of the ancestors were Hindu. 
The first rupture with the past came when they converted to Islam, the second with 
the migration from Mandvi to Salaya. Events and time anterior to each rupture have 
thus become increasingly obscured by the resulting social and geographical 
transformations. When the Bhadala seths evaluate the way in which they 
commemorate Moharam, they are able to look back (as if though time), onto the 
opposite bank of the river, and see how their ancestors did things. What they look 
upon is not the politically neutral landscape of their own pasts re-enacted in the 
present, but a landscape to which they are hostile. Again, as with Nava Naroj, 
Moharam is a sign of being Indian as well as being Muslim. Thus the reform of 
Moharam allows for a degree of regional distinctiveness. In other words, local 
customs and celebrations are acceptable if they fall, or can be designed to fall, within 
certain pan-Islamic criteria. There is nothing wrong with being Muslim and Indian 
but being an ‘Indian Muslim’ is a label from which they wish to distance themselves. 
‘Indian Muslim’ is a term used by Muslims in other parts of the Indian Ocean as a 
derogatory form of address. Indian Muslims are generally looked down upon because 
of their adherence to practices and customs -  such as tazia processions during 
Moharam -  that do not sit comfortably with dominant ideals held in the power 
centres of Islam in the Indian Ocean.
Islam is treated as an import good by the Bhadala and by those who work on their 
ships. Pilgrimage to Mecca, which for centuries Mandvi was a departure port, 
involves travelling outside Kachchh in order to return improved, transformed and 
with greater piety. The seths, all Hajis, frequently go on pilgrimage to Mecca. They 
recount the experience as a powerful influence upon their own attempts at religious 
reform and patronage. The Haj is a central metaphor in the transformation of sailors. 
Very few sailors actually perform Haj in their lifetimes, as the costs are too high. 
However, the repetitive voyaging to and from the Gulf region is considered an
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equivalent to a pilgrimage albeit one of a lesser order. Sailors visit the prestigious 
Gulf realm and commune with the land and people. Despite the status the Haj brings 
the Bhadala, and the considerable costs involved, whilst on pilgrimage seths often 
experience hostility and blatant denigration from other pilgrims because of their 
Indian origins. The experience of feeling inferior and being a victim of hostility on 
Haj, or on the docks in Dubai, is not conveyed to those who remain at home. The 
connotations of the ‘outside’ remain positive when seths and sailors are at home. The 
‘outside’ is used as a powerful image of Islamic power and wealth that, regardless of 
actual experiences is used to capture the imagination of others, whether through the 
sanctity, prestige or privilege of Haj, or via bundles of cosmetics brought from 
Dubai.
Here the Bhadala play on the difference between comparison and analogy. A 
comparison is an examination to establish similarities and dissimilarities. In analogy 
there is the inference that if two or more things agree in some respects, they will 
probably agree in others. The Bhadala and their sailors are in a position to make a 
comparison between Kachchh and the Gulf States. The majority of the residents of 
Mandvi and apprentices in shipyards are not, and process the comparison made by 
the Bhadala analogously. In other words, non-sailors compare what they think they 
know of the Gulf and not the reality of it as experienced by Bhadalas. Bhadala ships 
mainly call in to the ports of the UAE, especially Dubai, where the majority of 
Mandvi’s Muslim labour migrants also work. In Mandvi the whole region (Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Iran, Oman, Bahrain, Iraq and Qatar) is glossed as ‘Gulf, as 
in ‘my brother works in the Gulf. Depending somewhat on the context, this reflects 
the way in which the region is imagined by those who have never seen it -  a 
generality in which sailors are complicit when they are at home. Employment 
conditions and the freedom granted to sailors without passports vary considerably 
between the states of the region. Saudi Arabia places the most restrictive conditions 
on entry, while the UAE is relatively accessible. Thus the magical (quasi-religious) 
qualities of consumer goods are also seen as emanating from the ‘Gulf, which 
typically are only drawn from Dubai.
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Chapter 4 discussed the influence of historical migrations from the Persian Gulf to 
Kachchh. The South Asian population of UAE is generally reckoned to be around 
50% of the total population. As a result Dubai is something of a home from home for 
sailors. In the Gulf region Dubai is regarded as a place of low religious values and 
practices. However, it is in Dubai that Kachchhi sailors spend the greater portion of 
their time. Thus the highly valued religious artefacts and practices brought from the 
Gulf come from the city that within the Gulf is least associated with them. In 
Kachchh, the whole Gulf region is held to be the cradle of Islam, as the location of 
the glorious life of Mohammed and his successors. The area emanates sacred power 
and holds the marks of religious triumph and defeat. Experienced sailors tend to 
homogenise the region in conversations in Mandvi. Thus the differences of 
orthodoxy, sect and reputation of the different states are collapsed into the term 
‘Gulf. Sailors know that Dubai is a commodities mecca and not of the same 
religious standing as Mecca, but they do not import this difference into Kachchh. 
Most sailors, regardless of how orthodox they appear at home, find that in the Gulf 
(including Dubai) they do not measure up to widely held religious standards. In the 
Gulf, Kachchhi seths and sailors are low-status Muslims. There is no shrine worship 
around Dubai Creek (where the wharves and loading bays are located) and religious 
intermediaries appear to be demonised. This is the feature of Muslim practice and 
social organisation that the Bhadala have imported to Kachchh with the greatest 
fervour and is discussed further in Chapter 7.
The discussion now returns to Moharam, the overall effect is that a Sunni event, 
such as Moharam, which is perhaps unique to the sub-continent, is quite acceptable 
as long as it is observed within what are considered to be universal facets of ‘proper’ 
Islam. Such include salat, the Koran, modesty and decorum, and absolute faith in the 
transcendence of Allah. Antithetical to these propositions are: spiritual 
intermediaries, whether people or objects; prayer offered to, or through, deities other 
than Allah; ostentatious public performances; and immodesty. In short, everything 
that can be witnessed during the tazia processions. Moharam and Nava Naroj
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exemplify the relationship between the Bhadala-Pathan’s desire to be seen to transact 
with unequivocal signs of pure Islam and their enthusiasm for their regional 
distinctiveness.
As mentioned previously, the seths, as the sponsors of reform and architectural 
regeneration of Islam, employ a model that resembles standard scholarly models in 
their interpretation of what ‘being Muslim’ means. They distinguish three levels 
(also, Ahmad 1984:12-13). The superior form, the one that they promote and that 
others identify them with, revolves around mosques, prayer and dress. Which, during 
Moharam, means just that, going to the mosque, mourning and praying. The 
intermediate level contains those practices that are glossed as Islamic, such as the 
role of mendicants, shrines and magical Saiyed patrons. This intermediate stage is 
the category into which the Bhadala place the majority of the younger sailors on their 
ships. Finally are those popular practices that are embedded in the pluralistic historic 
and social locale. This latter category refers to what they consider to be the 
accretions of Hinduism. This model is used as an explanation of the hierarchical 
gradation of faith and the perceptions of relative purity amongst those who work on 
ships.
On the whole, the longer a sailor serves a particular sethf the greater the 
coincidence between the kinds of religious observances patronised by the seth and 
the sailor. Thus vahaanvatta hierarchy is dualistic in its composition, relating grades 
of labour hierarchy to grades of religious practice. The model current among 
apprentices is that the cumulative experiences of life gradually encourage a greater 
respect for Allah, and for the precise ways of worshipping him given in the Koran 
and other texts. Furthermore, elderly men are seen to have the time and resources to 
devote to religious practice. But the concurrence of senior positions on ships and 
meticulous religious observances are not only a function of individual maturity. 
Importantly, this hierarchy is a product of selective recruitment practices, where men 
gain promotion based on both their adroitness with ships and the rigour with which 
they adopt the ‘pan-Islamic’ criteria dictated by their employers. Religious reformers
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and reform are not simply split between the higher and lower orders of the shipping, 
but find a very vivid reflection in the more complex gradation of vahaanvatta 
hierarchy.
Ship owners paradigmatically appear at the apex of this hierarchy in their capacity 
as the sponsors of reform. Within this hierarchy labourers are paradigmatically 
inferior because they work with their bodies. Navigators, foremen and senior 
labourers typically fall somewhere between. In this sense pure Islam is by invitation 
only, in terms of prayer at the mosque, during commemorations and through the 
process of promotion on ships. The first time the captain of a ship asks a labourer to 
accompany him to prayers is very significant. It shows that the labourer has been 
accepted, is trusted, and that the owner will publicly associate himself with his 
worker -  albeit mostly through the agency of the captain. The network of gossip and 
information that facilitates knowledge of others plays a vital role in this process. The 
word on the street has to be positive about an apprentice, or a younger sailor, before 
he is invited by a ship owner to participate in particular forms of religious practice, 
and by participating in particular events with his seth his public reputation is further 
enhanced.
Despite this persuasive model the majority of Mandvi’s Muslims participate in 
Moharam, although very few of the men who work on the ships or in the shipyards 
participate in the festivities. The exceptions are those who bring the third tazia over 
the river from Salaya. This tazia is sponsored by Thaims and is carried by members 
of the atak and by their client sailors. The rhetoric of the Bhadala-Pathan thus bears a 
direct relation to reality as they construe it. The majority of Muslims who live in 
Mandvi are like Hindus and have little sense of propriety. Thaims are little better, 
despite running ships and being Bhadala. The evidence is further given that the 
Thaims cross the river into Mandvi, a hostile environment, to participate in the 
festivities with Mandvi’s Muslims. For the Thaims, patronising the construction of a 
tazia is a sign of communal unity between them and their less fortunate ‘brothers’ 
who live on the opposite bank of the river.
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6.51. Religious propriety
During Moharam the differences in religious practices between the vahaanvatta and 
Mandvi’s other Muslims are most apparent. Majid’s father, brothers and many of his 
neighbours contribute towards the construction of tazias. Majid’s own level of 
participation gradually declined as his career developed. When he decided to stop 
building tazias he continued to contribute money towards the cost of materials and 
would watch the processions in the street. Later he stopped participating and 
observing altogether, and in subsequent years his seth invited him over to Salaya to 
pray on the tenth day of the month. This process generated a complex set of tensions 
within his family. As Majid’s parents had predicted, their son had stopped 
participating in customs and celebrations that were dear to them. However, they 
respect Majid’s decisions, recognising that they are based on logic of what is 
construed to be ‘pure’ and ‘authentic’ Islam. Herein lies something of a paradox 
commonly seen in Muslim societies: those accused of religious corruption often 
respect the legitimacy of the accusation, because all have an abstract notion of what 
‘pure’ Islam is like. In this sense the hierarchy of practices outlined in previous 
chapters is also acknowledged by Majid’s parents, only they are not apical within 
this hierarchy. The Bhadala, denigrated because of their mixed blood and ‘race’, 
remain so corrupted in the eyes of the majority of Mandvi’s Muslims, but at another 
level their attempts at purifying religious practice are not contested. This falls short 
of respect because of the methods the Bhadala are rumoured to have employed in 
acquiring their wealth. In an abstract way the majority of Muslims know what 
‘proper’ Islamic practice is and how it is constituted, and as a result those who are 
accused of being corrupt respect those who accuse them because of the logic of the 
accusation.
In this widely held model, perfection and truth are given in the Koran, regular 
prayer and respect for the ideal figure of the Prophet. The extent to which the pattern 
of perfection is realised is always changing because it depends on leadership within 
wider social, economic and political contexts. The fact that everybody thinks they
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know what proper Islam is again reflects the distinction made previously between 
comparison and analogy. T.N. Madan (as many others) writes that the following 
features are true of Muslim communities everywhere:
Belief in the unity of God, in his angels and prophets, and in the revealed book, and 
submission to his final judgement form the core of orthodoxy. These are supplemented 
by daily prayers, the month of fasting, charity, and if possible pilgrimage to Mecca 
(1997:145).
This thesis has taken the ‘truth’ of the Bhadala as an ethnographic and 
comparative benchmark. It is obvious that their ‘truth’ is highly selective and is 
based on their own historically contingent social and economic struggles with Hindus 
and Mandvi’s Muslims. They would not disagree with Madan’s position, but 
mosques (and the wealth with which to build them) are their pre-eminent signs of 
being Muslim. They rank mosques only behind the Koran as signs of ‘pure’ religion. 
On these criteria, constructing what makes ‘good’ Islam is an elite phenomenon 
because those with the ability to patronise the most prestigious worldly symbol are 
ship-owners. Furthermore, in typical descriptions of the tenets of Islam there is no 
leeway to account for the other pre-eminent features of ‘pure’ Islam, in the ways that 
they are construed in shipyards. These features include: that Muslims don’t ride 
horses on their way to be married; don’t patronise all intermediaries; don’t feed the 
living-dead in the form of crows; do not cast money into the waves in hope of 
auspicious blessings; and don’t wander the streets singing and flirting while 
shouldering the replica of the tomb of a key figure of Muslim history. The larger 
percentile of what is good Islam is to be seen in characterisations of what it is not. 
Clearly these characterisations are socially contingent definitions of religious 
categories.
The key human symbols of corruption in Bhadala campaigns are the Saiyeds. 
Bhadala-Pathans reject what they construe as Saiyeds’ false claims to divine power 
based on super-human qualities inherent in their blood. However, it appears that 
although the Bhadala rhetorically reject this model as an archaic corruption, they
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have appropriated it in other contexts to support their big-man patron positions. 
Comparative ethnography of Muslim social order in Gujarat describes patterns of 
transaction between high and low order shrines, and between individual saints and 
their devotees. The flows of such transactions are premised on hierarchy, which 
displays an inherent capacity to integrate other shrines and individuals. This 
hierarchy is ordered around perceptions of proximity or distance from the sacred (H. 
Basu 1998:117-118; and Gaborieau 1986:128-129). Here hierarchy is structured by 
an individual’s literal distance from the source of the sacred, which receives further 
symbolic elaboration through patterns of respect and ritual exchange. For example, a 
Saiyed presiding over a particular shrine acts as a mediator between Allah and 
devotees through the extra-human charisma that he embodies. Saiyeds supervise and 
administer the downward flow of wealth, power and protection from the divine to the 
mundane. The more powerful the reputation of a shrine and those that preside over it 
then the higher it appears in the chains of transaction. The relative position of men in 
these relationships is structured by the principles of proximity and distance in 
relation to Allah, which in turn defines how elevated or how low an individual’s 
status is within the divine hierarchy. Those impoverished of proximity to Allah, and 
thus from power and wealth, appear as the paradigmatic recipients of the ‘things’ 
flowing downwards through the hierarchy. Amid the vast network of shrines in 
Gujarat is a complex layering of order premised on the distribution of power and 
status between various shrines, within which are equally complex hierarchies formed 
between devotees, disciples and living and dead Saiyeds.
Like Saiyeds within this hierarchy, the Bhadala also appear to be closer to Allah 
in terms of the social hierarchy that surrounds ships. However, as traders they have a 
commercialised model of hierarchy that structures relationships in terms of 
proximate distance to the divine (the mosque) and wealth (ship capital). All the ship­
owners appear before recruits as the intermediaries between Kachchh, poverty and 
corruption on one hand, and the Gulf, wealth and purity on the other. Thus there is a 
remarkably close correlation between the model they reject and how they appear in 
the hierarchy over which they preside. In this apical role the seths appear closer to
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Allah. As with clients of shrines, sailors appear as paradigmatic recipients of 
patronage, legitimised by the same hierarchy that subordinates them. The seth 
appears as the gateway to wealth and access to prestigious forms of religious 
practice. Therefore, despite the avowed intentions of the Bhadala-Pathans, traditional 
religious hierarchy is removed from the shrine and restructured around the ship. The 
charisma of seths is derived from their constituents and, although not considered 
intermediaries between the crews and Allah in an explicitly spiritual sense, they do 
appear as intermediaries between the crew and wealth. They appear through Allah’s 
grace to have fortune intimately tied to their piety, which is in part derived from their 
patronage. As with divine blessings in shrines, the ship-owner’s wealth trickles down 
through the grades of hierarchy to the crews. So far from replacing the traditional 
blood-based hierarchy from across the river, they create a simulacrum, with the 
power to channel wealth replacing the power to channel divinity. Appearing at the 
apex thus becomes a matter of capital and motivation rather than a matter of birth 
and genealogy.
6.6. Migrant labour
Majid was by now regularly voyaging between India, Iran, Iraq, UAE and Somalia. 
His wages increased to Rs. 1,000 per month on a bigger, faster and safer ship. He 
was given responsibility over a number of other crew and his negotiating position for 
profits on luxury goods brought from the Gulf to Kachchh improved. As the seasons 
passed Majid has become wealthy -  his status increasing exponentially with each 
return to Mandvi. Eventually a relative came to the port in Dubai to meet him and to 
offer him a job. Majid had no passport -  he still sailed on his now tattered identity 
card -  so he returned to India and applied for a passport through an agent. This 
process took nearly a year. Meanwhile he took a job on a ship registered in Dubai for 
a salary of Rs. 3,500 per month. Majid’s family was starting to feel the benefit, and 
his father and youngest brother had both given up their poorly paid work and lived 
on his remittances.
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In 1991 Majid signed a contract to work in the Bombay High oil fields, for a 
salary of $250 per month on a supply vessel belonging to a distant relative of his 
mother. In 1993 the same company issued Majid with an ‘able seamen certificate’. 
This remains one of Majid’s most cherished possessions. It is a professional 
certificate recognised worldwide. Later that year Majid rejoined a vessel sailing from 
Mandvi, and on reaching Dubai jumped ship and found work on a supply vessel with 
a company employing workers without proper documentation. Since 1994 Majid has 
worked for another company in the Gulf and his salary increased to $450.
Throughout this time Majid’s religious practice and knowledge of the world has 
become increasingly at variance with that of his family, a fact reflected in his more 
assiduous observation of regular prayers, his clothes, his veneration of the Koran, 
and his disavowal of public displays of what he called ‘naqli dukhV (counterfeit- 
mourning) during the local ‘celebrations’ of Moharam. However, the most notable 
difference between Majid and his brothers and father is to be seen in their 
relationship with Saiyeds and their shrines. Majid’s relatives are regular clients of a 
shrine that owned the house in which Majid was bom in the northeast of Mandvi. 
Majid refuses to visit this shrine, or have any dealings with the Saiyeds that preside 
over it. Majid’s brothers and father visit the shrine every Thursday (the day of the 
saints) and before they start any new project. Meanwhile, as Majid’s remittances 
increased, his mother started to send daily parcels of food to the Saiyeds. The 
constant tension between Majid and his family on this issue provoked some 
remarkable exchanges. Majid’s mother would frequently accuse him of ‘forgetting 
where he came from’ and of ‘ignoring those he owed’. I admired Majid’s patience in 
the face of these accusations: he did not answer his mother back, at least not when 
his father was in the house. However, on a number of occasions Majid’s father was 
not at home, and Majid would accuse his mother of giving her (his, their) money to 
people who were little more than ‘beggars’. He would go on to say that she regarded 
Saiyeds as divine figures to whom she could never give enough. Both of these 
expressions were appropriated from the wider ‘anti-Saiyed’ rhetoric that prevails in 
shipyards and in the weekly meetings held at Mukhdummi Sha, and this form of
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confrontation is common among families who have sent their sons to sea. However, 
as discussed previously, the tension is somewhat lopsided because Majid’s mother, 
among others, respects Majid’s ‘new’ religious ideas because they carry the seal of 
Gulf authenticity. Although Majid no longer works on the ships that sail from 
Mandvi port, whenever he is invited for prayer at the Friday Mosque or at the 
mosque-shrine of Mukhdummi Sha, upon meeting those on whose ships he used to 
work he will stoop before them and touch his eyes and mouth against the hand that is 
offered to him.
6.7. Conclusion
Majid’s biography and the generalisations that emerge from it are typical of social 
transformation among sailors. The passage from traditional to modem is not abrupt 
or absolute; rather, it is faltering and partial. It is given continuity by the underlying 
principles of respect, patronage and work and discontinuity by kin relations and 
friendships in Mandvi. The large numbers of sailors who return home to Mandvi 
once a year, or every night, are having a profound effect on the religious dynamics 
within the town. They are creating wider awareness of difference between Muslims 
and Hindus through their antagonism and hostility.
Apprenticeship is where technological production (shipbuilding) and social 
reproduction (crews) engage, which rather than making novices masters, only 
partially demystifies the process of production and simultaneously contributes to the 
enchantment of hierarchy. The possible paths of progression through the hierarchy 
become the objects of the apprentice’s dreams. When they set to sea the world 
outside Kachchh -  Masjid Bunder and Dongri Channel in Bombay and the ports of 
the Gulf States -  is predominantly Muslim. The kinds of Muslims they meet are 
different from those at home. They are frequently Wahhabi or Sunnis who appear 
ultra-orthodox in comparison to what young sailors know. These experiences are 
analogously given to apprentices in shipyards. The journey across the river into 
apprenticeship transforms men through competition for economic, symbolic and
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social capital. As men build ships they also build social relations, which often 
contradict those they were enmeshed in during the earlier parts of their lives. The 
mechanisms through which social apprenticeship is transmitted are similar to those 
discussed in Chapter 5. The minutiae of action and task, through which spatial 
appreciation and skills are learned, is similarly reproduced as social relations are 
learned. Hierarchical social relations are real and tangible bodily techniques. In part, 
deference, respect and patronage are physical actions that men learn as they learn 
how to ‘be’ in shipyards. The religious hierarchy (in relation to both Hindus and 
Mandvi’s Muslims) headed by the Bhadala seths creates similar potential corridors 
for violence. Legitimate violence flows downwards. The social groups below the 
Bhadala (at least from within the vahaanvatta) are sailors and labourers, Mandvi’s 
Muslims and finally Hindus, who are all legitimate targets for physical and symbolic 
violence. However, violence between elite groups (merchants), now and in the past, 
is mediated by respective groups of sailors. The ‘workers of the body’ act in the 
interests of the ‘workers of the mind’. Apprenticeship thus produces a new form of 
peculiarly coloured lascar.
Sailors do not turn green with seasickness, but with religion (the colour 
commonly associated with Islam in India). When Mandvi people say derogatorily 
that sailors ‘puff-up’ and ‘change colour’ they are alluding to the sailors’ swagger 
and servile position in relation to low-ranking mixed bloods. This is a parody of the 
conflicting organisation of hierarchy on ships and at home, and is perhaps sometimes 
couched in jealously. Sailors take on the dangerous religious and political colours of 
their mixed-blood patrons, who, within the last twenty years, have inverted the 
traditional merchant-sailor dyad with power that comes exogenously into Kachchh. 
Colour matters. In Salaya mixed-blood sailors have become powerful big-man 
patrons, while many apprentices drawn from the pure-blooded merchant jamats are 
becoming ‘sailors’. The genealogical metaphors of blood and descent have some 
difficulty accounting for the transformation. Mandvi people dismiss sailors as 
‘black’, not only because they spend time labouring in the sun, but also because they 
are ‘taking’ from the Bhadala. The outline of social hierarchy presented in Chapter 3
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relates to stereotyped skin colour and associated mental and physical faculties. To 
call men ‘black’, or to call them ‘crows’, both common insults, equals the same 
accusation: that the accused is of low rank and shares the mentality of the Siddis who 
could so easily be taken into slavery because they lived an inhuman existence in 
Africa without proper kings.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion.
Seths, Saiyeds and sailors: the social production 
of Islamic reform
7.1. Review
Throughout this thesis very little has said very little about what the Bhadala think of 
themselves. Obviously, not all Bhadalas are interested in exactly the same issues or 
have the same life experiences. The most blatant differences are between those who 
work on international tankers and those who work on the local ships. However, there 
are some themes that frequently recur in Bhadalas’ self-presentation within their own 
village, and it is these presentations that concern me now. Chapters 4-6 discussed 
their interest in particular forms of religious architecture, social organisation and 
occupation, and how they construct their religious disposition in relation to others. 
The Bhadala see themselves as religiously and socially orthodox, and as furthering 
the Islamic cause through their active campaigns against lesser and false gods and 
polytheists. They see themselves as sexually voracious and potent, and view their 
large families as providing them with security and strategic options and as a direct 
reflection of their wealth. They construe themselves to be modem in commercial and 
religious senses, and as locally pre-eminent in their experience of the cosmopolitan 
world. They are aware and proud of their regional origins, their language, and their 
village. But they do not dream of Kachchh becoming part of a Muslim state. The 
partition divided their residential patterns between Salaya and Karachi. As a result 
they have close ties to Pakistan and visit Karachi frequently. But they are often 
intimidated by the city, which, they say, is violent, full of guns and controlled by 
religion. Relatives from Pakistan frequently (illegally) come to visit Salaya. They 
have ‘underworld’ contacts in Bombay and Dubai, some of which are so influential 
that they know Bollywood film stars. With me, with each other, and with apprentices 
in their shipyards they would also claim to have power and influence within the
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criminal organisations headed by the infamous figures of Daud Ibrahim and ‘Tiger’ 
Mushtaq Memon. These characters are associated with the bomb blasts in Bombay in 
1993 and with kidnapping, extortion, the bankrolling of Bollywood film productions 
and smuggling.
Peter Mayer has argued that the dominant academic image of Muslims in India is 
that they are poor and uneducated and suffer from political, cultural and linguistic 
oppression (1981). His study shows that while Muslims do not see themselves in this 
light conventional indicators, such as formal education attendance and levels of 
declared income point to the marginalisation of Muslims from the dominant national 
agendas (Hansen 1999:151). By these measurements the Bhadala are not 
stereotypical Muslims. However, they do conform to the other stereotypes held in 
western India that derive from BJP and RSS political rhetoric and from related 
patterns of local rumour. From this viewpoint, Muslims, such as the Bhadala, are 
seen as expansionist, bigoted, aggressive and secretive and concerned with territorial 
and ideological dominance. Undoubtedly some of the half-known truths from which 
the stereotypes have been assembled do not quite capture the full picture, but plastic 
explosives, Kalashnikovs, hashish and persons without formal identification are 
discovered along the coast with more frequency than statistical probability would 
suppose. Additionally, a surprising number of the sailors are imprisoned in India, 
Pakistan and Dubai, while others are in the custody of the United Nations for having 
been found in Iraqi waters. Others still have court cases pending and warrants 
outstanding for their arrest.
Such stereotypes run hand in hand with another set in which Muslims are cast as 
poor, backward, uneducated and ignorant. Muslims, as shown in previous chapters, 
have their own equally elaborate images of Hindus, and together these sets of images 
have contributed to a social polarisation between all sections of the Muslim and 
Hindu populations in Kachchh. In Mandvi, at no social level do Hindus and Muslims 
mutually participate in festivals or other devotional activities. The ‘conservative
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radicalism’ of the Bhadala is a reflection of this trend, which also draws upon the 
wider political climate in the Indian Ocean region.
As shown in chapters 3 and 4 the traditional pattern of commerce among 
Mandvi’s Muslims was one of Sunni sailors being employed by Shia merchants. In 
this system the dynamics and effects of apprenticeship were very different from 
those relationships between Bhadalas and sailors described in chapters 5 and 6. The 
main reason for this difference was that Shia merchants had little interest in the 
religious practices of their sailors -  the fact that sailors were putatively Muslim 
seemed to have been enough. The patterns of capital ownership and the division of 
commercial labour during this period kept sailors and merchants ritually, 
economically and socially segregated. Now that the capital is in the hands of the 
Bhadala, the rigidly defined boundaries, which in the past were provided by sectarian 
affiliation, have disappeared. With changing economic conditions Bhadalas have 
reached a position from where they can extend their webs of influence into the social 
lives of their sailing constituents. This trend represents something of a radical 
transformation because in the past, high-status merchants employed low-status 
Bhadalas; today low-status Bhadalas employ high-status ‘merchants’ (although not 
the Shias who were their previous patrons) from proprietary jamats.
The process of strengthening religious identity has been shown to be a way of 
distinguishing seths and sailors from Kharvas and Mandvi’s Muslims. In turn this 
dual process has created an identifiable collectivity discernible from language, 
occupation, expectations, bodily postures and by the selective observance of some 
religious practices and the condemnation of others. This process is recognised by a 
large number of Mandvi’s Muslims who describe the Bhadala and sailors as the 
vahaanvatta jamat. This does not refer to marriage patterns, but to a religious 
congregation. Although this congregation is clearly concentrated in Salaya, every 
Sunni jamat (as well as among those with no formal jamat organisation) in Mandvi 
contains men who belong to the informal vahaanvatta jamat. The broad client base 
of the seths is indentured in various forms to the interests of the Bhadalas. The
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sailors, like Majid, are often bonded by their fathers to a seth. They are also 
indentured, in an informal sense, by their aspiration and the potential wealth that can 
be generated through such a relationship.
7.2. Apprenticeship
While producing this thesis I have frequently considered the possibility that the 
Bhadala had consciously used all of the social strategies available to them to improve 
their own position. Could it really be that a group of them came to an understanding 
about how they were going to run their shipyards? Did they decide that by stripping 
apprentices of their prior senses of social propriety that they would create loyal 
constituents? Have they really thought of opposing the dominant Muslim social order 
through the respected process of Islamic reform? Or that the particular emphasis they 
place on an infinite god could improve their social position within Muslim society 
and deflect communal antipathies away from themselves and towards their lascars? It 
is highly improbable that they have made conscious evaluative decisions towards 
these ends. The task of identifying and thinking these things through has been mine. 
The social resources were at their disposal and they have used them accordingly, 
leading to a patronage of the idea of monotheism, which corresponds to the ideal of 
religious perfection also widely held among those whose polytheism is decried by 
the Bhadala. But, there is more to it than that, and the aim of this final chapter is to 
show that none of the social processes that have been described are without 
precedent. They are part of the life experiences of the Bhadala themselves, and they 
are now in positions of power that enable them to transpose their biographies onto 
the political and religious landscape of the town. This transposition extends to 
experiences of violence, domination and oppression, but also relies on a form of 
apprenticeship that has deep roots in Muslim society.
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7.21. Pir-murid
The archetypal and elevated model of apprenticeship in Kachchhi Muslim society is 
between the Saiyed and his devotees. Derived from Sufi traditions, this relationship 
is commonly known as murashad-murid (spiritual guide-aspirant or novice). In 
Mandvi, the Sufi heritage of the master-apprentice relationship is not articulated 
because even among Mandvi’s Muslims there is a pervasive trend to arabicise 
architecture and prayer in an attempt to distance themselves from negative 
associations with Sufis. To what extent this trend is a product of the Bhadalas’ 
influence it is impossible to say, but most Saiyeds are keen to present their practices 
as timeless and as unchanging, even if they changed all the signs in their shrines 
from Gujarati to Arabic only a few weeks previously. During my stay in Mandvi the 
husband of a scholar who has done substantial research on shrines in Yemen came to 
visit. He asked me what I knew about the history of the abundant Sufi shrines in 
Mandvi and Salaya. By this time I had been in the town for over a year and was 
slightly worried that I might have missed something important, so we went to see the 
shrines he was talking about. The shrines he took me to are not regarded as Sufi 
shrines by Mandvi people -  they are shrines of Saiyeds within the Sunni tradition. 
This misunderstanding raises an important issue, for if a shrine is clearly steeped in 
the Sufi tradition of India, but those who now preside over it deny this fact, then how 
is the shine to be treated? As a Sufi shrine? As a shrine within the Sunni tradition? Or 
as a syncretic blend of formal traditions? My resolution of this problem, as has been 
evident in previous chapters, is not to trace the history of the shrine but to ask why is 
it important that the shrine is seen as a Sunni shrine and not a Sufi one, while 
remaining aware that the shrine, as with most Muslim religious practices in Kachchh, 
has roots different from their present attributions.
This problem is at the heart of studies of Indian Islam and highlights the central 
problem of the provincial ethnography of men who are part of a politicised world 
religion, and who are clearly enmeshed in transnational networks that bypass the 
town in which they live and where fieldwork was conducted. Most ethnographers are
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not in a position to make comparison (exceptions see Geertz 1968; and 
Juergensmeyer 2000) and have to rely on analogy. However, the analogy is largely 
made against textual orthodoxy and ends up being based on the ‘core versus 
periphery’ model of Islam or as a comparison between an ethnographic ‘type c’ and a 
rather abstract ‘type p \  Thus the basis for variation is in practice taken from an 
abstract and highly rarefied model of Islam -  roughly equivalent to the universalist 
position outlined in Chapter 1 -  and not exactly from Sunnis, Shias, or any of the 
other segmentary lineages of thought and practice. While I do not think I have 
entirely got around this problem, never having spent the long time in Dubai that 
would allow me to make comparison, I do think that my task was made somewhat 
easier by having observable processes of comparison and analogy in the field that 
informed religious reform as it is propagated in Salaya.
Muslims in Mandvi and Salaya claim they are Sunni. However, many of their 
practices, religious relationships and recitations can only be found in what are more 
conventionally referred to as Sufi texts. For example, Sufi literature describes an 
elaborate relationship between individual actions and the resulting state of the soul. 
Richard Kurin, in a discussion of conceptions of paradise held among Muslims in 
Pakistan, observes that the internal condition of the body is closely related to external 
habits and activities (1984). In this sense, the relationship between Saiyed (pir) and 
murid in Mandvi is structured around particular conceptions of learning in which the 
internal self is transformed though external actions. This observation is vital for 
understanding spiritual apprenticeships under a Saiyed, and vahaanvatta 
apprenticeships under a seth, because both forms develop particular practices, actions 
and tasks that are seen as transforming the inner-self.
The esoteric knowledge of the pirzade (lineage of saints) attracts corresponding 
lineages of disciples. Peter van der Veer describes this as: ‘a social hierarchy of high- 
status patrons and low-status clients’ (1994:41, also see Gaborieau 1986). The types 
of learning or apprenticeship this entails presupposes a subtle relationship between 
the activities themselves and the inner-self: ‘The central metaphor for personal
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development is that of habit or malaka through which outer actions transform the 
colors of the soul’ (Metcalf 1984:10). In this model, actions are seen as a reflection 
of true knowledge while simultaneously creating truth. This reflects the widely held 
disdain in Muslim society for those considered to possess the potential for 
knowledge who do not nurture it (Bloch 1996). ‘Whether one is learning a craft, or 
poetry and language, or music, or moral and spiritual qualities, the process of outer 
practice, the creation of habit, and finally a realisation of that process in one’s being 
is precisely the same’ (Metcalf 1984:11). In spiritual apprenticeship the murid 
internalises the image of perfection represented by the Saiyed. Through recitation, 
practice, prayer and study the murid passes through a series of reciprocal 
transformations between the image they have of the Saiyed and the image of 
themselves. However, the murid can never become a Saiyed. The murid knows that 
regardless of how much time, energy and personality he sacrifices to the Saiyed’s 
teaching he will always remain inferior because of his birth.
The first step of a murid's training with a Saiyed is baia (pledge of loyalty). From 
this stage the murid enters a dual process of scrutinising his faults (and attempting to 
remove them) and his virtues (and attempting to improve on them). The many Sufi 
orders have different, and sometimes very complex, ways of regulating and 
furthering this relationship (see Ajmal 1984). In Mandvi there are five durgahs with 
residing Saiyed families in attendance and numerous other less developed sites. The 
son of the last pir to sit on the gadi (throne, seat of power) at the Dhayapir in Mandvi 
frequently stressed to me the importance of the rules that his father’s clients and 
murids had to follow to maintain the pir's countenance. First and foremost, they had 
to show all forms of respect to their master. This meant addressing him respectfully-  
accompanied by the appropriate gestures. They were not to cast a shadow on the 
pir's body or on his prayer mat, use his utensils or his place of ablution, attend or 
speak to others in the presence of the pir, leave the pir's audience without permission 
or raise their voice or contradict the pir. Further, the murid was supposed to give the 
pir the utmost attention and never doubt his words or actions.
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These specific rules regulated the interaction of the murid with the pir. There 
were, however, two other more general principles to which the murid was supposed 
to abide. First, the murid was to realise that the pir was omnipotent and that by 
calling upon other Saiyeds or sources of divine authority the murid was 
compromising his receipt of his master’s bakarat (ritual efficacy, power). Secondly, 
the murid was to abandon any prayers or rituals practised prior to initiation, and 
observe only prayers that the pir outlined. As mentioned in Chapter 1, in this 
relationship the Saiyed is all-powerful and the murid is like a dead body in the hands 
of its cleanser.
7.22. Seth-sailor
This model of learning and the associated forms of respect and obedience have 
clear parallels to the way in which apprenticeship in shipyards operates as a process 
of individual transformation. In the shipyards, attention to task and the performance 
of skills and postures have a direct relationship to the spiritual transformation of 
apprentices. The appropriate kinds of behaviour for pir-murid relationships (outlined 
above) exemplify the behaviour within ideal seth-sailor relationships. In the previous 
chapter it was argued that at a fundamental level apprenticeship was a transformation 
of a neophyte’s hierarchical conceptions from one based around the axiomatic blood 
of Saiyeds to a commodified model of mediation based on access to prestigious lands 
and goods. However, apprenticeship in both systems is premised on the process of 
internal transformation and takes the figure of the Prophet as the model of human 
perfection.
Learning in shipyards also follows a model of inner transformation in response to 
external activities in the world and this is clearly principled on the same kinds of 
respect and deference. But who is the teacher? As shown in chapters 5 and 6 there is 
not a single individual responsible for the flow of knowledge and skill from the 
experienced to the neophytes. The master craftsman is not particularly valued as a 
figure in relation to the more prestigious hierarchies of sailors. The foreman is
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responsible for some of the elementary instruction in shipyard techniques, but the 
dominant source of apprentices’ knowledge is devolved through the collective 
actions of the vahaanvatta hierarchy itself. The model of human perfection that 
presides over this regime is of course the seth: the source of wealth and the model of 
religious virtue. The apprentices are not learning to explicitly become craftsmen, 
marine architects or engineers, rather they are learning to become sailors.
It is tempting to make a direct comparison between the pir-murid relationship and 
the seth-sailor relationship, but there are, however, two important differences 
between the systems. First, among seths and sailors the relationship is more complex 
than between the pir-murid because the hierarchy in shipyards is comprised of 
multiple occupational-religious stations. Secondly, while the murid knows that he 
will never become a Saiyed, or even saintly, the apprentice in the shipyard knows 
that it is possible for him to become a seth. As discussed in Chapter 5, seths tell 
neophytes that if they work hard they can also become ship owners. Despite these 
differences, the patterns of hierarchy, and respect and deference described as 
constituting a fitting pir-murid relationship strongly resemble the patterns of 
hierarchy and bodily performance in shipyards. Therefore, the ideal pattern of 
apprenticeship in shipyards is loosely based on the pir-murid relationship -  or at 
least its form. This being the case then the final two preconditions (discussed above) 
for spiritual apprenticeship with a pir are worthy of special attention in relation to 
apprenticeship in shipyards.
As shown, the first rule states that neophytes should not turn to other masters 
because this compromises the patronage of their own master. The second is the idea 
that apprentices should only follow the ritual practices dictated by their master and 
should abandon any practices they had before they were initiated. From the material 
presented in chapters 5 and 6 it is clear that both of these ideas are clearly reflected in 
the organisation of shipyard work. The relationship between a sailor and a seth is 
cumulative one that, vitally, depends on the disparities between the religious 
observances of the seth and the sailor decreasing over time. In terms of work this
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means that sailors labour in the interests of their patron unless they are instructed by 
him to work for another ship owner. Additionally, sailors are careful not to be seen to 
compromise their loyalty to the seth, because, as discussed in Chapter 6, the 
reputation of a sailor is vital in the maintenance of his relationship with the seth.
The second precept of particular note is that labourers should give up their 
previous religious and ritual attachments. In this light, it is expected in master- 
apprentice relationships that neophytes should forsake previous religious practices in 
favour of those given by their new masters. Chapters 5 and 6 have presented seths as 
manipulating the activities and thoughts of their sailors. Within this framework the 
aspirations of the apprentice also contribute towards creating symmetry between 
downward flows of expectation and upward (aspirational) forms of behaviour among 
apprentices. In other words, the relationships that construct the vahaanvatta may be 
structured by the agendas of those that control the capital, but they are also 
reinforced by the long-term ambitions of the apprentice. The transformation of 
apprentices therefore, stems not only from competition among sailors for scarce 
positions within the crew, but it is part and parcel of the expectations apprentices 
have before they arrive in shipyards. When Majid was young he had regularly gone 
to the shrine that owned his house to serve the presiding Saiyeds, and before going to 
the shipyards, had seen many murid relationships develop within the confines of the 
shrine.
This is the dominant model of apprenticeship in local Muslim society and it 
operates on the same principles among pirs and murids as it does among seths and 
sailors. Apprentices in shipyards learn how to move cross-members, erect 
scaffolding, pass chappals and laugh at jokes told about crows. Through these 
external activities and their gradual accommodation of the skills, techniques and 
technologies of shipbuilding, the apprentice is transformed internally. Becoming a 
sailor involves a transformation from novice to habitue as habit becomes habitude. 
This is a process of technical and social action in the world transforming the 
dispositions, aspirations and understandings of the internal self. However, the
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parallels between the pir-murid relationship and the seth-sailor relationship are not 
that simple. The following section describes how apprenticeship in shipyards, and the 
model of internal transformation through external actions, coincides with the 
distinction outlined in Chapter 5 between ‘work of the body’ and ‘work of the mind’.
The traditional regimen of merchants and sailors is principled on the qualities of 
descent, most commonly expressed through idioms of blood. This has been shown to 
be a cause, and partially an effect, of diet, sexual appetite, temperament, disposition 
towards violent actions, and the ability or inability to ratiocinate. This last quality is 
expressed in idioms of ‘minds’ and ‘bodies’, which have a direct relationship to the 
division of labour and the distribution of capital between merchants and sailors. It 
has been shown that apprentices in shipyards, and sailors on ships, dismiss their work 
as ‘easy knowledge’. However, when this statement is considered in conjunction 
with the outline (above) of external actions transforming the colour of the soul a 
further set of conclusions can be drawn.
7.23. The gift ship
In an environment that is simultaneously brutal and rewarding where does the 
sense of certainty in the aspirations of the apprentices come from? Later in this 
chapter the discussion turns to the ways in which working on ships allows sailors 
access to certain kinds of prestige through shipping. However, within the last ten 
years there had been two gifts given in Salaya that were not overtly religious, nor had 
they been purchased from Dubai. Both Thaims and Pathans had gifted ships to men 
who had served them long and dutifully. These gifts elevated two men from the rank 
of captain to that of seth, and while the established ship owners did not gift modem 
or efficient ships, they had gifted ships. The obvious effect of these gifts was to 
entrench more deeply the lives of the recipients into the constituency of the givers. 
However, the exemplary nature of these gifts has a profound effect on the aspirations 
of apprentices. The amount of capital required to build and run a ship is large. The 
segmentary nature of inheritance and capital management tends to keep the control
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of ships within very specific groups of men. Thus, entrance into the shipping 
business is highly restricted and depends largely on individuals exploiting 
exceptional economic circumstances. The Bhadala may use their own lives as 
examples of what it is possible to achieve, but by gifting ships to loyal members of 
their crews they had set a precedent. Men who had come to the shipyards as 
apprentices, now owned their own ships and were addressed as 'seth'. This was 
further evidence for the apprentices that it was possible to achieve great things 
through serving a particular seth. Loyalty and obedience are part of becoming a 
sailor, but in the example set by the two honorary seths so is spending time in prison 
and taking great personal risks on behalf of the patron.
Apprentices aspire within the hierarchy over which the seth presides. They know 
that when the seth was young he worked as a wage-labour apprentice. They also 
know that he is now a wealthy man of considerable influence. From labouring and 
gradually appreciating the skills, tasks and technologies of shipbuilding and sailing, 
the seth is seen as having transformed internally. Through cumulative acts of 
refinement the seth's mental acumen has developed and his corporeal disposition has 
become weighted in favour of his mind.
This leads back to the discussion in Chapter 3 of the relationship of the body and 
soul where it was argued that the soul was comprised of two elements: nafs, dictating 
base instincts, and aql, the higher order of the intellect and moral faculties. Seths are 
seen to have transformed the inner condition of their souls -  that is to say they have 
developed aql -  through outer activities in the world. Gradually mastering each stage 
of the practice of technology, the seth was able to start carrying out the kind of work 
traditionally carried out by merchants. Over time, mastery of the bodily techniques of 
the vahaanvatta has an effect on the internal dispositions of the body in favour of the 
mind, refinement and prestigious comportment. The seth's condition is related to the 
inter-connected factors of business acumen, wealth, religious observances and 
power. The external activities in the world that the seth is capable of performing are 
a reflection of the cumulative process through which neophytes can become masters
329
of themselves. The seth is seen as having mastered the bodily techniques of shipping 
and shipbuilding, which gradually has led to the refinement of his mind. In chapters 
4 and 5 it was argued that the Bhadalas’ view of themselves did not coincide with the 
dominant idea in Mandvi that the propensities for, and dispositions towards, certain 
kinds of tasks and actions are firmly given in the blood. This is also seen in the gift 
ships that allowed sailors to become seths. It was also pointed out that in Mandvi it 
was held that the Bhadala had not really become merchants, but had used the 
violence and immorality of their corrupt mixed-blood natures to become wealthy. In 
shipyards the view is rather different. The seth is all-powerful and this power is a 
reflection of his success as a trader and merchant. The closer neophytes get to seths 
the harder it is to ignore their physical and social statures.
7.3. Kingship
In Chapter 2, it was argued that the pervasive model of social organisation among 
Hindus in Kachchh was derived from Rajput polity, which revolved around apical 
social figures and their webs of influence. In this section a few similarities between 
the organisation of Muslim shrines and the organisation of kingship are described. 
Richard Eaton has noted similar parallels between the organisation of Muslim 
sainthood in the Punjab, in terms of the highly elaborated codes of etiquette and 
pageantry, and the centrality of the royal turban in the construction of power 
relations and in determining paths of legitimate succession (1984:355). It is also 
apparent in Kachchh that Muslim (and for that matter Hindu) sainthood is 
constructed from elements of royal polity and corresponding forms of social 
organisation.
In Mandvi Saiyeds are addressed as bava, and less commonly as bapu. Both terms 
are also used to describe the kings and Hindu holy-men of Kachchh, the latter is 
additionally used to describe the land-owning Rajputs more generally. Devotees of a 
particular bava come to the chhilasthan (place of retreat and seclusion) of the pir 
(saint). Specifically, clients come to the dead Saiyed’s bacchanu (resting-place) and
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to the gadi (seat or throne) of the living Saiyed from where the devotee receives an 
audience. As discussed in previous chapters, from the shrine the pir mediates on 
behalf of clients between mundane and divine realms to cure sickness, grant wishes 
and convey auspiciousness. Within the durgah sharif (shrine, noble court and seat of 
spiritual authority), aside from the mazar (tomb) of the dead pir, the other most 
important structure is the nissan or nishin (the pole from which the standard flies). 
The nissan indicates the presence of a noble successor and forms part of the divine 
qutb (axis) that runs through all legitimate saintly bakarat (spiritual efficacy or 
power).
In the organisation of the shrines there are clearly many terminological references 
to forms of traditional kingship and leadership from the Middle East and Iran. 
However, there are also many connections between the organisation of the Durbar 
and the organisation of durgahs. This is not particularly surprising as traditionally the 
Durbar granted wilaya (lands and administrative positions) to Saiyeds with large 
followings. The Rajput Durbar was comprised of a set of institutions, including 
courts, palaces and administration buildings. At the centre of this cluster of 
institutions was the gadi from where worldly power over the kingdom emanated. In 
Kachchh however, in common with the Bhatiya material presented in Chapter 2, the 
organisation of Saiyeds and shrines is one that reflects the dominant mode of social 
and ritual organisation as represented by Rajput polity. Clearly there are differences 
in these organisations, but the apparent similarities refer to more than merely 
metaphors of place and power. For example, Metcalf outlines a series of connections 
between the hereditary and institutional positions of sainthood and kingship:
Despite the division of function between the religious and the political leader, however, 
the ruler was often expected also to manifest Islamic qualities in himself. A bad king is 
a bad Muslim. A good king is ascribed saintly qualities. The relation is closer than 
metaphor, for the ideal is that of the Prophet himself, leader in all aspects of life 
(1984:7).
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Likewise, a king is described as a saint, and the saint in turn is described as a 
king, or at least shah (prince). Islamic societies are permeated by the importance of 
moral exemplification, which includes discipline, training, refinement, respect, 
discrimination and personal order. In Indian Islam, as elsewhere, Allah is the 
ultimate authority men derive worldly authority from (see Masud 1984). Authority in 
this sense is God-given. Underlying the pronouncements of seths and Saiyeds is the 
conviction that Islamic practice defines the higher levels of human potential. Men 
who meet the accepted standards of religious behaviour are the most fully human. 
Thus for the Saiyed, his birth and his blood give him a tremendous advantage in this 
quest: he is bom with a disposition to become fully human.
What links Muslim kings and Saiyeds, but excludes the Rajput Durbar, is the 
ideal figure of the Prophet as a model for behaviour. The Prophet is seen as 
personifying ideal human qualities, which are accessible to other men through the 
Koran and sunna (Robinson 1983:201). It also seems reasonable to argue (albeit 
from a different perspective) that the ideal Rajput king also personifies ideal human 
qualities. Normal men can aspire to the perfection of these figures. In the terms of the 
Bhadalas’ religious discourse, in which they model themselves on the ideal figure of 
the Prophet, the quest for human perfection means treading the thin line of purity in 
ritual and action discussed in the previous chapter. By treading this path the 
individual can avoid the perilous realms of low deities and demons. However,
Saiyeds are in a rather different position because they are seen by their devotees as 
closer than normal men to the Prophet and to divine realms. The Saiyed patron is a 
source of ilm (knowledge) and a model of comportment, demeanour and 
temperament for the murid (apprentice). But, neither seth nor Saiyed is actually of an 
equivalent status to the apical figure of the Prophet, they are merely seen as the 
highest form of men locally.
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7.31. Big-manship
A number of chapters have referred to the idea of big-manship in terms of charisma, 
giving, reputation, patronage and the distribution of knowledge. The model of 
kingship that seems to permeate caste, jamat, occupation and political life in Mandvi 
is obviously a reflection of this idea. The language of social organisation in Kachchh 
is replete with idioms alluding to the power and greatness of men. These words and 
titles are often tied to positions within institutions, such as the mahajan, samaj and 
jamat. The big-man’s galactic polity emanates from centralised positions within 
institutions from where he redistributes power and prestige, and brokers political and 
economic transactions. Although, as shown in Chapter 4, Mines is keen to distance 
his model of a big-man from the role of kingship in South India, in contrast, big-men 
in Kachchh draw upon the royal model of power and patronage. It was pointed out 
that all big-men, except the biggest big-man, are part of the constituencies of other 
big-men. Thus, Haji Thaim is certainly an institutional big-man, but is dependent on 
the services of Haji Bhadala-Pathan who appears as a bigger big-man. However, it 
seems to me that Mines’ model has further potential that he only alludes to. Rather 
than being a model that is applicable to those perched at the top of the hierarchy, the 
model actually refers to all levels of the hierarchy. In other words, wishing to appear 
as a benefactor and patron are facets that characterise all levels of vahaanvatta 
hierarchy. Among the vahaanvatta, every sailor and seth is a big-man to a degree. 
Each is the pinnacle of his own transactional pyramid in terms of giving, while 
simultaneously being in a lowly recipient position in other men’s transactional 
arenas. The following sections explore a number of aspects of this idea.
7.32. From nagarseth to dadaseth
Chapter 2 discussed the now redundant role of the nagarseth, the apical non-royal 
big-man in mercantile society. This position was occupied by the most powerful 
Hindu mercantile families of the times. In contrast, the dominant mode of big- 
manship in western India today is the dada. Hansen describes the dada as:
333
a style of political and social power and protection which evokes images of a masculine, 
virile, assertive -  and violent -  local strongman (who himself is ‘popular’), acting 
through a multitude of local, self-made networks of loyalists, and not through 
institutionalised action and discourse (1996:158).
The dada is an elder-brother figure. Although Hansen associates this type of 
social figure specifically with the rise of the Shiv Sena in Bombay the dada also 
plays an important role among Muslims. While all ship owners and their sons are 
seths, among the Bhadala there is only one dadaseth: the eldest son of the apical 
Bhadala Pathan. He is taciturn and serious and plays the role with utmost dedication, 
and is everything that Hansen describes. He is un-institutional and is the political 
rival to the eldest son of the apical figure of the Thaim atak, who is the patel 
(headman) of the Bhadala Jamat. In Salaya the dadaseth is the apical big-man 
(although subservient to his father). Below them in the hierarchy are the ranks of 
Pathans, Thaims, other seths, captains, navigators, foremen, sailors and those 
employed from Mandvi. Within these stations every man is concerned with playing 
the big-man game, and some of the ways in which they go about this are explored in 
the following section.
7.33. Saleem Ali’s betrayal
Saleem Ali is a sailor and a contemporary of Majid’s. As Saleem Ali narrated his 
transition from apprentice to habitue he highlighted the importance of trust and the 
role of big-manship within the vahaanvatta. In the two hours he took to recount his 
biography a third of the time was taken up with an explanation of a particular 
incident of betrayal that had happened seven years before our conversation. He was 
preoccupied with this incident as it was continuing to influence his reputation. The 
significance he attached to being betrayed is indicative of the centrality of trust and 
reputation and the role of patronage. The story of his betrayal is simple. At the time 
he had worked for the same seth for seven years and was a senior sailor on a ship that 
ran regularly between Bombay and Dubai. Saleem Ali clearly had an excellent
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relationship with his seth, was anticipating promotion and had borrowed two large 
sums of money from him: one to build a house for his family and a second to buy a 
taxi for his brother. In 1991, two of Saleem Ali’s ‘friends’ returned from Dubai after 
their temporary labouring contracts had expired. They had both been apprenticed on 
the ships of another seth, but had jumped ship in Dubai without informing him of 
their intentions. This had resulted in bad faith between them and the seth, who 
refused to re-employ them. They approached Saleem Ali to ask if he could vouch for 
them and get them employed on his seth9s ships. Saleem Ali had known both men 
since childhood and had exchange relations with them of the type described in 
following sections of this chapter. He was obliged to help them and to use his 
position of influence to find work for them. The seth agreed and employed them both 
as junior sailors on another of his ships. Saleem Ali had proved himself capable of 
managing the distribution of patronage and protection of the seth to those to whom 
he himself appeared as a source of patronage and protection.
As he continued to tell me the story he was clearly angry. After a few months at 
sea the two sailors were arrested in Dubai. At first it was assumed that this was a 
mistake, but, as the story unfolded, Saleem Ali was horrified to learn that the men 
had been arrested for stealing marine engine spares from Dubai docks. In practical 
terms the arrest was an inconvenience and expense for the seth who was legally 
responsible for the sailors while they were in port. It also left him short of two 
competent crewmembers. However, the consequences of this action rebounded in 
three ways for Saleem Ali, who at the time was in Somalia and clearly not involved 
in the theft. First, it called to question Saleem Ali’s ability to vouch for the 
trustworthiness of others. This is more complicated than it seems because it 
jeopardised his trust relationship with the seth and called into question Saleem Ali’s 
ability to make loyal constituents for himself. Secondly, the black mark this left 
against his name was further compounded when it was disclosed that the men had 
stolen the engine parts on behalf of a rival seth from the port of Jam Salaya. The men 
had negotiated and transacted autonomously with a seth who was not their own. This, 
as discussed above, is a highly disreputable form of action, which is heavily
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sanctioned. In this case, the blame fell at Saleem Ali’s feet. The men had not been 
employed because the seth knew them, but because Saleem Ali knew them. In effect, 
he had become responsible for their integrity and skill from the moment he publicly 
vouched for them. From Saleem Ali’s perspective he had betrayed the seth himself. 
Thirdly, to compound Saleem Ali’s shame, the men had openly joked about the 
incident in Mandvi after they had been released from prison. They also made no 
attempt to provide recompense for their actions, which damaged Saleem Ali’s 
reputation within the vahaanvatta as well as among his own constituents in Mandvi.
This story illustrates the salutary perils and risks involved in constituency 
construction and the fallibility of trust-based relationships. Saleem Ali trusted the 
two men and was under the impression that he held their respect. This tale also 
illustrates something of the morality of exchanging trust for patronage. In a perfect 
world, Saleem Ali’s reputation would have ensured that his constituents acted in the 
interests of the seth's constituency of which Saleem Ali was a prominent member. 
That they did not, and that Saleem Ali’s honour was compromised, points to the fact 
that the morality of others is in part the responsibility of their patrons. Through his 
actions Saleem Ali was attempting to be a little big-man. This form of action, pre­
eminently personified by the dadaseth, permeates all levels of the vahaanvatta. A 
few months after the incident Saleem Ali found work on another vessel vouched for 
by a sailor from whom Saleem Ali had received goods and occasional favours, of 
which this was one. With this story in mind the following section considers the 
question of constituency building at all levels of the vahaanvatta hierarchy.
7.4. Fences or bridges? The exchange of goods
The social lives given to goods can be used to build ‘fences and bridges’ (Douglas 
and Isherwood 1996:xv). Among the vahaanvatta the role of particular kinds of 
transaction reveal how big-man status is formed at all levels of the hierarchy. This 
section examines some of the connections between these different forms of exchange 
among seths, sailors and their kin. Continuing the biographical approach from the
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previous chapter this section relates it to commodity transactions (Kopytoff 2000; 
and Appadurai 2000). The previous chapter outlined a typical biography of migration 
and travel from within the long-term perspective of putative population exchange (as 
discussed in Chapter 3). The goods presented by sailors to those remaining at home 
appear ‘out of the blue’ from markets unknown to the recipient. The biography of the 
good is verifiable through the more familiar biography of the ‘individual’ sailor.
What follows is an examination of the exchange of goods, as gifts and commodities, 
and the conceptions of power inherent in ‘foreign’ goods, as various methods 
available to men for gaining status and constituency. This leads into a discussion of 
how imported religious items and notions are treated as various kinds of goods. The 
argument is that the ways in which the effects of long-term historical migrations 
(voluntary and forced) have ordered social hierarchy are given a modem logic 
(attached to commodities and religion), which is deployed in an attempt to overturn 
‘traditional’ social ordering at a general level. Sailors also use this logic to create 
their own constituencies. Consequently, the discussion focuses on the relationship 
between the acquisitive domain of the individual (who also acquires through giving) 
and the cycle of long-term exchanges concerned with the reproduction of the social 
and cosmic order (Parry and Bloch 1989:2). However, in this instance, the social and 
cosmic orders are being reproduced in a subverted form -  that is to say, as a 
transformation of the traditional logic described in Chapter 3.
To return to the issue developed in the previous two chapters, of the commodified 
mediation of people and things, crucially, and in common with the material presented 
in Chapter 3, commodified mediation is also based upon the traditional model of 
status and prestige being unevenly distributed throughout the Indian Ocean. This 
trend is a reflection of a transforming dialectic between the short-term exchange of 
people and things and the long-term exchanges concerned with the reproduction of 
social order. The principal difference between the way goods and religious ideas are 
circulated is the restricted domain allowed for the latter. While goods are 
commodified through the activities of extraordinary brokers, religious concepts and 
items are passed within highly confined realms that deliberately rule out the
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possibility of brokerage. In this discussion the enchantment of the seth's charisma 
stems from the exceptional elective affinity between the religious features of 
charisma and the sociologically generated material interests of the sailors. The 
commodity pyramids described in the following sections make seths, and to a lesser 
degree senior constituents, appear as having embodied barakat (with a special 
emphasis on the quality of abundance).
In Gregory’s (1982) division of gifts and commodities the first is based on an 
exchange of inalienable objects between interdependent transactors; the second an 
exchange of alienable objects between independent transactors (see Parry and Bloch 
1989:8). In this formulation, gifts and commodities and their transactors are 
composed of different qualities and thus are separate. This division is also reputed to 
be found in the separation of precapitalist economies from capitalist economies:
the fetishism that is found in the economics of precapitalist societies arises from the 
sense of organic unity between persons and their products, and this stands in stark 
contrast to the fetishism of commodities in capitalist societies, which results from the 
split between persons and the things that they produce and exchange. The result is a 
subordination of men to the things they produce, which appear to be independent and 
self-empowered (Taussig 1980:37).
As Jonathan Parry and Maurice Bloch have illustrated both these divisions are 
erroneous, and are clouded with our perceptions of economy and the morality of 
exchange. They argue that:
The radical opposition which so many anthropologists have discovered between the 
principles on which gift and commodity exchange are founded derives in part, we 
believe, from the fact that our ideology of the gift has been constructed in the antithesis 
of market exchange (1989:9).
In this sense, gifts are transubstantiated in a kind of reverse fetishism of 
commodities. James Carrier argues of ‘our’ notion of gifts that:
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They become disembodied - they lose their past as commodities and even as material 
things, instead becoming subordinated to the individual emotions of the giver. In doing 
so, they are seen to entail no taint of obligation or interest on the part of either the giver 
or the recipient (1995:166).
In contrast, the ‘gifts’ described here are valued for two reasons, other than those 
described above. First, they have a biography and a social life, albeit moving from 
the unknown bazaar into familiar relationships. Secondly, they entail obligation and 
interest. Therefore, ‘gifts’ given by sailors appear to be the opposite of how Carrier 
conceptualises our notion of the ‘gift’. For goods brought by ship from Dubai it is 
only when items come to resemble commodities that their biographies become de­
personalised, removing the sense of obligation and the stamp of personalised 
authenticity.
In the ethnography presented in this section what appear as ‘Western 
commodities’ (examples of ‘fetishised’ commodities in the extreme) are exchanged 
in transaction for currency while simultaneously embodying the qualities of a ‘gift’. 
The categorisation of the two, gifts and commodities, becomes blurred. Furthermore, 
when such commodities become transactional (i.e. they are exchanged for cash to an 
independent broker), they do so in order that the procurer of the good can avoid the 
qualities inherent in them that make them good gifts. Thus turning goods into 
transactable commodities is the final resort for the agent.
Ships return to Mandvi before the seas grow rough between July and the end of 
September. This marks the return of loved ones and the season of new goods, 
fashions and consumption potential. The sizeable hoards of goods that accompany 
returning sailors range from the mundane and cosmetic to the weird and the 
wonderful. The more extravagant items have included an ambulance, a sun bed and a 
French language typewriter. Typically, however, sailors return with soaps, perfumes, 
clothing, electrical items, cassettes, watches and cameras. The Bhadala also import 
foreign goods from Dubai on their ships, but are more ostentatious in their 
consumption than their sailors. The video hall and the sunken bath mentioned in
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Chapter 5 are technologies from the Gulf. The most famous import during my 
fieldwork was a Honda racing motorcycle from Dubai, the import duty on which 
would have purchased two Indian-made models. The allure of this kind of 
consumption fuels the aspirations of those the Bhadala recruit to their ships. The 
opportunities to ride a racing Honda, with slick tyres, narrow mudguard clearances, 
and taut suspension, are limited in a village where the roads are not metalled and for 
much of the year are covered in sand. But to see commodities purely in terms of their 
utilitarian value is to miss the point of possessing them. Similarly, Jock Stirrat argues 
that the point of similar consumption patterns among fishermen on the northwest 
coast of Sri Lanka is simply to own such objects. But, Stirrat further argues that: ‘the 
aim was to arouse jealousy in others. Through owning such objects social standing 
could be claimed over those who did not own them’ (1989:107). Jealousy is a 
dangerous emotion in Salaya, the root of much suspicion and misunderstanding and 
not something to be evoked lightly, and such products were not imported to arouse 
jealously deliberately. However, such goods are explicitly about claiming standing 
over others who do not have the resources to possess, and more importantly, to 
procure such goods. Broadly, this works in two ways. First, it displays the wealth of 
the seth especially to those who labour for him. Secondly, it shows the seth's power 
to procure such goods from a world economic system that they see themselves 
integrated into. Explicitly, they have the power to extract goods from this system and 
import them into Kachchh. The ‘worth’ is not the monetary value of the 
‘commodity’, but the qualities inherent in these goods that reveal the individual’s 
power to procure them.
The preceding discussion has pointed to the fact that the attribution of worth and 
value to such goods is somewhat anomalous. For example, a highly prized Sony 
television bought without tax or duty surcharges in Dubai can be obtained in 
exchange for the same amount of currency as an Indian made television with similar 
features from a local dealership. Additionally, with the increasing liberalisation of 
the Indian economy and the reduction of once prohibitive import duties on foreign 
goods, Sony televisions are now available from specialist import shops in Bombay.
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However, the same model from Bombay is less valued than one from Dubai. Those 
in possession of a Sony may well make reference to the quality of the parts and 
workmanship, and the longer service guarantee offered by the (conveniently located) 
agent in Dubai. But to see such preferences as rational processes based on a perfect 
flow of consumer information and an assessment of opportunity cost is again to miss 
the point. Nobody would exchange a twelve-month-old Sony television for an Indian 
made one with a bigger tube, super-woofers and split-screen viewing. Neither is it 
simply that Sony made televisions are harder to come by, although that is certainly a 
part of it.
Every Muslim I met in Mandvi has at least one personal connection living or 
working overseas. Those distant figures are inundated with requests for foreign 
goods and services. Whatever the connection between the emigre and the individual 
in Mandvi, very few such requests are honoured because of the time, expense and 
bureaucracy involved for the migrant. Those who work on ships have the time and 
the resources to secure, transport and personally oversee the execution of such 
demands. Thus men of low status on ships embody an enviable degree of power in 
the eyes of those who do not travel. Ships may be kept waiting in port for many 
weeks, giving sailors time to secure goods knowing that they can accompany their 
purchases all the way home, minimising the possibility that they will be vandalised, 
stolen or damaged.
Frankly, I was somewhat puzzled by the way that people would constantly ascribe 
quantitative amounts to items such as Sony televisions. Figures would commonly be 
given in Rupees, but also in Rials, and yet more prestigiously in American Dollars. 
This kind of counting could represent a form of aggregated value, a marker of 
prestige depending on the amount of currency involved, or as a form of analogy 
standing for substitutability (Strathem 1992:117). However, the example of Sony and 
Videotron television sets implies that something other than monetary value gives the 
good its worth. Two apparently similar goods cost the same, but are evidently not 
worth the same because they are not substitutable. What provides worth is the sense
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of the unquantifiable exogenous power in the ‘thing’. It could be argued that the 
value in the Sony television set over the Videotron one was that the former was 
simply more difficult to procure. However, the value of the good cannot be given in 
strict monetary terms, nor in terms of its accessibility, because the value is given by 
access and control over such goods, which are quantifiable through various degrees 
of sabandhi (relationships between people). The power inherent in a good, such as an 
imported television set, is translated into a variety of different forms of sabandhi, 
which reveal what makes big-men, how men relate with each other, what are 
worthwhile objects, and the role that worthwhile objects play in constructing men 
and their relationships. The goods that sailors return home with are purchased 
overseas with a variety of destinations in mind. Goods brought on ships are destined 
for personal use and display, for ‘gifts’ to relatives, friends and neighbours, and for 
sale to individuals and to independent wholesalers. Leaving aside the personal use 
and accumulation of these goods, the following section examines the types of 
transaction involved in exchanging goods, which become respectively ‘gifts’, 
‘commoditised gifts’ or ‘transactable commodities’.
7.41. Gifts
The returning sailors and migrant labourers bring with them a series of things to 
‘gift’ to relatives, friends, allies and potential allies. These goods actualise and 
modify social relations. From the sailor’s perspective giving away consumer items is 
a way of acquiring status among his kin group and within a wider social network, but 
also a way of maintaining control over the goods and the people to whom they have 
been entrusted. The presentation of gifts beholds the receiver to the giver. Receiving 
creates a greater sense of relatedness to the donor than giving creates relatedness to 
the receiver. These prestations are not reciprocal in material terms, rather they are 
reciprocal in terms of respect and status given to the donor. For the sailor, such 
donation entails an element of calculation because they do not have access to an 
unlimited supply of gifts. Presenting a watch to another man creates a permanent tie 
between the giver and the receiver. However, the efficacy of this relationship can
342
dwindle if it is not refreshed with similar gifts in subsequent seasons. Thus, most 
gifts represent long-term investments in the loyalty of particular constituents. In 
short, the more the sailor gives the more status he attracts. By doing this he is 
directly emulating the patronage of his seth, who in turn is conforming to pervasive 
rules of status and constituency building. As donors, sailors are playing at being little 
big-men. Through ‘gifts’ a sailor maintains prestige within this kin group -  important 
in view of his prolonged absence from local social relations throughout the shipping 
season.
7.42. Commoditised gifts
Sailors not only meet the demands of relatives and friends for goods, they also buy 
things in order to resell them. Typically smaller items, these goods are occasionally 
openly sold in the bazaar, but more commonly clients are sought through kin and 
friend networks and through the shipping fraternity itself. The sailor acts as a 
guarantor of the commodity, standing as a symbol of a verifiable and prestigious 
origin. Regardless of whether money is exchanged in the transaction, the new owners 
of the good will describe it in terms of the procuring sailor because this attests to its 
power. Tracing the migration routes of commodities through the biographies of 
sailors affirms their authenticity. Without such a biography the qualities imbued in 
the transaction are diminished. This form of exchange is a partial attempt to create 
equality between the giver and the recipient. However, the good is not a disembodied 
commodity because part of its identity remains dependent on its biography (Kopytoff 
2000:66-68) and on the figure who guarantees its authenticity. In other words, even 
through cash transactions the qualities of the procurer remain inherent in the 
commodity. Having access to these forms of commodity is reflective of the 
receiver’s ability to procure goods -  even if money is exchanged. In this form of 
transaction the sailor acts as a patron, and the receiver is beholding to the giver. 
Through such transactions sailors gradually become big-men, their status increases 
with their ability to procure foreign goods to donate as gifts or to sell as commodified 
gifts.
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7.43. Transactable commodities
Some sailors sell their personal cargo directly to a ‘wholesaler’ rather than relying on 
word of mouth and their networks of personal influence. The two ‘wholesalers’ I was 
acquainted with are wonderful, strange and highly unusual people. There is a good 
reason for the concurrence of their personal idiosyncrasy and their occupations. What 
is striking about these brokers of prestigious foreign goods is that they are women. In 
Mandvi to see the Muslim women related to sailors on the streets at all was unusual, 
to see them freely engaging men in conversation in public was highly unusual 
because, to varying degrees, all other women connected to sailors and seths live in 
seclusion.
The women trading in foreign commodities were Muslim, their brothers, male 
affines and some consanguines worked on ships. Aware of the women’s occupation, 
these men (and others) supply many of the goods women transact. Both the women I 
know were shrewd and cunning negotiators. Coming into the bazaar in the evenings, 
they would improbably remove cartons of cigarettes or bottles of perfume from their 
clothing before prospective clients. Widely thought of as prostitutes, they were 
feared by men in the bazaar. They were in the business of commercially transacting 
commodities better known as gifts. They seldom handle large or expensive items, 
restricting themselves to soaps, perfumes, batteries, cigarettes, watches, compact 
discs, branded clothes and electronic toys. Procuring goods through such agents 
gives the good a higher value than if it had been purchased in Bombay. However, 
goods purchased from a specialised broker have a lesser value than those either 
gifted or transacted by a relative or friend. These women mediate between social 
realms -  between sailors and townsfolk, between sea and land -  buying commodities 
in bulk from sailors and reselling them in the town. They are unconventional 
merchants. Regarded as sinful women, their business is not based on enticing 
displays or on rehearsed sales banter because the immutable quality is evident in the 
object itself. The improbable figure of the mediator denies the formation of sabandhi
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between the sailor and the consumer of the good; the inversion of the conventional 
mercantile gender and style ensures that the biography of the good is ruptured and 
depersonalised.
By disposing of goods in this way sailors make money in a single rapid 
transaction, but in doing so they make considerably less than they would if they had 
disposed of the goods individually. Although part of the rationale of this transaction 
is to realise a profit, sailors willingly incur a ‘loss’, in order to avoid developing a 
cumbersome network of clients too large for them to maintain. Individual bottles of 
perfume and bars of soap could be sold in individual transactions, but as 
commodified gifts such transactions would necessitate further transactions in the 
future. Goods transacted by these women carry with them a depersonalised 
biography. Their authenticity is given by an association being made with the ships of 
a particular seth (e.g. from Haji Thaim’s ships), rather than with an individual sailor. 
For landlubbers the desirability of goods given in all three kinds of transaction is 
twofold. First, they are imbued with wondrous and unquantifiable power of the 
‘outside’. Secondly, they reflect the social standing of the owner -  owning the good 
is not in itself sufficient to reflect high standing, but within the item it is implied that 
the owner had the social influence (others were somehow beholden to him) to extract 
goods from others. In other words, the exchange of a good that provides the sailor 
status, also allows the recipient to claim elevated status in the social realm outside 
the confines of the transaction itself. Thus, constituency building is not simply a 
matter of unwitting clients receiving from powerful patrons, the clients also benefit 
from their association with the patron in realms outside the particular transaction. In 
these ways it is not so much the goods themselves that are used to create social 
bridges or fences but the kinds of exchange through which foreign goods are 
integrated into the local economy.
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7.44. Exchange of images and ideas
The preceding discussion has outlined the logic applied to foreign commodities as 
values of exchange in Mandvi. Typically, however, these goods are not consumed in 
a conventional sense. They are displayed and paraded on special occasions, but are 
not actually used as daily or routine items. The discussion now turns to look at the 
ways in which images and ideas of Islam are imported and commoditised through the 
models of local exchange outlined above. The argument presented below runs as 
follows: Islam is treated as if it were a transactable object, in terms of the power 
complex that accompanies imported versions. Religious values and paraphernalia are 
categorised as ‘gifts’ and as ‘commoditised gifts’, but always fall short of becoming 
‘transactable commodities’. This deliberate selection of particular paths of 
transaction reflects the political and social interests of those driving the reform 
process. The status of the Bhadala seth is dependent on the ability to appear as patron 
and as giver of religious gifts. Thus access to prestigious mosques, ritual events and 
certain kinds of ritual paraphernalia is assiduously controlled by seths and is not 
allowed to enter realms in which religious value becomes freely transactable. Rather 
than making a universal attempt at Islamicising all Muslims, the imported values 
inherent in the message are used by a relatively small group of men to enhance their 
own social status and, in the process, reform social and religious precedence.
The seth does not of course have a monopoly on procuring symbols of high 
religious standing. The Koran, clothing and prestigious ways of performing rituals 
can be imported by any number of sailors. However, the status of the individual 
whose biography attests to the authenticity of the good also plays a role in the value 
attached to it. Simply, goods imported by men of high standing are imbued with a 
greater value than those brought by sailors. In this sense, the inherent power of 
foreign goods reinforces the existing hierarchy of the vahaanvatta. With a consumer 
item a sailor has to decide whether to present it to A, B or C. It is a limited good and 
competition for his largesse is zero sum. If A becomes the recipient then B and C 
loose. It is possible to argue that the opposite is true of prayers and rituals because A,
346
B and C can all attend and benefit from a sailor’s patronage without entering the 
seth's orbit of influence. However, because of the hierarchy of patronage the sailor 
can only entice his inferiors into participating in such prestigious events. Through 
this he gains further support, but does not gain extra status in terms of the 
vahaanvatta hierarchy. The most powerful forms of status gain can only be conferred 
by the seth. Rituals and prayers sponsored by the seth remain the most prestigious 
and most efficacious in terms of status elevation. Invitations to attend prayers during 
Moharam or Nava Naroj are not limited goods in the strict fashion, but they are 
severely restricted. So it follows that prestigious ritual and prayer are limited in 
similar ways to consumer goods. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that power and 
quasi-magic qualities ascribed to foreign lands and the things that are brought from 
them are not entirely divorced from the social relations and position of those who 
import them.
Previous chapters contrasted two seemingly ubiquitous forms of Islam. It follows 
from these discussions that in India, as elsewhere, the perennial targets for religious 
reformers are intermediaries who claim powers that enable them to mediate between 
the human world and the divine. In Mandvi, intermediaries claim to be descendants 
of the Prophet and claim prestigious origin from Arabia. Simply put, reform against 
the role of intermediaries led by the ship owners, serves, in the long term, to better 
the Bhadalas’ social position by denying the legitimacy of social hierarchy based 
principally on genealogical origin and the purity of blood. However, there is perhaps 
a more important reason why they deny intermediaries and that is because they wish 
to control what socially makes men, prestige and status. Islamic patronage, which 
works in a remarkably similar way to the exchange of goods, is a similar method of 
social elevation as ‘gift’ and ‘commodified gift’ exchanges. As discussed in Chapter 
6, everyone knows that authentic Islamic practices come from the Gulf, and the 
religious ideas and commodities transacted by seths are seen as coming directly from 
there. Importantly, the distribution of prestigious religious practices is not farmed out 
to intermediaries because the personal biography and agency of the individual seth or 
sailor is vital for him to claim elevated social status. The authenticity of particular
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practices is derived from the Gulf -  this is verifiable through the biography of the 
individual. Thus in the prestigious arena of distributing religious practices and goods 
the individual retains the power inherent in the good for himself within his 
constituency. He does not release this power into the wider world of intermediary 
exchange. Religious things and practices contain within them more persuasive power 
than consumer goods. The worth inherent in religious artefacts is political, 
efficacious, and is the ultimate sign of authenticity.
Importing Islam refers to tangible religious objects such as the Koran, clothes, 
foodstuffs and architectural styles and techniques. Alongside these objects come 
religious practices, language and propriety. These things, perhaps surprisingly, are 
also imported from Dubai the commodity mecca, rather than Saudi Arabia, the nation 
state in which Mecca stands. The signs and ideals of orthodoxy and orthopraxy of an 
illusory model of Islam have become central to the ways in which the Bhadala 
organise social life. The social project of the Bhadala is carried out in their own 
terms, influenced by their experiences in the Gulf, but independently from other 
Kachchhi Muslims (aside from their constituents).
Gifts made to the community by the seth carry with them the same powers as 
commodities discussed previously. Architectural style, form and proportion are taken 
directly from Dubai. Two of the three most prestigious mosques in Salaya are 
constructed with single imposing minarets, in counter-distinction to the traditional 
style where a small minaret was built at each comer of the structure. ‘Gifts’, such as 
the building or endowing of mosques and Arabic or Urdu medium Koran schools, are 
the most striking examples of a seth's status. While most men working at sea have 
the opportunity to present kin with consumer goods, only the very wealthy can afford 
to import religion in tangible commodified forms.
Commodified gifts of a lesser order are provided to the clients of seths. These 
things include robes, slippers, and invitations for Friday prayers, Nava Naroj and 
Moharam commemorations. The prayers at the Friday Mosque are a striking example
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of the way in which apprenticeship transforms the individual. After some time in the 
service of a seth a neophyte will be invited over the river to join the Friday 
congregation. In order to attend, the young sailor has to forsake his traditional jamat 
mosque in which his family and neighbours pray. Clothing imbued with specific 
religious overtones is made by the seth's tailor in Dubai and imported into Kachchh. 
These items are then purchased by young sailors, who benefit from the prestige of 
clothes that come from both the ‘Gulf and the same hand as those worn by the seth.
The Bhadalas’ denial of the legitimacy of Saiyed intermediaries in religious 
orthopraxy means that control of Islamic practice remains in the hands of those who 
have the power to patronise a particular vision. Skullcaps, robes, slippers, religious 
prints and rose water imported by the seths are never sold to a commodity agent. 
Rather, these items are sold, or sometimes given to young sailors. Commercial and 
spiritual intermediaries are denied legitimacy in the promulgation of the ‘faith’. Such 
figures mitigate transactions that actualise sabandhi ties and depersonalise the 
migration biographies of things, thus by releasing a commodity into a realm where 
the individual status inherent in a transaction is negated there is no gain for the seth. 
Therefore, religious reform is persuasive because the flows of commodities and the 
status that emerges from these transactions is tightly controlled and restricted to the 
prestigious realms of ship owners.
The status of the two intermediaries, the feminine broker and the divine Saiyed, 
can be seen as parallel when it comes to the integration of exogenous commodities 
into local exchange relations. The Saiyed is himself a putative exogenous figure, who 
is also seen as a religious mediator by virtue of his birth. In the Bhadalas’ rhetoric he 
is also a corrupt and liminal figure who transcends the boundaries between the divine 
and the mundane. The Saiyed is a broker of lesser order truths and powers. The 
feminine broker, in comparison, personifies an inversion of the normal attributes of 
brokerage and transaction. She de-personifies the biography of the gift in speech (‘it 
came from Haji Thaim’s ships’) she diffuses the actual worth of the commodity (its 
potential to generate sabandhi ties through its elevated exogenous power) by
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appearing as an abomination of all the characteristics of a conventional patron. After 
men have purchased cigarettes from her they do not want to sit around smoking and 
chatting with her about their mutual interests. They want her to go away. As a 
consequence, Saiyeds (at least in Bhadala rhetoric) and female commodity brokers 
alike, transcend the boundaries of normal human actions.
In summary, religious commodities are not farmed out for three reasons. First, the 
power in the commodity, both its authentic religious worth and its inherent potential 
to generate sabandhi relations, would be negated through the de-personified 
biography of the procurer. In this manner the circulation of religious commodities is 
highly restricted and status gains derived from religious items are tightly controlled. 
Secondly, both figures are necessarily seen as transgressing boundaries through 
mediation, which casts some categorical uncertainty on their status. It has already 
pointed out that the Bhadala counter their ascription as mixed bloods by accusing 
Saiyeds of also being of mixed blood. There is an additional element to this 
accusation because the Bhadala also accuse Saiyeds of horrifically denying their 
paternity by claiming prestigious descent through female bloodlines, thus they 
rhetorically feminise Saiyeds. Both the women’s brokering of commodities and 
Saiyeds’ brokering of the divine is construed as liminal, of questionable integrity and 
as the source of social and moral corruption. It is only a small leap of imagination to 
see why Saiyeds are sometimes referred to as prostitutes to the desires of their 
clients. Thirdly, as previously shown for Saiyzd-murid relationships and the 
corresponding seth-sailor relationships, the apprentice cannot turn to other brokers 
without compromising the patronage and integrity of his own master. This puts the 
apprentice sailor in a position of only being able legitimately to receive items of 
religious value from his seth. Receiving such goods from others is equivalent to 
following their potentially divergent religious path. To the murid the Saiyed appears 
of highest human rank under the ideal image of the Prophet. Likewise, the seth is the 
apical human figure within the vahaanvatta and also appears closest to the ideal 
model of the Prophet. By distributing goods of religious worth through
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intermediaries the seth would compromise his position as an ideal figure -  akin to a 
lesser image of prophetic perfection -  in the eyes of his apprentices.
The latter two reasons really explain the potency of the first because the biography 
of the ‘gift’ or ‘commodified gift’ is what gives it worth, and maintaining the 
categorical integrity of the transaction simultaneously enhances this sense of worth.
In this case, there is clearly a complex relationship between ‘short-term’ exchanges 
and the longer-term reproduction of the social and cosmic order. The short-term 
(single) transactions are themselves clearly part of longer-term relationships, through 
which various levels of constituency are actualised and maintained. Within the 
vahaanvatta gifts and commodified gifts perpetuate and reproduce the kinds of 
relationships that are necessary to produce categorical lascars and suitable crews for 
Bhadala owned ships. However, through short-term (immediate) transactions the 
longer-term social order is being reformed and power and status relationships are 
being reconfigured.
General local hierarchy orders commerce and town over agriculture and village: 
urban merchants above rural landowners. This is elaborated by Muslim conceptions 
of the inside and outside of Kachchh. ‘Good’ things, brand names, wealth and Islam 
come from overseas. The opposite of the power inherent in things foreign is 
derogatorily known as deshi (of the country, local). Things that are deshi are 
predominantly bad and of the land and the past. But men, practices and Islam can 
also be deshi. As discussed previously, at the Mukhdummi Sha meetings Saiyeds are 
described in a negative light, and among the accusations levelled at them is that they 
are deshi. In the eyes of the Bhadala the formula is simple: why practice deshi Islam 
that subordinates you when you can have brand-name Islam from the Gulf?
The logic of pir-murid and seth-sdiiloi relationships within both hierarchical 
models is premised on evaluations of the relative status of goods and people from 
particular parts of the littoral western Indian Ocean. What makes men men in the first 
hierarchy are the facts of migration and bodily code and substance. The Bhadala
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have transformed this ranking into one premised on the ability to present ‘gifts’ and 
‘commoditised gifts’. Rather than status being derived from the historical past, which 
in their eyes is something of a politically expedient fabrication, status emerges from 
an ability to convince others that a particular vision of the world is the correct one. 
For Bhadala seths what makes big-men is their ability to consume and reproduce a 
loyal workforce based on contact with the ‘Gulf and the prestigious secular and 
religious commodities that are available from its bazaars.
7.5. Islamic reform as a form of biography
Chapter 1 summarised the main ways in which social and religious change has been 
understood among Muslims. As a result of this review I declared that my intention in 
this thesis was to present the context in which the process commonly known as 
‘Islamisation’ was occurring in Salaya against Hume’s ‘flux and reflux’ thesis. The 
apparent simplicity and universality of Muslim religious institutions, monotheistic 
belief, social egalitarianism and the perspicuous role of texts and legal traditions 
have been explored in a very specific context with very specific findings.
Throughout this thesis the many aspects of the variable and contextual nature of 
Muslim ritual and rhetorical practices have been presented. In conclusion, the 
discussion turns to two related broader themes to emerge from the preceding 
discussions. The first is the contribution of biography to the saliences of religious 
reform. The second is the inherent potential within Muslim religious fundamentalism 
to reproduce the precise things to which the fundamentalism was opposed.
The social context of Islamic reform described in the preceding chapters takes its 
shape from the details of the social contingencies and political needs of a small group 
of men who preside over large and dependent constituencies. It has been 
demonstrated that the important factors are those that relate to perceptions of the 
kingdom, the past and hierarchy. Furthermore, the kind and quality of relationships 
maintained with hostile and friendly others influences the content of the process of
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religious reform. It has also been shown that social and religious change is effected 
through the production of constituencies that transgress the traditional boundaries of 
historical and religious social hierarchy. All these trends and processes are connected 
to the lives of those who patronise and devolve religious knowledge. In other words, 
the local content and meaning attributed to the universal signs of mosques, prayers, 
dress and postures are intertwined with the biographies of senior Bhadala men, and 
their conceptions of religion and orthodoxy are tied into macro-political changes 
within the Indian Ocean region. However, the direction and pace of the creation of 
particular forms of religious salience are specific to the time, place and lives of those 
involved. There is a direct correlation between the biographies of the seths, the 
content of their religious message, and the conceptions of space and time on which 
this message is premised.
The Bhadalas’ own local migration from Mandvi, over the river, provides a clear 
image of their own past from which they are at pains to distance themselves. The 
environmental divisions in landscape stand as contemporary markers of temporal and 
spatial social division. The view from Salaya, across the river, is a real reminder of 
the past activities of the Bhadala. The history of the local environment is inscribed in 
contemporary residence patterns and in social differentiation. Salaya stands as a sign 
of modernity and as the consequence of a past migration. The majority of non- 
Bhadala apprentices in shipyards also re-enact this journey -  itself a re-enactment of 
the Bhadalas’ re-enactment of hijra. As a result it is the central symbol in the rhetoric 
of religious reform. Demons, Hindus and mistaken Muslims live on the opposite 
bank of the river -  literally in the Bhadalas’ past. Although Hindus and deshi 
Muslims are contemporaneous with Salaya’s architecture and population, their ways 
of being and thinking are considered to be archaic. Hinduism was the land of illusion 
from which the Bhadala started to emerge upon their conversion to Islam. Gradually, 
as generations came and went, the purity of their religious practice increased until 
eventually they stopped being deshi. The evolutionary typology inherent in this 
model places the Bhadala as the ultimate product of the chain. This state was 
achieved partially by accident, as their relationships with mercantile patrons
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collapsed, and partially through their migration over the river and into a space in 
which they could redefine themselves in particular ways with their new wealth.
These transformations allowed them to escape structural inequalities with merchants 
and religious hierarchy. The processes of incorporating and excluding ‘others’ in 
history and in, and from, the meaningful present are a direct expression of their own 
life experiences. The formal and informal rhetoric and language of their reform is an 
elaborate rendition of their own biography.
The major thrust of the Bhadalas’ reform process is against the role of Saiyed 
intermediaries between man and God. It has been shown that despite the Bhadalas’ 
opposition to Saiyeds they remodel this kind of hierarchy in the vahaanvatta. This is 
a process in the history of religious schism, reform and renewal that frequently 
appears. It has also been shown that the Bhadalas have specific groups of ‘others’ 
against which their reform is directed. In this analysis, rather than pointing to 
irreconcilable division between Hindus and Muslims, religious antagonism has been 
described as developing as a result of changing relationships between merchants and 
sailors. Furthermore, by directing their reformist zeal towards Mandvi’s Muslims the 
Bhadalas directly shift the focus of communal antagonism away from themselves and 
onto others. The principal mechanism through which this process operates is the 
creation of lascars in apprenticeship. Through this process the most successful 
Bhadalas have created large political constituencies. However, this still does not 
explain where the content of the reform process came from.
Many of the Bhadala seths were bom into poor sailing families in an area of 
Mandvi known as Bhadala Pod. Those bom in Salaya also know that their fathers 
were bom in Mandvi. From a young age they were apprenticed by their fathers and 
other male relatives on ships either owned or contracted to Shia merchants. After 
dedicating around twenty years of their lives to sailing back and forth across the 
Indian Ocean the merchants sold their ships, dishonouring their long-standing 
relationships with their Bhadala sailors. A few Bhadalas retained small vessels and a 
few others were able to buy small ships. Having lost their patrons and their source of
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political protection to the migration process, they started to conduct their own small- 
scale trade with East Africa. In the 1970s they started to trade from the newly opened 
duty-free port of Dubai, from where they rapidly became wealthy. There they started 
to transact commercially with Muslims from the Gulf States and became part of new 
commercial and political networks that were developing in the Indian Ocean. The 
prominent Bhadalas became successful traders and started to expand their fleets. At 
first they recruited from within the Bhadala Jamat and later from over the river. For 
around a decade their activities largely went unchecked until in the early 1980s the 
Indian State started to crack down. This culminated in a customs raid on Salaya and 
subsequent violent confrontation on the streets of Mandvi with their old rivals the 
Kharvas.
In the years following the confrontation religious identity, as a vehicle of social 
differentiation, became dominant. They built new mosques and houses that stressed 
the connections with the Gulf States, and deliberately isolated their village from the 
comings and goings of the town. As traditional sailors they had experienced the 
Indian Ocean region in terms other than those of the littoral nation states. As their 
businesses expanded many of them stopped going to sea and spent months of each 
year in the ports of Bombay and Dubai, becoming transnational residents and 
migrants who operated between the territory and jurisdiction of different states -  
much like their illustrious predecessors of the nineteenth century. In this sense they 
continue to have only marginal interest in nation state politics and loyalties.
Although not pro-Pakistan they are not particularly pro-India either. Their interest is 
in their ‘home’ (variously desk or vatan), conceived of as their houses, village and 
the architectural signs of their wealth. As predatory capitalists they maintain a fluid 
web of loyalties and inter-dependencies that allow them to trade and move through 
diverse social and economic spaces. The patterns, direction and routes of their 
migration and commercial enterprise have provided the Bhadalas with a framework 
through which to present and invigorate their religious reform. Very specific 
antagonisms with Hindus and other Muslims have been addressed through a
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standardised, if highly personal, rhetoric of Islamic reform drawn largely from the 
Gulf States.
There is a paradox in many studies of Indian Muslims that reflects the problem of 
ideal and actual religious practices or of universalist and particularist version of the 
religious tradition. The majority of Muslims (including the Bhadala) in India are seen 
as being converts from Hinduism. The paradox emerges in scholarly 
conceptualisations of this conversion and in situating the present social and religious 
conditions of Muslims in relation to it. On one hand the Muslim conversion is held to 
have been ‘incomplete’, while on the other, historical social processes are seen as 
having gradually eroded the original and ideal faith of Muslims, rendering them 
degenerated and syncretic. Clearly the two processes cannot simultaneously 
influence the practices of the same people. The Bhadala are firmly of the opinion that 
their ancestors partially converted, and retained the names, customs and social 
organisation of Hindus before they passed to a more syncretic stage. The material 
presented in previous chapters may be taken to support the work of both Francis 
Robinson and Asim Roy. Robinson argues that there is a slow movement towards
17ideal patterns of religious perfection in South Asian Islam (1983,1986) . Similarly, 
Roy argues that Muslims in Bengal have passed from being converts in a social 
sense, through a syncretic phase, to a period of ‘Islamisation’ in the exogenous sense 
(1983). Although the Bhadalas’ version of change and continuity over time 
corresponds with this model it does seem presumptuous to suppose that the present is 
the actual pinnacle of all past actions and social processes. Furthermore, in these 
models there is no room to accommodate the effects of segmentation, reversal or 
schism within ideology over time. Muslim segmentary society is necessarily 
hierarchical and competitive. It therefore seems perfectly natural that shifts of 
capital, allegiance and constituency should also produce changing patterns of what 
constitutes good Islam and what is deified to the point of infinitude.
17 This is the most frequently cited of Robinson’s statements, but twelve lines above, in the same 
article, he also reminds us of movements away from this pattern of perfection.
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Returning to the paradox outlined above, it is possible to reach an entirely 
different conclusion from the data presented in this thesis. Both the elements of the 
paradox rely on a concept of what proper Islamic practice is. This seems unavoidable 
given the beauty, simplicity and memorability of the precepts and practices. But, it 
has been shown how the logic of the Bhadalas’ hierarchy is a reinvention of the one 
presided over by Saiyeds. If we step further away from the rhetoric of the Bhadalas’ 
reform then it is evident that they are apical, mediate between realms and are 
idealised figures with initiated clients. Furthermore, it is also evident that within their 
social hierarchy there is the potential to absolutely recreate the social order they 
appear to be opposed to.
The people of Kachchh have produced some rather unlikely saints. For example, 
James MacMurdo, leader of the first colonial war against piracy in the waters off 
Kachchh and witness to the 1819 earthquake, is entombed in a shrine famous for its 
powers of fertility in the east of the district. In shipyards it was common to speculate 
about the death of the living apical figure of the Bhadala-Pathan atak. Most of the 
religious and social monuments in the village are largely the result of his patronage 
and philanthropy. He is revered and highly respected for his piety, wisdom and 
vision. An elderly, retiring man he spends much of his time in seclusion. The 
dominant opinion in the shipyards is that he will be entombed as a saint in an 
elaborate public mausoleum, and his devotees could come to seek his protection, to 
request auspicious blessings and his intervention in their difficulties. This was also 
the earnest opinion of a number of highly respectable Muslims in Mandvi. The figure 
on the verge of sainthood may or may not become a saint in death. However, the 
graves in the shadow of the Kharva Dariyalal temple are widely held to contain 
Bhadala bodies. They are venerated and maintained by the families of a few of those 
that sail on Bhadala-Pathan ships. Sainthood is already a possibility for Bhadala- 
Pathans.
The dominant orthodoxy in Mandvi is that only Saiyeds, both living and dead, 
have the necessary charisma to become saints. Clearly, if a Bhadala-Pathan is
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entombed as a saint this will signal a radical break with tradition. Within a broader 
historical context, the Muslim social and religious movements described in this thesis 
are not uni-directional or stubbornly resistant to change. Rather, they are unorthodox 
in their orthodoxy and are firmly rooted in the life experiences of their proponents. In 
the situation described therefore, the processes of conservative orthodoxy or 
fundamentalism contain within them the potential to produce the very same traditions 
that they oppose; as wealthy figures patronise deities to the point of infinitude they 
too become increasingly efficacious as intermediaries to the deity they have created.
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